Review Essay

Is Turkish Secularism Antireligious, Reformist, Separationist, Integrationist, or Simply Undemocratic?


Turkey often presents itself, and is often hailed by its allies, as being a positive example of secular democracy for Muslim countries to emulate. Scholars analyze the country as a relatively successful case of secular modernization and state-building in a postimperial, Muslim-majority society. At the same time, Turkish state-dominated secularism (laiklik) has long been criticized as an undemocratic or even unsecular model. But critical accounts often make mutually exclusive and contradictory assertions regarding the nature of Turkish secularism. The question is: What exactly went awry with laiklik?

Three Criticisms of Laiklik

Critics have put forward three major empirical and theoretical claims.

(I) Put simply, the first one asserts that the Turkish state has been hostile to religion, whereas Turkish society and culture are mainly Muslim-conservative, which creates an undemocratic and oppositional state–society relationship. For example, Hakan Yavuz wrote that “modern Turkey, like a transgendered body with the soul of one gender in the body of another, is in constant tension. . . .


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soul of white Turkey and its Kemalist identity is in constant pain and conflict with the national body politic of Turkey.”

(II) The second criticism is related to the first one but makes more specific assertions regarding the public role of religion. It contends that Turkish secularism removes, or at least tries to remove, religion from the public sphere. For example, Ahmet Kuru maintains that laiklik reflects “assertive secularism,” which is “incompatible with any religion that has public claims. . . . The assertive secularists, such as the Republican People’s Party and the majority of military generals and high court judges, want to confine religion, in general, and Islam, in particular, to the private sphere. Yet the passive secularists, including conservative parties (for example, the ruling Justice and Development Party) and groups (for example, the Gülen movement) . . . [want that] the secular state play a “passive” role . . . avoiding the establishment of any religions . . . [and allowing] public visibility of religion.”

Thus, the second criticism makes three analytically separate but practically interrelated assertions. The first one is about state institutions and practices and claims that these remove, or are at least aimed at removing, religion from public sphere. The second one is about the ideologies, goals, and intentions that underlie these institutions and practices. It maintains that these negate and are incompatible with any public role of religion. Finally, the third assertion claims that prosecular political and state actors endeavor to privatize religion while conservative parties including the Muslim-conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) want to “passively” protect the freedom of public religion while avoiding state promotion of any particular religion.

(III) A third type of criticism makes very different observations regarding the nature of Turkish secularism. It argues that Turkish secularism controls but also promotes Islam. Andrew Davison

3. The term “white Turkey” does not refer to an actual racial or ethnic distinction but is a figurative term some critics use to denote prosecular segments of Turkish society. Kemalism refers to the worldview and secular-nationalist reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). See Hakan M. Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2000): 21.
puts it succinctly: “The new Kemalist state never made religion or Islam an entirely separate (and, thus, ‘private’) matter. Rather, in its terms, it ‘rescued Islam’ as a matter of ‘belief’ and ‘conscience’ by institutionally supporting, financing, and promulgating a different version of Islam... Islam was not disestablished; it was established differently.” This perspective also makes two assertions, one about state institutions and practices and the other about actor intentions and ideologies. First, it maintains that state practices control but also support and promote selected versions of Islam in public. Second, it contends that despite their suppression of facets of Islam that were deemed to be backwards, superstitious, or pro–ancient regime (the Ottoman state that the republic replaced), actor intentions that shaped Turkish secularism included those that sought to reform Islam and promote it for nation-building, public morality, and bolstering state legitimacy.

This third criticism of Turkish secularism is empirically and theoretically incompatible with the first two. The state cannot simultaneously oppress/privatize and establish/promote religion. Unless one works with a more nuanced theoretical and conceptual framework, it is also logically impossible to claim that state institutions and practices are intended to do both at the same time.

Kuru and Alfred Stepan hold that the third criticism (III) is compatible with their own claims (I and II) that Turkish secularism removes religion from the public sphere. I cannot see how this is possible. Whether or not the Turkish state removes, or tries to remove, religion from the public realm is an empirically testable claim. This can be done for example by counting changes in the number of mosques, identifying state involvement in their construction, and observing other religion-related state practices in public realms such as education, social policy, public security, national defense, and regulation of the public sphere. The first and second criticisms become untenable if it is shown that the Turkish state publicly promotes religion, at least in some important public spheres.

