Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics, a Country’s ‘Centre,’ and Democratization

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Abstract
Based on a within-case comparative analysis of Turkish democratization since the 1920s and data on elite values, this essay develops a theoretical framework to better explain the moderation of religious and secular politics and democratization. First, it is maintained that the content of moderation and its effects on democracy will vary among countries depending on each country’s domestic and international context—called a country’s “centre”—and political rivals’ reactions. Second, moderation can further democratization only insofar as it occurs with a democratic centre. Third, absent a democratic centre, moderation may involve adoption, retention and reproduction of the centre’s undemocratic attributes. In such cases, the challenge of democratization is not moderation per se but the construction of a new, democratic centre. Fourth, moderation is interactive between religious and secular actors, multidimensional and reversible. Turkish democratization began with the moderation of authoritarian-secular actors, but generated only a semi-democracy because the changes were not institutionalized through explicit and formal compromises to produce a fully democratic centre. Turkish political Islamism moderated during the 1990s. However, in spite of, major achievements, democratization remained ambiguous under the rule of moderate Islamists because they compromised and associated themselves with the semi-democratic centre, and secular-religious cooperation failed while some secular actors de-moderated.
I. Introduction

How does the Turkish case help us to better theorize what moderation of religion and secular politics entails, and when and how moderation leads to successful democratization? The emergence of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the late 1990s and early 2000s marked an important transformation of Turkish political Islamism and democracy. Modern Turkey was built during the 1920s and 1930s through radical secular reforms that sidelined Muslim-conservative elites and founded a secular nation-state and mainstream social and economic institutions in a predominantly Muslim-conservative society. Through the partial moderation of secular practices and transition to multiparty politics, the political system was consolidated as an electoral but illiberal democracy during the 1950s and 1960s. The 1970’s saw explicitly political Islamist movements and parties entering the political arena. These parties had a pragmatic and dynamic but predominantly anti-systemic and religious discourse and ideology, which targeted Turkey’s uneven development and pro-western and secular mainstream orientation. The AKP was rooted in this tradition. By 2002 when it came to power, however, The AKP had adopted a pro-western, liberal-democratic and globalist discourse in which religion did not figure saliently. This development was hailed by many as the moderation of political Islamism and the dawn of “Muslim democrats and Muslim democracy.” Yet, despite favorable conditions and major democratic achievements of the AKP such as the curtailment of military praetorianism, the overall record of democratization has been disappointing, especially since 2007.

How can we explain this transformation of Turkish political Islamism and its ambiguous impact on democratization? Moderation of religious politics, a major
Theoretical construction that current research employs to address such questions in Turkey and elsewhere, remains a poorly defined and slippery concept. What will determine the nature of democratization in emerging post-Arab Spring polities such as Egypt and Tunisia where ‘moderate’ Islamists have become major political actors? By analyzing the evolution of religious as well as secular politics and democracy in Turkey since the 1920s, I develop a conceptual-theoretical framework to address these questions.

I argue that one cannot adequately theorize moderation by focusing on political Islamist actors alone or a single period of their evolution, such as the emergence of the AKP. It is necessary to examine both religious and secular actors and in multiple periods. The Turkish case exhibits various sub-periods when religious or secular actors moderated and sometimes de-moderated. This provides significant analytical leverage to develop more general theoretical and empirical implications, through within-case comparisons and a focus on causal processes. These within-case comparisons show that the reasons for, and content of, moderation do not remain constant. The occurrence, causes, and content of moderation depend on the changing social, political, and international context of moderation.

I call this mainstream context of moderation a country’s centre. Pending an elaborate conceptualization in the next section, I employ a country’s centre broadly to capture the main attributes of the mainstream social-economic, political and external environment of that country at a certain time. While their impact should not be seen deterministically, I argue that these attributes restrain political actors and influence their understandings of how to become and remain major power holders. Thus, they mold the content and consequences of moderation on democracy, whenever moderation occurs.
Accordingly, I define moderation as an adjustment to at least some attributes of the centre in a particular country at a certain time. Moderation theories consistently treat moderation as some kind of an adaptation, willingness to cooperate or compromise, and focus on discovering which interests or ideological attributes make it happen. But they do not specify “to what” the moderating actors adapt, or “with what” they cooperate or compromise. Is it the median voters, the mainstream political institutions or culture, westernization, a universally defined conception of democracy and pluralism, or, in the case of religious parties, an acceptance of secularism? One implication of my definition of moderation is that only some features of moderation, such as a predilection towards non-violence, can be conceptualized universally. The rest of what moderation entails can be expected to vary cross-nationally and cross-temporally because moderation entails adjustment to different contexts, i.e. to different centres in each case. This is why moderation seems such a slippery concept. Its content is a variable by definition.

For example, the moderation of Turkey’s secularists during the 1940s meant a compromise with the social component of the centre, a reflection of the preferences of religious-conservative voters, as well as with the centre’s shifting international component following the Second World War. Hence, Turkish secularists moderated by becoming more open to public religion and by adopting electoral-democracy and a more pro-western foreign policy. By comparison, the moderation of Turkish Islamists had a very different content because the centre they adjusted to was very different. Islamists compromised with existing attributes of the centre by curtailing religious, anti-secular and anti-western rhetoric. And, they adjusted to new attributes of the centre by embracing
the goal of EU membership, integration with global markets, and the rhetoric of liberal democracy.

In the same way that the content of moderation changed cross-temporally in the Turkish case, one can expect it to vary across countries. A moderating actor would clash as well as compromise with widely different values, interests, actors, and institutions which constitute the centres in, say, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, and, Belgium.

