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Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–2002)

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ABSTRACT *This article examines the increasing and intensified cooperation between Russia and Turkey as a central feature of Central Eurasia's post-Cold War restructuring, and seeks to explain their cooperation with reference to major theories of international relations. It argues that the diminution of the Russian threat is what allowed for the possibility of Turkish–Russian cooperation.*

Introduction: Turkish–Russian Cooperation after the Cold War: The Practical Importance, Theoretical Significance, and the Outline of the Argument

The emerging structure of international politics after the Cold War is the most fascinating question of our times.¹ Some scholars have posited the United States, Germany, and Japan as the prospective poles of this new order.² Others have revised this claim by postulating NAFTA, the European Union, and East Asia as the emergent poles.³ Still, others have proposed China as the second pole in its own right.⁴ In contrast, relatively scant attention has been paid to the emerging structure of international politics in Central Eurasia. Though some scholars have theorized about the restructuring in this region, most have done so *only* in its relation to Western interests, and not in and of itself.⁵ This article examines the increasing and intensified cooperation between Russia and Turkey as a central feature of Central Eurasia's post-Cold War restructuring, and seeks to explain their cooperation with reference to major theories of international relations.

While speaking at the conference held by the Military Academies Command entitled “How to Establish a Peace Belt around Turkey,” General Tuncer Kılınc, Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, expressed frustration at the European Union's policies towards Turkey. He said that Ankara needed to start looking elsewhere for new allies. He singled out Russia as Turkey's potentially most strategic partner and proposed to form an “alliance” with this country.⁶ This statement came as an overwhelming shock to those who had not been observing the trends and radical shifts in Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.⁷

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Intensifying Turkish–Russian cooperation in the last decade is a radical break with a 500-year history of mutual interactions between two countries usually considered to be “archivals.” Such contrast is promising for international relations scholarship, as different international politics theories can be tested with regards to this radical change in Turkish–Russian relations. This article argues that the diminution of the Russian threat allowed for the possibility of Turkish–Russian (T-R) cooperation. At a second stage, the proliferation of common geopolitical interests between Turkey and Russia encouraged them to take advantage of this “window of opportunity.” This paper focuses almost solely on the first and crucial aspect of this development, the diminution of the Russian threat.

The organization of this paper closely follows the argument. First, T-R relations before, during, and after the Cold War are reviewed, with an emphasis on post-Cold War relations. While discussing the post-Cold War period, the earlier period of increased cooperation is distinguished from the later period of intensified cooperation. This is a crucial distinction for the argument, because the further intensification of cooperation in the later 1990s is a fundamental change in T-R relations that various liberal approaches fail to explain.

Population, GDP, GDP per capita, and military manpower figures for Russia and Turkey between 1960 and 2001 will be compared in order to assert the diminution of the Russian threat as a fundamental dynamic underlying T-R cooperation after the Cold War. It is apparent that the Turkish economy and military might have drastically improved vis-à-vis these aspects of Russian power with the collapse of the USSR and throughout the 1990s.

Next, the alternative explanations offered by the four different strands of liberal IR theory are examined. First, the institutional liberal challenge is considered by examining the institutions, which Turkey and Russia co-founded or became members of, in order to see whether international institutionalization is the cause of increasing cooperation. It is concluded that institutionalization is not a causal factor in intensifying T-R cooperation. Second, the level of democratization in these countries is discussed with regard to the level of mutual cooperation. Using Turkey and Russia’s scores in the Freedom House rankings on democracy, it is demonstrated that cooperation rapidly intensified in the late 1990s as both countries regressed in terms of the democratic nature of their political system. Third, it is shown that the fluctuations in Turkish–Russian trade volume do not correspond with later fluctuations in the level of their cooperation. Trade is argued to be not a cause, but rather a symptom of increasing geopolitical cooperation. Fourth, domestic political coalitions are shown to be uncorrelated, if not contradictory, to the foreign policies adopted. In a very brief rejoinder to the main thrust of the argument, three issue-areas of common interests and T-R cooperation are identified: cooperation in the field of defense industry, combating terrorism, and finally, opposition to the war on Iraq.

The argument presented in this paper has immediate implications for the nature of T-R cooperation and for its future course. The two causes of cooperation are not mutually reinforcing in the classical sense, since the first stage (diminution of

the Russian threat) is a prerequisite for the second. Thus, without the conditions brought about by the diminution of the Russian threat, proliferation of common interests does not suffice for any meaningful cooperation on a scale that is discussed here. Furthermore, if the Russian threat were to re-emerge in the future, T-R cooperation, despite many common interests, might disintegrate once again.⁸

The practical importance of the topic notwithstanding, this article addresses some of the key theoretical debates in security studies. The argument presented here is that the diminution of the Soviet/Russian threat for Turkey allowed for increased cooperation in the early 1990s, and that the proliferation of common geopolitical interests between the two countries further intensified their cooperation in the late 1990s. In contrast, institutions, trade, democratization, or domestic coalitions do not explain T-R cooperation. In providing a case study of unprecedented cooperation based on realist premises between two historical archrivals, this article contributes to the ongoing debunking of the naïve belief that “realism means conflict and liberalism presupposes extensive cooperation.”⁹ The failure of liberal approaches to explain a particular case of cooperation does not disconfirm these approaches altogether. Nonetheless, it means that the liberal approaches cannot explain a curious case of cooperation in Eurasia. It also means that realism is not obsolete like “some students of international politics think,”¹⁰ and that it is possible to be a realist in the strictest sense of the term without “stretching its conceptual foundations beyond all utility and recognition.”¹¹

Finally, the study of Turkish–Russian cooperation provides valuable insight into the nature of transitory phases where tremendous power shifts occur. This study shows that the expansionist ideologies and underlying myths of empire that abounded in these periods were due to the tendency to make strategic miscalculations.¹² However, in the orthodox realist vein, Turkey and Russia soon understood each other’s capabilities and “adjusted” to the objective conditions of the new security environment, hence gradually abandoning these revisionist ideologies. As Turkey’s military-economic capabilities and limitations were exposed during the brief Pan-Turkic moment in the early 1990s, Russia and Turkey alike understood that Turkey did not pose a direct threat to Russia, just as the Russian threat diminished from Turkey’s point of view. Although the extraordinary power shifts underway complicated cooperation as expected,¹³ the disappearance of mutual borders and the availability of areas beyond their borders where their capabilities could be tested (Caucasus, Central Asia) made it possible for the process of adjustment to take place relatively peacefully.

The study of Turkish–Russian relations presented here also contributes to the discussion and debate over the interaction between systemic effects and regional transitions.¹⁴ By providing a case study of a “two-stage cooperation,” first made possible by the “balance of capabilities” and then carried further by the “balance of motivations” and common geopolitical interests, this case study broadly conforms to the model of a post-Cold War transition developed by Benjamin Miller.¹⁵

Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War: The Earlier Period “... from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China ...”

The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the relations between Russia and Turkey.¹⁶ “The threat of the past 400 years—Russia—has been virtually eliminated.”¹⁷ During the first six months of 1992, the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers visited each others’ country.¹⁸ The Turkish president and prime minister visited Moscow four more times during the following four years.¹⁹ Such diplomatic traffic contrasts sharply with the preceding 45 years of the Cold War, during which such visits were unheard of. High-level diplomatic traffic as such was not fruitless either. During the relatively brief period of 1992 to 1996, 15 agreements and protocols were signed between Russia and Turkey, covering issues such as scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and economic cooperation, and the exchange of armed forces personnel.²⁰

According to Ayhan Kamel, the “Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation” signed in 1992 “is similar to the long-abolished 1925 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries in that parties assure each other that in the case of an attack to one of the Parties, the other Party will not support the aggressor and will seek to stop the attack by appealing to the UN and other international organizations.”²¹ Turkey and Russia took the initiative in forming the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992.²² This organization established a permanent secretariat in Istanbul in 1994 and developed many institutional branches such as the BSEC Business Council, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), and the Parliamentary Assembly.

