Turkey and the Idea of a European Union during the Inter-war Years, 1923–39

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In most textbook accounts on the history of European integration, the inter-war years merit particular attention for the intellectual origins of this idea. 1 Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe project and Aristide Briand’s European Union proposal at the League of Nations are two cases in point. Most standard accounts usually fail to mention where the young Turkish Republic stood in relation to the idea during that period. 2 From the Turkish perspective, there is a similar tendency to overlook the inter-war years and focus instead on the first decade of the Cold War in locating the origins of Turkey’s association with the idea. 3 Such an oversight might partly be a consequence of the fact that Turkish scholars and policy-makers have traditionally focused more on the institutional rather than the ideational aspect of European integration. At any rate, lack of attention to such a critical period is both interesting and conspicuous. It is even more so from the Turkish perspective, where many proponents of Turkey’s full membership see no problem in utilizing the nineteenth-century term ‘the sick man of Europe’ coined for the ailing Ottoman Empire as historical proof of Turkey’s European identity. 4 This indeed stands in sharp contrast to the new Republican Turkish elite’s view of their Ottoman past. Their interpretation of Turkey’s European identity lay in rejecting rather than embracing the Ottoman heritage. For instance, only five years after the establishment of the new republic, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) defined his country’s new orientation and identity as being a western power to which ‘the death of a peasant in the Balkans is of more importance than the death of a king in Afghanistan’. 5 Moreover, during the inter-war period, Turkish decision-makers and intellectuals were adamant in asserting the new republic’s European credentials in the international institutions.

Our main purpose is to introduce the inter-war dimension to the debate on the history of Turkey’s association with the idea of European integration. In this regard, we will first address the two somewhat related initiatives: Aristide Briand’s European Union proposal within the framework of the League of Nations and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe idea. We will then look at how Turkey was at first excluded from and was then incorporated in both of these. In this context, a discussion of why such a change of mind regarding Turkey came about will be presented. Then this article will turn to the other side of the debate with a consideration of the Turkish reception and perception of the idea of European Union. It should be noted that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas did not seem to resonate...
with the Turkish leaders and public as much as those of Briand. Therefore, we will attempt to explain why the Turkish leaders and intellectuals could relate to the latter’s initiatives better than to the former’s.

As regards the sources, we principally draw on documents available in the diplomatic archives of France and Italy as well as published records of the League of Nations. Our research at the French diplomatic archives at Quai D’Orsay yielded surprisingly few documents related to the French official position regarding Turkey’s inclusion in Briand’s project. In Turkey, the diplomatic archives are not yet available for academic research. Therefore, we have to rely on scattered documentation in the Republican Archives of the Prime Ministry in Ankara. Finally, Turkish newspapers proved to be another valuable source of information particularly on the elite perception of the idea of European union in the 1930s. We use them as complementary sources in this paper.

There had been a number of initiatives and movements towards the European in the inter-war period. Among them, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe movement stands out for several reasons. Coming from a cosmopolitan background, with an Austrian father and a Japanese mother, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi was born in the multi-national and multi-ethnic empire of Austria-Hungary. His ideas inspired influential political leaders of the time such as Aristide Briand who attempted to launch a European Union within the framework of the League of Nations. Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s project of Pan-Europe, though initially excluding Turkey, was subsequently revised to include it.

In 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi put forward the idea of a European Union in his book *Paneuropa* (or *Pan-Europe*). It was not accidental that he published his book after the First World War. On the one hand, the war destroyed both the European economy and its political systems. On the other hand, the international organization known as the League of Nations did not satisfy the needs of its members. Moreover, many intellectuals, among them Coudenhove-Kalergi, did not believe in the power of the League of Nations. He argued that the ecumenical League of Nations conceived by President Wilson remained a utopia for the following reasons: first, two world powers, Russia and the United States, rejected the League. The latter, therefore, represented only part of the whole world. Secondly, the League was inorganic; instead of grouping the peoples and states of the world organically according to their economic, cultural and geographical affinities, it joined them together mechanically, like bricks: large and small states, Asian and European, neighbouring and distant, without regard to geography, history, culture, or economics. Thirdly, the fundamental defect of the League of Nations was its abstract structure, rendering it impersonal and producing no response in the sentimental life of mankind, which, starting from the family, passed by degrees through nations and groups of nations, and culminated in the ideal of a world-embracing humanity.

In fact, it was the weakness of the League of Nations that had already led Coudenhove-Kalergi to focus on the ideal of the United States of Europe in the early 1920s. His united Europe was defined politically rather than geographically or culturally. Geographically there was no European continent; there was only a European peninsula of the Eurasian continent. For him, Europe was a political
concept which embraced all the non-Soviet states of continental Europe, including Iceland (united to Denmark by a personal union). What remained of European Turkey belonged politically to Asia. Then he continued: ‘To the political concept of Europe, as distinguished from its geographical counterpart, I give the name: Pan-Europe.’

A central argument of Pan-Europe was that the League of Nations was no substitute for Pan-Europe. So long as Germany did not belong to the League of Nations, the grave danger was that Europe would break into two camps – the Geneva League and the Moscow League. While Germany lived in endless conflict with the leading nations of the Geneva League, it maintained a cordial understanding with the Moscow League. He also argued: ‘Thus it may some day happen that Germany, as well as Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, will become members of the militarist league of Moscow rather than of the pacifist league of Geneva.’ The outcome would be an isolated Poland and a Rhine frontier to Europe.

Such a configuration would mean the end of the Pan-European idea and, consequently, the end of European peace. In fact, the greatest obstacle to the realization of the United States of Europe was the 1,000 years of rivalry between the two most populous nations of Pan-Europe: Germany and France. This rivalry could be placated only by joint European efforts. Therefore, Pan-Europe’s main function would be to secure peace by creating a supranational structure, the European federation. The main advantages of a federal union would be the following: security from an inter-European war; the neutralization of Europe in world conflicts; protection against invasion by a Red or White Russian army; the possibility of disarmament; the ability to compete with American and British industries.

Moreover, Pan-Europe would promote economic growth by creating a common market. Nationality problems in Europe would be diminished by means of both economic and political integration, and democratic principles. As a result, borders would gradually lose their significance. There was only one radical way to resolve the problem of European frontiers equitably and enduringly: not by redrawing the frontiers but by suppressing them. What Coudenhove-Kalergi called ‘the European edict of liberation’ deprived state frontiers of their national meaning; the Pan-European security pact would deprive them of strategic meaning; and the Pan-European customs union of economic meaning.