Similarly, claims regarding actor ideologies and intentions that produce these state practices can be verified or falsified through careful historical and ethnographic studies. Representative samples of resources such as actor statements, memoirs, and records of parliamentary debates can help to show actors’ goals and intentions during different periods. What did prominent political actors have in mind

when they were laying the foundations of major state institutions and practices during the formative years of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s? How did their goals and perceptions change from the late 1940s onward when state institutions and practices were partially and gradually transformed, and secularist politics partially moderated, as a result of competitive politics? Interviews with representative samples of politicians and public officials, participant observation, systematic content analyses of representative texts, and systematic analyses of laws and official documents can help to reveal the thinking and intentions of current political actors and state officials. Insofar as such studies find that the motivations and self-justifications of actors included any attempts to reform Islam, this would contradict another claim of Kuru and Stepan. This claim is that Turkish laicism was a top-down, foreign project in contrast with the indigenous and more bottom-up development of French laicism.

Why Is This Debate Important?

This debate has significant theoretical and empirical import for broader discussions regarding different institutional, political, and ideological conceptions of secularism and their relationships to democracy. The Turkish case of secularism, to which studies often refer as a crucial case, needs to be adequately analyzed and correctly categorized to contribute to these debates. The first and second criticisms describe a separationist and hostile state–religion relationship. The third criticism portrays an integrationist and symbiotic relationship where the state is the controlling and dominant party.

But proper description of Turkish secularism is also important because it has major practical and political consequences. If we can correctly infer the flaws of Turkish secularism, then we can have a better idea about how to reform the state–religion relationship in Turkey and generate more reliable lessons for successful democratization in other Muslim countries.

The Arab Spring has repositioned Islamist or Muslim-conservative actors as the dominant political actors in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. It has also launched these polities on courses of uncertain change and transition as they try to build new democratic institutions. Meanwhile, in Turkey the AKP has been in government since 2002 and secured path-breaking political and economic reforms. With the AKP as the dominant political actor and growing criticisms that the government is turning more religious and authoritarian, Turkey is also in a time of uncertain transformation and trying to reform its troubled democratic institutions by writing a new constitution and other efforts. What kind of a state–religion relationship and, for that matter, state–society relationship should the ongoing Turkish and Arab reform processes seek to construct? The three criticisms generate very different and often conflicting policy implications for advancing these processes of democratization.

If the first and second criticisms are right (i.e., if the Turkish example’s problems are laiklik’s hostile relationship with the religious body politic, its antireligious bias, and its removal of religion from the public sphere), then the main remedy would be to focus on improving religious freedoms and on creating more public space for religion. Legal and institutional changes would structure a more accommodationist relationship (or perhaps even an integrationist relationship to compensate for past oppression) between state and majority religion. By contrast, if the problem is that laiklik harbors state support as well as control of majority religion (as the third criticism implies), then the main remedy would be to launch legal and institutional reforms that would create a more separationist relationship between state and majority religion. Furthermore, the reforms should concentrate on securing better protection of


both secular and religious freedoms, not only religious freedoms, the latter including minority religious freedoms.\textsuperscript{14}

In a nutshell, we have an empirical and theoretical puzzle with major political and practical implications. This puzzle needs to be addressed with fine-tuned, theoretically informed, and empirically grounded case studies, systematically collected evidence, and theoretical and conceptual rethinking.

**What Went Wrong with *Laiklik* and Why?**

Against this background, the volume edited by Berna Turam (*Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in Play in Turkey*) makes a very timely and valuable intervention. The book is primarily focused on the debate between the first and third criticisms. But the contributions in the book equally inform us in the debate between the second and third criticisms.

The main goal of the book is to overcome simplistic theoretical/conceptual frameworks that pit a secularist state against a pious civil society. Aptly, Turam highlights the “misperceptions that have predominantly juxtaposed the secular state against the pious in society in the Middle East” (p. 2).

Separate chapters in the book commendably focus on different public domains and show how the first and second criticisms are contradicted by empirical evidence. And, in support of the third criticism, they show that *laiklik* establishes and promotes a version of Sunni Islam that the laic state deems to be reformed, enlightened, and “correct.”