Nurver Nuris, the vice president of BSEC, asked whether “it is possible to establish a long-term cooperation and solidarity framework within the BSEC area, using oil and natural gas as factors of regional peace and stability, inspired by the example of the European Steel and Coal Union, which eventually led to the creation of the European Union.”²³ The rapid rise of the T-R trade volume and mutual investments gave more substance to the cooperation between the two countries. “The economic relations between these two countries have been radically transformed into a new dimension.”²⁴

Unlike most observers who emphasized economic and trade relations, the institutional framework, and the two countries’ convergence on a liberal democratic political system, George Harris argued in 1995 that one avenue for cooperation is the “possibility of Russia’s providing military items that Turkey could not acquire from its Western allies.”²⁵

The Turkish authorities sought to deal with the sharpening domestic conflict with Kurdish insurgents at the end of the 1980s by increasingly extensive military operations. This created a need for armor and helicopters free of NATO restrictions; the Russians offered an attractive alternative when the Germans cut off supplies to Turkey because of growing objections at home in October

1992. As German supplies phased out, Russia agreed to sell helicopters and armored personnel carriers.²⁶

Harris claimed that “even in regional issues there was at times a parallelism in approach that put Russia and Turkey in the same camp. As time went on, this came to be true in policy toward Iraq ... Each had special reasons for wanting to see the economic embargo on Iraq lifted.”²⁷

In sum, scholars, policy-makers and other observers agreed on the radical change that took place in the nature of T-R relations. The increase in T-R cooperation was noticed by everyone. However, there is a divergence of opinion among these observers as to the causes of this development.

Although it is true that T-R cooperation dramatically increased in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, it is important to address the geopolitical competition over areas of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia that was also taking place between these two countries. It is precisely this feature of T-R relations that distinguishes the earlier period of increasing cooperation (earlier 1990s) from the later period of intense cooperation and strategic partnership (later 1990s). Most scholarly and popular writing and foreign policy proclamations at the time were acutely aware of Turkey’s ambitious attempt to bring the Turkic states of Central Asia and the Caucasus under its influence.

Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan were enthusiastically welcomed by Turkey as the other “Turkish republics,” which finally won their independence after having lived under the yoke of Russian imperialism. In his 1992 visit to Central Asia, Turkish President Demirel:

... spoke of the possibility of establishing a Union of Turkish States, and suggested that Central Asia might be better off out of the ruble zone. In October of the same year Turkey sponsored a summit meeting to found a regional Turkic-speaking economic union, consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and four Central Asian Turkic countries.²⁸

On March 21, 1993, Turkey sponsored the First Congress of Turkic Peoples, in which delegations from Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and the Turkic-speaking republics of Russia participated.²⁹ Similarly, “at another conference in Ankara ‘on issues of Turkish orthography,’ Turkish, Azeri, and Turkic Central Asian delegates agreed to adopt a common Latin script [which Turkey uses].”³⁰ Turkey undertook the education of a significant number of Central Asian students and civil servants, while the Turkish satellite TV network (TRT INT-AVRASYA) for Central Asia and the Caucasus began broadcasting three hours of programs every evening as part of its policy to promote a common language.³¹ In terms of financial aid, “Turkey aggressively entered Central Asia, offering financial aid packages to the Central Asians, who had suddenly lost their source of financing (Moscow). Hence, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan each received \$75 million in credit, and Uzbekistan received \$500 million.”³² Turkish foreign policy had Pan-Turkist undertones:

Although not an official policy, Pan-Turkism has been a major component of the Turkish policy towards Central Asia ... Pan-Turkism seeks the creation of Turanistan (Greater Turan or Greater Turkey), an Ankara-led state consisting of all the Turkic nations from the Mediterranean to the Chinese border. It would not only include the Central Asian countries, but also the Turkic peoples of Iraq, China, Russia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Iranian Azerbaijan ...³³

Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser published a book in 1993 on the subject of Turkey's role in the world, entitled *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*.³⁴ In it, Fuller discusses "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation" and the way in which Turkey's new export-oriented policies "sharply increased its interest not only in the Middle East, but in the newly independent economies of the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the emerging independent republics of the Soviet Union."³⁵ In his book *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World*, Fuller notes that Turkey cannot remain entirely aloof from the struggle of the Turkish peoples of Western China (Xinjiang or Chinese Turkestan) for national self-determination.³⁶ This example of a possible Turkish–Chinese conflict over Xinjiang illustrates the scale at which Turkish foreign policy goals were conceived during the early 1990s.

Frequent references were made to the Turkish world as "stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" by Turkish policy-makers, columnists, and others in public. National history, national geography, and national security textbooks in Turkish middle- and high-schools all had an appended map showing the extent of the Turkish world, along with a list of independent, autonomous, and other (non-free) Turkish peoples of the world.

More important for the purposes of this paper is the status of Turkic-Muslim groups that remained within the Russian Federation. These groups are concentrated in four regions: first, there are the autonomous republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Chuvashstan huddled together in the Volga-Ural region; second, there are the autonomous republics of Tuva, Gorno-Altai, and Khakass huddled around the Altai mountains at the intersection of the Russian, Kazakh, Mongol, and Chinese borders; third, there are the autonomous republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardin-Balkar, and others in northern Caucasus; and fourth, there is the autonomous republic of Yakutistan, covering the middle one-third of Siberia.³⁷ With the exception of the last one, all of them are Muslim and relatively conscious of their Turkic heritage and identity, and all of them speak some Turkic dialect.

Russia was irritated when Turkey made overtures to these autonomous Turkic-Muslim republics within the Russian Federation. Garreth Winrow, writing about "the emergence of a 'gigantic Turkish world'," recounts that:

The Yeltsin administration seems to have deliberately exaggerated ... its fears of the revival of Pan-Turkism ... Zhirinovsky's hostile rantings against Turkey and his dream of conquering "Constantinople" are well-known. But more serious analysts such as Alexei Arbatov, the Head of the Department of the

Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, have also pointed out to the Turkish threat ... Arbatov also reiterated what is becoming a commonly expressed Russian fear of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan coming under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and separatism (the latter most probably inspired by Turkey ...), which could split Russia in two along the Volga.³⁸

After discussing the visit of Tatarstan's President Shaimiyev to Ankara in October 1992 and the Turkish foreign minister's visit to Tatarstan in return, Winrow claims that:

Ankara ... has offended Russian sensitivities with regards to ... Chechnya. The Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev has visited Turkey—which has a large Chechen community—on at least two occasions, but after [President] Demirel received Dudaev in October 1993, [the] Turkish ambassador in Moscow was summoned to give assurances that such a meeting would not be repeated.³⁹

Similarly, writing on Russia's dubious future as a viable Federation, Konarovsky mentions that:

Tatarstan, one of the most industrially advanced parts of the federation's central regions, producing 26 per cent of its oil and having the second largest populated area, with an approximately 50–50 Turkic-Slavic population, confirmed its independence from Russia ... Disagreements with another large territory with significant industrial capacity such as Turkic Bashkortostan were watered down at the last moment ...⁴⁰

Russia was also pursuing a policy of imperial reassertion towards formerly Soviet (now CIS) republics. The policy to keep the CIS under Russian leadership is formulated in the famous Near Abroad Doctrine, issued in 1993. The Near Abroad Doctrine is a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby Russia states that its interests and priorities should be respected in the CIS countries. This doctrine was used to justify the prolonged stay of Russian troops in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Indeed, in order to remain in the region, Russia pursued a policy of destabilizing the Caucasus (especially Georgia) in the earlier 1990s.