In the 1920s, there was some hope of reconciliation between different nation-states in Europe. In October 1925, the Locarno agreements were concluded between France and Germany on the one hand, Belgium and France on the other. This paved the way to Germany’s admission to the League of Nations in 1926. Moreover, French political leaders such as Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand were attracted to the idea of Pan-Europe.

In October 1924, at the Sorbonne, the French President Herriot pleaded openly for the idea of a United States of Europe. In a speech delivered to the Chamber of Deputies on 29 January 1925, he said that his greatest wish was one day to see the United States of Europe become a reality. Reconciliation between some European nations was a prerequisite for such a venture to be realized. The German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann responded approvingly to this appeal and, as a result, an international discussion on the United States of Europe opened. In 1925, the Inter-Parliamentary Union resolved to work for the realization of a European
Customs Union. In October 1926, the first Pan-European Congress was held in Vienna.

In 1927, French Foreign Minister Briand became the honorary president of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe movement. Briand had been in the office since 1925 and retained the foreign affairs portfolio even after he became Prime Minister in 1929. Briand’s interest in a European federation can be linked to a number of factors. First and foremost, as a realist, he was concerned about French security. Like most of his compatriots he believed that French security could be jeopardized by a German revival. He was convinced, therefore, that French security interests would be best served if Germany could be harnessed to a European framework. Moreover, the idea of Anschluss which the Austrian press brought up and discussed openly from 1927 was anathema to the French. For instance, in 1928, Briand said: ‘L’Anschluss, c’est la guerre’. Hence, a European Union would also provide, in a sense, a practical alternative to the Anschluss.

Briand’s realism was coloured by idealistic overtones due to his socialist background. His concern for international peace was second only to his principal concern for French security. During the signing of the Locarno Treaties, concerning French–German relations, he had already said: ‘No more wars, no more brutal, violent, bloody ways of settling our differences, which certainly have not disappeared.…. Away with rifles, machine-guns, cannons! Room for conciliation, arbitration, and peace!’

Finally, economics influenced Briand’s orientation towards the idea of the European Union. His economic advisor, Louis Loucheur, stated in 1926 that the long-term goal was the constitution of a United States of Europe as the only viable economic alternative for matching the United States of America. Briand himself said, again at Locarno: ‘We are going to find ourselves soon circled by two enormous powers, the United States and Russia. You see that it is indispensable to make the United States of Europe.’ Such views obviously struck a responsive chord in Germany. During the 1927 World Economic Conference, Aristide Briand brought up the prospects for a European economic union with Stresemann. In June 1929, he argued that the problem was no longer ‘one of Germany’s isolation in Europe but one of Europe as a whole in fee to the power of the United States’. When the House of Representatives raised customs tariffs, that move turned the United States into a problem for the whole of Europe.

Soon, in his address to the League of Nations on 5 September 1929, Briand called for the creation of a sort of federal link between the European nations. In the introduction to his speech, he pointed out that the League had to fill in a serious gap in order to reach a peaceful settlement. In fact, he believed that the League functioned slowly and feebly. According to Briand, the association envisaged would be primarily economic. He continued: ‘This association will act especially in the economic domain: it is the most pressing need.’ In contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand emphasized geographical criteria in the making of the European federation. He said: ‘I think that a sort of federal link has to exist between people geographically grouped like the European people.’ Moreover, he was careful to emphasize that this link would not jeopardize the sovereignty of any nation.

Four days after the speech, representatives of 27 European states held a preliminary meeting in Geneva to discuss, at the request of the French, Briand’s
proposed ‘federal link’ between the European states. The representatives, in turn, asked Briand to publish a memorandum on European federation on 1 May 1930. Its final version was transmitted to the European states on 17 May. The most striking difference between the League speech and the subsequent memorandum was the latter’s call to set up European political structures as the necessary foundations for an economic system. In other words, the memorandum brought political issues (peace and security) to the fore over economic matters. The memorandum also made clear that a federation would be built not upon the idea of unity but of union. In other words, it was to be flexible enough to respect the independence and national sovereignty of each state. Moreover, Briand’s memorandum subordinated the European Union to the League and made membership of the League a prerequisite for participation in the Union.

The two events that took place between his speech at the League and the publication of his memorandum probably helped Briand to crystallize his ideas on the European Union. These were the World Economic Crisis of 1929 and the death of the German chancellor and foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann. His death could have a negative bearing on German–French relations, which Briand considered key to European reconciliation. It was Stresemann who had initiated the Locarno agreement with Briand. Within the German Foreign Office, Stresemann was one of the few who had responded positively to the French initiative on a European Union. However, already in February 1930 the crucial meeting between the German and Austrian chancellors on the Anschluss was taking place while the governments of Europe were still waiting for Briand’s report.

Another factor that led Briand to change the content of his speech from 1929 to 1930 was Britain’s coolness to the idea of a United States of Europe. In its reply, the British government was critical of the French suggestion for the creation of a new European Conference and Executive Committee, and perhaps also of a new European secretariat. Their main concern was that these new European institutions would diminish both the efficiency and the authority of the organs of the League. At the same time, by emphasizing that ‘much can be done by political authorities to promote a wider outlook on economic questions’ the British were also concerned about the challenge to Anglo-Saxon economic domination.

Twenty-six European states, including Britain, communicated their replies to the French government, which compiled them into a report nearly a year after Briand’s League of Nations speech. The work on the idea of a European Union officially commenced in the form of a commission of enquiry at Geneva on 29 September 1930. The first session dealt with formalities such as the election of a chairman, appointment of a secretary, composition of the commission and the name of the commission. Aristide Briand was elected as the chairman, while, of the two names proposed, ‘Commission of Enquiry for European Union’ was favoured over ‘Commission of European Union’.

Coudenhove-Kalergi, the idealist, was disappointed with Briand’s memorandum for the following reasons: ‘It rejected a European customs union and scrupulously respected the sovereignty of all nations involved. It avoided intruding upon the authority of the League of Nations. It aimed at no European federation, but an effective League of Nations. It was a substitute, not the real thing.’ In fact, Briand
deliberately refrained from using the term ‘European Federation’. He instead talked about a federal link between the European states.

