Does It Take Democrats to Democratize? Lessons From Islamic and Secular Elite Values in Turkey

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Abstract
Do political-Islamic elites need to be democrats for participation in democracy, how do their values compare to secular elites’, and how do their values change through participation and affect democratization itself? A comparative-systematic content analysis of three Islamic-conservative and two pro-secular Turkish newspapers over nine years shows that, overall, political-Islamic elites adopt democratic political values. Furthermore, they began to view that liberal-democratic rights and freedoms serve their interests. However, value democratization, and, thus, moderation and democratization, is not a linear and inexorable process automatically resulting from participation or socioeconomic development. It occurs through ruptures such as conflicts with secular actors, and interdependently through the interactions of secular and religious actors. Hence, religious actors’ adoption of more democracy may paradoxically make some secular actors less democratic. The consolidation of pluralistic democracy requires the emergence of both religious and secular democrats by resolving complex problems of commitment, and of clashes in areas like social pluralism where Islamic values are less open to change.

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One of the major questions of current world politics that interest scholars and policy makers alike is how compatible political Islam is with democracy, that is, to what extent political-Islamic actors can embrace democracy and democracy can flourish with them. This question is related to two broader questions: the relationship between religious values and democratization and, more generally, how values, as opposed to interests, affect democracy and democratization. After all, the main factor that distinguishes Islamic political actors from other religious or nonreligious political actors is their values.

The debate on political Islam is divided between the skeptics and optimists. The skeptics view a close relationship between values and democratization and maintain that political Islamists lack the necessary values for embracing democracy in a credible and sustainable way (Brumberg, 2005; Fish, 2002; Huntington, 1996; Kedourie, 1994; Pipes, 1997; Tibi, 2008). There is no one viewpoint among the optimists regarding how values relate to democratization. Some view that values are important for democratization but maintain that moderate, reformist, or “civil” Islamists emerge, embrace democratic values, and produce their own pluralistic values and public sphere, as they participate in democracy or democratic openings under authoritarian regimes, experience socio-economic development, and absorb global ideas (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996; Esposito, 2002; Hefner, 2000; Nasr, 2005; Schwedler, 2006; Wickham, 2004). Others argue that political-Islamic actors join democracy for self-interested, strategic reasons but their values change over time; in other words, democratization does not need democrats but creates democrats (Kalyvas, 2003; Waterbury, 1997).

Very few studies, however, actually document the values of a broad spectrum of political-Islamic elites systematically, comparatively, and dynamically. For the debate to move forward, first, there is need to document the values of a large and diverse sample of political-Islamic elites over time, not only a subset of them at a specific point in time. Studying the “moderates” alone fails to show to what extent pluralist or moderate Islamists are prevailing over the authoritarian; observing and interviewing politicians alone biases the analysis in favor of the prevailing political actors at the expense of those who were pacified before the research. Focusing on politicians or political parties alone also fails to capture the more broad-based repertoire of ideas and values from which they emerge. Although Islamist political parties in
different countries and at different times may depend on specific Islamic movements and on Islamic politics to different degrees, Islamic politics at large as a loose collection of social-political movements, faith-based organizations, and literary circles with different ideological orientations is not necessarily dependent on Islamist political parties; it informs and shapes the political parties it supports (White, 2002; Yavuz, 2003). Thus, it is important to analyze the values of a broad spectrum of Islamic intelligentsia as a factor constraining, forming, and presaging the evolution of political Islamism, without underestimating the partially independent leadership role of political parties.

Second, the full effects of Islamists’ value moderation on democratization can be analyzed only if we compare their values to secular actors’ values. Secular and religious ideas and values influence each other, and sustainable democratization depends on the commitments of both types of actors. Finally, we need to trace how actors’ dominant values respond to political-institutional developments that change their ability to participate in democratic politics. This helps to understand when and to what extent one can expect the inclusion of Islamists in competitive politics to bring about their moderation. These findings then need to be explained in their social and political context.

This article pursues these objectives by comparatively tracing and critically examining Islamic-conservative and prosecular elite beliefs and values during a formative 9-year period of Turkey’s democratization. The analysis is based on a systematic content analysis of three “religious-conservative” and two “prosecular” Turkish newspapers, covering their issues between 1996 and 2004. Pending a detailed discussion of the methodology and terminology ahead, more than 40,000 articles in the printed versions of 4,850 newspaper issues were examined. This captured the values of a wide and diverse spectrum of elites. The analysis infers continuous changes over time. This enables one to produce testable hypotheses regarding whether or not and when actors changed their understandings and normative evaluations of values such as pluralism and democracy, with regard to which specific issues and through which debates. The object of the analysis was values reflected by the discussions in Turkey’s activist press, which forms a major platform of contestation and deliberation for Turkish elites (Heper & Demirel, 1996; Somer, 2010). The content analysis was supplemented by interviews with civil society actors and journalists.

The period analyzed was critical for Turkey. The country had transitioned to multiparty democracy in 1950. But it was still considered a partial democracy because of military interventions, political instability, deficits of civil and political liberties, and a poor record of peacefully and democratically resolving questions such as Kurdish minority rights and Islam’s public role. Following the military-induced push of an Islamist-led elected government

The AKP’s leadership and core membership are rooted in earlier Islamist parties. But it recruited secular members and voters and adopted a socially conservative yet politically liberal, reformist, and pro-EU discourse. In government, the party secured reforms that reduced the military’s involvement in politics and enhanced liberties legally if not in practice. But politics, society, and observers became polarized between the AKP’s supporters and skeptics.

