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

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Continuity and Change in the Regimes of Ethnicity in Austria, Germany, the USSR/Russia, and Turkey: Varieties of Ethnic Regimes and Hypotheses for Change*

Sener Akturk

Regimes of Ethnicity in Multi-Ethnic Societies after Empire

After World War I, Austria, Germany, Russia, and Turkey moved from dynastic-imperial political regimes to quasi-republican regimes justified on the basis of popular legitimacy. Prior to this transition, in the management and political (in)significance of ethnic categories these empires broadly resembled each other.[1] After World War I, the core successor states to these four empires pursued radically different policies in dealing with ethnicity as a social category. One can therefore speak of distinct Austrian, German, Soviet/Russian, and Turkish models in managing multi-ethnic populations, models which persisted since the 1920s. Both the emergence of different regimes of ethnicity in the 1920s and the persistence of these policies throughout the twentieth century present very intriguing puzzles for political science. It is not possible to "explain" either the emergence or the persistence of these distinct policies within the confines of this paper. Instead, the major differences between state policies in these four countries will be described in detail in order to highlight the important differences and the most significant features of each case. Since the major contours of these policies did not change throughout the twentieth century, I will limit myself to a brief description of period-specific nuances in the distinct national trajectories between the 1920s and the 1990s. Finally, I will focus on a period of significant change in the late 1990s in Germany, Russia, and Turkey, and inquire as to the causes of these changes.

Regime of Ethnicity

The focus of my study is the "regime of ethnicity." This term retains the meaning of a "regime" in the democratization literature and applies it to ethnicity. Regime of ethnicity denotes *the rules governing the permissible expression, codification, and political uses of ethnicity*. Regime of ethnicity refers to the official rules and regulations at the

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state level and does not describe the non-official societal norms and informal institutions relating to people's coping mechanisms with ethnic diversity in everyday life. Although regime of ethnicity influences individual and social perceptions of ethnicity, the change in society's perception of ethnicity is not the focus of my study.

Regime of ethnicity is a complex, composite variable because it refers to a bundle of interrelated institutions and policies. It is a constellation of seven related institutions and policies: (1) recognition of more than one ethnicity in the constitution, census, and other key official documents, (2) official territorial ethnic autonomy (e.g. autonomous ethnic republics), (3) citizenship of ethnic minorities, (4) linguistic rights of ethnic minorities, (5) single versus multiple official languages, (6) affirmative action for ethnic minorities, and (7) the basis of immigration (ethnic or not). Austria, Germany, the Soviet Union/Russia, and Turkey provide variation along these dimensions and hence can justifiably be classified as upholding different regimes of ethnicity (see Table 1).

The variation along these dimensions relates to the connection between the "nation" and "ethnicity" at the official level. One can discern at least three distinct ways of connecting ethnicity and the nation: the nation can be equated with one ethnic group only (mono-ethnic), the nation can be conceived as the union of multiple ethnic groups (multi-ethnic), and the nation can be defined along a social category other than ethnicity, such as religion, language, or ideology (non-ethnic). Germany, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, and Turkey can be said to have mono-ethnic, multi-ethnic, and non-ethnic regimes, respectively. Austria, having instituted a non-ethnic regime after World War I, tended towards a mono-ethnic regime during the Nazi Occupation, and moved towards a multi-ethnic regime after World War II. However, in describing the regimes of ethnicity in the four countries, I will not use these labels (mono-, multi-, and non-ethnic) so as to prevent doing injustice to the subtle complexities of these regimes, and to allow the reader a wider interpretive freedom based on the empirical data presented below.

Regime of Ethnicity in Austria since 1918

The Habsburg Empire collapsed at the end of the World War I. Austria was identified as the primary successor of the Habsburgs. The name of the state changed from Habsburg Monarchy to the Republic of German-Austria (*Deutschösterreich*). Of the Habsburg territories, Lower Austria (includes Vienna), Upper Austria, Salzburg, and Carinthia were inherited by the German-Austrian state, while Tyrol and Styria were split, the northern parts remaining in Austria and the southern parts ceding to Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene (SCS) Kingdom, respectively.[2] Austria constituted less than one-fifth of the prewar Habsburg territories. Tremendous shrinkage of territory and population was coupled with challenges to what was perceived as core German-Austrian territories, such as Carinthia and Tyrol. Although the very

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TABLE 1 Dimensions of regimes of ethnicity and variation across cases until 1997