One could argue that Briand’s efforts for a European Union justified Coudenhove-Kalergi’s words: ‘Far-seeing Frenchmen favored the idea of transforming the provisional system of security now in existence into a permanent one, by establishing a European federation before Germany had recovered from its present inferior military state.’33 However the realism of Briand and the idealism of Coudenhove-Kalergi clashed. Briand cared first about his country’s security as a French political leader. As an intellectual Coudenhove-Kalergi cared more about the interests of Europe as a whole. For him, the European federation would prevent the eruption of new wars, protect individuals against tyrants and finally block the hegemony of one European nation over the others.34

Briand believed that the collaboration of three great powers, France, Britain and Germany, was fundamental for the formation of a new order in Europe.35 In other words, Briand thought that the union should be based on the initiative and the agreement of great powers, whereas Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that a European federation was ‘in the interest of the whole civilized world in preventing the hegemony of one European nation over all others’.36 He assumed that hegemony would not exist in a unified Europe.

For that reason, according to Briand, Britain, which dominated the League, had to be a member of the Union. He believed that it was in France’s interests to cooperate with Britain in order to preserve the peace in Europe. Correspondingly, the role of the League of Nations in this process had different meanings for Coudenhove-Kalergi and Briand. For the French leader, the League was conceived as the locomotive in the formation of a European Union. However, for Coudenhove-Kalergi a European federation was an alternative to the League because of undue British influence in the latter.

Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that if Britain became a member of a European Union it would block the union of European countries since it had so many interests outside Europe. In contrast, Briand’s main concern was to gain the approval of Britain for the European Union project even though the latter was to be subordinated to the League. By signing the Locarno treaty in 1925, Britain was already committed to securing the status quo in Western Europe. British involvement in the European cooperation process was important for French security. Therefore, Briand did not want to alienate Britain by ignoring the role of the League in founding a European Union based on a fragile alliance with Germany.37 This fundamental difference between Briand’s and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas was manifest in their conception of Europe. The former’s geographical concept of Europe was rather narrow. In fact, the core of this limited Europe was made up of the great powers of Western Europe. For that reason, he cared most about the British response to his memorandum.

One could easily make the comparison between ‘the idealism of the cosmopolitan aristocrat’ Coudenhove-Kalergi and the realism of the statesman Briand who naturally thought more in terms of interests and conflict. First, unlike Briand, Coudenhove-Kalergi always emphasized the equality of the peoples and states within a European Union.38 Second, as a cosmopolitan intellectual Coudenhove-Kalergi was always critical of nationalism. His ideal was a Europe without national frontiers.
He believed that cultural nationalism was a menace to the European federation. He complained that the leaders of Europe, with few exceptions, remained blind and deaf to this possibility. He later argued that the policy of national isolationism led to the disastrous Munich Conference.39

To his credit, Aristide Briand was not one of the blinkered leaders of Europe. However, Briand’s mind was not very clear on the nature of his own European Union either. The vagueness of his ideas was reflected in his speech to the League in 1929. There, he spoke of a kind of federal link between European states, but he did not suggest any surrender of sovereignty.40 Moreover, in his 1930 memorandum, backtracking on his early emphasis on the economic issues, he shifted to politics. In addition to that, the terminology that Briand used for a European Union was contradictory. He used the terms such as ‘federal organization of Europe’, ‘European cooperation’, ‘federal link between the European states’, ‘regime of federal union’ as if they all meant the same thing.41

As a French political leader, Briand’s immediate concern was for French security. European peace came second. He counted on British solidarity for French security, while his European policy had to rely on regional pacts with Eastern European states for collective security.42 Therefore, he had to recruit both the British and the Eastern Europeans to his proposed union. In order to lure the Poles into the proposed European Union, the French implied that it would make East European borders more secure. In a sense, it would serve to correct the deficiencies of the Locarno arrangements. This was not an altogether convincing argument, at least initially, for some Eastern European political leaders. Czech Foreign Minister Eduard Benes, for instance, believed that the Briand plan represented a French endeavour to gain greater security at the expense of East European alliances.43

The two projects/proposals for a European Union came around the time when Turkey was trying to break its international isolation and to end its status as an outcast in European politics. On the domestic front, an ambitious modernization programme had been initiated. These two processes worked in tandem in redefining Turkey as a western/European nation-state. When Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropa was first published in 1923, Turkey had just emerged as a sovereign state trying to build a nation and detach itself from the Ottoman past. Considering the magnitude of domestic and international challenges to the viability of the new Turkish state, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s decision to leave Turkey out of his Pan-Europe was probably one of the lesser, if not the least, concerns of Turkish leaders who managed to stabilize both domestic and international conditions by the end of the decade.

In contrast, the Briand proposal first came as a blow to the Turkish pursuit of recognition as a European member of international society in the early 1930s. Briand did not initially include Turkey among the 26 European countries which were invited to discuss his memorandum on the European project. Turkey was excluded from the project for two reasons. First, it was not a member of the League of Nations; second, Turkey was not part of the geographical Europe as defined by Briand whose mindset reflected the realist approach of France concerning the European Union.

Although not officially invited to discuss the project, Ankara was very attentive to Briand’s initiative. Nevertheless, Turkish intellectuals and statesmen remained
sceptical about Briand’s proposal and particularly about the inclusion of Britain. Zeki Mesut (Alsan), an eminent Turkish journalist and jurist of the time, foresaw that Britain would not favour such a project since this was developed as a political move to counter Anglo-American hegemony. For him, Briand’s project was not the product of a unionist approach: in other words, it did not have a congregation of European countries as its goal. On the contrary, Briand’s project was a reflection of the imperialist and chauvinistic aims of the French Prime Minister Poincaré who was seeking to divide the European nations.

On the other hand, the fact that Briand did not include Turkey within the proposed European Union confirmed the existing Turkish suspicions regarding France’s political motives. Many commentators criticized the way in which the French defined the borders of Europe. The Turkish press argued that, for the French, the European border ended at the borders of France and those of its allies. Therefore, the French project was not considered viable because it was based on arbitrary criteria for inclusion. Even though the French ignored it, according to the Turks, Turkey was geographically in Europe, since it was bounded by two European seas: the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Moreover, it was argued that the values and norms accepted by societies were more significant than the geographical criterion in defining Europeanness, which in any case was met by Turkey.

Around that time, Turkey was adopting European institutions in both political and social spheres. For the ruling elite, to become part of a wider European project was the goal. A member of the Turkish Parliament wrote that the European project would not be taken seriously nor would it be successful if it was based on the definition of people as eastern, occidental or Balkan. Instead, people should be distinguished from each other by their civilizations, mentalities and lifestyles.