On the one hand, the country seems to be on its way to consolidating pluralistic democracy whereby reformist elites—an odd coalition including Islamists and liberal democrats—are pitted against secular nationalists, sceptical liberals and leftists and the pro-secular military and judiciary. The fact that Islamic conservatives are at the forefront of the reformist camp suggests that Islamists can successfully embrace democracy and foster democratization. On the other hand, Islamic elites are often ready to employ an instrumental and majoritarian understanding of democracy, authoritarian measures, and exclusionist rhetoric against their secularist, religious (e.g., Alevi), or ethnic (e.g., pro-Kurdish) rivals. They are reluctant on reforms that would strengthen freedoms of expression and the rule of law for all. Similarly, though the party’s critics claim that they oppose many AKP-led reforms and defend secularism in the name of democracy, they seem ready to sacrifice democracy, for example by endorsing military supervision of politics, whenever they perceive secularism to be in danger. Many are also reluctant on reforms that could make Turkey’s laic secularism, which features state regulation and control of religion, more open and inclusive. Hence, neither Turkey’s secularists nor Islamists are exemplary democrats of a principled and inclusive kind. Both are selectively democratic.

According to the transition theories of democratization, such deficits of democratic values may not matter in the face of deeper changes that may be transforming interests, institutions, and structures. For these theories, democratization mainly results from interest-based class coalitions and elections, elite negotiations, choices and institutional crafting, and economic development and turmoil. Interests create democrats, not the other way around. Ideational democratization may emerge over time as a by-product or unintended consequence (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Lindberg, 2009; Lipset, 1959; Moore, 19663; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1992; Rustow, 1970).

Yet, such democratic theorists as Robert A. Dahl highlight how crucial “virtue in the citizenry” is for democracy by showing that neither constitutional
checks and balances nor coercive rewards and penalties *per se* could prevent the return to tyranny. Instead, “democracy would require extensive social indoctrination and habituation” and consensus “on the polyarchal norms . . . set by the important values of the politically active members of the society” (Dahl, 1956, pp. 18-19, 47, 132-135).

Transition theories recognize that values may be important during the “habituation phase” or consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rustow, 1970). Also acknowledged is the role of values in protecting democracy once it is in place. But it needs to be shown and theorized when and how values change and play these roles after the initial transition to electoral democracy. Which conditions initiate and sustain value change after the transition? Can value democratization be interrupted or reversed when new political actors and divisions emerge? Can we explain value democratization merely as a byproduct of socioeconomic and cognitive processes, such as the emergence of post-industrial societies, without taking into account the role of politics and conflict (Bermeo, 1992; Inglehart, 1997; Norris and Inglehart, 2005)? When does value change become a cause rather than an effect of political-economic development in general, and of democratization in particular?

The present study helps to explain the role of values during democratization in two ways. Insofar as the advancements and troubles of Turkish democratization can plausibly be linked to prior changes in the beliefs and values of religious and secular elites, this illuminates the causal links between values and political outcomes and casts doubt over the possibility of value-free democratization in partial democracies. In turn, the timing of these prior ideational changes provides theoretical insights into how politics and interests affect value changes.

Partial democracies like Turkey form a particularly under-studied and insufficiently understood category compared to advanced democracies and to autocracies in transition (Carothers, 2002; Epstein et al., 2006).

The paucity of democracies among predominantly Muslim societies makes them an even less understood category and increases the importance of the few existing Muslim democracies such as Turkey, Mali, Senegal, and Indonesia. But it is difficult to conduct comparative case studies including Turkey because of the country’s peculiar historical-institutional background as the heir of the Ottoman Empire and as a case where secular-revolutionary elites with a relatively strong popular support base accomplished a relatively successful project of state formation and modernization in a semi–Middle Eastern cultural-geographical context (Findley, 2010; Mardin, 2005). However, one draws more general conclusions from studying Turkey as a “most-likely crucial case” (Eckstein, 1975). Based on qualities such as long history of democratic transition, level of economic development and EU candidacy, we would
expect it to achieve full democracy; explaining why this is yet to happen uncovers many difficulties of democratization. In 2010, two other Muslim-majority democracies, Indonesia and Mali had combined freedom scores (2.5) higher than Turkey’s (3.0). But, though interrupted by multiple democratic transitions and reversals since 1950, Turkey’s experience with multiparty democracy is considerably longer, which makes it easier to analyze the many challenges of democratization that cannot be treated as merely transitory.

The within-case analysis here has also the explanatory advantage of examining five newspapers over 9 years or 108 months. Thus, it can be viewed as a comparative analysis of 5, 45, or 108 cases depending on one’s unit of analysis, while holding many historical-institutional factors peculiar to Turkey constant (Eckstein, 1975).

Before moving further, a few definitional clarifications are in order. First, throughout the article, democratization refers to a continuum between complete non-democracy and fully pluralistic, liberal democracy, as opposed to merely free and fair elections. Second, for brevity, I use the terms values and beliefs interchangeably, although the former denotes normative judgments and the latter opinions about facts and causal relationships. The content analysis infers both. Third, the highly imperfect terms religious and secular are used here for simplicity and to comply with the popular usage of dindar-laik (“religious–secular”) division in Turkey. The content analysis shows that “religious” and “secular” elite values do not differ from each other in every respect; in many categories, there is more convergence than divergence and intragroup differences are greater than intergroup differences. However, religious and secular actors on average have considerably different evaluations and interpretations of subject categories related to religion and secularism (Somer, 2010). This lends justification to the terminology. Finally, the terminology does not necessarily imply that the political division in Turkey draws on religion rather than, say, power and economic interest. It draws on both.

Values and Democratization

Early and revised modernization theories put much emphasis on participatory, deferential, and empathetic values and attitudes, mass communication, political socialization, and post-industrial values to explain the emergence of pluralistic and democratic societies (Almond & Verba, 1965; Deutsch, 1953/1966; Inglehart, 1997; Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1969; Norris & Inglehart, 2005). Many transition theories themselves highlight the importance of values at the stage of democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996).
Democratic values emerge as important explanatory factors when one conceptualizes democratization as a “continuous process” rather than a transition from authoritarian rule, adopts more substantive and “civic or Tocquevillian” definitions of democracy, focuses on partial democracies, and examines the causal mechanisms that might lead to the emergence of a “twin tolerations” between religious and secular actors. (Hefner, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Stepan, 2000; Tilly, 2007). However, the role of values is complex and poses many theoretical and empirical challenges. The same value such as civic trust can either support or undermine democracy depending on intervening variables such as the level of political patronage (Jamal, 2007).