Descriptive dimensions	Austria	Germany	Soviet Union/Russian Federation	Turkey
Recognition	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Territorial ethnic autonomy	No	No	Yes	No
Citizenship	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Linguistic rights	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Official language	Multiple regional: Hungarian and Croatian in Burgenland, Slovenian in Carinthia	Single: though Danes, Frisians, and Sorbians have a right to education in their own language in their territories	Multiple regional: dozens of autonomous regions have their titular languages	Single: though Armenians, Greeks, and Jews have a right to education in their own schools
Affirmative action	No	No	Yes	No
Immigration	Ethnic	Ethnic	Non-ethnic	Non-ethnic

Note: The ethnicity category was abolished from Russian internal passports in 1997; the German citizenship law was amended in 1999; and Turkey allowed broadcasting in minority languages in 2003.

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multi-ethnic Austro-Hungary was reduced to a much smaller Austria, large numbers of Slovenes lived in Carinthia, while Croatian and Hungarian minorities were present in Burgenland.

The regions that constitute Austria, such as Carinthia and Tyrol, had been Habsburg regions with distinct regional identities. Salzburg, Tyrol, and Carinthia distinguished themselves from other Austrian provinces and Vienna, and jealously guarded their distinctiveness, also entertaining ideas of wide autonomy and even independence.[3] The resilience of regional identities, with their distinct flags, symbols, and histories, has its institutional and political foundations in the Habsburg era. The surprising strength of regional identities in Austria provides an intriguing contrast to the relative weakness of regional identities independent of the national narrative in a much larger country such as Turkey.

Varieties of National Self-Determination: Ethnic Border Drawing and the Plebiscite

As a victor of the Great War, Italy was given South Tyrol in the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1918), which was a clear violation of the national self-determination principle since the population was overwhelmingly German speaking (about 3% were Italians).[4] In this case the debate was not over clarifying some ethnic frontier between Austria and Italy but rather an obvious trumping of the national self-determination principle by Italy.

In contrast, the scramble over both Burgenland and Carinthia was guided by a desire to implement the principle of national self-determination. While Burgenland was a part of the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy before the war, between 1918 and 1921 the German population agitated for union with Austria. In 1921, Hungary conceded to the unification of Burgenland with Austria with the exception of the regional capital, Ödenburg/Sopron, where Hungarians demanded a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, the results of which were contested by Austria, Sopron and several small communities around it voted to remain in Hungary.[5] A large Croat and Hungarian minority remained in Austrian Burgenland, constituting about a fifth of the population. Croats were about four times as numerous as Hungarians. After the *Anschluss* with Nazi Germany, Croats and Hungarians in Burgenland were faced with a virulent Germanization campaign aimed at eradicating minority languages and cultures, while the Jews and Roma/Sinti of the region were sent to the concentration camps.[6]

Carinthia provided the most protracted border dispute and the largest "minority problem" for Austria. The evocation of different types of ethno-linguistic identities by the states involved and the curious identity formations at the societal level make Carinthia an interesting region for studying regimes of ethnicity. World War I continued for a while longer along the Austrian-Yugoslav border. In order to increase their

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bargaining power, Yugoslav armies occupied Klagenfurt, the regional capital of Carinthia, only to lose it to Austria later.

Austria was in favor of allowing the population to decide the future of the region via a plebiscite.[7] Austria's attitude as such in Carinthia is surprising and counter-intuitive, since Slovenes had a majority in the plebiscite area. Though the Yugoslav delegation evoked the principle of ethnic-national self-determination, their arguments were based on an "objective" understanding of ethnicity, whereby the Slovene majorities in Carinthia justified its annexation to Yugoslavia, but they resisted giving primacy to subjective understandings of ethnicity, which would be manifest in a plebiscite. Paradoxically, then, Yugoslavia did not want a plebiscite in Carinthia.