Central Asia is not strategically crucial for Turkey, but the Caucasus is.⁴¹ When Azerbaijan won its independence, "the new nationalist president of Azerbaijan, Ebulfez Elchibey, pursued an openly pan-Turkist policy. He championed close ties with Turkey and the adoption of the Latin alphabet for Azerbaijani Turkish."⁴² A vocal admirer of Kemal Atatürk, he criticized the regime of mullahs in Iran and predicted the break up of Iran and the union of two independent Azerbaijan.⁴³ He declined to ratify Azerbaijan's membership in the CIS and forced the Russian troops out of his country. However, Elchibey was soon overthrown by Haidar Aliyev, a former KGB officer and a representative of the pro-Russian faction. Elchibey's fall was deeply

resented in Turkey. Later, ultra-nationalist groups in Turkey were implicated in an unsuccessful coup attempt against Aliyev.

During Elchibey's term in office, Turkey sent arms shipments and military personnel to Azerbaijan, in order to help the country thwart the Armenian invasion of Nagorno-Karabagh, an invasion that eventually succeeded due to Azerbaijan's virtual lack of a standing army. When Turkey threatened to militarily intervene to stop the Armenians, Russia warned that it would not tolerate such an action. Hence, a military confrontation of Turkish and Russian troops in the Caucasus was a real possibility in the early 1990s.⁴⁴ In sum, increased T-R cooperation in the economic, institutional, and strategic spheres notwithstanding, the earlier 1990s also witnessed conflicts of interest between Russia and Turkey over spheres of influence.

From the Mid-1990s to the War on Iraq

Beginning in the latter half of the 1990s, the already increased T-R cooperation further intensified. By October 2000, Putin declared Turkey to be a "traditional and important partner" and expressed the desire "to upgrade the relations between Turkey and Russia to the level of a strategic partnership."⁴⁵ In March 2002, the secretary general of the Turkish National Security Council, General Tuncer Kılıç, declared that Turkey should form an "alliance" with Russia.

The latter half of the 1990s witnessed a plethora of high-level diplomatic visits. Russian Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Kasyanov visited Ankara in 1997 and in 2000, respectively. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit paid a visit to Moscow in 1999. The Turkish and Russian foreign ministers Igor Ivanov and Ismail Cem met twice, first in Turkey in June 2001, and later in New York in November 2001. During the latter meeting, they signed the "Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia—From Bilateral towards Multilateral Partnership," which stipulated the formation of a Joint Working Group.⁴⁶

In the military field, there were two significant visits by high-ranking officers. The Russian Chief of Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, visited Ankara in January 2002, and the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Kıvrıkoğlu, reciprocated with a visit to Moscow in June 2002. During Kvashnin's visit to Turkey, a "Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Field and Agreement on Cooperation in Training of the Military Personnel" was signed.⁴⁷

In the field of economic cooperation and trade, there were significant fluctuations on a yearly basis, but one can say that the T-R trade volume stabilized at the relatively high-level that it reached by the early 1990s. Some domestic political developments in this period, too, might be of interest for a theoretical discussion of T-R relations. On February 28, 1997, the Turkish National Security Council issued a long list of measures and policy recommendations to the ruling Islamist-conservative coalition government, with the goal of preventing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. These MGK recommendations effectively forced the government out of power later that year, in what was dubbed a "post-modern coup" in the Turkish media. This move was condemned by domestic and international critics as a

manifestation of and slide into an authoritarian–militaristic form of government. Russia also moved away from democracy with the new President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Putin took many measures to eliminate, or at least silence, the opposition. Russia’s democracy and freedom ratings declined significantly, just as those of Turkey in the same period.

Overall, Turkish–Russian relations undoubtedly improved significantly throughout the late 1990s. The first aspect of that improvement was Turkey’s abandonment of its quasi-expansionist policies in favor of much closer—both economically and politically—relations with Russia, rather than with the Turkic states of Central Asia.⁴⁸ A second aspect of improving T-R relations was the increasing military cooperation. In April 2001, Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia formed a joint naval task force by the name of the Black Sea Force.⁴⁹ This task force holds annual maneuvers in the Black Sea. This is the first time Turkey and Russia are participating as part of a joint military contingent in 500 years of T-R relations.⁵⁰

A third aspect of improving T-R relations in the late 1990s was their desire to contain and suppress ethnic separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. For the first time, Turkish PM Ecevit announced that Turkey would extradite a Chechen terrorist to Russia. Similarly, Russia closed down the office of the PKK in Moscow, and forced the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan out of its territory when he sought refuge in Russia. A fourth aspect of improving T-R relations was their desire to stabilize the Caucasus. Turkey has always insisted on this point, but it was Russia who changed its position in the late 1990s, from one of excluding Turkey from all Russian efforts in the Caucasus to one of including and working with Turkey in its endeavors at stability. Finally, a fifth aspect of improving T-R relations in the later period was the joint stance of these two countries opposing the US-led military campaign against Iraq. Their stance on this issue was foreshadowed by their earlier insistence on lifting sanctions on Iraq.

Explaining the Changes in the Course of Turkish–Russian Relations

As the review above indicates, it is necessary to explain two radical changes: first, the shift from indisputable rivalry and enmity to increasing cooperation immediately after the end of the Cold War, and second, the shift from increasing cooperation to intensified cooperation and partnership during the latter half of the 1990s. In an attempt to disentangle the underlying dynamics of these two countries’ foreign policy reorientation(s), four competing understandings of international politics are examined in their explanatory power: realism and the three liberalisms (institutional, democratic peace, and trade theory).

If realism is right, we should observe a radical change in the balance of power between Russia and Turkey in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and a special augmentation, or at least persistence, of this trend of change throughout the late 1990s. If institutional liberalism is accurate, we should observe an explosion of institutionalization in the early 1990s and a further institutionalization in the late 1990s. If the democratic peace theory is correct, we should observe a radical change

in the domestic political structures of these two countries towards democracy at the end of the Cold War as well as a further democratization in the late 1990s. If the liberal trade theory is true, we should observe an explosion of bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Russia at the end of the Cold War *and* a further increase in the bilateral trade volume in the late 1990s.

Realist Perspective: Radical Change in the Balance of Power

Realists describe international politics as a struggle for power necessitated by the anarchic structure of the system. Asserting that “states have two kinds of power: latent power and military power,” John Mearsheimer describes latent power as the socioeconomic ingredients that go into building military power, which is based on a state’s wealth (expressed by its GDP) and population.⁵¹ While discussing military power, Mearsheimer emphasizes the primacy of land power.⁵² Peter Gowan characterizes realist IR theory as a “Calculus of Power.”⁵³ Stephen Walt argues that when faced with a great power threat, states tend to balance against the threatening state instead of jumping on the bandwagon.⁵⁴ He further claims that states do not balance against the largest concentration of power, but rather against the threatening power that they directly face.⁵⁵

Since Turkey allied against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and then moved to increased, and later intensified, cooperation with Russia, realist premises would suggest:

1. The Russian threat radically diminished for Turkey in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and, hence, Turkey moved towards increasing cooperation with Russia.
2. The Russian threat further diminished, or at least did not increase, during the second half of 1990s, and, hence, Turkey moved from increasing cooperation to intensified cooperation and strategic partnership with Russia in the latter half of the 1990s.

A comparison of figures of Russian vs. Turkish GDP, population, GDP per capita, and manpower in the army since the 1960s clearly demonstrates all of the above realist expectations to be true.