This framework of explaining moderation helps to explicate the relationship between moderation and democratization. It implies that one can expect moderation to contribute to democratization only insofar as it occurs in a country where the centre already has primarily democratic attributes. This would also help the moderating actor to ensure the cooperation of political rivals.

Without a fully democratic centre, Turkey’s moderate AKP—which accomplished major democratic reforms under peculiar domestic and external conditions during its first term—adopted democratic properties only as far as the centre itself was democratic. Meanwhile, many secular actors were threatened and radicalized by the AKP rule, because the centre lacked sufficiently effective and neutral democratic institutions that could successfully mediate the material and ideological conflicts between religious and secular actors. Thus, the more the moderate AKP government consolidated its power and merged with the mainstream, the more authoritarian it became and the more it began to exclude its liberal supporters, reproducing the semi-democratic centre in a more religious-conservative form.

All this implies that the distinction between normative and behavioral moderation, which many extant studies address, may not be so crucial for democratization. Instead,
the crucial question is which ideas, norms and types of behavior a moderating actor is adopting. These, I maintain, are significantly determined by the nature of a country’s center. Arguably, moderation inevitably includes some ideational component. The narrative of the Turkish case will show that the moderation of both political secularism and Islamism entailed important ideational as well as behavioral changes. At the same time, these changes failed to consolidate full democracy sometimes because the ideational changes were rather selective and poorly institutionalized and other times because de facto behavioral changes were not legitimized through explicit ideational compromises. In short, they were not supported by and did not lead to the building of a fully democratic centre,

The argument complements research on the transformation of Turkish Islamism. We have a plethora of partial explanations: economic liberalization; political learning; political party system and voter preferences; globalization, modernization and Turkish Sufi Islam; the EU and relations between the western world and Muslims; Islam-state relations; political and institutional checks and balances; and secular rivals. While highly informative, however, current research does not offer conceptual tools to explain or predict the content and consequences of moderation. Take political economy explanations. They show that the emergence of a market-based bourgeoisie with religious-conservative roots contributed to moderation. But while a conservative bourgeoisie can be expected to support a more accountable government and liberal economy, it is unclear why they would also countenance social and political rights for workers, or, for that matter, ethnic and religious minorities. Similarly, extant studies can explain either the democratic accomplishments or failures of the AKP, but not both.
introducing the concept of the centre and focusing on both religious and secular actors, it becomes possible to explain why the AKP moderated and why it successfully led democratization in some areas but not in others.

II. Moderation, Democracy and a Country’s “Centre”

Extant studies usually do not offer a clear definition of moderation and, when they do, widely disagree on what it entails and the capacity of Islamists to moderate. For a diverse group of skeptics, moderation more or less amounts to upholding the norms and practices observed in western, liberal and secular democracies. Optimists also offer a plethora of implicit and explicit definitions. Accordingly, moderation may involve a movement: toward acceptance of competitive politics and electoral and non-electoral constraints; from state-centered to society-centered, civil and reformist movements; toward rapprochement and intermediation between opposing ideological groupings; from monopoly of religious truth to the acknowledgment of ambiguity and multiplicity; from closed to more open worldviews tolerant of alternative truth-claims. Notwithstanding these different definitions, in practice moderates tend to be identified simply as those who don’t want to “rock the boat”.

But why should moderation look and affect democratization the same way in different contexts where moderating parties would compromise with very different institutions, values and rival actors? For example, the prevailing institutions, rival secular actors, and international allies in different countries would react differently to the moderation of an Islamist party, thereby influencing the consequences of moderation.
However, it is also true that moderation may have some generalizable characteristics such as non-violence. Hence, it can be argued that the concept of moderation consists of universal and country-specific dimensions. Table 1 illustrates that it has some general manifestations such as a relative potential for openness to different worldviews. Other manifestations of moderation, however, can only be identified meaningfully in reference to the centre of a particular country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universal Dimension</th>
<th>Country-specific dimension</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Potential openness to other worldviews and to peaceful competition, cooperation and compromise with other actors</td>
<td>Compromise with the centre. Depends on the qualities and behavior of the centre in a particular country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to relax ideological priorities for appealing to greater segments of voters</td>
<td>• Political-Institutional component of the centre (e.g. secularist and Islamic state institutions in Turkey and Iran respectively)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preference for peaceful political strategies</td>
<td>• Social component of the centre (e.g. the preferences of the moderately pious and (Turkish) nationalist median voters in Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International Component of the centre (for example Turkey’s long-term western alliances with the US and the EU, and, since the 1980s, extensive embeddedness in global economy)</td>
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Table 1. Universal and Country-Specific Dimensions of Moderation

I maintain that the concept of centre has three components. The political-institutional component refers to the characteristics, values and interests of the dominant state institutions and agents, and of the dominant actors in “political society,” such as the main political parties. The social component involves the characteristics, values and interests of the median voters and of the dominant actors in civil society, including the
main economic power holders and the intelligentsia. The international component captures the external context of moderation, and denotes the main international alliances and position of the country in global politics and economy.

The overall strength and cohesiveness of the centre would vary across societies. As an anchor and pull factor, the centre’s impact on the moderation of religious politics would depend on such variables as how cohesive the centre is, how strongly it is embraced by a unified group of elites, how extensively and effectively the values associated with the centre are promoted in areas such as education and the media, and how attractive the political and economic benefits of reconciling with the centre are.

The relative importance of the center’s different components in affecting moderation would also vary across cases and time. One could hypothesize, for example, that the weight of the social component would be higher the more the elections are free and fair, and the more autonomy elected governments enjoy in a country. Similarly, dependence on international alliances and integration with the world economy would increase the weight of the international component.

