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The Janus-Faced Relation of Religious Actors and Human Security: Islamic and Secular Values in Turkey

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Introduction

The main goal of this essay is to underline the Janus-faced nature of religious nonstate actors' involvement in the provision and protection of human welfare, rights, and freedoms. In doing so, it will draw on a critical examination of the case of Turkey, supported by a content analysis of three religious and two secular newspapers and interviews with Islamic nonstate actors.' This exercise helps us to better understand both the multifaceted impact of religious and nonreligious actors on human security and the complex concept of human security itself.

A simple conceptualization of human security may be "the welfare and quality of life of a state's inhabitants." However, closer examination reveals that human security has both an objective component (on which there may be widespread agreement across societies and individuals) and a subjective component. More specifically, it has three interrelated yet analytically distinct components: (1) a material component involving physical health, well-being, and security; (2) an idealistic and legal-political component relating to protection of basic human rights and civic, economic, and political freedoms, insofar as such fundamental and universal human rights and freedoms can be defined; and (3) a more elusive, culturally conditioned factor, marked by different communities' subjective understandings of human autonomy and values of collective freedom, self-expression, and self-preservation. It can be assumed that religious nonstate actors at times enhance human security by complementing states and secular nonstate actors. Religious charity, for example, may help to alleviate poverty by attracting more contributions from the pious. Religious human-rights watchdogs may

address problems that secular watchdogs tend to overlook because of ideological prejudices, selective attention to different issues, or insufficient ability to reach out to the pious segments of society. In pursuit of religious liberties, "moderate" religious actors that embrace democratic pluralism may join forces with other pro-democratic actors and be a catalyst for the enhancement of democratic liberties in general. More directly, however, religious nonstate actors contribute to human security by virtue of the fact that their activities are not only means to achieve social, economic, or ideological ends; they are also "expressive activities." The ability to participate in these activities is an essential component of human security, insofar as freedom is an end of human development itself (Sen 1999). By participating in religious nonstate actors' activities, people enhance their own well-being by expressing and promoting their religious values and identity, fulfilling religious duties, exercising religious freedoms, and building social networks. Often, these activities also increase their participants' well-being by reducing moral dissonance, that is, by enabling them to do things and pursue lifestyles that satisfy their religious values.[1]

In Turkey, religious nonstate actors such as religious foundations, brotherhoods, communities, and associations are active in a vast array of areas ranging from manufacturing and trade to publishing, broadcasting, labor unionism, human rights advocacy, religious education, and charity, as well as building and running schools, dormitories, and mosques.[3] While these actors tend to support Islamist and conservative political parties and benefit from the successes of these parties, they are at least partially autonomous. Many view themselves as part of an Islamic "movement" that is driving rather than being driven by Islamist politics. They have survived even in periods when pro-Islamic parties were in decline (White 2002). Similarly, as we will see, while these actors are undoubtedly influenced by the complex mixture of inclusive-supportive and exclusive-controlling Turkish state policies in regard to religion in public life, they drive state polices at least as much as they are driven by them. Many of them have no organic relations with the state. They view themselves as part of a loosely defined and vastly diverse social-cultural and political movement that has anti(secular) state and antisystem characteristics in addition to a mission to transform society in accordance with Islamic guidelines.[3] To varying degrees, they have distinct organizational styles that draw on Muslim and traditional identities and practices (White 2002; Yavuz 2003). Undoubtedly, many people join these religious nonstate actors largely for instrumental reasons such as economic gain and social recognition and communitarian support. Others, however, join primarily to express their religious identity and beliefs, and to advance and exercise religious freedoms.

At the same time, I argue that religious nonstate actors can have a negative impact on human security under two conditions. First, they can do so insofar

as they compete with the state agencies and secular nonstate actors that provide human security. For example, social security in a society suffers if, faced with the alternative of contributing to religious organizations, many reduce their contributions to secular organizations by more than what they give to religious organizations. Alternatively, human security suffers if states cut down on social security spending by shifting responsibility to religious nonstate actors. In Turkey, for example, the promulgation of religious charity and aid organizations has gone hand-in-hand with government policies since the 1980s that have increasingly outsourced social security provision to voluntary organizations or to formal and informal partnerships between the government and such organizations (Buğra 2008).

Second, religious nonstate actors can undermine human security if they promote values and beliefs that undercut freedoms and protections that are granted by modern, pluralistic democracies (Dahl 1998; Schmitter and Karl 1991). More indirectly, religious actors adversely affect human security insofar as they bring about social and political polarization. This happens when they promote values and beliefs that conflict with those held by the secular segments of society and when social and legal-political institutions fail to successfully mediate these conflicts.