Values are much emphasized by research on political Islam. Skeptics maintain that legalism, cultural “predicament with modernity,” presumed fusion of state and religion, and patrimonial and discriminatory attitudes toward women and minorities conflict with democratic values, and that a clerical establishment that has the authority to solve these conflicts is absent in Sunni Islam (Brumberg, 2005; Fish, 2002; Huntington, 1996; Pipes, 1997; Tibi, 2008). Optimists maintain that Islamic politics resolves these conflicts through revival (tajdid), reform (islah), and changing modes of interpretation (ijtihad; Eickelman & Piscator, 1996; Esposito, 1992).

**Turkish Political Islamism and Moderation**

A rift over secularism, or over the nature of it, between secular-revolutionary and Islamic-conservative elites emerged in Turkish politics with the Ottoman modernization and Westernization efforts in the late nineteenth century. It deepened with the top-down reforms of secular modernization, such as the abolition of the Caliphate during the formation of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s (Berkes, 1998; Findley, 2010; Mardin, 1998, 2005). The AKP’s predecessor, the Welfare Party, became the dominant partner of a coalition government in 1995 but was forced to resign in 1997 by the military-induced “February 28 process.”

The AKP was founded in 2001 by the pragmatic-reformist Islamists within the Welfare. Within a year, the AKP won the national elections and came to power in a single-party government (Yavuz, 2006). The destruction of the political center as a result of the 2000-2001 financial crises significantly helped the AKP, which was a new, untainted party. However, also crucial was its program and discourse that downplayed religion and promised prosperity and a more democratic and less corrupt government (Hale & Özbudun, 2010; Yavuz, 2006). This led many liberals to join and support the AKP despite its Islamist roots, whose support was vital for the party’s electoral success and acceptance by Turkey’s Western allies.
What explains the discursive-ideological transformation of Turkish political Islamism? An important facilitator is the rise of an “Islamic bourgeoisie” since the 1980s, one of the AKP’s key constituencies (Gülap, 1999; Kinzer, 2006; Nasr, 2005; Öniş, 2001). By itself, however, this is an unsatisfactory explanation, not only because of the bourgeoisie’s contingent relationship with democracy (Bellin, 2000; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). The Islamic bourgeoisie may embrace economic liberalism and limited government but not democracy, it may embrace democracy but its conception of democracy may fall short of full democracy and may exclude some societal groups and rights, or it may fully embrace pluralistic democracy. How would an economic interest-based account explain and predict these different outcomes? Furthermore, how and when do new interests translate into a new discourse and values? Did the ideational change occur by reinterpreting Islamic theology and indigenous values, or did it occur more eclectically by adopting new ideas and values for example from liberalism? Why did Turkish Islamism change in the late 1990s rather than sooner or later?

Reformist Islamists “vernacularize” and selectively adopt modernity (Yavuz, 2003). This makes possible but does not automatically bring about adaptation to pluralistic democracy—modernity historically supported both democracy and authoritarianism. A person who adopts modernity and even embraces electoral democracy may not embrace pluralism in a normative sense and in every sphere of life (Berger & Zijderveld, 2009).

Insofar as they associate moderation with inclusion, cooperation and democratization, moderation theories cannot explain why the most drastic change of Turkish Islamists – the split of the reformists from the Welfare Party – followed the exclusion, not inclusion, of Islamists in 1997, and why moderation produced limited democratization and cooperation with secular actors in specific areas (Mainwaring and Scully, 2003; Schwedler, 2006; Tezcür, 2010). The Turkish case involved complex processes of strategic responses to institutional incentives and confrontation as well as gradual engagement and compromise between Islamic and secular actors (Mecham, 2004; Turam, 2007). The outcomes of these processes cannot be understood without taking into account the roles of human agency, beliefs, and values in a particular social-political context. Considerable “political learning and changing thinking” occurred among Turkish Islamists (Çavdar, 2006; Tezcür, 2010). The challenge is to systematically document and theorize the extent, timing, and mechanisms of this ideational change.

**Methods**

In terms of inferring when and how Islamist thinking changed, the content analysis complements and has advantages over alternative methods. Focus
groups, actor interviews, and ethnographic studies are crucial for theory development. But they rarely draw on representative samples and produce comparable and replicable findings (Kadioğlu, 2005; Turam, 2007). Participant observation and interviews with politicians rely on politicians’ own recollection and subjective views on which roles they played in shaping the past and do not reflect the views of political actors sidelined earlier. Insofar as they are regularly applied with the same questions to similar populations, public opinion surveys produce comparable results regarding the public’s general values (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006; Fish, 2002; Norris & Inglehart, 2005). But they cannot show continuous change and cannot infer exactly when and through which discussions the dominant values and understandings of concepts such as democracy change over time.

By comparison, the content of the press presents a large, diverse, and continuous sample of views expressed before, during, and after actual political change by a broad spectrum of social and political elites, who include journalists, academics, businessmen, writers, and current and future politicians. By definition, all the content of the press is public; thus, it reflects both the dominant views elites feel they should conform with and those views some elites oppose strongly enough to contest publicly. Turkish media elites “have been far from neutral brokers . . . and wish to shape political regimes, policies, and the course of events in the polity and society” (Heper & Demirel, 1996, p. 120).