But it is inherent to the idea of a center that these relative weights cannot be predicted easily and decisively. If it were simple to identify them \textit{ex ante}, all actors could similarly and correctly predict how rewarding moderation would be in terms of its political consequences such as electoral success and acceptance by domestic and international actors. Thus, moderation would not provide any extra political advantage to those actors who successfully moderate. In other words, different actors can give different normative as well as strategic responses to the same centre, and there can be successful and failing attempts to moderate. Successful moderates are those who
outperform their competitors in gauging which specific compromises to make, with which components of the center, and when. As we will see, the AKP turned out to be successful moderates in the Turkish case because they made these choices better than other actors and with the right timing.

Because the process of moderation entails an initially anti-systemic actor’s adjustment to a country-specific context, in partial democracies (or, for that matter, non-democracies) it would be misleading to identify all moderates as democrats, because these partial democracies by definition lack a democratic centre. Without a democratic centre that promotes democratic standards, moderates would tend to adopt the centre’s democratic as well as semi-democratic and authoritarian features. In regard to issues on which the centre lacks democratic standards, mainstream institutions would neither compel nor encourage moderating actors to cooperate, adopt pluralistic positions, and compete with each other on a pluralist platform and discourse.\textsuperscript{26}

Indeed, as the following analytical narrative will illustrate, full democracy failed to materialize in Turkey despite the occurrence of both religious and secular moderation in different periods. Table 2 summarizes the discussion ahead in terms of sub-periods.

### III. 1920-1945: The Emergence of the Secularist Political Centre

In this period, top-down reforms built a Turkish nationalist, secularist and authoritarian centre with a state-led economy, mainly ‘Muslim-conservative’ society and growing secular social-political elite. The centre’s international component was westernizing, pursuing a neutral foreign policy and limited explicit alliances with western powers.\textsuperscript{27}
This formative phase of the secular Turkish Republic spanned the opening of the Grand National Assembly during the War of Independence (1920), the promulgation of the Republic and a new constitution (1923 and 24), the constitutional recognition of the secularism principle in 1937, and the end of the Second World War. Between the secularist and modernist Islamic elites that emerged during the late Ottoman times, the peculiar conditions of the War of Independence enabled the former to become hegemonic and unilaterally build the centre during this period. The secular-nationalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) was founded by Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938). The CHP’s single-party regime sidelined the Islamist-modernizing elites, often in spite of societal opposition.

The CHP abolished the Caliphate, consolidated a unified and secular education system, secularized the legal system in toto, minimized religious education and brought religious endowments under state control, legislated mostly equal civil and political rights for women, banned Sufi orders, lodges, and holy shrines except for a few, and vernacularized ezan (call to prayer). In many ways, these reforms were anti-clerical and anti-ancient regime (Ottoman), aiming to privatize Islam a la French laicism. In other ways, they continued late-Ottoman modernization and were inspired by modernist Islamism, aiming to control as well as reform religion.

The pro-secular political centre came to include the military, the CHP and a stream of centre-right parties after transition to multiparty politics in the next period. Later, it also developed strong state institutions such as the judiciary. A main goal of secularist reforms—echoing later efforts of Islamists to nurture a religious-conservative “counter-elite”—especially in the educational realm, was to promote a pro-secular
intelligentsia and urban middle class. Thus, over time, the social component of the centre evolved to entail predominantly pro-secular academia and intelligentsia, media organizations, and business, labor and professional associations. It also included the median voters who remained predominantly Muslim-conservative but whose preferences were undoubtedly affected by secular education and social-economic modernization.

What were the long-term consequences of the secularist center established in this period? On the positive side, it helped Turkey develop “an overarching national identity” and achieve “the level of political, economic and cultural development it has reached today”. On the deficit side, the authoritarian and unilateral way in which it was built generated a disgruntled group of Muslim-conservative modernizers, arguably creating one of the deeper fissures that typically emerged between secular-nationalist and Islamist elites in Muslim countries.

Coercive institutions such as the military formed a main pillar of the centre. However, what made Turkish secular modernization relatively successful in terms of both its own survival and democratic development, and a major factor that distinguished Turkish secular-nationalists from their counterparts such as the Baathists in Iraq and Syria, was their relative moderation during the 1940s.

III. 1946-1970: The Emergence of A Semi-Democratic Centre

The CHP’s establishment of multiparty politics in 1946 reflected moderation in the universal sense described in Table 1, openness to peaceful competition with rival actors. Soon thereafter, the party took actions along the country-specific dimension of moderation, such as the reopening of shrines and tombs of saints in 1947. Thus, the CHP
moved closer to the values of the Turkish median voters. The CHP then peacefully relinquished power when it lost the elections to the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950.36

The DP was formed by former CHP members representing its more economically entrepreneurial and liberal, and more religiously conservative elements. Threatened by Soviet expansionism soon after the Second World War, Turkey sought entry to, and joined, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Thus, interests and calculations such as joining the western camp, CHP leaders’ belief that they would carry the elections, and the DP’s assurances that it would not dismantle secularism contributed to democratic transition.37

But ideational factors were also important. The CHP entailed actors with “hardline-secular” (authoritarian and anti-religious) and “moderate-secular” (secularist but open to democratization, and secular but relatively open to public religion) ideals. While some CHP functionaries were unapologetic autocrats, the long-term vision of others who were conditional democrats included democracy and power-sharing.38

The DP also represented moderate religious interests. On one hand, the DP restored the call to prayer in Arabic, lifted the ban on religious radio programmes, opened state-run religious imam-hatip schools, built mosques, and displayed a generally more tolerant stand toward Sufi Islam. On the other hand, they accepted the centre’s secular character and remained loyal to the essence of the Kemalist reforms. It did not try to restore the Caliphate, the abolition of which had caused much resentment among Islamists. Nor did it try to cancel the constitution principle of secularism. A political party charged with anti-secularism was closed in 1951, and the suppression of Sufi orders continued during the DP rule, albeit more moderately.
This twin moderation of secular and Muslim political actors presented a golden opportunity for the building of a democratic centre. However, this opportunity was missed when both the CHP and the DP became increasingly authoritarian and immersed in antagonistic bickering.