The political leadership in Ankara was initially confused about the Briand project. Therefore, Ankara failed to contemplate a coherent reaction. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) admitted there was confusion resulting from Briand’s proposal. In a sense, the Turkish leaders of the early 1930s were caught off-guard as they were preoccupied with gaining recognition as a legitimate member of the international community through League of Nations membership. The Turkish leaders believed that Turkey should be part of all international initiatives. By excluding Turkey, the Briand proposal, in a way, set the bar for Turkey’s admission to world councils at a higher level. Consequently, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) criticized the European Union project as planned only for the continent. In his opinion, a harmonious international order could be established only if it included all nations which already had connection with each other in this small world.

Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) later wrote that the reactions of European countries to the Briand project were diverse in the sense that they did not all welcome it. Meanwhile, Ankara lobbied several European countries, namely Italy, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria, to push for the extension of an invitation to Turkey to be a participant in the deliberations on the European Union. Turkish diplomatic lobbying must have paid off, as in their replies to Briand’s memorandum on the Organization of a System of European Federal Union each of these European capitals mentioned, in one form or another, the desirability of Turkey’s inclusion.
While Italy and Germany recommended the participation of both Turkey and the Soviet Union in the European Union project in their responses to Briand, Greece stood out as Turkey’s principal sponsor. Mussolini’s Italy objected to Briand’s project, arguing that France wanted to emphasize the disparity between the victorious and defeated powers of the war. In other words, France intended to ratify only the existing European system and its inequalities. The fascist leader’s professed aim was to put an end to this inequality. In fact, similar arguments were made in the Turkish press at the time. For instance, Muharrem Feyzi (Togay), a columnist in the Turkish daily newspaper Cumhuriyet, wrote that France aimed to establish the European Union based on the division between the victorious and defeated powers of Europe. Leaders of Turkish opinion could not help but sympathize with the Italian criticism of Briand who excluded Turkey from the European project.

At the same time, the Turkish political leadership knew well the real motives behind the Italian opposition to Briand’s project. A major stumbling block in the way of a European Union was the rivalry between Italy and France. Turkish leaders and the press were not convinced that these two countries were ready to give up this rivalry for the sake of a European Union. According to Zeki Mesut (Alsan), the minds of European leaders were not even clear on what Europe was. For instance, he believed that, for France, Europe meant Western Europe, while Germans and Austrians focused on Central Europe and the Italians were interested in creating an Italian-led bloc in Europe.

In fact, the Italians perceived the Briand proposal as an opportunity to capitalize on the increased sense of isolation in Turkey. As an alternative to the exclusivist union idea of France, Mussolini intended to press on with a plan for an Italian–Soviet–Turkish alliance. He thought that the three countries could collaborate in the Black Sea against ‘French intrigues’. Mussolini was also pushing for triangular collaboration against France in the Mediterranean. The fascist leader was working for a Turkish–Greek reconciliation that would lead to a triple alliance with Italy in order to compete with France in that region. At the same time, Mussolini started using the motto ‘the Balkan pact in the same spirit as Locarno’. This spirit was supposed to bring together countries like Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Turkey around Italian leadership in a way that would compel Yugoslavia to bow to Italian pressure, and therefore, to neutralize the Little Entente.

Turkish political leaders had their own concerns regarding France. Ankara particularly resented French foot-dragging in ratifying the French–Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Reconciliation and Arbitration of February 1930. However, Turkey’s suspicions of France did not necessarily prompt Ankara to rush into any alliance system, particularly an Italian-led one. The reserved Turkish attitude towards alliances of unequal strength found its expression in an interview in the Italian daily newspaper Popolo d’Italia with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras, who stated that, as three separate treaties of friendship already bound Turkey, Greece, and Italy, there was no need for an additional tripartite pact.

In fact, to be part of a bloc would not help Turkey to become a member of the League of Nations. Since Turkey wanted to be recognized as a legitimate actor, it could not alienate either Italy or France. For that reason, Prime Minister Ismet
(İnönü) said to the Italian ambassador in Turkey that the Turkish government would consider Briand’s proposal and the Italian response to it together. In other words, İsmet (İnönü) was concerned not only about the Briand initiative but also with the reactions of countries to it. The Turkish press of the time mirrored İnönü’s mindset to a certain extent, as most Turkish newspapers devoted more attention to the Italian reply to Briand’s proposal than the proposal itself. Obviously, in its conception of Europe, Mussolini’s Italy did strike a responsive chord in Ankara.

The issue of extending invitations to the Soviet Union and Turkey was brought up during the first meeting of the second session of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union on 16 January 1931. German and Italian foreign ministers figured prominently in the consequent debate, advocating both Soviet and Turkish participation. Greek Foreign Minister André Michalakopoulos also had no doubts whatsoever regarding Turkey. He stated: ‘it is the opinion of the Greek government that, from an economic and even from the geographical point of view, Turkey belongs to Europe rather than Asia’. In fact, Michalakopoulos argued that Turkish–Greek solidarity was essential for a larger cooperation between the European nations. He also added that the Greco-Turkish friendship was a step towards the realization of the European Union.

The chairman of the Commission, Briand, did not sound very enthusiastic about the participation of states other than those originally invited. He cited procedural (constitutional and jurisdictional) limitations. He was inclined to construe the mandate the Commission received from the Assembly of the League of Nations in a way that ruled out full participation of non-members. According to Briand, the Commission’s mandate was not confined to a discussion of a specific technical issue but might include any international issue under the League’s jurisdiction. For that reason, he expressed concern that accommodating these countries might complicate rather than facilitate the Commission’s work. Finally, he had reservations about extending invitations to such countries before their possible reactions had been investigated. During the deliberations, interestingly, he did not mention Turkey, but only the Soviet Union in the context of participation of European states that were not members of the League of Nations.

Despite Briand’s reservations, the question of Turkish and Soviet incorporation into the Commission led to an agreement among the member states that acted on different yet compatible interests and motives. For instance, Greece and Italy pursued diverging objectives in promoting Turkey’s participation in the works of the Commission of Inquiry from the beginning. Italian diplomatic documents reveal that Rome was concerned about Athens’ enthusiasm regarding Briand’s project. Briand’s proposal, if realized, could stand in the way of Italian plans for creating an Italian-led bloc including Greece and Turkey. Hence, while Rome advocated Turkish participation to complicate and even to undermine Briand’s proposal, Athens saw it as an opportunity to consolidate its newly improved relationship with Ankara.