Thus, the press content is investigated here mainly as an indicator and partial cause and source of changing elite discourse and values. Republican (as opposed to direct) and deliberative theories of democracy consider the media an essential “public forum” where actors exchange views, share common experiences, and persuade each other (Habermas, 2006; Sunstein, 2002). The newspapers analyzed were Milli Gazete, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet, and Milliyet. The papers were selected with the intention of covering as broad an ideological spectrum as possible. The first three are “religious-conservative” newspapers with their overall images ranging from the most conservative to the most liberal (or reformist) in respective order. The last two are “prosecular,” where Milliyet and Cumhuriyet represent the liberal and conservative ends, respectively. Despite these overall public identities, the writers of the papers are not homogeneous, and religious-conservative papers include columnists with a secular-liberal identity and prosecular papers have religious-conservative writers.

The content analysis tracked the relative attention to, contending views and judgments of, and code words in regard to 13 categories including democracy, pluralism, nationalism, and relations with the Western world.
The methodology is original and similar to the “manual holistic” and “deductive” approaches to framing analyses (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Herrera, 2005; Krippendorff, 2004; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Somer, 2010). The primary aim is to document and quantify “manifest” (expressed) rather than “latent” meaning in a replicable and systematic fashion and from the “receiver’s” point of view and then interpret the findings in light of their social-political context (Entman, 1993; Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 18-25).

Accordingly, the coders were instructed not to try to infer the overall opinion of an article. For example, if an article on nationalism contained arguments and examples both praising and critical of nationalism, they were instructed to code both favorable and unfavorable judgments for the article on nationalism. They also had an option to code “neutral” when no normative claims were made. This reduced the role of their subjective judgments as their job was not to make predictions and judgments about the authors’ intentions or an article’s main, or dominant, viewpoint.

The detailed tables of coding were prepared with a view to maximize the validity and the theoretical relevance of the findings (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). First, potential subject categories were determined deductively based on theories of religion and politics. Then, these were combined with actual subjects covered, questions discussed, and code words used in the press, after a preliminary analysis examined around 1,200 randomly selected articles.

A total of 20 coders received a 1-week-long training. These analysts then analyzed the whole contents of the newspapers excluding the sports sections and advertisements by using the same tables, rules, and definitions in Istanbul and Ankara libraries between April 2007 and December 2008. In about 4,850 newspaper issues, more than 42,463 articles were found relevant and analyzed. Thus, validity and reliability problems were reduced by covering a large number of issues, by distributing the issues among 20 analysts with no consecutive day examined by the same person, and by having each coder employ the same rules and definitions of categories and answer the same set of questions.

The last part of the analysis consisted of the compilation, comparative analysis, and interpretation of the findings. During this time, unstructured, in-depth interviews were conducted with four civil society actors and three journalists to compare their experiences with the findings.

In content analyses, absolute levels of frequencies are hard to interpret; for example, references to democracy may be lower where democracy is more accepted than where it is more in question (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 60-62). But in another context, less reference to democracy may result from censorship or disapproval of democracy. In response to this difficulty, the focus was put on changing and relative frequencies in a given social-political context.
A rising frequency of positive discussion of democracy within the same newspaper was interpreted as a sign of rising interest in, and positive value change on, democracy in that paper. If there were more positive references to democracy in one newspaper than in another, this was interpreted as a sign of prodemocracy values, or possible prodemocracy change, in the former newspaper without necessarily making any inference regarding the latter paper. And, whenever social-political context showed the need for deliberation on the subject, patently low and unchanging frequency of discussion of a subject was interpreted to indicate the lack of open deliberation, and, thus, a potential problem. Consider a society stricken by violent ethnic conflict, for example. If it was found that ethnicity was discussed less frequently than comparable subjects such as, say, race or religion and that the level of discussion had not been rising, this would mean that there was no sign of public deliberation searching for solutions to the ethnic problem.

Finally, as changing frequencies of codings in general made sense as meaningful responses to political events, this suggested that the content analysis was properly conducted, inferring valid changes.

**The Findings and Their Interpretation**

The first group includes the findings indicating that religious, secular or both types of actors began to more strongly express values associated with pluralistic democracy (such as human rights), and any findings indicating that religious and secular actors’ understandings or evaluations of values such as secularism converged on each other. Convergence would facilitate consensus-building and cooperation for democratic reforms. The second group includes findings indicating that one or both actors began to more strongly express authoritarian or democracy-skeptic values and any findings indicating that two actors’ understandings or evaluations of a value diverged from each other.

**Value Democratization**

*Electoral versus liberal-pluralistic democracy.* An article related to the category of democracy could contain three types of opinions, or a combination of them. It could contain favorable opinions that highlight its benefits (e.g., representation and accountable government), unfavorable opinions that highlight its perceived flaws (e.g., instability, toleration of “subversive” ideologies or conflicts with Islamic principles), and neutral opinions that do not make any manifest judgments. In the three religious newspapers content-analyzed, within a total of
5,853 codings of democracy, there were only 607, or 10.4%, “unfavorable” codings, that is, skeptical views referring to the flaws or failures of democracy.

This skepticism is almost twice as strong as skepticism in the secular newspapers, which had only 5.8% unfavorable codings on democracy (258 within a total of 4,478 codings). However, most of the unfavorable codings in the religious newspapers came from *Milli Gazete*, which had 17% unfavorable codings on democracy in a total of 2,636 codings. *Milli Gazete* had lower circulation than the other two, which were supportive of the AKP and represented the views of the conservative-Islamist National Outlook movement, which was critical of the AKP. Although many AKP politicians come from the National Outlook tradition, the movement supported its rival Felicity Party, the heir of the conservative camp within the Welfare Party. By comparison, *Yeni Şafak* had only 4.0% of unfavorable codings, similar to pros-ecular *Milliyet*’s 3.1%, and *Cumhuriyet*, the second secular newspaper, had a relatively high percentage of unfavorable codings, 8.7 percent. Thus, there was convergence between secular and less conservative religious newspapers with respect to the overall value of democracy.