Neither the CHP nor the DP had firmly liberal-democratic principles and unconditional commitment to pluralism and power-sharing. Political expediency and democratic aspirations led to the *de facto* moderation of each side’s positions *vis-à-vis* power-sharing, religion and secularism. But there was no intellectual reconciliation between the two potentially mutually exclusive ideals of modernization—secularist-westernizing and Islamic—and no explicit compromise over the principles of a more democratic secularism. Furthermore, within the Cold War context, Turkey’s western alliances, which had become a key component of the centre by then, prioritized stability and loyalty over democratic pluralism.

The decade culminated in the military intervention of 1960-1961, which made a new constitution envisioning a liberal-democratic political system while strengthening civil and political liberties. While the centre thus became equipped with the formal institutions and discourse of liberal-democracy, actual democracy remained guided and limited. The constitution curtailed legal politics with the ostensible aim of protecting democracy from Marxist, Kurdish-nationalist and political Islamist threats and legitimized the role of the military-bureaucratic elites (mainly the army and the judiciary) in restricting civilian politics, through such institutions as the Constitutional Court and the military-dominated National Security Council.
The military pushed elected governments out in 1971 and 1997, and took over in 1980. Democratic politics were also constrained through announcements of the military or the National Security Council, which civilian governments felt compelled to heed. Although political parties were freely established and contested elections and power rotated peacefully, the powers of elected governments remained limited with respect to ‘sensitive issues’ such as “leftist, religious and ethnic radicalism.” Until 2001, the Constitutional Court shut down six political parties for ‘violating secularism.’

Nevertheless, secular moderation, electoral democracy, and practical interactions between secular and Muslim actors brought about changes in the centre especially with respect to secularism, at least practically if not ideologically. Hence, contradicting some claims in extant research that exclusively focus on state attempts to suppress and privatize religion in many contexts, the practice of Turkish statedominated secularism (laiklik) increasingly evolved into an integrationist and accommodationist model. It diverged from both French laicism and American secularism, privately and publicly supporting Sunni Islam in some contexts while restricting both religious and secular freedoms in other contexts. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) grew constantly and built mosques, educated imams, published religious materials and discriminated against non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims such as the Alevi. Centre-right politicians pandered for votes through public displays of piety. Despite the illegal status of explicit political Islamism, new “opportunity spaces” were created for Islamists and Sufi communities which published newspapers, built dorms for poor students, and trained Islamic intellectuals and politicians.
However, none of these de facto inclusive changes *vis-à-vis* public religion and religious actors occurred through explicit compromises. They occurred through the infiltration of the state bureaucracy, political patronage, and the mobilization of illegal or semi-legal Islamic communities. While establishing interest-based pragmatic compromises, neither Muslim nor secular politics settled their fundamental ideological conflicts with each other. While becoming more amorphous and practically more inclusive, the centre did not develop more inclusive formal principles coupled with the rights and norms of a more democratic secular model and political regime.

**IV. 1969-1980: Explicit Political Islamism**

Until the late 1990s, Islamist political parties were formed and dominated by the National Outlook movement (*Millî Görüş, MG*). The MG was founded in 1969 defending “Islamic values” and proposing an indigenous (*millî*) developmental path, as an alternative to “imitating the West”. Its charismatic founder, Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), declared that it was open to everybody except for “free masons, communists, and Zionists.” 43 The first MG party was shut down by the Constitutional Court soon after the coup of 1971. But its heir, the National Salvation Party MSP, became a junior partner in several coalition governments during the 1970s, with voter support around 10 percent.

The MG represented the de-moderation of Turkish Muslim politics. It was established by a group of dissidents from the moderately-conservative Justice Party, who distinguished themselves through their explicit Islamist identity and indomitable opposition to the secular centre. They attributed most of Turkey’s ills to the country’s secular-western orientation. The MG called for moral as well as material development,
more pro-small business and protectionist policies, and a greater public role for religion.\textsuperscript{44} Compared to the centre-right parties that launched a critique of laiklik from within, the MG was an anti-systemic movement.

Political, socioeconomic and ideational factors help to explain the emergence of the MG. Many Sufi movements found the pro-Islamic performance of centre-right parties unsatisfactory\textsuperscript{45}; the failure of centre-right parties to reconcile the diverging interests of urban-based big business and countryside-based small and medium size businesses created a political gap.\textsuperscript{46} Concurrently, the thinking of Muslim intellectuals had been changing in response to domestic experiences, internal debates, and interactions with global ideas then in currency, such as third world developmentalism and a revival of political Islamism from Iran to Sudan and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{47}

During the 1970s, the CHP also attempted to moderate again by adopting a more populist and social-democratic identity. Despite its notable accomplishments such as the 1977 elections when the party became the first party with 41 percent of the national vote, however, voters did not reward the CHP sufficiently to rule in single-party governments. Centre-right religious rivals responded antagonistically as well, due to personal rivalries and their unbending ideological opposition to the left.\textsuperscript{48} Either way, both the CHP and the MSP were banned by the military regime of 1980-1983.