Such conflicts arise in two areas. The first area concerns political pluralism and democracy. For example, scholars have long argued that Islamic actors have a built-in conflict with democracy for various reasons, such as Islam's comprehensive belief system that includes the realm of state.[5] Such arguments had been advanced earlier with respect to Catholicism. However, available evidence suggests that Islamist political actors have shown considerable flexibility in embracing political democracy (Nasr 2005; Bayat 2007; Browers 2009). Public opinion in Muslim societies is generally supportive of democratic government, even in the Middle East (Norris and Inglehart 2005: 146–147; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010).[6] As I will show ahead, the contents of Turkish Islamic newspapers also demonstrate Islamic actors' adaptation to pluralistic democracy. Thus, we can expect that under favorable conditions Islamic political actors would adjust to democratic government, as Christian political parties did in Europe (Kalyvas 1996, 2003). The determining factors are whether or not social and political institutions provide sufficient incentives for secular actors to adopt an inclusive attitude toward religious actors, and for "radical" religious actors to moderate, that is, choose democratic competition over religious-authoritarian hegemony, and the presence of some freedom and pluralism in the public sphere so that pluralist ideas can develop.[7]

The second area of social pluralism is more problematic. Clashes between secular and religious actors over issues such as free expression, abortion, teaching evolution theory, stem cell research, and women's and gay rights constitute social

and political tensions and threaten social pluralism in many parts of the world, including advanced democracies. Moreover, available evidence shows that, while desiring political democracy like other societies, Muslim societies tend to hold more religious and conservative values than the rest of the world with respect to social issues such as gender equality, sexual liberalization, and the role of religious authorities in social affairs (Fish 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2005: 146–147). In Turkey, Muslim-conservative intelligentsia are more skeptical of social pluralism than secular intelligentsia, even though they are not less supportive of political pluralism (Somer 2011).

Thus, while advancing some religious and other freedoms, Islamic actors often promote values that undermine some freedoms that are granted in advanced democracies. Alternatively, even when religious actors do not oppose certain rights, they promote different understandings of such rights that conflict with the understandings of them by secular actors. Many Islamic actors believe, for example, that the separation of men and women in public life promotes women's freedom. This contrasts with secular conceptions of women's advancement in society, which aim to achieve the opposite. The resulting loss of consensus over the goals of democratization, and conflicts between religious and secular understandings of it, affects human security in society.

These multifaceted linkages demand that a comprehensive analysis of human security with respect to religious actors requires one to address complex questions such as potential conflicts between secular and religious understandings of democracy, human wants, rights, and freedoms. They also indicate that the relationship between religious nonstate actors and human security will be affected by a country's social structure and political system. Particularly important is the nature of the relationship between the state and religion, on one hand, and the religious and secular segments of society on the other.

The Turkish case is an ideal illustration of these complex mechanisms through which religious nonstate actors affect human security because they are vividly manifest in its current politics and social relations. As I show in the next section, the reasons lie in the country's peculiar background of secular modernization and democratization in a Muslim social-cultural context. The Turkish experience entails the social and political effects of both the exclusion and support and proliferation of religious nonstate actors. The exclusion resulted from state-led and comprehensive secularization that affected both the political and social-cultural realms. The proliferation resulted from various factors including the country's relatively advanced democratization, economic development, and integration with the world, the failures of the secular state and nonstate actors to provide sufficient social welfare, and, paradoxically, state support of religion to promote national unity and its own legitimacy. A main goal of Turkish secularization policies in

early years was to make sure that the government controlled and regulated religious activities and religious actors because the latter were thought to hold at least some values that were incompatible with modernization and development. State policies thus tried to suppress and exclude autonomous religious nonstate actors from mainstream politics and society. This generated a conflict-prone and distrusting relationship between the state agencies and religious nonstate actors, fed the politicization of Islamic actors, and generated a deficit of religious freedoms.

Through relative economic development, integration with the world, and the limited yet "conditional but promising" inclusion of Islamic political parties in a competitive political system, however, the Turkish experience also created opportunities for Islamic actors to participate in political and socioeconomic lives, build symbiotic relationships with state agencies, and adapt to pluralistic democracy and market economics (Yavuz 2003; Somer and Tol 2009).[8] As I show below, a content analysis of Islamic and secular newspapers demonstrates Islamic actors' discursive adaptation to democracy. Islamic, nonstate actors thus became major players in Turkey's political and economic life. One consequence of this process was the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a mass party rooted in Islamism. Religious actors have gained new opportunities to influence government policies and to shape social life since the party came to power in 2002. This period boosted Turkey's political and economic development in many ways. But it also polarized society and politics in various ways. Major political conflicts occurred between the AKP and the prosecular military-bureaucratic and political actors.[9] Relations between the religious and prosecular nonstate actors became tense and polarized. As the findings of the content analysis will indicate, one source of these tensions seems to be that major differences exist between secular and Islamic understandings of secularism and social pluralism.