But did Turkish Islamic actors value democracy primarily as electoral democracy or as “liberal” or “pluralistic” democracy (Dahl, 1971; Lindberg, 2009, p.11). These are non–mutually exclusive dimensions of democracy, but the ratio between the two dimensions might reflect the actors’ dominant and emerging conceptions. *Electoral democracy* was defined for the analysts as “the discussion of democracy by emphasizing its roles in determining the rulers through elections and in bringing the will of the people [halk] upon government.” *Liberal democracy* was defined as “the discussion of democracy by emphasizing its features such as freedoms, human rights, rule of law, and minority rights.”

Figure 1 indicates that religious actors’ support for liberal democracy (71% of codings) converged on a similar value as the secular support for liberal democracy (73%). The interviews also conveyed the sense that Islamic actors were at home with at least the rhetoric of liberal democracy. The numbers in parentheses reflect the number of total codings in each category.

More information is obtained from the ratio of different codings in each type of newspaper. Table 1 shows the ratio of the times democracy was discussed primarily as liberal democracy to the times it was discussed primarily as electoral democracy. A shift of emphasis occurred in Islamic newspapers from electoral democracy to liberal democracy, which is most visible in favorable codings. Although the ratio was almost equal in 1996 and 1997, after 1998 the favorable codings for liberal democracy were double or more
Figure 1. Support for democracy among religious and secular actors

the favorable codings for electoral democracy. The terms of reference for favorable considerations regarding democracy came predominantly from a liberal conception of democracy.
Table 1. Codings for Electoral Versus Liberal Democracy by Year

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Shifts between electoral and liberal understandings of democracy.

Secular elites had a relatively more liberal conception of democracy as the liberal/electoral democracy ratio was higher for secular newspapers, the yearly average being 1.9 for religious newspapers and 3.0 for the secular. However, in those years when an Islamic party was in power (1996, 1997, 2003, and 2004), and in years that led to the elections that brought an Islamic party to power (2001 and 2002), the ratio for unfavorable codings was less than one. In other words, more of the unfavorable codings for democracy in secular newspapers pertained to electoral democracy in those years. Arguably, its ability to bring Islamists to power is an “unfavorable” aspect of electoral democracy from the point of view of some prosecular elites. This is a sign of rising democracy skepticism among some secular actors, which is discussed further below.

**Human rights.** The findings on human rights exhibited by Figure 2 corroborate the view that religious and secular newspapers converged on the overall value of human-rights-based liberal democracy. The favorable codings in Yeni Şafak and Zaman (72%) are more or less the same as those in secular newspapers (70%). Furthermore, comparing Yeni Şafak and Zaman to Milli Gazete helps to explain reformist Islamists’ difference from the conservative Islamists. Favorable considerations regarding human rights in Yeni Şafak and Zaman are considerably more, and unfavorable considerations are considerably less, than those in Milli Gazete.

**Political pluralism.** The category of political pluralism refers to political diversity and rights, as in the ability of communists or Kurdish nationalists to
form political parties and support political movements. As Figure 3 shows, in general, religious actors embrace the idea of political pluralism more than secular actors, especially when *Milli Gazete* is left out.

These findings are representative of others on political democracy and pluralism. They help to explain the AKP’s emergence and its prodemocratic rhetoric and policies by showing that they are embedded in ideas previously circulating in the religious press. Furthermore, the convergence in these areas between religious and secular actors bodes well for the consolidation of democracy. What explains, then, the religious elites’ democratic deficits and the tensions between the supporters and skeptics of the AKP?
**Figure 3. Political pluralism**

*Lack or Reversal of Value Democratization*

*Electoral democracy as a means or goal: Religious silence and secular suspicion.* There is insufficient evidence that Turkish Islamists themselves intend to instrumentalize democracy merely “as a means to come to power” (among others, Brumberg, 2005; Kramer, 1997). The ideas that democracy is desirable “as a means” and “as an end goal” for Islamists were supported (53% and 42% respectively) and rejected (7% for each) at similar levels in religious newspapers. Furthermore, this discussion found little expression: the idea of democracy as a means received only about three codings per year and newspaper. This may imply either that the idea was not so much entertained or that it was so well established that it did not need any discussion. Either way, no significant debate portended any changes in dominant views.
However, there was considerable skepticism in secular newspapers about Islamists’ instrumentalization of democracy, which helps to explain the religious–secular tensions during the AKP rule. This question was relatively important for secular newspapers, receiving 15 codings per year/newspaper. Of the codings, 57% indicate a disagreement that Islamists may embrace democracy as an end goal, receiving 7.4 codings per year/newspaper.

The findings also reveal a split within secular newspapers. Skepticism (i.e., approval of the idea that democracy is a means for Islamists) decreased and disappeared in *Milliyet* after the AKP came to power in 2002. On the contrary, it increased in *Cumhuriyet* and, in 2004, became as high as in 1997 (when the Islamist RP was in power). The seculars became divided. Although some became more trusting of the Islamists’ goals, others became more suspicious. This helps to explain why some secular actors supported and helped the AKP to come to power and why others felt threatened by the AKP rule and contributed to the religious–secular polarization.

*Liberal democracy as a means for Islamists.* Both pessimistic studies and secularist political actors are preoccupied with the question of whether or not Islamists view electoral democracy as a means to achieve their goals. But they overlook that reformist Islamists may appreciate liberal democracy as an effective means to achieve the same goals, whatever these goals are. Figure 4 captures this contrast. Although only 7% of the views in secular papers agreed and 72% disagreed with the idea that liberal democracy would allow Islamists to reach their aims, 83% in religious papers agreed with this idea.

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**Figure 4. Liberal democracy as a means for Islamists**
This finding helps to explain, first, how the new Islamists could lead many reforms promoting liberal democracy in line with EU standards, which seemed to contradict values usually associated with Islamism. Second, it helps to explain why many secular actors found it hard to believe that Islamists genuinely wanted these reforms. In fact, Islamists came to believe that there was no incompatibility between their own aims and the freedoms and the rule of law provided by liberal democracy: Both enhance religious freedoms and provide more space for Islamists to organize and promote their views in government and civil society.