We observe a doubling of the Turkish GDP in relative terms vis-à-vis the Russian GDP in the latter half of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the earlier 1990s witnessed Turkey reaching one-third of the Russian GDP, and the latter half of the 1990s witnessed Turkey’s reaching two-thirds of the Russian economy.

In terms of the demographic component, the balance is even more consistently changing in favor of Turkey. Turkish population jumped from one-fifth to two-fifths of the Russian population with the end of the Cold War and reached almost half of the Russian population by the year 2002. Derivative of changes in GDP and population and Turkish GDP/capita, which was 24 percent of the Soviet GDP/capita in 1971, reached 145 percent of the Russian GDP/capita in 2001.



Figure 1. Turkish GDP/Russian GDP (1968–2001).

Comparisons of Turkish and Russian military might demonstrate similar trends. In 1962, manpower of the Turkish army was 455,000 as opposed to the 3.6 million of the Russian army, corresponding to 12.6 percent. This ratio remained relatively stable throughout the Cold War. In 1985, the same figures were 630,000 to 5.3 million for Turkey and Russia, corresponding to 11.9 percent. With the collapse of




Figure 2. Turkey/Russia (population) 1968–2002.

the Soviet Union, Russian manpower shrank to 2.7 million while the Turkish manpower stood at 560,000. Hence, the corresponding ratio improved to a 1:5 ratio in 1992. Continued demobilization of the Russian army brought the Russian army down to 1.5 million in 1995, while the Turkish army remained at about a half a million, establishing a 1:3 ratio. In the mid-1990s, and especially in 1995/1996, Russian demobilization sped up, while Turkish manpower increased by 20 percent in absolute terms, so that the Russian and Turkish armies had 1.27 million and 630,000 soldiers, respectively, revising the Turkish–Russian ratio to 1:2. Turkish manpower as a percentage of Russian manpower never again declined below 50 percent, thus stabilizing the Turkish–Russian ratio at 1:2. Russia’s continued but declining possession of a substantial nuclear arsenal complicates this picture, and yet a nuclear confrontation between Turkey and Russia in connection with the regional conflicts (Azerbaijan-Armenia over Nagorno-Karabagh, Georgia-Abkhazia, etc.) in which they take different sides is extremely unlikely.

In sum, the Russian threat against Turkey diminished radically, both in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and in the mid-1990s, both in terms of latent power (economic and demographic) and in terms of actual military power. Therefore, the diminution of the Russian threat as a causal factor of increased and intensified cooperation, informed by the realist theory of international politics and the balance of power logic, convincingly explains Turkish and Russian foreign policy reorientations after the Cold War.



Figure 3. Turkey and Russian GDP per capita (1968–2001).




Figure 4. Balance of manpower between Russia and Turkey (1965–2001).

Alternative Explanations: Four Strands of Liberalism

Institutional Liberalism: “Institutions Foster Cooperation”?

Liberal institutionalists such as Keohane and Ikenberry argue that international institutions foster cooperation by establishing an order “beyond the balance of power” politics. Keohane discusses the cooperation among the advanced capitalist countries after the Second World War and views international regimes and institutions “not as weak substitutes for world government but as a device for facilitating decentralized cooperation among egoistic actors.”⁵⁶ Using rational choice (Axelrod) and functionalist methods, and drawing on Marxist (Gramsci, Wallerstein) and other notions of hegemony, Keohane stresses factors such as institutions, international regimes, and the ethical value of cooperation.⁵⁷ Ikenberry likewise evaluates three varieties of order, balance of power, hegemonic, and constitutional,⁵⁸ discusses the international political settlements after the Napoleonic Wars, the First and the Second World Wars and the Cold War,⁵⁹ and concludes that the innovative use of international institutions created an order that went beyond balance of power politics, exhibiting constitutional characteristics.⁶⁰

What may institutional liberal IR theory suggest as the causal factor facilitating cooperation between Russia and Turkey? It would suggest the creation of international regimes through institutions and diplomatic protocols to be the causal factor behind T-R cooperation.

The two important multilateral organizations set up by Turkey and Russia are the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR). The rapprochement between Russia and NATO in 2002 was also a development whereby Turkey and Russia were brought closer in an institutional framework.

After its establishment in 1992, BSEC developed branches such as the BSEC Business Council, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), and the Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC).⁶¹ Although BSEC officers such as Nurver Nuris expressed their hope to use oil and gas (among other natural resources) to cement a regional integration framework similar to the European Coal and Steel Union,⁶² these hopes have not yet materialized. Indeed, observers⁶³ claim that over the years the BSEC has become a much less influential component of regional cooperation than expected, especially since Greece joined this organization. Whether Greece “spoiled” the BSEC or not requires a separate discussion of BSEC mechanisms, and hence falls out of the scope of this author’s argument. However, there is virtually no incidence of BSEC-induced cooperative effort between Turkey and Russia. Furthermore, Russia does not seem to be interested in the BSEC structure anymore. At the BSEC tenth anniversary gathering in Istanbul in Summer 2002, attended by the presidents of many member states, Russia sent only one of its many deputy foreign ministers.

BSEC fulfills an important function in assisting some of its members in their integration with the European Union by contributing to democratization and civil society development through many of its branches.⁶⁴ However, Turkey’s integration with the EU does not necessarily contribute to the development of Turkish–Russian relations. In fact, it is possible that a gap may be opening between BSEC members with EU prospects (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) and those without such prospects, which most definitely includes Russia.⁶⁵ Hence, BSEC cannot be the primary explanatory variable behind the tremendous growth of Turkish–Russian relations after the Cold War. Russia, in its recent attempt to benefit from EU’s “European Neighborhood Policy,”⁶⁶ increased its involvement in the BSEC, which still does not directly enhance Turkish–Russian cooperation. Though BSEC is not the primary cause of Turkish–Russian cooperation, it is a forum where one can observe the symptoms of such cooperation. “Symptomatically, in 2005, when Russia blocked a U.S. request to get observer status in the ... BSEC, Turkey, the group’s formal host and supposedly Washington’s ‘strategic ally,’ did not raise a finger to help obtain a positive decision. It took the lobbying of other BSEC members to push the U.S. candidacy through.”⁶⁷

BSEC includes countries that are opposed to Russian interests and visions for the Black Sea region, such as Georgia and now increasingly Ukraine under Yushchenko; the composition of BSEC’s membership as such makes it difficult to conceive of this organization purely as a vehicle for Turkish–Russian joint interests. Russia rather seeks bilateral strengthening of its relations with Turkey, while siding with Turkey in the disputes with the United States over the status of the Black Sea region. Turkish–Russian joint opposition to extending the US-led Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) to the Black Sea in 2005 was likewise expressed by these two countries individually, rather than being formulated via BSEC.⁶⁸ BSEC does not serve as a vehicle to express joint Turkish–Russian interests and positions as such, due to the membership in BSEC of ardently pro-American post-Communist states such as Bulgaria and Georgia. While rejecting OAE’s extension to the Black Sea,

“Turkey launched Operation Black Sea Harmony in 2004 to patrol the southern segment of the Black Sea.”⁶⁹ In all of these cases, formal institutions appear to be forums where Turkish–Russian cooperation is expressed, often without becoming the formal stance of the institution, as the above examples from BSEC testify. Hence, institutions such as BSEC and BLACKSEAFOR should be seen as symptoms, not causes, of the cooperation between the two countries.