Turkish Secularism and the Exclusion of Religious Nonstate Actors

Turkish secularism (laicism) was originally designed to control religion in order to modernize society and to secure the autonomy of the legal-political order from religious actors (Berkes 1998; Mardin 2005, 2006; Tunaya 2007).[10] It is a product of radical reforms that took place in the formative period of republican Turkey between 1924 (the abolition of the caliphate) and 1937 (the institution of the secularism principle in the constitution), under the charismatic leadership of Kemal Atatürk. These reforms both continued and broke away from the modernization-secularization model of the Ottoman ancien régime that republican Turkey replaced. The late Ottomans attempted to reform and co-opt traditional religious institutions and official authorities (*ulama*) in the name of modernization.

Convinced of this model's inadequacy, Kemalist reformers replaced these institutions and authorities with new institutions and agencies that were either secular or under state supervision. A main target of the secular reforms was a vast array of Islamic nonstate actors such as Sufi orders. "Official Islam" was easier to manage because it was already under state control in the Ottoman system (Mardin 2006). But Sunni Islam lacks a hierarchical church system and its decentralized organizational structure harbors a wide range of actors, autonomous or semiautonomous from the state.

In the Ottoman period, religious nonstate actors such as religious foundations (*vaqfs*), *madrasas*, and Sufi orders and brotherhoods (*tariqat*) fulfilled major functions such as regulating civil relations, providing education and social security, and lending legitimacy to the legal and political order. Kemalist reforms dissolved religious courts and schools and replaced them with secular courts and schools. All Sufi orders but a few were banned. The *vaqfs* lost their autonomy and were brought under government supervision. Having thus eliminated potential opposition to other social-cultural and legal-institutional reforms, secular reformers embarked on a series of reforms such as the westernization of the alphabet and calendar, the institution of universal suffrage for both sexes, and the adoption of civil and penal codes based on Swiss and Italian models.

A comprehensive evaluation of these radical reforms in terms of human security is outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to make two observations here. First, the general principle of secularism is likely to have helped Turkey's development. At the end of 2008, Turkey was one of only five countries that could be considered to be an "electoral democracy" among majority Muslim states. None of these five democracies had a state religion and all had the freedom of religion as a constitutional principle (Freedom House 2008).[11]

Second, beyond the general principle of secularism, Turkey developed a model of secularism that involves heavy state regulation of religious activities. The developmental effects of this model are more controversial. At first sight, Turkish secularism resembles the French *laïcité*, which promotes a strict separation of church and state that is symbolized by its famous motto "the Republic neither recognizes, nor salaries, nor subsidizes any religion" (Kuru 2007). The Turkish constitution prohibits any law based on religion, and it is a crime for any political actor to try to base the state's workings on religious principles.[12] Looking more closely, however, one recognizes that Turkish secularism, unlike France, involves strict regulation and subsidization of the majority religion. According to Fox (2008), Turkey has the twenty-third highest score of government involvement in religion, in a group of 175 countries.[13]

The colossal Directorate of Religious Affairs regulates Muslim religious practices, and appoints and pays the salaries of all the imams in the country. According

to Article 24 of the constitution, it is the state's duty to supervise all religious and moral education. In the eyes of the prosecular state agencies, these practices are aimed at checking religious radicalism and promoting a more rational and prosecular religion. A similar rationale underlies a highly polarizing ban on the Muslim headscarf in schools and government offices. Islamic nonstate actors vehemently oppose it but it has been upheld by the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The courts reasoned that the Islamic headscarf may symbolize antisecular politics, and, without restrictions in a Muslim-majority society, it may create religious pressures on uncovered women (Kalaycıoğlu 2005).

Such restrictions adversely affect religious liberties, and thus, human security. A detailed US Department of State report concluded in 2007 that the government "generally" respected freedom of religion, while an international ranking put the environment of religious freedoms in Turkey as "partially free."[14] It is also debatable as to whether or not the prosecular regulations serve the developmental goals that were the main motives of Turkish secularization. For example, a major goal of Turkish secularism was the transformation of the traditional Turkish-Muslim society to facilitate equal participation of women in public life. However, the legal equalities provided by secular laws did not necessarily translate into actual equality (Kalaycıoğlu and Toprak 2004: 16). Prosecular restrictions on Islamic headscarfs exacerbate this situation by making it more difficult for covered women to be represented in professional life.[15]