Secular defensiveness. Although authoritarian interventions seem to have persuaded religious actors to embrace political democracy as insurance for their interests, the ascendance of new Islamism seems to have persuaded seculars to turn to military-bureaucratic supervision to protect their interests. This does not translate into overall secular authoritarianism (Somer, 2010). Nor does it imply that all seculars support all kinds of military interventions. Within a total of 351 codings on the secularist “February 28 intervention,” a minority of 108, or 31%, of the codings in secular newspapers consisted of supportive views on the intervention. A higher share (41% in Milliyet and 42% in Cumhuriyet) constituted critical (unfavorable) codings. Opposition to the “February 28 intervention” in the secular press was even higher whenever the context of the discussion was “liberal democracy” (as opposed to electoral democracy): 221 codings, or 46% of all the codings in Milliyet and Cumhuriyet reflected unfavorable views. This contradicts the view expressed by many Islamic actors in the interviews conducted that the “seculars” all supported the intervention. This perception might be shaped by the headlines of some newspapers that seemed supportive of the intervention, ignoring the multiplicity of the views expressed in the rest of the newspapers.7

However, the findings again pointed to a split among the seculars, as Table 2 shows. Support for military interventions in general was higher in Cumhuriyet (14%) than in Milliyet (3%) and somewhat increased after 2000. Similarly, although 66% of the codings in Milliyet were opposed to “military interventions in general politics,” in Cumhuriyet a bare majority, 57 percent, were opposed.

The picture changes when the context of discussion involves secularism. Supportive codings for military interventions increased considerably in both secular newspapers whenever the context of the discussion was not military interventions in general, but “military interventions in order to protect secularism.” In Milliyet, support for interventions increased from 3% to 27% and opposition fell from 66% to 33%. In Cumhuriyet, support increased from 14% to 47% and opposition fell from 57% to 17%.

Social pluralism. The category of social pluralism was defined as the discussion of or reference to “the diversity of social, cultural, religious, and similar
Table 2. Support for Military Interference in General and for Military Interference “to Protect Secularism” in Secular Newspapers

**Miliyet**

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**Cumhuriyet**

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Figure 5. Values on social pluralism among religious and secular elites

groups (such as different life styles or different interpretations of a philosophy or religion), the relations between these groups, and the benefits of, or problems caused by, such diversity.” Religious elites are considerably more suspicious of social diversity than secular actors are, as Figure 5 depicts. There is also little sign of convergence over time: Only Yeni Şafak displayed a slight rise in openness to social pluralism.

Cross-country research suggests that the main differences of Muslim societies from the rest of the world revolve around values over social issues (among others, Fish, 2002; Norris & Inglehart, 2005). Surveys on Turkey also suggest that those who consider themselves religious tend to display more intolerance of social pluralism (e.g., avoiding people with different identities and lifestyles as neighbors, business partners, or spouses) than people who consider themselves not religious (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006, p. 49).

Religious elites’ social conservatism, however, does not necessarily result from religious chauvinism. Religious newspapers were not more suspicious of differences coming from non-Muslims than they were from intra-Muslim differences. For “in-group pluralism” (among Muslims) the percentage of unfavorable codings, 39%, was almost the same as the unfavorable codings for “out-group pluralism” (emanating from non-Muslims), 41%. Thus, the main concern seems to be difference per se. Unfavorable (disapproval) codings for the category “non-mainstream identities and life styles” was 31% in religious newspapers, compared to 16% in the secular newspapers.

Different attitudes toward social difference may be a source of the political tensions between the religious and secular. Occasional acts of the
government—such as a short-lived attempt to criminalize adultery or a government minister’s statement declaring homosexuality a disease—give rise to religious–secular tensions (Hürriyet Daily News, 2010).

Exclusion of rival groups from the benefits of pluralistic democracy. The findings for the Alevis, gays and lesbians, Armenians, and women are summarized as representative of other groups. The issue of gays and lesbians is a taboo for religious elites, as Figure 6 reveals. Issues related to them were rarely discussed, and, whenever they were, homosexuality was talked about with disapproval, as a disease. This conviction was also expressed during some of the interviews; for example, the editor of a religious-conservative newspaper, who earlier expressed predominantly liberal and democratic views vis-à-vis political questions, said, “But of course we cannot endorse homosexuality.”

On some issues, religious elites first seem to be more open to pluralism than the secular. An example is views on Armenian minority rights in the context of social pluralism. In religious press, favorable codings are a higher percentage of the total codings. A closer look reveals, however, that the percentage of the unfavorable codings is also higher in the religious press. Furthermore, this subject received fewer codings in the three religious papers combined than in the two secular papers, although in general (on all the subject categories) religious newspapers did not produce fewer codings: This issue drew even less attention in the religious press than in the secular.

Similarly, as Figure 7 captures, the low number of the codings in the religious press (fewer in three religious papers combined than in the two secular
papers) is notable vis-à-vis the Alevis—a major Muslim minority suffering from lack of public recognition and social discrimination and prejudice by the Sunni Muslim majority. The problems of the Alevis was not a significant issue for the religious newspapers, despite their legitimate grievances, and only a relatively more significant issue for the secular press.

Ironically, the reformist AKP government initiated several courageous openings (dubbed “democratic opening” by the government) to mend
relations with and address the current and historical problems of groups such as the Alevi, Armenians, Roma, and Kurds. These liberalization efforts clearly demonstrate the party leaders’ reformist zeal and good will. These openings may succeed in the future. As of the writing of this article, however, they had not produced many tangible results, and the government had already reneged on some of its promises. The openings met significant resistance both inside and outside the party. The findings here help to explain why. Unlike the case of overall political reforms, the openings were not supported by prior changes in elite values, which would have prepared the intelligentsia for these changes. (Somer & Liaras, 2010).