During the deliberations of the Commission of Enquiry, Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu said his country would welcome participation of these two countries, the moment it appeared expedient. In fact, according to Briand, the Commission was supposed to examine economic problems (as Britain desired) without giving an opinion on the admission for Turkey and the Soviet Union. For Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi, the admission of Turkey and the Soviet
Union was meant to move Britain and Germany away from France. On the other hand, Maarten L. Pereboom wrote that British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur Henderson proved himself to be more amenable to the proposals of German Foreign Minister Julius Curtius and his Italian counterpart Grandi than to that of Briand. At the second session of the Commission in January, Henderson suggested that all European nations be invited to participate in these discussions, whether they were members of the League or not. For him, this would be an experiment which would give the original 27 states an opportunity to decide whether they would like to keep those two non-members in or out of the project.

At the end of deliberations on 20 January 1931, the first resolution the Commission drafted was about inviting Iceland, Turkey and the Soviet Union to join. This resolution was eventually adopted, with Norway, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland maintaining their reservations regarding the issue. Adoption of this resolution cleared the way for Turkey’s official involvement in the work of the Commission of Enquiry beginning with its third session in May. On 20 January 1931, Briand in Geneva wrote to Paris that the French government hoped to see a positive response to the invitation from the Turkish government.

This invitation can hardly be seen as a manifestation of a French change of heart towards Turkey less than a year after Briand’s League of Nations address. At best, it can be regarded as a pragmatic move to prevent Turkey from drifting into the Italian orbit. There were indications that the French were concerned about Italian manipulation of Turkey, even within the framework of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Again in January, for instance, the French diplomats in Rome warned Paris about this possibility, quoting an Italian daily, Giornale d’Italia, which stated: ‘Turkey will accept the invitation of the powers to participate in the work of the conference [on the European Union] and will not forget the friendly attitude of Rome.’

The Italian officials, for their part, did not try to hide this expectation either. After his return to Rome from Geneva, Italian Foreign Minister Grandi informed the Italian delegation that the presence of these two countries in the debates on the Briand project was in the Italian interest. Later, Grandi hinted to the ambassadors of Turkey and the Soviet Union that Italy would support their participation if they declared their preliminary acceptance of the invitation.

The former French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, in his book Europe, published in 1930, wrote that he agreed with the Italian point of view that Russia and Turkey should participate in European Union conferences. In relation to Russian and Turkish participation in these conferences, Herriot talked about absolute equality between all states. Herriot also wrote in his book that the door of Europe should be open to Russia and Turkey because all of them needed each other economically.

In its reply to the invitation, the Turkish government not only confirmed its desire for participation but also its pronounced emphasis on the equality of all participating states. As such an equal, Ankara was convinced that ‘the aim pursued by the States represented on the Commission of Enquiry for European Union can only be achieved by strict adherence to the generally recognized principles of the sovereignty of all participating States, their equality at law’.
invitation was extended, the Turkish government decided to set up two specialized committees to prepare for the forthcoming Commission meetings.\textsuperscript{80}

One committee was to deal with financial, the other with economic matters. Their main task was to draft official Turkish positions on issues that might be brought up in the Commission of Enquiry. The government decree that authorized the establishment of these two committees provides important insights into how the Turkish government viewed the Briand proposal. First, it was realized that the proposal was economically and financially motivated. The decree also reflected the official Turkish mindset that identified Europe as having been ‘artificially divided by the peace treaties concluded after the Great War’.\textsuperscript{81} Hence, from the official Turkish perspective, the initiative was a novel attempt to bring unity on an economic basis to Europe’s existing division.

When the Commission of Enquiry resumed its work in May 1931, the discussions naturally centred on purely economic rather than political issues. Since finding immediate solutions to the World Economic Crisis had priority, no attempt had been made to tackle the political problems that existed between different states. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) was given the opportunity to express his country’s views on the issue. In his address, he pointed out the dangers of confining economic cooperation to a limited number of states or to a particular region. While recognizing the significance of European regional cooperation, Aras maintained that it should not take place at the expense of worldwide cooperation.\textsuperscript{82} By the same token, Aras enthusiastically supported the Soviet proposal for a pact of economic non-aggression.\textsuperscript{83}

While the reluctance of most members of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union to discuss political issues disappointed the Soviets and the Italians, though for different reasons,\textsuperscript{84} Ankara’s resentment stemmed from what it perceived as a complete disregard of the equality principle before and during these conferences. The Turkish press published reports that were critical of the procedures adopted for the meetings by the Commission which were seen as having been guided by Paris. In fact, Paris was determined to keep Turkey and the Soviets out of the organizational process on the grounds that they were not members of the League of Nations. Consequently, during the first meeting, both countries’ representatives felt left out of the work of the Commission as their proposals were not given serious consideration.\textsuperscript{85}

Shortly after attending the third session of the meetings of the Commission for Enquiry into European Union, the Turkish Foreign Minister appeared before the Turkish parliament where he was questioned about the state of affairs in the Commission. From his replies, it is possible to argue that the Turkish leaders or the foreign minister, at least, had come back from Geneva more confused than before about the meaning of Briand’s proposal. While he pointed to the inextricability of economic problems from political ones, his replies to the questions regarding the work of the Commission of Enquiry were in most cases not directly related or relevant to the issue under discussion. Parliamentary debate at that time inevitably boiled down to a discussion of Turkey’s League of Nations membership in conjunction with the European Union proposal of Aristide Briand.\textsuperscript{86}

In subsequent sessions, Turkey solidified its position in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union through its involvement in various committees, including the one that was tasked with studying the Soviet proposal for an economic
non-aggression pact. However, after the death of Aristide Briand in March 1932, the work of the Commission of Enquiry lost much of its momentum. When its sixth session opened with a tribute to the memory of Aristide Briand on 30 September 1932, Turkey was already a full participant owing to its membership in the League of Nations as of 18 July 1932.

Although Briand’s proposal did not materialize, his half-hearted inclusion of Turkey might have served to bring that country into the League as a European country. Indeed, by virtue of its participation in the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, Turkey had already gravitated towards the League, like another international outcast, the Soviet Union. The Turkish diplomats’ expression of their country’s desire to become a member of the League during a session of the Disarmament Conference on 13 April 1932 may be considered as evidence of the Disarmament Conference’s primacy in bringing Turkey into the League. Turkey’s inclusion in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, on the other hand, secured Turkey’s admission to the League as a European rather than an Asian country. League membership, in a way, set the seal on Turkey’s identity as a European country for France as well. Two weeks after Turkey’s admission to the League, the French parliament hailed Turkey’s entry as ‘a moral and political event of extraordinary significance . . . to Europe’s interest’.