Turkish Democracy and the Growth of Religious Nonstate Actors

Despite the state's built-in suspicion of religious, nonstate actors, Turkish political and economic development provided important opportunities for their participation in public life. After the transition to multiparty democracy in 1950, religious nonstate actors steadily expanded their autonomy and influence through formal and informal arrangements with center-right governments, state agencies, and religious-conservative and Islamist political parties. Although it remains a taboo for politicians to publicly denounce secularism, unlike their French counterparts, Turkish politicians freely accentuate their piety in expectation of voter support. The 1980–1983 military regime actively supported Islamic, nonstate actors in a deliberate effort to use them as an antidote against rightist and leftist extremism. The subsequent civilian governments of Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal included prominent disciples of the Nakshibendi religious order. He allowed Islamic actors more access to state agencies and the political mainstream, creating, among other things, a need-based social assistance fund administered

with the involvement of local clergy (Buğra 2008). Özal's promarket and pro-international trade policies helped the Turkish economy to grow and religious nonstate actors to gain autonomy from the state. In this process, a vast array of "legitimate and illegitimate" Islamic movements emerged and employed "state-centric and society-centric" strategies to promote more Islamic models of society, politics, and economics (Yavuz 2003: 27, 35).

In 1997, the symbolic moves of the government led by the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), such as an official dinner for heads of religious *tariqats* at the Prime Ministry caused much anger among prosecular actors. The prosecular military, judiciary, media, and civil society launched a fierce public campaign known in Turkey as the "February 28 process," which compelled the RP government to resign in June. A crackdown on actual and perceived Islamist political and social-economic actors followed, causing much resentment among religious actors.[16] Paradoxically, however, this undemocratic intervention accelerated the Islamists' adaptation to pluralistic democracy. They abandoned the Islamist political discourse, which envisioned a political and economic system based on Islamic principles, in favor of a pro–liberal democracy and pro–European Union (EU) discourse as a survival strategy in the face of prosecular opposition (Bulaç 2001; Somer 2011).[17] The AKP's foundation by former Islamists as a "conservative democratic" party and its coming to power in a single party government were products of this transformation (Öniş and Keyman 2003; Özel 2003; Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2006; Yavuz 2006).

In government, the AKP has avoided any legal-institutional changes that one may call Islamist, apart from a short-lived attempt to criminalize adultery and a constitutional amendment to legalize headscarves in universities that was later annulled by the Constitutional Court. Any Islamic changes in society occurred indirectly through religious nonstate actors that were encouraged or, according to prosecular claims, favored by the government. Prosecular social and political actors claim, for example, that government recruitment, promotions, and projects systematically favor the graduates of religious *imam-hatip* schools, members of powerful religious movements, and pro-Islamic business groups (Toprak et al. 2008). Accordingly, the membership of Muslim-conservative and progovernment civil society organizations grew significantly vis-à-vis prosecular organizations.[18]

In addition to promoting more conservative conceptions of social life and gender relations, Islamic nonstate actors promote a traditional, voluntarism-based notion of social security rather than a modern welfare state. In a similar vein, the government's policies emphasize the privatization of areas such as education. According to government statistics, the number of private schools of primary and secondary education increased by 67.2 percent between 2002 and 2007, while the number of public schools increased by only 0.95 percent.[19] In private schools run

by religious nonstate actors, religious groups have more flexibility than in public schools to bypass secular restrictions and, for example, to organize prayer groups or have female students wear the Islamic headscarf.

Janus-Faced Impact of Religious Nonstate Actors on Human Security

During the AKP's administration, Turkey adopted more liberal laws and reduced military influence on politics, developed a more prosperous economy, and became an official candidate for EU membership. Between 2002 and 2006 the Turkish economy grew on average 7.3 percent a year.[20] The new "Islamic bourgeoisie," composed of export-oriented Islamic-conservative businesses, was one of the sources of economic growth (Buğra 2002; European Stability Initiative 2005; Öniş 2009). These factors coupled with political stability contributed to the human security of many among both the religious and secular segments of the population, in a country accustomed to long periods of unstable coalition governments.

However, legal-political democratization and economic development came at the price of a society, politics, and media severely divided over questions of secularism and democracy, the activities of Islamic communities, secular and religious perceptions of social exclusion, and market versus state provision of human security.[21]

Optimists applaud Islamic communities as indigenous modernizers who "vernacularize modernity" via their selective openness to it (Yavuz 2003). Skeptics raise concerns about issues such as their opaque character, the secondary role they assign women in their operations, and their discriminatory practices vis-à-vis "outsiders" (Toprak et al. 2008). While the government and the religious-conservative portions of its constituencies welcomed the growing influence of religious nonstate actors, this led to a growing sense of insecurity among major segments of society about coexistence and the future of secular freedoms and protections. Meanwhile, prosecular restrictions continue to feed a sense of insecurity and exclusion among the religious segments of society, even when an Islamic-conservative government is in power. In 2007, the AKP nominated and eventually elected one of its leading figures to the presidency. But this process led to major political fissures, including an online ultimatum by the military, prosecular mass rallies against the government, and a legal proceeding seeking to shut down the party. In 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled against shutting down the party but warned it against being "a center of anti-secular activities." The government itself began to display increasingly "illiberal" tendencies after its victory in parliamentary elections in 2007, including a public campaign against the prosecular media.[22]