Another area in which the religious elites were less open to pluralistic rights is women’s rights. Figure 9 reveals the ideational lack of preparation, mostly in the form of ‘silence’ (low number of codings) regarding policies such as minimum quotas (e.g. in Parliament) and other affirmative action policies. Such policies would make the political and economic system more open to the participation of women through a much wider range of reforms than the lifting of the headscarf ban in universities and public offices, which is the focus of Islamist campaigns.

These findings do not necessarily mean that the secular elites were categorically more accepting of those who are “different.” Although they were more open to social pluralism in general, they were not sympathetic toward social differences emanating from “unsecular” or “not prosecular” people (laik olmayanlar). A total of 59% of the codings in Milliyet and 65% of the codings in Cumhuriyet were suspicious of social pluralism resulting from
manifestly unsecular groups. This finding may be interpreted as both a cause and an effect of the religious–secular polarization.

Divergence on the desirability and interpretation of secularism. As the high number of total codings in Figure 10 shows, secularism was a very important issue for both sides. Although it was an overwhelmingly positive norm in the secular press, however, it was mostly discussed critically in the religious press: It was mostly referred to as a problem, most of the time in the form of a criticism of Turkish laic secularism. Similar observations were made during the interviews. For example, the head of an NGO close to the AKP criticized the Constitutional Court for a 2008 ruling in which it warned the party against supporting antisecularism, labeling the decision “politicized and biased.” Later in the conversation, however, he argued that “ideally, of course, we would not have secularism.” There is a major gap between the evaluations of secularism by the religious and secular elites, and the findings not shown here indicate that the gap was not narrowing.

Many religious actors may not oppose secularism per se, but counter Turkish laicism that envisions state regulation and control of religion (Berkes, 1998; Findley, 2010; Küçükcan, 2003; Kuru, 2007). But how would the religious actors reform Turkish laic secularism? Are secular and religious understandings of secularism converging or diverging? Figures 11 and 12 suggest that religious actors focus relatively on religion’s role in social affairs. In the context of the question of secularism, there were more codings (304) of the idea “religion should be more influential in social affairs” than codings (234) of the idea “religion should be more influential in state affairs,” and twice as many codings (207) were approving of the first idea. Yet both types of changes were vehemently opposed by the secular elites. Thus, there is no convergence of understandings of secularism.

Figure 10. Evaluation of secularism in the religious and secular press
Can a more pluralistic political space that allows the expression of different understandings of secularism produce over time a consensus on secularism? Figure 13 points to a split within the secular elites on this question. Although the plurality of views expressed in Milliyet endorses the idea that “movements representing different understandings of secularism should be allowed in politics,” the plurality of the views in Cumhuriyet opposed this idea.

In a nutshell, these findings show that religious elite values changed significantly between 1996 and 2004 in ways that help to explain the emergence of the AKP and its prodemocratic and pro-West actions. At the same time, Islamic elite beliefs remained relatively less inclusive and pluralistic than secular elites vis-à-vis specific groups, especially in regard to social relations. Major differences exist between religious and secular elite beliefs.
in areas such as the desirability and interpretation of the secularism principle. Secular elites became more tolerant of military interventions in the context of “protecting secularism.” These findings help to explain why Turkey’s democratization lacks a strong cross-party coalition for reforms, why it divides observers between those arguing that Turkey is finally consolidating its democracy and those arguing that it is becoming an Islamist-led “illiberal democracy,” why the record of democratization has been weak in expanding rights and liberties to specific disadvantaged groups, and why the battles over “secularism” between religious and secular elites did not end after the AKP government came to government with a prodemocratic program (Somer, 2007).

**Conclusions**

Regarding political Islam and democracy, there is reason to be both hopeful and cautious. The findings document the potential to adopt new values as well as the limits of ideational democratization in some areas and the need for the simultaneous and interdependent democratization of secular and religious values. In the end, successful democratization hinges on both religious
and secular actors’ more categorical adoption of democratic rights and principles for themselves and others, whether their ideas and values come from liberalism, religion, or some other source.

**Ideational Difficulties of Value Democratization**

Like scholars of political Islam, Islamists are divided on the compatibility of Islamic values and democracy. Fundamentalists argue that Islamic values reject democracy, for example, because God’s laws should be the sovereign, not people. In return, reformists maintain one or all of the following: the values in Islam’s “golden age” included democratic precedents, Islamic principles can be reinterpreted to embrace democracy and human rights; Islam can support democracy if Islam as religion can be separated from Islam as politics (Ayoob, 2008; Hale & Özbudun, 2010; Hefner, 2000). Whether or not the reformists are right in principle, however, there remain many political, philosophical, and theological questions that need to be resolved within the Islamic faith and legalistic tradition. Although one can certainly imagine different models of democracy and Islamists can conceivably create their own, all democracies must satisfy some shared principles.

Although reformist and pragmatist Islamists can resolve, or overlook, these ideological constraints in some subject categories, they may have a harder time to do so in other categories. Democratization would stall as a result. Turkish Islamists’ thinking democratized considerably during the 1990s. The content analysis does not indicate, however, that this necessarily resulted from a reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine through debates resolving complex philosophical and theological questions; the findings do not show that Islamic references were frequently used. Rather, the change of thinking seems to have resulted from political expediency, pragmatic self-reflection and rethinking on the Turkish experience itself, and eclectic adoption of liberal and secular values from Turkish and Western sources. Potentially, unresolved theological questions may challenge the democratic commitments of at least some Islamists in the future.