Throughout the inter-war years, Turkish diplomats and intellectuals had jealously guarded their countries’ European identity. For instance, in 1934, two years after it had been admitted to the League of Nations, Turkey was elected to succeed China on the League Council. Although this election was regarded as recognition of Turkey’s international prominence, most Turkish commentators were careful to emphasize that the League had made an exception to its established practices by allowing Turkey, a European country, to succeed China, an Asian country, on the Council. For them, to take the place of an Asian country on the Council was acceptable as long as it did not compromise Turkey’s European credentials.

Compared to that of Aristide Briand’s, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s view of Turkey seems to have taken a sharper turn between 1923 and 1934. Interestingly, Coudenhove-Kalergi referred to Turkey’s inclusion in Briand’s project probably to justify his change of mind about Turkey. However, for Coudenhove-Kalergi, unlike Turkey, their participation in the same forum did not qualify the Soviets for inclusion in his Pan-Europe initiative. He firmly disapproved of Soviet incorporation into the Commission, a development which he regarded as pronouncing the end of the Project:

I think it was a great fault to invite Russia to take part in the European Committee [sic] at Geneva, and the effect was to paralyze the Committee’s [sic] work. I have no faith that Pan-Europe will come out of the European Committee [sic] at Geneva now; it will become a platform for discussion between capitalist and Bolshevik systems and no place in which to work for the organization of Europe.

In his first major work, Paneuropa, Coudenhove-Kalergi had regarded the new Turkey as a risk for Balkan countries. One commentator argues,
‘Coudenhove-Kalergi imagine[d] a Russo-Turkish military threat and a U.S. economic and cultural threat’ to Europe.\textsuperscript{96} In 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi himself wrote that Pan-Europe would permanently ensure the existence of the Eastern European states; they would be relieved of the crushing burden of arming themselves. The Little Entente would be secured against the Hapsburg danger; Scandinavia against the Russian; the Balkan countries against Turkey.\textsuperscript{97} He also argued: ‘Turkey, Persia, Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Afghanistan, India, and China are seeking more or less successfully to free themselves from the guardianship of Europe.’\textsuperscript{98}

In the first half of the 1930s, Turkey was among the countries Coudenhove-Kalergi visited in order to enlist allies for his struggle against Nazism. In 1934, Coudenhove-Kalergi published his second book, \textit{Europa Erwacht! (Europe Awake!)}, in which he rejected Nazi theories about nations being naturally given entities.\textsuperscript{99} His visit to Turkey obviously helped him change his mind about this country’s place in Pan-Europe, because in his book published in 1934 Coudenhove-Kalergi included Turkey along with the other Balkan countries within a political Europe. In fact, it was Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)’s reforms that compelled him to reconsider his view of Turkey.\textsuperscript{100} He then considered the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal in the 1930s as a compensation for what had been lost to Europe in the north and in the east as a result of the First World War. For him, this compensation (or gain) resulted from Turkey’s detachment from its past. He regarded it as the outcome of the reform process through which Turkey adopted European culture. He concluded that this development changed Turkey into a member of European civilization.\textsuperscript{101}

Coudenhove-Kalergi welcomed any country which aspired to join European civilization. For instance he wrote: ‘It may be that the two most westernized states of this region [Near East], Turkey and Egypt, would prefer to become members of the European federation instead of joining the Near East, and there is no reason whatsoever why Europe should decline their admission.’\textsuperscript{102}

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s new book interestingly construed Europe as open to Egypt but not to Britain, a hegemonic power. According to him, in a unified Europe none of its smaller nations would have to sacrifice their claims for home rule for the sake of larger market or of greater security within a strong state.\textsuperscript{103} On the other hand, it was out of the question for Briand to invite an ex-British colony, Egypt, to join the European family. Since security had priority over all other factors, the militarily strong countries were the most welcome into a European Union. However, for Coudenhove-Kalergi, countries such as Britain and Russia which were militarily and economically too strong were not to contribute but to challenge such a union.

Coudenhove-Kalergi later wrote in his autobiography:

\begin{quote}
The most important step toward such a new understanding between Europe and the Near East has been accomplished by Modern Turkey, that recently under its leader Kemal Atatürk, embraced without any European pressure all the vital elements of Western civilization. This Turkish Revolution is paving the way for a complete reconciliation between Europe and the Near East.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi was convinced that Turkey was an integral part of Pan-Europe. Interestingly enough, it was the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos who persuaded him that Turkey under the rule of Kemal Atatürk had
become an integral part of Western civilization and that whatever the future of Pan-
Europe, Turkey should be made a part of it. Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote: ‘He
[Venizelos] assured me that Greece could only cooperate with our movement if
Turkey were also included.’105 He also wrote that peace had been concluded between
Turkey and Greece thanks to the two far-sighted and energetic statesmen, Atatürk
and Venizelos. These two statesmen concluded an alliance and hence laid the
foundations of a Balkan union.106

According to Coudenhove-Kalergi, the only bright spot in the dark picture of
continued European strife was the reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. He
argued that while the Franco-German reconciliation had stalled, the reconciliation
between Greece and Turkey constituted a major success in the East in that respect.
The old arch-enemies, Greece and Turkey, had solidified their reconciliation which
provided the core for the Balkan Entente.107 Years later he maintained his positive
view on Turkey and Greece. For instance, he pointed out: ‘Since then I had often
thought of the inspiring example Greece and Turkey had given their sister nations by
securing national peace and prosperity at the price of a generous compromise. I
thought of them now. I compared their attitude with that of France and
Germany.’108 In this comparison, contrary to his view of Turkey and Greece, he
was more pessimistic towards France and Germany. He said: ‘If France . . . recog-
nizes that it cannot destroy Germany without putting itself in danger of death, it
must . . . resolutely take the path of reconciliation.’"109

Another manifestation of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s continued faith in European
integration and its contribution to Turkish–Greek conciliation can be found in a
private letter he wrote years later to Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in
1956 on the Cyprus problem. He proposed a solution that featured a pronounced
European dimension. For him, the best solution would be to admit Turkey, Greece
and an independent Cyprus to the Western European Union (WEU).110

Back in the 1930s, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s inclusion of Turkey in his Pan-Europe
was not devoid of geopolitical considerations or his usual anti-Soviet motives.
Although, at the time, Turkey had been denied full sovereignty over the Straits, he
claimed that European enlargement into south-eastern Europe was significant as the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were now in the hands of a European power, namely
Turkey.111