For example, my interviews with female members of religious nonstate actors revealed their sense of injustice caused by secularist restrictions of the Islamic head-scarf. They view these restrictions as yet another sign of secularists' exclusionary and prejudicial practices against pious people. In addition to government restrictions in public offices, they point to the practical exclusion of covered women from white collar positions in prosecular business corporations.[13] Accordingly, recent surveys show that Turks in general sense that there is discrimination against religious people; 40 percent of the Turkish public thought in 2002 that "there was oppression of religious people in Turkey," 67.7 percent of them giving the example of "headscarf/turban pressures" as the reason.[14]

In return, secular nonstate actors fear that the legalization of Islamic dress on schools grounds would create social pressures on uncovered women, since the overwhelming majority of the society is Muslim and the headscarf is viewed by many as a sign of religiosity and "good morals." Many secular women feel, for example, that women and men show less respect to uncovered women than to covered women in places such as public transportation vehicles, especially in conservative parts of the country (Toprak et al. 2008).[15] One survey found that the percentage of women using a headscarf increased from 64.2 percent in 2003 to 69.4 percent in 2007, while those using a distinctly Islamic headscarf (which secularists call a turban in Turkey) increased from 3.5 percent to 16.3 percent (Konda 2007). The wearing of an Islamic headscarf has a Janus-faced impact on women's human security, enabling more conservative women to join public life while increasing the legitimacy of religious-traditional and patriarchal social norms and practices. Accordingly, 22.1 percent of the general public, 35.9 percent of the "nonreligious," and 43.6 percent of university graduates believed that secularism, which is often understood to capture secular freedoms and lifestyles, was under threat in 2006 (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006: 76). Fifty-five percent of the public disagreed in 2002 that religious people were oppressed for reasons such as head-scarf restrictions, and 63.3 percent thought that people were free to practice the worship requirements of Islam (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007: 129).

Education is another area of contention. Religious actors complain about government restrictions of religious education. Secular actors complain that religious teachers tend to be assigned as directors in public schools, that schools connected with religious communities tend to exclude secular teachers, and that students are encouraged or pressured to be observant of religious practices, for example to fast during the holy month of Ramadan.

While pro-Islamic actors often charge prosecular actors with being biased against religion, prosecular actors charge the pro-Islamic actors with social conservatism and with using democracy only as a means to acquire power. In order to reach a fair assessment of the implications for human security, it is useful to take

a closer look at which beliefs and values religious nonstate actors promote. The following discussion focuses on three areas: political democracy, social freedoms and pluralism, and secularism.

Social and Political Pluralism, Secularism, and Turkish Islamic Actors

During my interviews with religious nonstate actors in Turkey, I made two general observations. The first is the diversity and mental flexibility of Islamic actors. One senses their eagerness to adopt selective dimensions of modernity and democracy and to reconcile them with tradition, faith, and a rural- or urban-conservative personal background. The second observation is that this flexibility meets sharp boundaries in relation to some norms of democracy and social pluralism that are accepted in western, liberal democracies. These norms relate to questions of secularism, free speech, social regulation, and public mores.

However, impressions based on personal conversations can be misleading precisely because people often try to impress each other in personal conversations. Public debates where secular and religious social and political actors discuss and deliberate issues in writing can be a more reliable indicator of these actors' views and values. Thus, I conducted a systematic content analysis of three religious-conservative (Islamic) and two secular newspapers published between 1996 and 2004 (Somer 2010, 2011).[26] In total, researchers I trained analyzed the contents of more than forty thousand relevant articles in about fifty-four hundred newspaper issues. These large numbers minimize the likelihood that the findings are coincidental.[27] In interpreting the findings, I also benefited from interviews with media representatives, persons from four Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and editors of two Islamic newspapers.[28]

The discussions in the newspapers are a good indicator of the views and values that religious and prosecular actors promote. All are privately owned and may, themselves, be considered nonstate actors. Turkish newspapers are similar to the French press, which is more closely tied to the political field and in which newspapers assign themselves a larger role in interpreting events and shaping public opinion than the US press, which tends to view its primary role as reporting facts and contending statements (Benson and Hallin 2007). Journalists, especially columnists, tend to view themselves as public intellectuals with a mission of informing as well as interpreting events for the public in pursuit of self-appointed goals such as democratization, (secular or religious) "justice," and "modernization."[29] Most newspapers are owned by major business groups with major political and social-ideological alliances and are connected ideologically with different constituencies and social movements. *Zaman* is closely tied with the powerful Fethullah

Gülen faith–based movement, *Yeni Şafak* has close organic ties with the AKP, for which many of its writers act as formal or informal advisors, and *Milliyet* is owned by the powerful and prosecular Doğan media and business group.

