Week 5 - Globalization, Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Populism
• Leftist (e.g. Latin America) and rightist (e.g. Europe, Asia) versions of neo-populism and neo-authoritarianism

• Different responses to globalization? Cosmopolitanism?
• Populist solutions to:

• Loss of economic security

• Loss of identity
Urban transformation in Istanbul and Budapest

- Conservative and traditional enterprises: «Reconstruction» of İstanbul and Budapest to mirror their «glorious past».
- Metropolises as arenas of ideological battles.
Urban transformation in Istanbul and Budapest

Historically, Taksim and Kossuth Squares were important venues for the expression of political, social and sexual identities.
Massive rally at Taksim Square on 1st May, 1977
2013 Istanbul, LGBT Pride at Taksim Square
«Neoliberal governmentality»

- Reducing lived spaces to commodities to be consumed.
  - Urban transformation / gentrification plans
  - No taking into account of local needs and conditions
  - Depriving historically important spaces from their meanings.
  - Re-invention of authoritarianism
«Neoliberal governmentality»

Both parties:

• Socio-political conservatism
• Styles of leaders
• Claims to define and occupy the central pillar of strength in politics
• Engagement of religion with politics: «conservative democrats».
«Neoliberal governmentality»

Urban transformation in Tarlabası (an impoverished district in İstanbul).

«We are not occupants but entitled to this property; free title of property is our right!»
İstanbul

• Formative years (1923-45) of the Turkish Republic
  – ambitious infrastructural projects, including the construction of roads, railroads, bridges, institutional buildings, and the implementation of uniform urban plans that were meant to transform the appearance of the country.
  – symbolizing modernity, progress and the birth of a new independent republic.
  – At the same time marginalized previously important public sites and symbols of collective identity such as mosques and religious lodges
  – About «power relations»: It enabled the state to assume a more active role in shaping the daily life of its citizens.
İstanbul

• Introduction of multiparty system and the election of Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) in 1950

  – re-promoted the spatialization of Islamic identity that the early Republican fathers had considered incompatible with their modernist imagination of ‘New Turkey’. 
İstanbul

  – Supported by urban poor and the relatively uneducated sections of the growing metropolitan cities and the conservative countryside.

  – More and more visibility in the urban space:
    • Commemorative ceremonies throughout the holy month of Ramadan
    • Communal services such as free meals evoking the religious memories from the Ottoman past.
İstanbul

• İstanbul, «the global city»
  – «Gecekondu»s constructed by migrant workers from the early 1950s to the late 1980s
  – Image of «global city» was constructed by state authorities and major business groups: gecekonduşs are not compatible with this image!
  – Real estate and construction sector and urban renewal projects: main pillars of the AKP's economic orientation and ‘success’.
  – In collaboration with TOKİ (the State Housing Administration) operating under the Prime Minister's office, the municipality of Istanbul demolished neighborhoods to build highways and high-rise buildings, eventually pushing the working class to peripheral areas.
İstanbul

«Mega Project» of İstanbul
İstanbul

- İBB’s redevelopment plan for Istanbul's informal settlements
  - threatened public spaces such as parks and forests and the privatization of historical monuments due to the AKP's ‘increasing self-entitlement to privatize public assets’ (Example: plans to construct a replica of the 19th century Ottoman Barracks to replace Taksim Gezi Park).

Levent (district of İstanbul) seen from Ayazma.
İstanbul

• AKP-led urban transformation not only entails grounding neoliberalism in the material environment, but it also projects a neo-authoritarian vision about nationhood and national history through envisioning buildings that serve culture for the public.

  – Symbolic importance of Halil Paşa Topçu Kışlası for its role during the incident on 31 March 1909
Budapest

• Elite-led democratic transition in the 1990s.