This ideational transformation also fell short of categorically embracing the requirements of pluralism with respect to various groups and subjects such as sexual and religious minorities, and major value gaps remained between religious and secular elites over the desirability and understanding of the secularism principle. This is not to say that Islamists should be expected to embrace liberal values and, say, endorse gay marriage. Nor is it to say that they can be expected to approve heterodox traditions of Islam such as Alevism. But Islamists can be expected to justify within their own values the legitimacy of these other groups’ political and civil liberties as equal to their own, for pluralistic democracy to take root.
Value Democratization and Moderation
Through Ruptures and Endogenous Mechanisms

Rather than suggesting that value democratization can be investigated as a merely normative or adaptive process that continuously follows democratic participation or socioeconomic development, the analysis indicates that dominant values shift through ruptures and interdependent processes that involve horizontal and vertical interactions and confrontations between secular and religious actors. Interests, ideas and institutions interact (Berman, 2001). Political conflict, repression and error-making, as well as cooperation, inclusion, and interactive exchange of ideas are major mechanisms of ideational change and “political learning.” (Bermeo, 1992). Absent institutions fostering basic trust between rival actors and improving the quality of deliberation in politics, value democratization may occur but remain incomplete. The positive impact of value democratization in one area may be negated by the weakening of democratic values in another.

Until recently, Turkish Islamism was a predominantly authoritarian force displaying a triple aversion to democracy, especially its liberal and secular kind, market economics, and the western world. Historically, it was a response of some religious elites to pro-secular hegemony, which established electoral democracy but failed to consolidate liberal democracy. Islamists’ political ‘moderation’ and subsequent ascendance in the 2000s split and triggered democracy-skeptical ideational change among secularists. The fact that pro-secular actors had been at the forefront of past steps toward democratization such as the pursuit of EU membership suggested that they would promote further democratization. However, while some supported further reforms, others became less sure that they could protect their interests in the absence of authoritarian supervisions. This endogeneity in partial democracies, which can be attributed to weak democratic institutions and checks and balances (which fail to credibly preclude the emergence of secularist or religious hegemony), makes democratization a contingent and hard to predict process: the same political rupture may simultaneously unleash several causal mechanisms with opposite effects on democratization.

Turkey’s “postmodern” coup of 1997 is such a rupture that produced several unexpected and unintended consequences with conflicting effects on democracy. On the other hand, and paradoxically, this authoritarian episode reinforced the “moderate” voices among Islamists. They sought to appeal to broader segments of the electorate and pursued compromise rather than confrontation with the secular establishment, liberal economic order, and the western world. (Gülalp, 1999; Öniş, 2001; Tuğal, 2009; Yavuz, 2006). During the interviews religious actors expressed consistently that the
intervention induced a reassessment of their interests in favor of liberal democracy both as a goal and a means.\textsuperscript{8}

Accordingly, Table 1 above shows a major increase in the ratio of codings for liberal democracy over the codings for electoral democracy in 1998.\textsuperscript{9} The highest ratios of positive codings for liberal democracy over electoral democracy occurred among religious elites in 1999, 2000, and 2001, when the Islamists stood to gain from reinventing themselves. Once the AKP was in power or, presumably, once religious elites less needed the protection of liberal freedoms, the ratio declined. This displays again the interrelation between interests and values. Notably, however, the ratio remained higher than before 1998, indicating that some ideational change was sustained.

Considering that the recent evolution of Turkish democratization can be traced back to Turkish Islamists’ reformulation of their interests and values after 1997, the next rupture in the Turkish case may be a reformulation of secular interests, values, and discourse.

Values and Democratization

One cannot be too complacent about “democratization without democrats.” More specifically, one cannot be too confident about the consolidation and deepening of democracy without both religious-conservative and pro-secular democrats. Interests may be crucial in leaving autocracy, whereby political movements with anti-systemic and authoritarian tendencies such as political Islamists may enter the democratic game—and the prevailing regimes and rival actors may let them—mainly for strategic reasons. But politics and political institutions must induce elites to adopt more democratic and pluralistic values so that an electoral democracy can be transformed into a full democracy, which must secure the rule of law and civil and political liberties for all.

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**Notes**

1. But the majority of Muslims live in democracies like Indonesia, India, and France.
2. Also see Özdalga (2006) and Göle (1997).
3. The five papers produced about 22% of the total newspaper circulation in 1996. See Somer (2010) for more information on the newspapers and the methodology.
4. The 20 coders included 4 undergraduate and 16 graduate assistants, 10 males and 10 females.
5. To maximize intercoder reliability, trial analyses were conducted during the training whereby the trainees analyzed the same articles and discussed each other’s codings with regard to consistency and usage of the same rules and definitions. During the actual analysis, analysts coded articles independently, but random checks were made to check for coherence and attentiveness to the rules. Reliability was further confirmed when two new coders analyzed 2 months of Yeni Şafak and produced similar average findings.
6. The interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2009. NGOs included the Istanbul branches of Mazlum-Der Human Rights Foundation, the Ensar Educational Foundation, and the AK-Der women’s rights organization. The journalists were from the Today’s Zaman, Star, and Taraf dailies. Any link to specific people was avoided to protect the privacy of the interviewees.
7. In 1997 and 1998, for example, the codings in the front pages of Milliyet were evenly distributed among favorable, unfavorable, and neutral views of the intervention, whereas the overwhelming majority were negative or neutral in the rest of the newspaper. The reverse relation held between front and back pages in Cumhuriyet.
8. Some of the interviewees also indicated that value changes in favor of democracy were already in the making beforehand.
9. Similar findings were found on many other categories not shown here.

**References**


**Bio**

**Murat Somer** is a democracy and development fellow at the Institute for International and Regional Studies at Princeton University and associate professor of international relations at Koç University in Istanbul. His research addresses questions of democratization, ethnic conflict, religious politics and secularism, the formation of elite beliefs and values, public and private polarization, the Kurdish question, and political Islam. His writings have appeared in book volumes and journals such as the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Comparative Political Studies, Middle East Journal,* and *Third World Quarterly.*