Democracy

Notwithstanding secular fears, Islamic actors are supportive of democracy in general: in the three religious newspapers analyzed, only 10.4 percent of the content on democracy expressed skeptical views, that is, negative views referring to the flaws or failures of democracy.[30] More importantly, their dominant understanding of democracy changed from electoral to liberal democracy. In other words, it shifted from one that allows Islamic actors to come to power through elections to one that secures pluralism and the rule of law. This is important because one fear of secular actors is that the strengthening of religious actors will produce an "illiberal democracy," if not an outright authoritarian regime.

In religious newspapers, the ratio of the times democracy was praised primarily as liberal democracy to the times it was praised primarily as electoral democracy was roughly one (1.1:1) in 1996 and 1997. In 1998, the ratio rose to roughly two (1.8:1), and after that year the positive codings for liberal democracy were at least double the positive codings for electoral democracy.

The findings indicated a relatively higher support for democracy in general and for liberal democracy in particular in secular newspapers. The ratio of positive codings for liberal democracy to the positive codings for electoral democracy was greater than 2:1 throughout the period and was 4:1 in 1999. However, in those years when an Islamic party was elected to power (1996, 1997, 2003, and 2004), and in years that led to the elections that brought an Islamic party to power (2001 and 2002), the ratio for negative codings of liberal to electoral democracy was less than 1:1. In other words, more of the *negative* codings for democracy in secular newspapers came from electoral democracy in those years. Arguably, its allowing Islamists to come to power is a negative aspect of electoral democracy from an exclusionist prosecular point of view. Similarly, although the secular newspapers were very critical of military interventions in general, they became less critical whenever military interventions were thought to "protect secularism."

Social Pluralism

Even though religious nonstate actors embrace liberal democracy in terms of political rights, they may hold socially conservative or illiberal values. If these values promote intolerance of different life styles and identities, the growth of religious actors may undermine social pluralism, freedoms, and thus human security.

Available survey studies in Turkey suggest that social conservatism, in the sense of avoiding people with different ethnic and religious identities and lifestyles as neighbors, colleagues, or marriage partners, tends to be higher among people who consider themselves religious than among people who consider themselves not religious (Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006: 49). The contents of the newspapers support this view. In general, religious nonstate actors are more skeptical of social pluralism than secular actors are. In the religious press, 36 percent of the content (compared to 11 percent in the secular press) related to issues of social, ideological ethnic, and religious diversity reflected negative opinions regarding the desirability of pluralism; 38 percent (as opposed to 59 percent in the secular press) reflected positive opinions, the rest comprising neutral opinions. For example, whenever the subject of pluralism stemming from different sexual preferences was discussed in the religious press, homosexuality was viewed as wrong or sick (91 percent of the times compared to 11 percent in the secular press).

The contradictions between political and social liberalism also came out during interviews. For example, two otherwise zealous and coherent advocates of EU standards of human rights asserted that gay rights were unacceptable because "homosexuality should not be supported." An otherwise daring female activist fighting for gender equality took pains to avoid shaking a male interviewer's hand at the end of a lively and candid conversation, visibly sensitive to the reactions of her male colleagues present.

Secularism

If religious and secular actors hold widely different views on secularism, it follows that the growth of religious actors can cause conflicts with prosecular nonstate actors and state agencies, undermining human security in society. In the religious newspapers, people tended to express critical views of secularism and their main demand with respect to secularism was that it should allow religion to play a bigger role in social affairs. The findings do not indicate that there was any improvement in religious actors' evaluation of secularism during the period. As expected, secular actors' evaluation of secularism was overwhelmingly positive.

In the religious press, 34 and 24 percent of the content on secularism reflected critical and supportive views regarding the desirability and consequences of secularism, in respective order. The corresponding figures were 2 and 73 percent in the secular press.