Yeşim Bayar’s chapter offers evidence that suggests that, while secularizing the education system, Turkey’s Kemalist founders did not intend to discard religion altogether. They viewed a nationalized, civic Islam as instrumental for moral education and nation-building. Sinem Gürbey argues that even though Turkish laws are secular, the Turkish state continues to rely on religion to discipline individuals “into obedient political subjects” (p. 50). She demonstrates that the Turkish military actively nurtures religious sentiments to encourage nationalism and self-sacrifice for the homeland.

Umut Azak examines the elite debates that led to the vernacularization of *ezan* (call to prayer) during the 1930s and shows that the issue at stake was the encouragement of a “pure” and “Turkish” Islam rather than the mere suppression of Islam. Importantly, he also argues that although the conservative Democrat Party brought back

the Arabic ezan and allowed relatively more religious autonomy after the transition to democracy in 1950, it did not want to relinquish state control over religious institutions and education (p. 69).

Metin Heper holds that Kemalist reforms envisioned a “cognitive revolution” aimed at “educating rational citizens” rather than a “cultural revolution” in line with the first criticism. I should highlight that the former goal appears to have produced an unequal state–society relationship as much as the second goal would. Nevertheless, I think that this is an important distinction that generates different theoretical and practical implications and invites more nuanced formulations of Turkish modernization. Heper also uses findings from public opinion surveys to dispel secular concerns about religious social pressures on secular freedoms. For example, a 2006 survey found that the main motivation that Turkish women cited when explaining why they covered themselves with different types of headgear and veiling was their own religious beliefs (71.6 percent of covered women) rather than “because others too cover themselves” (7.6 percent). He also notes that the overwhelming majority of the public did not consider the Islamic headscarf issue to be problematic.15 But Heper’s evidence is insufficient to support his argument. Majority public opinion can hardly be a guarantee against public restrictions imposed by a semidemocratic and domineering state or against social pressures exerted by well-organized small groups, which can target secular as well as religious freedoms. These freedoms can be better protected with clearly formulated rights and freedoms that are effectively enforced by well-developed and well-designed democratic institutions. Equally important are the “contingent consent” of the main political actors that would back these institutions and an accountable and responsive state.16

Esra Özyürek studies secular Turkish actors’ reactions against Christian missionaries and the small minority of Christian Turks. Her chapter demonstrates that Islam continues to be central to the national identity of secular as well as pious Turks. And, contrary to what the first and second criticisms contend, there is much continuity between the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in this respect. Finally, Tuğrul Keskin’s and Devrim Yavuz’s chapters reveal that pious economic actors have long been active and increasingly

pivotal (as opposed to peripheral) participants of Turkey’s socioeconomic development, defying explanations based in the first criticism. These actors helped to shape and were also transformed by the country’s developmental path. This has been especially but not exclusively true since the transition to relatively open and market-based economic development after the 1980s.

The book has one main weakness, as a result of which its true potential is not completely realized. It successfully challenges journalistic and scholarly misconceptions that simply pit a secular state against a pious society. But then it is content arguing instead that the state–society relations (in Turkey and the Middle East) are “constantly shifting” and “more complex.” I suppose this could be said about any state–society relationship. The book could, but unfortunately does not, try to tell us how we should conceptualize the Turkish state–society relationship as an alternative to simplistic accounts.

This weakness is partially addressed by an insightful afterword by Güneş Murat Tezcür. He successfully challenges what he calls the “secular religious polarization perspective based on a lasting and encompassing cultural divide” by arguing that intra-elite power struggles rather than a cultural divide shaped the evolution of the state–society relationship in Turkey (p. 195). During these struggles, the secular elite’s attempts to maintain their power led to many inclusive, engaging, and accommodationist practices vis-à-vis religion and the pious segments of society. An unintended consequence was that “Islamic life spheres were no longer sustainable as self-contained and insulated entities that claimed an exclusive alternative to the modernism of the Turkish Republic and the West” (p. 199). And, he rightly observes that “political actors often enter into coalitions that transcend the secular–religious divide; cleavages are multidimensional and may exhibit significant subnational variation” (e.g., with respect to Turkey’s Kurdish minority) (p. 204).