Democratic Peace Theory: “Democracies Cooperate”

Theorists of democratic peace assert that democratic countries do not fight wars amongst each other. Thus, as democracy spreads around the globe, the abode of peace will expand. Informed by Kant’s writings on the subject of a perpetual peace, democratic peace theory provides an alternative understanding of international politics. Drawing upon the three sets of rights at the foundation of liberalism, Michael Doyle argues that liberal democratic regimes of the world form a Pacific Union, the members of which do not fight wars among themselves.⁷⁰ Quoting Kant, Doyle asserts that “the Pacific Union of liberal republics ‘steadily expands bringing together within it more and more republics ... and creating an ever expanding peace.’”⁷¹ Likewise, Bruce Russett argues that:

(a) democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) because, (b) they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do not need to fight each other (a prudential statement), and (c) they perceive that democracies should not fight each other (a normative statement about principles of right behavior), which reinforces the empirical statement. By this reasoning, the more democracies there are in the world, the fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of peace.⁷²

What does democratic peace theory suggest as an explanation for increasing cooperation between Turkey and Russia after the Cold War? Freedom House (FH) ranks each country on two aspects of democratic freedoms on a scale of one to seven, one denoting the most free and seven denoting the least free conditions. Turkey and the Soviet Union/Russia have been evaluated by the FH since 1972. The Soviet Union remained the bastion of tyranny from 1972 to 1990–91, its scores ranging from the “absolutely Non-Free” 7.0 to 5.5, classified throughout as Non-Free. Turkey fluctuated between Free (1974–80) and partially-Free (1972–74; 1980–present) status, its scores ranging from 2.5 to 5.0. Although the military coup of 1980 brought Turkey to the verge of being a Non-Free country, freedom and democracy gradually recovered, and Turkey experienced a relatively “free” six years from 1987 to 1993, attaining a score of 3.0 during those years. As Turkey was experiencing its most free years in late 1980s and early 1990s, Russia broke “free” from the tyrannical world, first rising to the partially-Free status of 4.5 in 1990–91, and then settling at the better end of the partially-Free world with its average scores ranging between 3.0–3.5 for the next seven years (1991–97).

These figures should be a cause for celebration for the democratic peace theorists, since a radical increase in T-R cooperation in the early 1990s corresponds to the period when these two countries were experiencing their most free moments in decades, or in the case of Russia, ever.

However, if democratic peace is the causal factor behind increasing T-R cooperation, we should see a further increase in democratization in both countries in the late 1990s, whereas FH reports clearly show the exact opposite. Democracy and freedom relatively deteriorated in both countries beginning in the mid-1990s. The reassertion of the military in the February 28 process in Turkey, and Vladimir Putin's rise to power in Russia, were interpreted as shifts towards authoritarianism. Democratic peace theory, although it may claim to explain the increasing cooperation in the early 1990s, not only fails to explain the further intensification of cooperation in the latter 1990s, but starkly contradicts it.

Liberal Trade Theory: "Trade Fosters Cooperation"

According to the liberal trade theory, trade between states moderates geopolitical competition, decreases the likelihood of war, increases cooperation, and has a function similar to that of democracy in the democratic peace theory. First, one set of claims asserts that economic trade replaces conquest as a means of exchange, thus lowering expected levels of conflict.⁷³ Richard Rosecrance argues that "the growth of economic interdependence has been matched by a corresponding decline in the value and importance of territorial conquest for states,"⁷⁴ because "the benefits of trade and cooperation among states greatly exceed that of military competition and territorial control."⁷⁵ A second argument, with Russett and Oneal



Figure 5. Democracy and freedom ratings of Turkey and Russia.

among its proponents,⁷⁶ is that open commerce dampens political conflict by promoting economic dependence.⁷⁷

What does liberal trade theory suggest as an explanation for the increasing cooperation between Turkey and Russia? The liberal trade approach dominated interpretations of increasing T-R cooperation, not only in the popular media, but even among scholars.⁷⁸

As T-R trade declined significantly during late 1990s, interpretations of T-R cooperation as a derivative of increasing trade suffered a crucial defeat in the empirical field. However, in the early 2000s, the liberal trade approach revived in the form of an economic interdependence argument. In this connection, Turkey’s dependence on Russian natural gas received attention. Natalya Ulcenko argued that the “Russian administration must have remembered its old policy of solving its political problems with Turkey through expanding economic cooperation ...”⁷⁹ Quoting a report prepared by the Turkish Industrialists and Businessman Association, Ulcenko claims that:

By the early 2000s Turkey will become the second largest natural gas market [for Russia] after Germany. This fact, testifying to the level of Turkey’s dependence on Russia, also shows that Russia, which is concerned about not losing such a large market, will be equally dependent on Turkey and hence will be forced to be understanding toward Turkey’s interests.⁸⁰

Reviewing the trade figures, one faces a more complicated picture. Figures indicate a positive correlation between T-R cooperation and increase in trade volume in the early 1990s, but in the later 1990s, the trade volume did not increase further, and even *decreased*, contradicting the liberal trade thesis.



Figure 6. Turkish–Russian trade volume (million USD).




Figure 7. Turkish–Russian total trade volume (1997–2001).

T-R trade dramatically increased following the collapse of the USSR. Around \$300 million in the Soviet era, the trade volume quickly reached several billion dollars in the early 1990s. According to the Turkish Council of Foreign Economic Relations (DEIK), T-R trade volume jumped to 1.5 billion dollars in 1992, to two billion dollars in 1993, to 3.3 billion dollars in 1995, and to 4.1 billion dollars in 1997, indicating a 176 percent increase in T-R trade volume in the period between 1992 and 1997. Compared with the Soviet period, we observe a 1,700 percent increase in trade volume. Even these figures do not reflect the full extent of the radical change that took place in T-R trade in this period, since the so-called “luggage trade” between the two countries, which did not exist during the Soviet period, amounted to a stunning \$ 5.8 billion by 1997. Hence, the T-R trade proper (\$ 4.1 billion) combined with the luggage trade (\$ 5.8 billion) reached almost ten billion dollars in 1997. However, in 1998, T-R trade proper declined 25 percent to \$3.5 billion, while the luggage trade declined 38 percent to \$3.6 billion, bringing the combined trade from ten billion dollars in 1997 to \$7.1 billion in 1998. In 1999, T-R trade proper further decreased to \$2.9 billion, while the luggage trade decreased by almost 40 percent, from \$3.6 billion in 1998 to \$2.2 billion in 1999, bringing the combined T-R trade to \$5.1 billion. In sum, T-R trade declined from ten billion dollars in 1997 to five billion dollars 1999, signaling a 50 percent decrease. Luggage trade never reached the levels it had attained before 1997.

Quantitative indicators of T-R trade demonstrate that T-R trade increased from the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union to the year 1997, and declined after this date, only partially recovering later. This contradicts the liberal trade theorists’ interpretation of T-R cooperation, since it fails to explain the more intense T-R cooperation in the late 1990s.

In the last three years (2003–06), which is beyond the purview of this paper, economic cooperation between Turkey and Russia reached new heights with the completion of the Blue Stream gas pipeline.⁸¹ The Blue Stream project was planned and agreed upon already in the late 1990s, so it is misleading, and chronologically implausible, to think that the completion of the Blue Stream Pipeline was the cause behind Turkish–Russian cooperation that preceded it. More importantly, however, the Blue Stream project, once completed, provoked much hostility and criticism by the Turkish media for what was seen as Turkish dependence on expensive Russian natural gas; this led to what may have been the most public scrutiny of Turkish–Russian relations.⁸²

Domestic Politics: “Complementary Domestic Coalitions Foster Cooperation”

There is a line of IR scholarship that attributes major shifts in foreign policy to interest group politics, lobbying, log rolling, ideological affinities, and identity politics at the national level, especially among the ruling elites.⁸³ These explanations sparked a voluminous debate focusing on the intersection of domestic and international politics.⁸⁴

Throughout the 1990s, domestic politics in Turkey and Russia have been characterized by the collapse of old coalitions and the emergence of new ones, as well as challenges to the regime itself, including a soft coup in Turkey and a failed coup attempt in Russia. Is it possible to find, as proponents of domestic explanations would suggest, patterns of continuity amidst these changes, demonstrating the consolidation of pro-Russian and pro-Turkish groups in the domestic political scenes of Turkey and Russia?