• Urban landscape affected by neoliberal economic transformation
  
  – globalized urban strategy of gentrification, mainly in the form of ‘urban rehabilitation’ projects.
Budapest

- **Fidesz**: ultraliberal when it comes to tax and social policy, but remains paternalistic on the issue of decreasing utility costs, i.e. energy and water charges for families.
  - aims to bolster the civic city-dweller, the bourgeoizification of Hungarian society, and enrich the middle class with traditionally conservative moral and cultural codes and entrepreneurial values, while attacking the left-liberal factions as sources of decadence.
Budapest

The name of the «Roosevelt Square» replaced by «Széchenyi», a national hero.
Budapest

Reconstruction of Kossuth Tér, historical square full of collective memories.
Limits of Neoliberal governmentality at urban scale

• «Right to the city» (Lefebvre)

Gezi Parkı Protests at Taksim Square in 2013
Limits of Neoliberal governmentality at urban scale

• Less radical protests in Hungary

Protests in 2011 against the new media law of Fidesz
Question: What would be «undemocratic» in these urban transformations shaped by conservative ideologies and neoliberal policies?
Varieties of Populism in a Changing Global Context

The Divergent Paths of Erdoğan and Kirchnerismo
«Neoliberal globalization»

• Rise of the «Washington consensus»
  – widespread optimism in the dominant policy and academic circles concerning the benefits of liberalization and free markets.

• Reversal of the early optimism during the course of the 1990s
  – Frequency of the financial crises experienced in the global south
  – Inegalitarian nature of neoliberal reforms
  – «Post-Washington Consensus»
«Post-Washington Consensus»

• Leftist-populist turn in Latin America
  – Softer, more market-friendly version: Kirchners in Argentina, Lula in Brazil
  – More radical version: Chávez in Venezuela

• Similar developments in Turkey
  – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP as a similar case to the soft versions of the leftist-populist turn in Latin America
Argument: High public discontent accompanying the difficulties and crises associated with the policies of the Washington Consensus has generated a variety of populist responses in the global south.
«Populism»

«A mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages.» (Barr)
Common points:

- Rhetorical appeals against the power elite

- In order for a politician’s claim of being the people’s voice against the entrenched power elite to be credible, he or she must be considered either an outsider to the political establishment or a «maverick».

- Emphasis on plebiscitary linkages between the political actors and the citizens
«Populism»

• Populism of successive Kirchner governments:
  – Against power elite: “¡Que se vayan todos!” (“All of them must go!”)
  – Presenting themselves as being outside of Peronist establishment
  – «Supreme Court should respect the popular will»

• Erdoğan governments
  – Image of «Man of the people» away from political elites
  – Plebiscitary view of democracy and a concomitant disdain for institutions of horizontal accountability
«Populism»

- But divergent ways:

Kirchners’ left-wing populism seeking, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities.

Erdoğan’s right-wing populism rather than placing redistributive policies and social equality at the top of their programmatic agenda; it prioritizes economic stability and physical security.
Kirchners’ left-wing populism

• Three features:
  
  – Emphasis on a competitive real exchange rate to support domestic industry and employment
  
  – Support for labor
  
  – Frequent and substantial state interventions in the economy through regulations, subsidies, social programs, and nationalization (SCRER)
Kirchners’ left-wing populism

Figure 2  Real Minimum and Average Wages in Argentina and Turkey, 2002–2010

Note: Real average wages reflect wages for private sector workers in both countries.
Erdoğan’s right-wing populism

• Three features of Erdoğan’s policy following the 2001 crisis:
  
  – Retreat of the state to a primarily regulatory function

  – Emphasis on pro-capital policies and a general neglect of labor interests

  – A rather reactive and conservative macroeconomic policy-making
Why divergence?

• Four factors are essential for understanding why the Erdoğan governments followed a right-wing strand of populism while the Kirchner governments had a strongly left-wing tone:

  – Perceptions of the causes of previous economic policies’ failure that culminated in the crises of 2001–02 in both countries

  – Integration patterns into the international economy

  – Strength of labor

  – Regional dynamics
Problem of democratic deficit

• The plebiscitarian view of democracy

  – O’Donnell’s model of «delegative democracy,» characterized by an elected executive who considers himself as entitled to govern as he sees fit.

  – Authoritarian tendencies, most notably in the realms of the freedom of the press, judicial processes, excessive concentration of power in the executive, and a lack of tolerance for the opposition.