The 1980-1983 junta tried to control and instrumentalize selected Islamism by supporting handpicked Sufi movements in accordance with the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideology” put forward as an antidote against the “Marxist threat”. It actively promoted a Muslim discourse and identity, while simultaneously formally upholding the laiklik principle. With a new, authoritarian constitution, the Diyanet became constitutionally tasked with promoting “national solidarity and unity.” Compulsory religion courses were introduced in schools. Furthermore, while the military’s crackdown targeted all “subversive ideologies,” it proved most destructive of the leftists and created a gap in Turkish politics, which was partially filled by Islamists in subsequent years.

The military also launched neo-liberal economic policies implemented by Turgut Özal, who became prime minister following his return to competitive politics in 1983. Thus, the centre’s international component became increasingly embedded in global markets. The social component increasingly came to include a religious-conservative bourgeoisie who benefited from Özal governments’ supportive policies vis-à-vis Muslim-conservative businesses. These developments made the political centre’s secularist actors increasingly uncomfortable.

The AKP’s main predecessor, the Welfare Party (RP), was founded in 1983. Following its victory in the 1995 national election, the RP became Turkey’s first MG party that came to power as the dominant partner of a coalition government. The RP was moderate in terms of many standards of the universal and country-specific dimensions of moderation. It embraced peaceful, electoral politics and was open to forming coalitions with rival political parties. Its platform was not exclusively religious, reflecting its efforts
to garner the acceptance of the centre’s political component and to satisfy broader segments of the moderate-conservative social component.\(^{50}\)

Nevertheless, the RP’s “moderation” remained ambiguous. In fact, in some ways the RP radicalized (while the more radical Islamist groups that were loosely linked with the party moderated) during the late 1980s and early 1990s.\(^{51}\) While supportive of private business, the RP envisioned a state-led transformation of socioeconomic system based on Islamic moral principles and the promise of a “just order” (\textit{adil düzen}), which among other practices would end the charge of interest in economic transactions.\(^{52}\) It sought to revive an authentic Islam claimed to be central to Turkey’s identity.\(^{53}\) The RP was very critical of state-controlled \textit{laiklik}, demanding more religious autonomy and advocating legal pluralism a la the Medina Covenant the Prophet had made with non-Muslims.\(^{54}\)

Furthermore, the party advocated putting an end to Turkey’s pursuit of EU membership, pro-West foreign policy, and memberships in international organizations such as the IMF.\(^{55}\) Considering that Turkey signed a Customs Union with the EU in 1995, and the importance of its military-strategic relations with the US and Israel, this anti-western orientation put the party firmly at odds with the centre.

A military-led public campaign backed by major pro-secular media, business and labor organizations, compelled the government to resign in 1997. The subsequent “February 28 process” cracked down on Islamic-conservative political and economic actors and launched reforms that were ostensibly aimed at stemming perceived Islamization. Later, the Constitutional Court shut down the RP.

Paradoxically, secularists also tried to moderate during the 1990s. The CHP attempted to develop a more moderate secular ideology through the so-called “Anatolian
left” idea while struggling to cope with the intellectual challenges of globalization. However, neither the CHP nor its nationalist-leftist rival Democratic Left Party (DSP)—which embraced a more lenient attitude toward religious conservatism—managed to overcome ideological fissures, create new forms of bonding with voters beyond political clientelism and secure major electoral successes.\textsuperscript{56} While the DSP won the elections in 1999, it did so with only 22 percent of the vote significantly benefiting from nationalist votes and yet, could only head a coalition government.

\textbf{VI. 1999-2002: Moderation of Reformist Islamists and the AKP}

The AKP was founded by the reformers within the MG. Early elections were called soon after the financial crises of 2000 and 2001, the worst in the country’s history. The AKP won. Turkish voters punished the mainstream parties including the DSP, which they blamed for the crises, in favor of a new and “clean” party. The AKP perceptively named itself AK, which means “clean” in Turkish. This highlights the contingent nature of the relationship between moderation and democratic success. At a different juncture, the moderation of the reformist Islamists may well have been less successful.

But the AKP managed to exploit this opportune moment successfully because its founders had already decided and managed to reconcile with the changing centre more effectively than any other actor. After 1999 when the EU decided to declare Turkey an official candidate for membership, the EU and liberal democracy—the essence of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria—began to penetrate the centre’s international component. The ruling coalition government led by the DSP began to make EU-required democratic reforms. Simultaneously, the centre became more open to integration with global markets
in search of new markets and foreign investment and as a result of the IMF-led liberal institutional reforms following the 2000-2001 financial crises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) MG Tradition</th>
<th>MNP-Programme (per thousand words)</th>
<th>MSP-Programme (per thousand words)</th>
<th>RP-Programme (per thousand words)</th>
<th>FP-Programme (per thousand words)</th>
<th>SP-Programme (per thousand words)</th>
<th>AKP-Programme (per thousand words)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Refah (welfare)$^{57}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<td>National (milli)$^{58}$</td>
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<td>(2) Discourse of Religion</td>
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<td>3.33</td>
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<td>(3) Majoritarian versus Liberal Democracy</td>
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<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority (azinlik)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Thought</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4/5) Globalism and Integration with the West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation (millet)</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans, Middle East and Eurasia</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern (çağdaş)$^{60}$</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Agreements</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.** Comparative Frequency of Key Terms in the Successive Islamic Party Programmes, in chronological order (per thousand words)
Table 2 shows how the AKP’s programme differed from those of its predecessors and the Felicity Party SP, which continued the MG tradition, in five areas where the RP had clashed with the centre. The suppression of the Islamist MG legacy; avoiding the discourse of religion; adopting the discourse of liberal as opposed to majoritarian democracy; embracing Turkey’s western alliances and economic globalism. These changes helped the AKP to successfully gain relative acceptance by the political, economic and international components of the centre.