Except for some members of the Motherland Party (ANAP) in Turkey,⁸⁵ there are no influential political groups to be discerned in the domestic political scene in Turkey or Russia that are pronouncedly pro-Russian or pro-Turkish, respectively.⁸⁶ Except for ultra-leftist fringe groups such as the Workers Party, there is no political party—certainly not in the parliament—that is ideologically or programmatically in favor of increased Turkish–Russian cooperation. Even in the case of ANAP, some members of which are being investigated on corruption charges related to the Blue Stream Pipeline, the domestic explanation may only explain the launching of the Blue Stream Pipeline, which was not completed until recently, and not Turkish–Russian cooperation in the military-political field, or the relative convergence of Turkish–Russian foreign policy in the Black Sea, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

While there are no clearly identifiable political groups ideologically or programmatically in favor of Turkish–Russian cooperation as a vision for the future, there are prominent anti-Russian and anti-Turkish groups in both countries. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey is an ultra-nationalist right wing party based on the ideology of Turkish nationalism with Pan-Turkism as its primary goal in foreign policy.⁸⁷ Pan-Turkic ideology is revisionist and expansionist, and since most of the Turkic peoples lived and many still live under Russian rule, in terms of major foreign powers to be targeted, it is remarkably anti-Russian.

However, MHP was not in power during the early 1990s, when Turkish officials were making ample use of the Pan-Turkist rhetoric. As contradictory and disconfirming as it is for the proponents of domestic explanations, MHP became the second largest coalition partner in the government that ruled Turkey from 1999 to 2002, the period that also corresponds to the most intense T-R cooperation. Pan-Turkist rhetoric in foreign policy was abandoned by the Turkish state earlier than MHP's historic electoral victory in 1999. Once in power, MHP did not revive the Pan-Turkist, Russophobic rhetoric. MHP was a crucial partner in government at the very period when T-R cooperation peaked. It was during MHP's government that Turkish and Russian chiefs of staff were visiting each other and the Secretary General of Turkish National Security Council was calling for an "alliance" with Russia. Systemic pressures of international politics clearly trumped domestic political considerations.

There are virulently anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim, ultra-nationalist political groups in Russia as well, but it is impossible to talk about a pattern in their fluctuating fortunes that corresponds to the secular development of T-R cooperation. Relative to Turkey, the political scene has been more stable in Russia due to the super-executive authoritarianism of the president. Among the two Russian presidents in the post-Cold War period, Putin's presidency corresponds to more intense cooperation with Turkey than Yeltsin's. Even in the Russian case, it is possible to argue that T-R cooperation has been contradictory to what the domestic explanations would imply, though the contradiction would be much more nuanced than the stark contradiction in Turkey. Yeltsin and Putin's different policies on Chechnya and the other autonomous Turkic-Muslim republics is an exemplary case. Putin came as the representative of the hardliner, KGB military clique, as a hawkish leader who promised to deliver order and stability, especially in suppressing the rebellion in Chechnya and also renegotiating the powers of the Russian center vis-à-vis the mostly Turkic-Muslim autonomous republics in Russia. His hawkish vigilance in Chechnya and his drive for more centralization seemingly confirms the Turcophobic features of the military intelligence clique that Putin represents. In his foreign policy, however, Putin has been much more cooperative with Turkey than his predecessor.

Proliferation of Common Interests

The diminution of the Russian threat after the Cold War was the main factor "allowing for" T-R cooperation in this period. However, the diminution of the Russian threat is a necessary but not sufficient condition for T-R cooperation. The proliferation of common interests in four issue-areas further reinforced T-R cooperation after the Cold War: cooperation in the field of defense industry, cooperation in the field of combatting terrorism, cooperation in stabilizing the Caucasus, and cooperation in preventing the war against Iraq.

As Şükrü Elekdağ claims, "with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has totally lost its function of providing support for Turkey's defense."⁸⁸ Furthermore, "in the view of many senior officers, Turkey lacked the indigenous military capability

to sustain an independent foreign policy that risked a prolonged confrontation with its neighbors.”⁸⁹ Turkey responded to this security dilemma after the Cold War by following a policy aimed at normalizing relations with its neighbors as well as seeking ways to build an indigenous military-industrial complex capable of providing Turkey with the resources to sustain an independent foreign policy. Cooperation with Russia is crucial for Turkey to reach both of these goals.

In his visit to Ankara in 2000, Russian PM Kasyanov said that “our countries’ response to terrorism and religious fundamentalism is the same. Russians and the Turks know very well what international terrorism means through their own experiences.”⁹⁰ According to the “Cooperation in Intelligence Agreement” signed by the chiefs of the Turkish and Russian intelligence agencies during this visit, Chechen and Kurdish separatists will be closely followed by both agencies, and the intelligence related to them will be shared.⁹¹

During Turkish PM Ecevit’s visit to Moscow in 1999, Russian President Putin said that “regardless of their origins, Russia never supported, and will not support in the future, terrorism against Turkey.” Turkey expressed its support for Russia’s efforts to re-establish order in Chechnya.⁹² Turkey also took the initiative to combat terrorism at a regional level, especially in the Caucasus, which is parallel to Russia’s concerns over terrorism in this region.⁹³ Turkish observers celebrated Russia’s refusal to accept Abdullah Öcalan during his flight from Syria, as a key development in this connection.⁹⁴ Outstanding disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabagh and the dispute between Georgia and Abkhazia still have the potential to upset Turkish–Russian relations, since Turkey and Russia take different sides in these conflicts. However, the political relations between Turkey and Russia, and the overall geopolitical context of their relations, have changed tremendously since the early 1990s. The Russian Commander of the CIS armed forces, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, once warned of a “Third World War” if Turkey intervened in the Armenian–Azeri conflict.⁹⁵ Turkish and the Azeri leadership have changed since then, making such a situation almost impossible from the Turkish point of view, since Turkey gradually adopted a new position in the Caucasus, which is much less revisionist and is respectful of Russian prerogatives in the region.

Russia reciprocated by not further obstructing the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which they could obstruct if they really wanted to. Sinan Ogan, in his “Russia’s Baku–Ceyhan Policy between Kremlin and Lukoil,” amply demonstrates the degree to which Russian national security concerns shape Russia’s foreign economic relations, in both the private and public sectors.⁹⁶ Throughout the course of negotiations over the BTC pipeline, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense consistently prevented Russian companies from participating in the building of the BTC pipeline. However, as Ogan notes, Vahit Alekperov, the president of Lukoil announced in November 2001 that his company intended to join the BTC consortium with a 7.5 percent share.⁹⁷ This was a major symptom of mutual accommodation of interests between Turkey and Russia, even in the Caucasus, where their interests are seemingly opposed.