Whenever secularism was an issue, religious actors tended to refer to it as a problem, and most of the time as a criticism of Turkish secularism. Similar observations were garnered by the interviews. For example, the head of an NGO close to the AKP criticized the Constitutional Court for its 2008 warning that the

party supported antisecularism, labeling the decision "politicized and biased." Later in the conversation, however, he argued, "ideally, of course, we would not have secularism" (Somer 2011: 535).[11]

But if they had the ability to modify Turkish secularism, how would religious actors change it to better fit their ideals? The findings from the content analysis show that religious actors would allow religion to play a bigger role in social affairs. The results also indicate that the primary source of value conflict between religious and secular actors vis-à-vis the secularism question does not concern the separation of religion and state. Religious actors wanted to reduce the state's exclusionary practices but did not express views in favor of reducing the Turkish state's supportive involvement in religious affairs discussed above. Although there is considerable support (30 percent) among religious actors for religion to play a bigger role in state affairs, half of the religious (48 percent) and the overwhelming majority of the secular actors oppose this idea. However, the majority of religious media actors (68 percent) wants religion to play a bigger role in social affairs, while the overwhelming majority of secular media actors do not. This divergence of preferences can cause conflicts that can undermine human security.

Conclusions

The concept of human security has objective components such as wealth, life expectancy, and rights and freedoms on which there is widespread agreement across societies, and subjective components such as happiness, safety, and different understandings of human autonomy and freedom. As for the objective components, most humans feel more secure in having access to more and better health services when they are sick and access to more effective human rights organizations when they have trouble with the law. While having access to more lifestyles and cultural diversity may please many people in Seattle as long as they peacefully coexist, such diversity may make some people feel less secure by generating frustrating choices and by threatening the continuity of beliefs, values, and communities. This indicates an effect on the subjective component of human security.

Thus, any definition of human security and, for that matter, development reflects some degree of bias. The ingredients of human security may change across societies, states, and religious and secular communities. What may increase human security for an Orthodox Jew or Muslim may differ from what may increase human security for a secular Jew or Muslim. In the same way, Buddhists and Christians and, for that matter, socialists and liberals may perceive human security differently.

A close look at the Turkish case shows that, while contributing to the objective component of human security for many and to the subjective component

of human security for some, the growth of religious nonstate actors can have a negative impact on the subjective component of some people's human security through two mechanisms. The first one concerns the tensions between secular and religious understandings of human security. For example, religious actors may not accept a Millian liberal conception of individual autonomy based on the ability of adult individuals to pursue different notions of a "good life" and the associated rights to privacy and freedom from social controls (Mill 1985 [1859]). To give a more specific example, many liberal-secular Turkish intellectuals support the freedom of adults in universities to choose to wear the Islamic headscarf or veil but believe that such a freedom would subject children in elementary and high schools to parental and societal oppression (Kadıoğlu 2007). Many Islamic actors believe, however, that children need to be immersed in Islamic practices and symbols and some secular choices should be made unavailable to them in order to develop the habits that would make them good Muslims in the future (see, e.g., Karaman 2009: 162).

The second type of tension concerns issues of social exclusion and polarization and occurs even if one accepts the liberal notion that pluralism and the availability of different choices is an intrinsically valued asset for human security. There are now more human rights organizations with either secular or unsecular understandings of human rights, more charity organizations with different understandings of justice and welfare, and more newspapers and television channels with different takes on the news in Turkey primarily due to religious nonstate actors. Take the example of religious-conservative television channels. On one hand, their presence clearly increases the information available to Turkish citizens and their ability to choose between different sources of information. This potential choice increases neither subjective nor objective human security, however, whenever the norms and values promoted by these channels discourage the use of different sources. Alternatively, social polarization between the secular and unsecular gives rise to social pressures among both groups, even within families, that may limit exposure to different channels.

Policies aimed at improving human security should take into account these complex mechanisms. They should include legal and political measures to prevent social discrimination and polarization and platforms of public exchange and deliberation where religious and secular actors can try to reconcile their different values. This is a major challenge for Turkish democracy. While addressing Turkey's Grand National Assembly in 2009, President Barack Obama maintained that Turkey's secular democracy is "at the center of things [in the world]." "This is not where East and West divide," he argued optimistically, "this is where they come together." Indeed, the challenges facing Turkish democracy reach well beyond the country's borders.

Notes

1. The content analysis covers the period 1996–2004, and the analysis and narrative are based on events and developments in Turkey through the end of 2008. However, I was able to include some post-2008 bibliographical references while editing the final version of the essay in 2011. In my view, the social and political developments between 2008 and 2011 mainly confirmed and reinforced the observations and predictions made here.

2. For a formal analysis, see Kuran (1998).

3. By Turkish law, religious education should be provided either by state agencies or under state supervision and regulation. In practice, religious nonstate actors are involved in religious education either illegally, under government regulation, or through informal arrangements with state agencies.

4. While all Islamic political actors criticize the Turkish state's secular or secularist characteristics to differing degrees, many simultaneously defend a strong and patriarchal state as long as it supports public religion.

5. For such arguments, see, e.g., Huntington (1996); Lewis (2002); Tibbi (2008).

6. However, Muslims also tend to favor the clergy having more influence in government.

7. For moderation of Islamist political parties and movements, see, e.g., Brumberg (1997); Wickham (2004); Schwedler (2006 and 2011); and Tezcür (2010).