It can be shown that similar changes occurred in the predominant opinion of the religious-conservative intelligentsia, which suggests that the changes were not simply cosmetic. The following findings come from a comprehensive content analysis of Turkish religious and secular newspapers between the years of 1996 and 2004. Negative views denote critical views towards values such as human rights or an entity such as the EU, while positive views refer to supportive views. The numbers in the parentheses indicate how many times a view was coded, i.e. how frequently it was expressed.

As Table 3 shows, following clashes with the secularist centre, the religious press became more supportive of democracy in general and their discourse shifted to reflect a more liberal formulation of democracy. The findings also reflect divergence from the MG tradition. In Milli Gazete, which is linked with the MG movement, support for electoral democracy fell while support for liberal democracy remained the same. In contrast, support for both types of democracy increased in the non-MG newspapers. With these changes, the overall evaluation of democracy in the non-MG press converged on that in the secular press. Figures not shown here indicate that support for democracy remained stable and slightly higher in the secular press.
Table 3. Positive evaluations of electoral and liberal democracy in the religious press and in the MG and non-MG religious press.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996-99</th>
<th>2001-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>71% ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Religious press combined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>76% ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Religious press combined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>57% ↓</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16% ↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>62%→</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>81% ↑</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3% ↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-MG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>87%↑</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-MG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Changing Image of the West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>10% (42)</td>
<td>16% (69)</td>
<td>12% (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>72% (314)</td>
<td>55% (240)</td>
<td>60% (230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19% (82)</td>
<td>29% (125)</td>
<td>28% (106)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 summarizes how the Muslim-conservative elites’ image of the West improved drastically. The years 2003-2004 are treated separately as the war in Iraq,
which the Turkish public predominantly viewed as an unjust occupation of a Muslim country, had a negative impact on the coverage of the West.

Table 5 summarizes that the EU became a more frequently discussed subject (receiving three times as many references) with a considerably more positive coverage. In fact, it became more positive than in the secular press, which is striking considering that secular elites had previously been the primary proponents of Turkey’s EU ambitions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>14% (24)</td>
<td>45% (274)</td>
<td>38% (235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>57% (98)</td>
<td>30% (180)</td>
<td>36% (225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>29% (49)</td>
<td>25% (154)</td>
<td>25% (157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>13% (30)</td>
<td>26% (170)</td>
<td>19% (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>42% (99)</td>
<td>40% (260)</td>
<td>45% (186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>45% (105)</td>
<td>34% (219)</td>
<td>36% (150)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. The Image of the EU

VII. 2002-2007: Religious Moderation but Unsustainable Democratization with Secular De-Moderation and A Semi-Democratic Centre

The period of 2002-2006 witnessed major democratic reforms in addition to rapid economic recovery. The moderate Islamist AKP government, which now called itself “conservative-democratic”, gave its priority to the “twin objectives” of democratization and EU membership. Major constitutional amendments expanded the formal civil and political rights and freedoms and civilian authority over the military. In 2005, Turkey was awarded for its reforms with the start of the EU accession negotiations.
Notably, the reforms were legislated with cooperation across ideological lines. Unfortunately for democratization, this cooperation was not enabled by robust democratic institutions. While moderate secular actors cooperated with the AKP, others became radicalized and more supportive of military praetorianism against the Islamists. Allegedly, some military commanders planned a coup against the government but did not go ahead with it. Hardliner-secular fears however, were temporarily kept at bay by the EU anchor and the authoritarian features of the semi-democratic centre. By exercising its legal authority to its utmost limit, President Sezer—a staunchly secularist former judge—vetoed the government’s appointments and laws. The military and the EU issued strong warnings whenever the government attempted to pursue a religious-conservative agenda such as a short-lived draft law criminalizing adultery in 2004. Simultaneously, the AKP associated itself with the center’s international component, the EU, to defend itself against military threats.

Democratization was unsustainable due to an inevitable confrontation with the military-bureaucratic tutelage and its secularist fears. Military-bureaucratic tutelage also decreased the incentives for the secular political parties to renovate themselves. The latter suffered from internal fissures, corruption, discursive-ideological inertia, and AKP-skepticism. The CHP reversed its earlier attempts to moderate, adopting instead a more radical-secularist orientation to confront the AKP. Meanwhile, the AKP was gradually consolidating its power through its economic performance and bureaucratic recruitments.

In 2007, a showdown occurred between the AKP and the secularist segments of the social and political centre led by the military over the AKP’s election of one of its principal founders, Abdullah Gül, to the presidency. Against the backdrop of a military
ultimatum, which the CHP did not condemn, mass secularist rallies protested against the government.⁶⁹ This put the seculars at a disjuncture with the international component of the centre, notably the EU and the US. They also lacked convincing arguments to oppose Gül’s presidency and were unprepared to challenge the AKP in areas such as economic policy, an issue of great importance to voters. The AKP, rather than capitulate both elected Gül and won the parliamentary elections. This tipped the balance of power between the AKP and the secularist components of the centre, notably the military, in favor of the former.⁷⁰ In 2009, the Constitutional Court convicted the AKP of “having become a centre of anti-secularism” but ruled not to ban the party.