Since the United States put forth the idea of a second Gulf War against Iraq, Turkey and Russia have been among the most vocal and consistent opponents. Turkish and Russian opposition to the war on Iraq is not a random coincidence or a conjectural convergence without any long-term geopolitical or economic underpinnings. Russia and Turkey advocated the lifting of economic sanctions on Iraq ever since the Gulf War ended. The two countries consistently insisted on protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq. As early as November 1994, “Moscow announced that it was ‘ready to resume arms supplies to Iraq’ once the UN sanctions were lifted.”⁹⁸ Much earlier, Sergei Iastrzhembskii noted that Russia was “categorically against using the UN Security Council as a cover for attacks on Iraq.”⁹⁹ On August 6, 2002, the Turkish newspaper *Radikal* reserved its cover story for a piece entitled “Secret Turkish–Russian Cooperation for Iraq.”¹⁰⁰ *Radikal* reported that the two countries agreed to oppose a military operation against Iraq and to work together to prevent it.

If Turkey and Russia cannot prevent the intervention, their next goal is to prevent a Kurdish state. The agreement was decided upon during Russian deputy foreign minister Sultanov’s visit to Ankara on July 29, 2002, and it was kept secret. Turkish foreign minister Gurel confirmed this information. Even if a military operation takes place despite joint efforts to prevent it, then Russia and Turkey will try to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraqi territory.¹⁰¹

Finally, Turkey’s rejection of US troop deployments and Russia’s leading role in the Security Council’s opposition to American requests showed that both before and after the war, there were deep geopolitical dynamics underlying Turkish–Russian alignment in the Middle East. Turkey and Russia are two of the most prominent countries advocating the indivisibility of the state of Iraq. These two countries are also among the most vocal opponents of an independent Kurdish formation in Northern Iraq. These positions, and hence Turkish–Russian cooperation in the Middle East, are not likely to change radically in the near future.

Conclusion: Institutions, Democracy, Trade or Domestic Politics Do Not Explain Turkish–Russian Cooperation; Diminishing Russian Threat and Common Interests Do

As the comparison of Turkish and Russian GDP, population, and military prowess over the last three decades, as well as reviewing indices of institutionalization, democracy, and trade between Turkey and Russia demonstrated, Turkey’s drastic improvement in terms of potential and actual power vis-à-vis Russia is the only hypothesis that plausibly explains the increase and intensification of Turkish–Russian cooperation after the Cold War. International institutionalization, democratization, and bilateral trade were somewhat correlated with increased cooperation immediately after the Cold War, but they all failed to explain, and even contradicted, the intensification of the T-R cooperation during the later 1990s. There is no discernible connection between domestic coalitions and international politics either. The change

in the balance of power between the two countries, reinforced by the proliferation of common interests in three major issue-areas, provides a better explanation.

Cooperation between Turkey and Russia has continued and further increased since the beginning of 2003, where the analysis of this paper leaves off. Indeed, since the US invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, Turkish–Russian cooperation has taken on a more pronounced anti-American posture, most recently expressed by Turkey’s opposition to extending US-led Operation Active Endeavor to the Black Sea.¹⁰² President Putin’s visit to Turkey in December 2004 exposed the tremendous level of cooperation that the two countries have already reached, while spurring a new round of agreements and promises to further enhance the “strategic partnership” between the two countries. In a post-Cold War environment where the word “alliance”—when used outside of the NATO framework—immediately conjures up images of the two World Wars and the Cold War, “strategic partnership” appears to be the politically correct term to convey a level of cooperation akin to an “alliance.” During his visit, which has been hailed as a “historic jump” in Turkish–Russian relations, Putin was enthusiastically welcomed by people from a wide array of political persuasions—from the Turkish political leadership to the marginal but growing groups such as the Eurasianist Movement, which organized its most impressive conference at the time of Putin’s visit.¹⁰³ The anti-American undertones that Turkish–Russian cooperation took on at the official and the popular level¹⁰⁴ since 2002, at least for now, have disconfirmed the interpretation of Turkish–Russian cooperation as the emergence of a new, pro-American anti-terrorism bloc in contrast to the EU, which was seen as less willing to fight against terrorism due to human rights concerns.¹⁰⁵ Far from being a pro-American alliance pattern, the last few years have shown cooperation between Turkey and Russia to be more problematic for Turkish–American relations than for Turkey–EU relations, which the United States consistently supported.

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6. March 9, 2002: all major Turkish newspapers, among others, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Yeni Şafak*.
7. For comprehensive coverage of negative and positive reactions to the prospect of the Turkish–Russian "alliance" in the Turkish media, refer to "Kırmızının bilançosu," *Hürriyet*, March 11, 2002.
8. This prophecy is strongly supported by historical evidence. The springtime of Turkish–Soviet Russian cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s ended after the Soviet occupation of the Caucasus, rapid industrialization and militarization of Russia, and subsequent Soviet aggression, embodied in Stalin's territorial and military demands from Turkey after World War II. For a discussion of the "spring time of Turkish–Soviet relations," refer to Jeannette Pond, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic (1918–1939)," unpublished MA thesis, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, call number: DK999.
9. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security*, Vol.24, No.1 (Summer 1999), pp.44–63.
10. Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol.25, No.1 (Summer 2000), p.5.
11. This is what Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik accuse realists of doing in trying to accommodate many of the key developments in the post-Cold War era. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security*, Vol.24, No.2 (Fall 1999), p.53.
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14. Benjamin Miller, "Between War and Peace: Systemic Effects and Regional Transitions from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War," *Security Studies*, Vol.11, No.1 (Autumn 2001), pp.1–52.
15. Ibid. Based on Benjamin Miller's definitions of hot war, cold war, cold peace, and hot peace, one can argue that the two stages of cooperation that Turkey and Russia went through resemble cold peace and hot peace. Miller associates the balance of capabilities to systemic influences, and the balance of motivations to regional dynamics and to domestic factors, the first set determining the "cold" outcomes and the second set determining the "hot" outcomes.
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30. Ibid. The parenthetical remark is this author’s.
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32. Ibid., p.96.
33. Ibid., p.48.
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36. Graham E. Fuller, *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World* (Santa Monica, California, Project AIR FORCE, Arroyo Center, RAND, 1993), p.24.
37. Charles Warren Hostler, *The Turks of Central Asia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), p.17.
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39. Ibid., p.43.
40. Mikhail Konarovskiy, “Russia and the Emerging Geopolitical Order in Central Asia,” in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds.), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p.237.
41. Winrow (1995), p.44.
42. Fuller (1993), p.83.
43. Ibid.
44. “To prevent any potential Turkish opportunism at the time of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Marshal Shaposhnikov, then Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, warned of a ‘Third World War’ if Turkey were to interfere militarily in the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict. In March 1993, General Grachev, Russia’s defense minister, created Russia’s own military cooperation with Turkey conditional on Ankara’s discontinuing its military assistance to Baku.” Available at <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0301.htm>.
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46. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ae/russian.htm>.
47. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ae/russian/htm>. Fourteen agreements were signed between the two countries in a single day, on December 15, 1997, during Kasyanov’s visit to Ankara. Not a single agreement, protocol, or memorandum was signed for the next three years. For the five-year period from 1998 to 2002, the two agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraphs stand as the only diplomatic contracts signed.
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50. For more information on Turkish–Russian military cooperation, see the “Institutional Liberalism” section of this essay, and endnotes 66–69.
51. Mearsheimer (2001), p.55.
52. Ibid., pp.83–138.