I think Tezcür could also further develop the implications of his observations but he does not. Although ideology (but not simply religious versus antireligious or positivist ideology) was instrumental in forming actors’ intentions, politics was the primary dynamic that shaped the evolution of Turkish secularism. The evidence presented in this book and in others implies a state–religion relationship that is shaped by politics on the one hand and by Turkish pro-Islamic and prosecular elite attempts to control, reform, and instrumentalize Islam on the other. The outcome is a weakly democratic and weakly secular model that publicly promotes majority religion in many contexts and restricts both religious and secular freedoms in many other contexts. Both religious and secular actors embrace this model to differing degrees, albeit with different
ideological justifications and objectives. The key problems of Turkish secularism are the unequal state–society relationship it creates, the integrationist, interventionist, and unaccountable state institutions that enforce and implement it, and its inability to sufficiently protect religious as well as secular freedoms, both because of its own structure and because of the weaknesses of the accompanying legal and political institutions.

Is Laiklik Becoming Less Interventionist and More Tolerant?

If the first and second criticisms were correct, Turkey would have evolved into a less integrationist and less interventionist model of state–religion relationship with the “conservative democratic” AKP government. More precisely, the purportedly “passive secular” AKP rule would have given rise to less government involvement in religious affairs. Most evidence, however, is to the contrary. Since 2002, government policies increased state interference with and promotion of religion instead of moving in the direction of a fuller separation of religion and state.

A less integrationist model could have evolved, for example, by either dismantling or downsizing the state agency Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) or by reorganizing it into a less interventionist and more inclusive and representative organization (of non-Sunni Muslim beliefs). Legally, the main functions of the Diyanet are “to run the affairs related to the beliefs, acts of worship, and moral principles of the religion of Islam, to enlighten society about religion, and to govern places of worship.”

The Diyanet is also constitutionally tasked with promoting “national solidarity and unity.” It actively supports an official version of Sunni Islam at the expense of other religions, interpretations, and sects, for example by training and employing imams (Sunni Muslim preachers), subsidizing the building and functioning of Sunni mosques (but not the shrines of other sects such as the Alevi cemevi), running “Qur’an courses” (Qur’an reading schools), and publishing religious material.

The total budget and personnel of the Diyanet are not very transparent and are hard to pinpoint because the agency is involved in myriad formal and informal relations with local communities. Thus, a state-employed imam could work in the same village mosque and live in the same government-provided housing alongside another imam whose salary would informally be paid by the village community and who would therefore not be visible in Diyanet statistics. According to

17. Article 1, Law 633.
18. Article 136, Turkish Constitution.
official figures, the Diyanet’s share within the total state budget rose by more than twofold since 2002 when the AKP came to power, increasing from 0.54 percent in 2002 to 0.82 percent in 2006 and to 1.2 percent in 2012.19 Again according to official figures, the Diyanet’s personnel also increased by about 30 percent between 2002 and 2011, from 74,374 to 98,555.20 Government statistics show that there were 82,693 mosques in Turkey in 2011 (up from 75,941 in 2002) and about 10,914 Qur’an courses in 2013, compared with 32,797 schools of primary education.21 This means that there was approximately one Sunni mosque for every 900 people in Turkey.

According to the US Department of State in 2012, although the Turkish “constitution and other laws and policies generally protect religious freedom . . . some laws, policies, and constitutional provisions . . . restrict religious freedom.” One major example is the notorious ban on Islamic headscarves on university campuses. In recent years under the AKP rule, even though women have become more or less free to wear head scarves on most college campuses, they are not guarded by any formal, legal protection. Muslim and non-Muslim religious minorities suffer from discrimination in many areas such as legal and practical restrictions on the building of cemevi, synagogues, and churches.

But all this does not mean that secular freedoms necessarily fare any better. For example, artists and writers are often convicted of “insulting religion” in their critical intellectual and artistic expressions, which in practice invariably means “insulting Islam.” A recently passed law severely restricted the sale, consumption, and advertisement of alcoholic beverages, and the Prime Minister opined on national TV that it would be fine for the state to restrict a practice that religion bans for the “people’s own good.”22

**Theory and Policy Implications**

Throughout all of these problems of Turkish secularism, the issue at stake is the weakness of pluralistic democracy and a state that is preoccupied with protecting its own supremacy and with designing and

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20. The official website of the Diyanet, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanim/tanimistatistik.asp. These figures do not include open positions and “contracted employees.” Including the latter, the Diyanet’s personnel numbered 141,233 in 2012. By comparison, the Ministry of Justice had 136,251 employees, and the Ministry of Education had 955,629 employees.
22. For the prime minister’s remarks on Habertürk on June 3, 2013, see the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsLvU5vR0pM.
controlling societal and private affairs (i.e., social engineering). It is not secular state versus religious society. As Turam and Tezcur correctly observe, the simplistic state–society relationship produced by the secular state and Muslim society framework “obscures the complexity, scope and direction of democratic struggles” (p. 195). However, unless one offers a better framework, scholars advertently or inadvertently continue to employ terminology and concepts based in the secular state and Muslim society model.