VII. 2008-2012: Religious De-Moderation and the Reproduction of the Semi-Democratic Centre

In this period, the AKP consolidated its power within the political centre, by winning a crucial referendum in 2010 and national elections in 2011. The party failed to enlist the cooperation of its secular rivals in building new and more democratic centre, for example by writing a new constitution and continuing the democratic reforms made in the 2002-2007 period. Both the reactionary nature of the weak opposition and the increasingly domineering orientation of the AKP seemed to contribute to this failure.

Theoretically, the AKP had sufficient power to unilaterally construct a democratic centre. In 2011, it received almost half of the votes cast making it the first party in the country’s history to win three consecutive national elections with increasing support each time. It also seemed to have effectively brought the military under its control. But, in addition to the weakness of the opposition parties that fueled the AKP’s authoritarianism,
two factors seem to have diverted the party from focusing on constructing a truly democratic centre. The external support for democracy waned with economic crisis in western democracies and as Turkey’s EU membership prospects became an increasingly moot point on both sides. Additionally, it became clear that the religious elite were not ideationally prepared to address the policy challenges of democratization in specific areas such as social pluralism, ethnic pluralism and freedom of expression.

Despite bold but short-lived attempts such as a “democratic opening” an attempt to democratically resolve the long-festering Kurdish question, the pro-EU and pro-liberal democratic zeal of the AKP gave way to an increasingly nationalist, majoritarian and socially conservative rhetoric and practice. The use of religious discourse grew increasingly frequent. Prime Minister Erdoğan announced for example that birth control was a conspiracy to weaken Turkey, abortions amounted to murder, and that he would like to cultivate more religious new generations. A revolutionary education bill overhauled the primary and secondary school system, allowing for more religious education. There were no plans to make laiklik more democratic, for example by dismantling or decentralizing the Diyanet. Rather than advocating a more comprehensive separation of religion and state, the government appeared intent on using state-controlled secularism for its own goals. Between 2007 and 2010, Turkey’s press freedoms rating declined by about 60 percent.

In 2010, a new and more moderate leadership took over the CHP with the motto “new CHP.” The moderates wanted to transform the party’s defensive nationalist and secularist orientation into a more social democratic and proactive orientation focused on
promoting economic development, the welfare state, and democracy. As of the end of 2011, however, these efforts were only moderately successful.

**VIII. Conclusions**

All this is not to say that moderation cannot contribute to democratization absent a democratic center. It can, but under such conditions, the main challenge of democratization is different; it is not moderation per se. It is the construction of a new centre, which requires actors to transcend, not embrace the existing centre. In the presence of a mainly democratic center the main challenge is to secure enhanced integration of underprivileged groups within the democratic system. This is achieved through the moderation of privileged groups who dominate the system and of anti-systemic actors who demand rights and opportunities for disenfranchised groups. A good example would be democratization in the US, especially prior to the civil rights movement. Arguably, the US then already had a mainly liberal-democratic social and political mainstream, i.e. centre. Democratization was still necessary and dependant on the inclusion of racial minorities who were socially excluded and politically disenfranchised in many ways. Hence, the challenge was to make the reforms that were necessary to expand the rights, freedoms and opportunities available to racial minorities, through cooperation between the moderates within the majority and minority groups.

By comparison, in cases with mainly authoritarian or semi-democratic centers, the main challenge of democratization is to first construct a democratic centre. One can hypothesize that this may happen under two scenarios, hegemony, i.e. under the leadership of a dominant political actor, and cooperation, i.e. through collaboration between religious and secular actors. One could imagine for example, that a moderate
Murat Somer (2012): “Moderation of religious and secular politics, a country’s “centre” and democratization,”

A hegemonic actor could build a more democratic centre on its own, if it had a well-developed democratic ideology or enjoyed strong external support for democratization.

Table 6 summarizes these different scenarios that can lead to successful or failing democratization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1: Moderation</th>
<th>| Scenario A</th>
<th>Moderation takes place in the presence of a democratic center.</th>
<th>Democratization ensues. Moderation is sustained.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Stage 2, Scenario A  |\| Moderation takes place in the presence of an undemocratic or semi-democratic center | Scenario B1. A moderate actor that becomes hegemonic can unilaterally build a more democratic center if it has a well-developed pluralist ideology (i.e. its democratic values must transcend the undemocratic or semi-democratic center).

Scenario B2. A moderate hegemonic actor can unilaterally build a more democratic center if it has strong external support for democratization that effectively pressures the actor to make democratic reforms. |
| Stage 2, Scenario B  |\| Moderation takes place in the presence of an undemocratic or semi-democratic center | Scenario C. Cooperation between religious and secular actors (or other actors depending on the main political cleavages in the country), who will have to rely on their political agency to overcome their differences, is necessary to rebuild a more democratic center. Otherwise, a hegemonic moderate actor (with a weakly pluralist ideology and weak external support) will probably find the undemocratic or semi-democratic center a convenient means to govern (or transform) society according to its own preferences. Moderation may not be sustained if inter-actor cooperation fails. |
| Stage 2, Scenario C  |\| Moderation takes place in the presence of an undemocratic or semi-democratic center. The favorable conditions of B1 and B2 are missing. | Scenario C. Cooperation between religious and secular actors (or other actors depending on the main political cleavages in the country), who will have to rely on their political agency to overcome their differences, is necessary to rebuild a more democratic center. Otherwise, a hegemonic moderate actor (with a weakly pluralist ideology and weak external support) will probably find the undemocratic or semi-democratic center a convenient means to govern (or transform) society according to its own preferences. Moderation may not be sustained if inter-actor cooperation fails. |

Table 6. Moderation and democratization under different scenarios
Neither condition seemed to be present in Turkey in 2012. Despite significant ideational transformation, Islamists lacked a categorically pluralist ideology, were (like secularists) selective democrats, and the EU support for Turkish accession had waned.\textsuperscript{77} Alternatively, a democratic centre would need to be constructed through cooperation, based on “twin tolerations” between religious and secular actors.\textsuperscript{78}

While Turkey is a case with a semi-democratic center, the emerging post-Arab Spring polities would be examples of cases with authoritarian centres. In both cases, Islamist and secular actors tend to have comprehensive ideologies and distrust each other to differing degrees.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, a key challenge of democratization in both instances is for secularist and Islamist actors to overcome their authoritarian ideologies, material and ideological conflicts and wherever possible form a winning coalition that would form the political basis and construct the institutions of democratic centres.