53. Peter Gowan, "A Calculus of Power," *New Left Review*, Vol.16 (July–August 2002), pp. 47–67.
54. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.17–50.
55. Ibid.
56. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1984).
57. Ibid., pp.243–60.
58. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp.21–50 (Chapter 2).
59. Ibid., pp.80–257 (Chapters 4–7).
60. Ibid., pp.257–75 (Chapter 8: Conclusion).
61. <http://www.bsec.gov.tr>.
62. Peimani (1998), p.50.
63. Michael L. Nash, "European Union as a Template," *Contemporary Review* (January 2003), p.4: "So what has BSEC achieved so far? ... BSEC 'does not have an overall positive image'... contains within it states 'where there might exist a national consensus on future membership of the European Union' which undermines its credibility. Another reason why it does not appear to have made more progress is the lack of legal status and the failure to develop supra-nationality for its institutions ... In February 1993, the speakers of the national parliaments of the BSEC states signed an agreement to establish a parliamentary assembly ... Greece did not participate in this initiative to begin with, although it does now ..." In contrast to Nash's very pessimistic view of BSEC, this organization gained legal status and developed many organizational branches, fostered connections between civil society groups around the Black Sea, and aided in preparing some of these countries for integration into the EU. For a Turkish perspective, see Erol Manisalı, "KEİB ve Türk Yunan ilişkileri," *Yeni Günaydın*, June 24, 1992, p.7.
64. Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, Ayça Ergun and Işıl Çelimli (eds.), *Black Sea Politics: Political Culture and Civil Society in an Unstable Region* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005); especially Tunç Aybak's chapter in this volume.
65. Ibid.
66. "Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy" (RECEP) is an organizational reflection of Russia's attempt to forge some relations with the European Union through the latter's "European Neighborhood Policy," <http://www.recep.ru/>.
67. Igor Torbakov, "Turkey Sides with Moscow against Washington on Black Sea Force," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (of Jamestown Foundation), March 3, 2006, available at http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370832.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), *Debating Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp.3–57.
71. Ibid., p.22.
72. Bruce Russett in Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), *Debating Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p.59.
73. Jon C. Pevehouse, "Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol.66, No.1 (February 2004), pp.248–9.
74. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
75. Scott Bruchill, "Liberal Internationalism," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.37.
76. John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.41, No.2 (1997), pp.267–94; John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations," *World Politics*, Vol.52, No.1 (1999), pp.1–37; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001).

77. Pevehouse (2004), p.249.
78. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Turkish–Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2000), p.59.
79. Natalya Ulcenko, “The Role of Energy Exports and Imports in Russia’s and Turkey’s Strategic Security,” *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.6, No.4 (Winter 2001), p.145.
80. *Ibid.*, p.148. Ulcenko and TUSIAD clearly express an optimistic view of T-R interdependence whereas some Turkish observers express concern over Turkish dependence on Russia on this issue.
81. For early coverage of the Blue Stream Pipeline and the domestic controversy it caused, see Mevlüt Katik, “Scaled Back Pipeline Marks Advance in Russian–Turkish Relations,” *Eurasianet*, October 30, 2002, available at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav103002.shtml>.
82. For the official investigation launched on corruption charges related to the Blue Stream Pipeline, see “Mavi Akım Soruşturması,” *Sabah*, May 26, 2004, available at <http://www.sabah.com.tr/2004/05/26/gnd105.html>.
83. Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions and Information* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Robert D. Putnam, *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
84. For debates over the role of domestic politics on foreign policy, see Susan Peterson and Christopher Wenk, “Domestic Institutional Change and Foreign Policy: Comparing U.S. Intervention in Guatemala and Nicaragua,” *Security Studies*, Vol.11, No.1 (Autumn 2002), pp.53–76; Sten Rynning, “Shaping Military Doctrine in France: Decisionmakers between International Power and Domestic Interests,” *Security Studies*, Vol.11, No.2 (Winter 2002), pp.85–116; Jerry Pressman, “Domestic Politics, Foreign-Policy Making, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Security Studies*, Vol.10, No.3 (Spring 2002), pp.80–114. For a selection of articles discussing specifically the role of identity politics on foreign policy, refer to Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia,” *International Security*, Vol.24, No.3, pp. 108–138.
85. Mevlüt Katik, “Scaled Back Pipeline Marks Advance in Russian–Turkish Relations,” *Eurasianet*, October 30, 2002: “Unresolved charges claim that Yılmaz’s Motherland Party (ANAP), supported by big business groups at the time, endorsed Blue Stream to shore up companies that had dealings with Russia and eagerly supported the deal. No tender was opened in Turkey on the project and no satisfactory answer was found to the question of why a shorter Georgian route was not selected. Now that Turkey has scaled back the project, questions about the deal’s propriety may revive.” Available at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav103002.shtml>.
86. Barry M. Rubin and Metin Heper (eds.), *Political Parties in Turkey* (London: Frank Cass, 2002); Michael McFaul, “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy,” *International Security*, Vol.22, No.3 (Winter 1997/1998), pp.5–35.
87. Rubin and Heper (2002).
88. Ikenberry (2001).
89. *Ibid.*
90. Kimikloğlu (2001), p.157.
91. *Ibid.*, p.157. Also look at Kubilay Kultigin, “Turkey and Russia: A Strategic Partnership?,” *Biweekly Briefing*, January 31, 2001. The Analyst, available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/Jan_31_2001. “During Kasyanov’s visit ... the two countries decided to establish a ‘defense cooperation commission’ whose task is to examine potential arms sales from Russia to Turkey and an ‘intelligence cooperation agreement’ against terrorism.”
92. Maria Beat, “Turkish–Russian Relations (1991–2001),” *Strategic Analysis*, No.19 (November 2001), p.123. Quoted from *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, November 6, 1999.
93. The “Terrorism and Organized Crime” summit was held in the Turkish city of Trabzon in April 2002. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia attended the summit. Azeri President Aliyev said that “in the field of security, and cooperation against terrorism as a means to secure the East–West corridor, the groundwork for cooperation is laid by these three countries.” *Hürriyet*, April 30, 2002. Also accessible through <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr>.

94. Öcalan was later accepted by Italy and Greece for limited periods of time, but eventually captured by the Turkish intelligence in Kenya, the last country where he successfully landed.
95. Gareth Winrow, "Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus," *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, Vol.1, No.2 (July 1997).
96. Sinan Ogan, "Russia's Baku-Ceyhan Policy between Kremlin and Lukoil," *Strategic Analysis*, No.26 (June 2002) pp. 68–76.
97. *Ibid.*, p.70.
98. Talal Nizameddin, *Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy* (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1999), p.203.
99. *Ibid.*, p.213.
100. *Radikal*, August 6, 2002, available at <http://www.radikal.com.tr/>.
101. *Ibid.*
102. Torbakov (2006).
103. On Putin's December 2004 visit to Turkey, see Sedat Ergin, "Türk-Rus ilişkilerinde tarihi sıçrama," *Hürriyet*, December 7, 2004. On the Eurasianist Movement's conference saluting Putin, see Yalçın Doğan, "Milliyetçi mabetten Putin'e selam!," *Hürriyet*, December 7, 2004. For a selection of columnists articulating and analyzing the importance of Putin's visit, see Murat Yetkin, "Bu ziyaretin önemi büyük," *Radikal*, December 7, 2004, and Mahfi Eğilmez, "Putin ve Rusya'nın dönüşü," *Radikal*, December 7, 2005.
104. Consider the enormous popularity of the political fiction bestseller *Metal Fırtına* [Metallic Storm], which took many Western and Turkish observers alike by surprise. The novel narrates a full-scale war between Turkey and the United States, ignited by a dispute over Northern Iraq, in which Russia rescues Turkey from US invasion.
105. In the heated debate that ensued following General Tuncer Kılınc's statements favoring a Turkish–Russian alliance, this interpretation of Turkish–Russian cooperation as a pro-American bloc formation was implied in an op-ed by İhsan Dağı in the Turkish daily *Radikal*, and then picked up by many other columnists in support of the European Union accession process. For the original article, see İhsan D. Dağı, "Kritik Karar: ABD yada AB" [Critical Decision: US or the EU], *Radikal*, March 12, 2002.