At this point, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas did not find an echo in the Turkish
leadership or the Turkish public even after he changed his mind about Turkey and its
European identity. At least, the Turkish leaders preferred to avoid being seen as
publicly enthusiastic about, or officially endorsing, Pan-Europe. However unenthu-
siastic or indifferent Ankara seemed in the early 1930s, the government did not turn
down an invitation for Turkish participation in Pan-Europe conferences. Records
available indicate that Turkish Ambassador Çemal Hüsnu (Taray) and Secretary
Nedim Veyssel (Ilkin) to Berne attended the Basel meeting in November 1932 as
official delegates of the Republic of Turkey.112 Coudenhove-Kalergi, for his part,
defined this participation as a manifestation of Turkey’s accession to Europe.
Reportedly, these two official Turkish delegates were very active in the deliberations
on economic issues.113

Notwithstanding knowledge of, and involvement in, Pan-Europe at the official
level, there is interestingly no evidence that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on Europe
were popular with (or ever allowed to be disseminated to) the Turkish public. His popularity came a little later and in a somewhat different, though related context. Turkey’s nascent liberal movement discovered Coudenhove-Kalergi only when he published *Totaler Straat-totaler Menchs (Totalitarian State versus Man)*, which offered an extremely critical view of totalitarianism. Excerpts from the book were published first in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s pro-European and uniquely liberal weekly *Fikir Hareketleri*, between January and March 1939.\(^{114}\) The whole book was translated into Turkish by Galip Kemal Söylemezoğlu, the last Ottoman Ambassador to Czarist Russia.\(^{115}\) In one sense, the translator’s introduction to the book reveals a lack of knowledge or awareness of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe initiative in Turkey. Söylemezoğlu (mis)identifies Coudenhove-Kalergi as the son of a Japanese mother and an American father, yet allows that ‘he is one of the well-known philosophers and sociologists of our time’.\(^{116}\)

What is more interesting is that although known as a pro-European weekly, Yalçın’s *Fikir Hareketleri*,\(^{117}\) which published translations of a number of works on the idea and spirit of Europe\(^{118}\) as well as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s later work on totalitarianism, did not carry any reference to his Pan-Europe vision. Furthermore, there is no record that his books were read by, or placed in the personal library of, President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who, in the 1930s, was known to be an avid reader of books on civilization.\(^{119}\)

In view of the evidence that Coudenhove-Kalergi and his influential Pan-Europe were known at least to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, why his ideas, which had evolved in a positive way that endorsed Turkey’s European identity, failed to permeate or were not allowed to be disseminated by the press to the Turkish public begs an explanation. The first reason that comes to mind is Coudenhove-Kalergi’s strong and unrelenting anti-Soviet stand. His conception of Pan-Europe retained a pronounced anti-Soviet rhetoric and spirit, even after he changed his mind about Turkey. Considering that, at the time, Ankara cared more about its cordial relations with the Soviets than any other country, the Turkish leaders’ reluctance to be associated openly with an anti-Soviet movement might be understandable. The Turkish leaders, including President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself, reportedly intervened personally on other occasions in the 1930s to prevent the airing of anti-Soviet views in public.\(^{120}\)

Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s conception of Pan-Europe inevitably presented the new Turkish rulers with a dilemma regarding sovereignty. In the 1920s and 1930s, the new republic was struggling to recover its sovereignty and rid itself of the remnants of the Ottoman capitulations. While Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe called for participating states to make concessions from their sovereignty in a somewhat supranational entity, Ankara was preoccupied with gaining full sovereignty, particularly in the realm of economics. Therefore, Ankara’s immediate objectives were not compatible with some of the founding principles of Pan-Europe.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that pan-regions or pan-ideas did not have much of an appeal for Turkish leaders or the public because of their experiences during the First World War. The new rulers of Turkey had witnessed first-hand a succession of pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist ideas, espoused to save the ailing Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II had
tried pan-Islamism, which was supposed to appeal to the Muslims of the Empire in the face of the Western (Christian) threat. On the eve of the First World War, it evidently failed and was succeeded by pan-Turkism aimed at bringing the Turks together in a homeland stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia. The latter was regarded as having generated even more dramatic and destructive consequences at the hands of Enver Paşa, resulting in a waste of the Empire’s dwindling manpower resources in military adventures that hastened its collapse. Hence, these two previous experiences with pan-ideas probably cast their shadows over the minds of Turkish leaders in shaping their perception and understanding of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe.

In the 1930s, the new Turkish state was gradually brought into the European fold through participation in two significant European Union projects of the time. It should be noted that Greece, or the Venizelist government in Greece to be precise, played a profoundly important role in the process by sponsoring Turkey’s inclusion into both Briand’s and Coundenhove-Kalergi’s projects. Of these two, Turkish leaders and public could relate more effectively and more easily to Briand’s European Union than to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe for two reasons. First, Briand’s proposal called for an intergovernmental setting which was acceptable for the sovereignty-conscientious Turks. Second, the new Turkish state was seeking an organic presence in the European state system. Admission to the League of Nations was regarded as a way-station to such an organic presence. Since Briand’s proposed European Union would form within the framework of the League, it added yet another layer of obstacles to the Turkish admission to the European state system. Ankara’s success in breaking its international isolation and securing an invitation to the Commission of Enquiry for European Union was certainly linked to political rivalries in Europe and, in particular, to the balancing acts on the part of Italy and Germany against France on the continent. In this context, Italian insistence on Soviet and Turkish inclusion in the work of the Commission of Enquiry point to a continuity and consistency in Italian thinking.

For instance, a year after Briand’s proposal, in response to the 1929 economic crisis, various proposals and counter-proposals were made regarding the elimination of tariffs and other barriers among the countries in Central Europe. Both Italy and France tried to modify the proposed schemes to suit their political interests in the region. One tactic Rome frequently resorted to was an ‘attempt to enlarge technical difficulties by pleading for the inclusion of Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Poland and Turkey, who would be counted on to make negotiations more complicated and lengthy and, if none the less succeeded, to counterbalance the influence of the Little Entente’. Though less vocal and assertive than the Italians, there is evidence to suggest that the Germans had similar motives in mind when they advocated Turkey’s inclusion in Briand’s project. After his conversation with his German colleague, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Hüseyin Ragip (Baydur) reported that as Germany was inclined to view Briand’s proposal as a move to ratify the existing Versailles order, it would attempt to dilute the proposal rather than reject it outright. Therefore, the great powers’ rivalry in Europe earned Turkey a place in the institutions of Europe during the inter-war period.
On the ideational aspect of European integration, the available records do not suggest that the Turkish leadership or public could relate as much to the most prominent initiative in this regard. Although Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas on Turkey and its place in Pan-Europe had turned around radically during the period from the 1920s to the 1930s, it is not possible to find a trace of his influence among the most ardent pro-European intellectuals of the time in Turkey. This lack of awareness and appreciation of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe has continued up to now. It may reflect a general failure to articulate the European Union as an ideal beyond its economic and political dimensions. The Turkish case, so far, stands in stark contrast to the experience of newcomers to the current European Union from East and Central Europe where Coudenhove-Kalergi’s utopia had been quickly rediscovered and frequently cited as a justification for these countries’ claims for a place in the European Union. Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Pan-Europe are yet to be discovered (rather than rediscovered) in Turkey.