Notes
\textsuperscript{1} Nasr, ‘The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy’; Kinzer, ‘The Quiet Revolution’.
\textsuperscript{2} Tezcür, \textit{Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation}; Müftüler- Baç and Keyman, ‘Turkey under the AKP: The Era of Dominant Party Politics’; Turam, ‘Turkey under the AKP: Are Rights and Liberties Safe?’.
\textsuperscript{3} Schwedler, ‘Can Islamists Become Moderates?: Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis’.
\textsuperscript{4} In choosing the term “centre,” I am undoubtedly inspired by seminal work on the idea of “centre” in Shils, ‘Centre and periphery’ and Mardin, ‘Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? However, I develop and work with an original conceptualization of my own throughout the essay.

30
Among others, Karakaya and Yildirim, ‘Islamist Moderation in Perspective: Comparative Analysis of the Moderation of Islamist and Western Communist Parties’.


Cizre, ‘Introduction’.


For valuable exceptions, see Tepe, ‘Turkey’s AKP: A Model ‘Muslim-Democratic’ Party?’; Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation*.


Kalyvas ‘Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization’; Kurzman and Naqvi “Do Muslims Vote Islamic?”

Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia*.


Murat Somer (2012): “Moderation of religious and secular politics, a country's “centre” and democratization,”

24 Schwedler, ‘Can Islamists Become Moderates?: Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis’.

25 See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe for a conceptualization of “political society.”

26 Although less likely, political agency may still be enable moderating actors to develop pluralistic positions.

27 Secular-nationalists blamed western powers for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire but embraced political and cultural westernization. Potential alliances were also limited also.


29 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey; Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity; Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey; Mardin, ‘Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?’.


34 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity.

35 Piscatori, Islam in A World of Nation-States; Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation.

36 Angrist, Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East; Altunışık, ‘The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East’; Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey.

37 Angrist, Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East: Explaining Turkish Exceptionalism

38 Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism; Heper, İsmet İnönü : The Making of a Turkish Statesman ; Özbudun, Otoriter Rejimler, Seçimsel Demokrasiler ve Türkiye .


42 Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*.


44 Soydan, *Türkiye’nin Refah Gerçeği*; Şen, *AKP Milli Görüşçü mü?*.

45 However, it should be noted that political Islamist parties remained organically separated from, yet sensitive to the support of, the Sufi communities.

46 Soydan, *Türkiye’nin Refah Gerçeği*; Şen, *AKP Milli Görüşçü mü?*.


48 Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism*.


50 Despite the relative rise of religious-conservatism since the 1980s, the median voter could be considered moderate as only a minority of Turkish voters supported Sharia-rule. See Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections Protest and Stability in An Islamic Society*.


53 Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey*.

54 Ibid, 7.

55 Dağlı, ‘Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization’.

56 Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism*.

57 The term welfare is also in the name of the RP and therefore represents a symbolic reference to continuity for parties founded after the RP’s abolition.

58 Depending on the context, the term *milli* (National), which is in the name of National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement, may imply association with the movement.

59 The emphasis on minority rights as opposed to the will of the majority is a distinguishing feature of liberal democracy, and deficits of ethnic and religious minority rights (*azînlık hakları*) constitute a major problem Turkish democratization needs to address.

60 The term of *çağdaş* is often used by Turkish secular modernizers to denote modernization/westernization, and was shunned by many Islamists who aspired to authentic models of modernization.

61 Somer, ‘Does It Take Democrats to Democratize?: Lessons From Islamic and Secular Elite Values in Turkey’. The research examined the discussions among Muslim-conservative and secular intelligentsia prior to the foundation of the AKP through a systematic content analysis of three religious-conservative and two secular newspapers, by covering more than 40,000 articles.
Murat Somer (2012): “Moderation of religious and secular politics, a country's “centre” and democratization,”

62 Yeni Şafak and Zaman.

63 Somer, ‘Does It Take Democrats to Democratize?: Lessons From Islamic and Secular Elite Values in Turkey’.

64 Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, 55.


66 Somer, ‘Does It Take Democrats to Democratize?.

67 Öniş, ‘Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads’; Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism.

68 Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism.


70 Somer, ‘Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Democracy’.


72 Somer, ‘Does It Take Democrats to Democratize?: Lessons From Islamic and Secular Elite Values in Turkey’; Tezcür, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation.

73 Somer and Liaras. ‘Turkey’s New Kurdish Opening: Religious versus Secular Values’.

74 Finkel, ‘What’s 4 + 4 + 4?’

75 Reporters without Borders, Press Freedom Index.

76 King et al, Democratization in America: A Comparative-Historical Analysis.


78 Stepan, ‘Religion, Democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations”’.

79 Cavatorta, ‘‘Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail’: Opposition Politics in Morocco’; Volpi, ‘Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World’. 
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