8. Also see Yavuz (2006) and Güney and Başkan (2008) for sanctions against Islamic political parties.

9. As of 2011, the AKP had prevailed in most of these conflicts and had consolidated its power in government.

10. The discussion here focuses on Muslim religious actors. Note that 99.8 percent of Turkey's population is *nominally* Muslim. Christian and Jewish minorities recognized by the Lausanne Treaty have their autonomous religious and educational institutions but they are restricted by government regulations and exclusive practices that have been relaxed in recent years alongside EU-led legal reforms. Other religions need first to be recognized by the state in order to have legal protection. See Fox (2008); US Department of State (2007); Aktar (2000).

11. By comparison, twenty of the remaining thirty-two nondemocracies have a state religion. Three of the democracies, Mali, Senegal, and Turkey had the principle of secularism enshrined in the constitution.

12. The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 24.

13. The Religion and State Project, available at http://www.religionandstate.org.

14. Data of Religious Freedom obtained from Hudson Institute website (http://crf. hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=survey_files); before being moved to Hudson Institute, the data was reportedly collected by Freedom House.

15. Turkish women, however, are highly represented in some professions such as law.

16. Accompanying prosecular policies were aimed at undermining religious nonstate actors. For example, new legislation made religious *imam-hatip* high schools, which are state administered but largely built through local initiative and charity, less attractive, leading to a 65 percent fall in enrollment. See Bozan (2007: 21).

17. Also see, e.g., Ali Bulaç, "Modernliğin Merkezine Göç" (Migrating to the Center of Modernization), *Zaman*, April 28, 2001.

18. The membership of the Muslim-conservative labor union Memur-Sen, for example, swelled from 42,000 in 2002 to 315,000 in 2008, while the membership of the competing unions either decreased or remained the same. See Toprak et al. (2008: 113).

19. In the same period, the numbers of mosques also increased at a slightly higher rate. From 2003 and 2007, the number of mosques increased by 3.47 percent, while the corresponding rate was 2.94 percent between 1998 and 2002.

20. However, Turkey's ranking in the Human Development Index remained more or less the same between 2002 and 2005 (see http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/). Similarly, the country's gender gap score remained the same, and its ranking actually deteriorated from 105th to 123rd, between 2006 and 2008. See Global Gender Gap Index, World Economic Forum (available at http://www.weforum.org/).

21. For implications for democratic consolidation, see Somer (2007).

22. See, e.g., Tülin Daloğlu, "The Decline of Freedom of Expression in Turkey," *Washington Times*, March 4, 2009.

23. See the explanation on the interviews conducted in the "Social and Political Pluralism" section.

24. However, less than 1 percent indicated "turban, religion and religious pressures" as the most important problem of the country. See Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 129, 152).

25. See interviews with religious actors in Toprak et al (2008: 116).

26. For a more comprehensive discussion of the methodology and findings, see Somer (2010, 2011). The newspapers were *Milli Gazete, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, Milliyet*, and *Cumhuriyet*. The first three are religious-conservative newspapers. Note that the terms "religious" and "secular" are used to denote these newspapers for brevity, for lack of better terms, and to abide by the popular usage in Turkey.

27. In general, I also minimized validity and reliability problems by distributing the issues among twenty analysts with no consecutive day examined by the same person

and each coder's employing the same rules and answering the same set of questions while coding the articles. The coders were also instructed *not* to try to infer the overall opinion of an article. For example, if an article on nationalism contained arguments and examples both favoring and critical of nationalism, they were instructed to code both positive and negative judgments for the article on nationalism. This reduced the role of their subjective judgments and made it possible to code the composition and changing balance of different views in the texts.

28. The NGOs are the Istanbul branches of Mazlum-Der Human Rights Foundation, the Ensar Educational Foundation, the AK-Der women's rights organization, and the Deniz Feneri Charity Foundation. The newspapers are: *Today's Zaman* and *Vakit*. In order to protect the privacy of these parties, however, I will not link comments to specific actors.

29. The Turkish word is "çağdaşlaşma," which can be translated as "adopting the contemporary level of civilization." See also Heper and Demirel (1996).

30. This skepticism is still almost double the skepticism in the secular newspapers, which had 258 negative codings, or 5.8 percent, within a total of 4,478 codings on democracy.

31. Intellectual ambivalence vis-a-vis secularism is common among Islamist actors in the Middle East. See Tamimi and Esposito (2000).

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For Annette, Constance, and Georgia: you bring grace and peace.
—James K. Wellman, Jr.

For Greta, Chiara, and Cecilia: with gratitude and love.
—Clark B. Lombardi