Notes

4. A rather curious and controversial contribution to the debate on Turkey’s European identity was made by former French President Jacques Chirac, who justified his support for the Turkish EU bid by referring to the Byzantines as ancestors common to the Turks and the Europeans. He said: ‘Voilà comment se présentent les choses. Alors que l’on me dise: ‘mais les Turcs ne sont pas Européens’, cela n’a pas de sens. D’ailleurs vous savez, nous sommes tous des enfants de Byzance!’ [This is how the things are presented. They might tell me: ‘but the Turks are not Europeans’, This is nonsense. You already know we are all children of the Byzantium]. Débat de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à l’occasion de la XIVème Cité de la réussite, avec des jeunes sur le thème des ‘nouvelles frontières’, animé par M. Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, Marseilles, 14 Nov. 2004, available at http://www.elysee.fr/root/bank/print/22680.htm (accessed 1 May 2007). Also see ‘Hepimiz Bizans’ın Çocuklarıyız’ [We are all children of the Byzantium], Milliyet, 16 Nov. 2004. For a rather implicit and a more subtle expression of a similar claim, see T. Özlü [G. Aktan], Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (Nicosia: Rüstem & Brother, 1991), pp.141–83.
8. Ibid., p.89.
10. Ibid., p.90.
19. Pereboom, Democracies, 146. In his conversation with a German diplomat, Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Briand said that the American tariff increase had come at the right time for him; it was a real boon, because it made it clear to Europe that she must cooperate if she did not want to remain helpless, and she must have something to offer in opposition to this hemming in. Rubarth, Three Men Tired, pp.244–5.
28. On 24 October 1924 and 25 January 1925, French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot had given two speeches on the realization of a United States of Europe. This idea was discussed in the Reichstag in May 1925 and the German SPD included support for a United States of Europe in its September 1925 Heidelberg programme. P.M.R. Stirk, A History of European Integration since 1914 (London: Continuum, 2001), p.29.
29. Ibid., p.38.
33. Ibid., p.121
34. Ibid., pp.252–7.
40. Stirk, A History of European Integration, p.35.
50. Ibid., p.76. The British Ambassador in Turkey wrote that Tevfik Rüştü was planning to have an official visit to Moscow to discuss especially the idea of Pan-Europa among other issues. PRO FO 14585 E 4975/3476/44, 15 Sept. 1930, f.3.
51. See League of Nations, Documents relating to, pp.23, 32, 37, 43, 61.
52. Petricioli argues that Italy was fighting against the French hegemony in Europe either by a rapprochement with Britain (as in the naval disarmament conference), or by forming an entente with Berlin or by drawing new forces such as Turkey and the Soviet Union into the European system. M. Petricioli, ‘Dino Grandi et la Réponse Italienne’, in Le Plan Briand d’Union Fédérale Européenne, pp.331–46. Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen believed that Italy had pressed for an invitation to Turkey and the Soviet Union as a means of killing the scheme (possibly discrediting the League). Pereboom, Democracies, p.167.
53. T.C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), 254.712.20, Foreign Minister Aras to Prime Minister İnönü, 3 Aug. 1930.
56. There was a series of articles on the topic in Cumhuriyet and Hakimiyeti Milliye in 1930 and 1931.
58. Archivio Storico della Ministerio Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Pacco 1732/8021, 17 Nov. 1930.
60. Ibid.
63. ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 8 Sept. 1930.
64. For Turkish press coverage see Ayn Tarihi, No. 77 (Aug. 1930), pp.6430–41.
65. The Italians argued that the participation of these two countries in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union was vital to the viability of the European project. Their support for the Soviet and Turkish participation was meant to serve as gesture of goodwill towards these two countries. It could not be construed per se as Italian support for Briand’s ‘artificial’ conception of Pan Europe. MAE, Série Y Internationale, Vol.631/632, No.5, 5 May 1931, p.157.
68. League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Minutes of the Second Session, p.27.
69. ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021 Turchia, 4 Nov. 1930.


72. For Henderson’s remarks, see League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Minutes of the Second Session, p.28.

73. Although reserved about the Commission’s expansion, Denmark insisted on the inclusion of Iceland among the European states to be invited. Ibid., p.24.

74. Ibid, 40 and 81. Although reserved about the Commission’s expansion, Denmark insisted on the inclusion of Iceland among the European states to be invited. Ibid., p.24.


76. Ibid, 40 and 81. Although reserved about the Commission’s expansion, Denmark insisted on the inclusion of Iceland among the European states to be invited. Ibid., p.24.


80. BCA, 19.27.3, Government Decree, 9 May 1931, and 19.27.5, Government Decree, 10 May 1931.


82. See for instance, C. Tukin, Bugün Avrupa Devletler Manzumesinin Doğuşu ve Türkiye’nin Bu Manzumeye Duhulda [Emergence of Contemporary European States System and Turkey’s Inclusion in it], Konferanslar Seri: 1-Kitap 18 (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayını, 1938).

83. For Turkish press coverage of the issue, see Ayın Tarihi (Oct. 1934), pp.181–3 and 218–28.


85. For the Soviet account of the Briand proposal, see V. Potyemkin et al., Uluslararası İlişkiler Tarihi: Diplomasi Tarihi [History of International Relations: Diplomatic History], Vol.4, trans. Attila Tokatlı (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1980), p.95.

86. Ibid., p.67.

87. BCA, 222.498.4, Foreign Minister Aras to Prime Minister İnönü, 5 Aug. 1932.

88. See for instance, C. Tukin, Bugün Avrupa Devletler Manzumesinin Doğuşu ve Türkiye’nin Bu Manzumeye Duhulda [Emergence of Contemporary European States System and Turkey’s Inclusion in it], Konferanslar Seri: 1-Kitap 18 (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayımı, 1938).

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93. BCA, 19.27.3, Government Decree, 9 May 1931, and 19.27.5, Government Decree, 10 May 1931.

94. Ibid., p.198.

95. Ibid., p.198.

96. Ibid., p.198.

97. Ibid., p.198.

98. Ibid., p.198.

99. Ibid., p.198.