The book itself is no exception. It occasionally employs language and arguments and at least one chapter that seem to contradict its own main contributions. While offering a potentially productive comparison between the Turkish and Israeli cases, Aviad Rubin’s chapter seems to overstate the contrasts between these two cases. It asserts, for example, that Atatürk’s “comprehensive anti-religious reforms” conceived “every [emphasis mine] manifestation of religion as challenge to the Kemalist project” (pp. 171–72). In passing, Keskin says that “Islam and the Turkish Republic have been in conflict since the republic’s birth” (p. 138).

Even Turam seems to contradict the book’s arguments at times in her introduction. She claims, for example, that “the increasing economic and political power of pious Muslims has changed the previous power structure where the secularist elite were ruling alone [emphasis mine]” (p. 3). In fact, although Turkish prosecular elites undoubtedly had the upper hand and at times enjoyed a hegemonic position in the past, Turkey’s power structure was quite complex and secular elites never ruled alone, as the contributions in the book make abundantly clear. At least since the “partial moderation of secularists” in the 1940s, Turkish prosecular elites have shared power with pro-Islamic elites through a variety of formal and informal compromises that were products of multiparty politics, even when the “center” of mainstream state institutions and politics remained prosecular.23

Then, Turam simply maintains that now “Turkish society is negotiating [emphases mine] the terms of its democracy” (p. 9). But how can we know when society rather than elites are negotiating? How do we know that elites are negotiating rather than seeking hegemony? These are important causal and relational claims that need to be established rather than simply assumed.

Despite these shortcomings, Secular State and Religious Society presents a much needed and valuable intervention in a consequential debate. The book shows once again that there has always been more de facto inclusion and power-sharing in the Turkish case than what

is conveyed by simplistic accounts informed by the framework of secular state and Muslim society. In fact, the Turkish state might not be as secular nor Turkish society as religious as this construction implies. Neither are the currently dominant pro-Islamic elites ruling alone.

Integrationism, rather than separationism and differentiation, is the dominant form of state–religion relationship in Muslim-majority societies in general and those in the Middle East and North Africa in particular. Only 2 percent of people were argued to live under “free” regimes in the Middle East and North Africa in 2013, compared with 13 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and 44 percent in the Asia-Pacific region. Against this background, Turkey presents an example of only relative and limited success in building indigenous, secular democracy.

As a party combining religious and democratic values, the AKP made revolutionary contributions to Turkish democracy, especially in its first two terms. But it would be misleading to explain the party’s democratic accomplishments as well as shortcomings and rising authoritarianism in recent years with its own “Muslim-democratic” orientation alone. One needs to simultaneously analyze the roles of secular and religious political actors and take into account the achievements as well as failures of Turkey’s semideocratic, secularist legacy.

Turkey’s current challenge is to improve and democratize its state-dominated secular institutions by making them less integrationist, less interventionist, and more protective of both religious and secular freedoms. It remains to be seen whether the AKP and other political parties will choose this path or will try to instrumentalize Turkey’s flawed secularism for their own purposes in the years to come.

Ultimately, the best way to reform and rescue Turkish secularism might be to strengthen democratic institutions built upon the principles of power-sharing, strong checks and balances, and effective protections of individual liberties. One can only agree with Turam that “secularism without democracy” (p. 5) cannot successfully produce a trust-based and egalitarian relationship between state and religion. The lessons to be drawn from the Turkish case should take into account its accomplishments as well as failures. Turkey was relatively successful in establishing electoral democracy. But de facto arrangements of power-sharing between the prosecular and pro-Islamic

actors were never institutionalized sufficiently through explicit and principled agreements to build the institutions of an inclusive, pluralistic democracy.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, a crucial factor determining the future of Turkey’s democracy and its ability to become a better example to emulate will be the extent to which prosecular and pro-Islamic actors will choose to cooperate in building new and more democratic institutions this time around.

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\textsuperscript{26} Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics, a Country’s ‘Center’ and Democratization.”