> But Italy was not the only power that opposed the idea of a plebiscite in Carinthia. As it turned out, Yugoslavia also resisted the suggestion. In early June, Trumbic had informed Belgrade that he was certain a plebiscite in Carinthia would spell a loss for Yugoslavia.[8]

Once the decision for a plebiscite was made, Austria and Yugoslavia engaged in a campaign war in Carinthia, the themes of which reveal the different strategies of inclusion/exclusion that these states employed. The Slovenian leadership carried foodstuffs to the Carinthian Slovenes, and organized trips between Slovenia and Carinthia to engender a Slovene–South Slavic feeling. The history of "German oppression" was emphasized, and while the "old" Austrian state was portrayed in a state of "decay," Yugoslavia was presented as a youthful new state in the making.[9]

In contrast, the Austrian side emphasized (1) the regional identity of Carinthia as a historically rooted, social, cultural, and economic unit that was indivisible, thus in conflict with the ethnic principle, which would require a partition of the region between the Slovene and German parts, (2) the Catholicism of the Austrian population, which is common to Germans and Slovenes, in contrast to the Orthodox-dominated Yugoslavia, (3) the republican, democratic regime of Austria, in contrast to the monarchy in charge of Yugoslavia.[10] The results of the plebiscite were surprising:

> Over 22 000 had chosen Austria, while 15 000 had voted for Yugoslavia. In other words, 59 per cent of the population maintained that the whole of Carinthia should remain in Austria. This is particularly interesting in light of the language survey of 1910, which indicated that 69% of the population of the plebiscite area was Slovene. This implies that 10 000 Slovene-speaking Carinthians voted in favor of Austria.[11]

An Austrian campaign based on old imperial (Habsburg), regional (Carinthian), and religious (Catholic) affinities, and regime-based and economic arguments defeated the ethnic arguments linking Carinthian Slovenes to the other South Slavic people of Yugoslavia.

The Austrian state used a mixture of old imperial and new republican ideas of membership in the nation reinforced by Catholic unity and historically rooted regional identities to elude the recognition of ethnicity as a political force and to reconstitute the Austrian nation in a non-ethnic guise. The Austrian model of managing

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multi-ethnicity in the early interwar period is similar to the Turkish model, which also employed imperial history, religion, republican ideas, and eventually language, to elude the recognition of ethnicity as a political category. Later, this mixture of imperial, regional, and religious ideas would be abandoned in favor of linguistic assimilation in both states.

Enigma of the "Windish" in Carinthia: Slovenes who want to be German?

Apart from German- and Slovene speakers in Carinthia, the category "Windish" (*Windische*) appears in censuses and other ethnic investigations in the region. The Windish are Slovenian-speaking residents of Carinthia who do not identify as Slovenian speakers. According to a theory developed in the 1920s, the Windish are not descended from the Slovenes but rather from the Wends, who have been in Carinthia for 1,000 years, who belong to the German cultural circle (*Kulturkreis*), but who only share many words with the Slovenes.[12] But, in fact, the Windish are Slovenes who want to assimilate into Austrian society.[13] The "Windish … are Slovenes, who do not want to be Slovene."[14]

Apart from the Windish, a very large proportion of self-identified Slovenes also signaled their willingness to be part of Austrian society, as the plebiscite indicates. Even in the relatively liberal environment of postwar Austria, in the two decades between the 1951 and 1971 censuses, more than half of Slovenian speakers adopted German as their only language (see Table 2). This is surprising since one would have expected Nazi rule (1938–1945), which pursued an aggressive policy of Germanization both in Burgenland and in Carinthia, to have bolstered ethno-linguistic identification among the Slovenes. The Nazi elite of Carinthia in this period are well documented.[15] Carinthia was the only part of Austria where Yugoslav partisan activity took place during Nazi occupation, and Tito demanded a revision of the border after the war. "[T]he least Yugoslav goal was the obtaining of a territorial autonomy for the Slovene-inhabited part of Carinthia."[16] While Soviet support for the Yugoslav position was meager and tactical from the beginning, after Tito's split with Stalin it

TABLE 2 Autochthonous and urban minorities in post-Habsburg Austria, 1923–1971

Census results by language	1923	1934	1939	1951	1971
Croats in Burgenland	41,761	41,392	28,327	30,428	24,332
Hungarians in Burgenland	9,606	8,353	4,383	4,827	5,447
Slovenes in Carinthia	34,650	24,857	43,179	42,095	20,972
Czechs in Vienna	47,555	28,403	52,275	3,438	6,528

Source: Suppan, *Die österreichischen Volksgruppen*, 18.

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disappeared altogether, and the Allies reasserted prewar Austrian borders in the 1955 state treaty that established postwar Austria.

In Burgenland, social and economic developments encouraged assimilation into the German-speaking majority, as witnessed by the decline in Croatian and Hungarian speakers. While the remnants of the Hungarian nobility and middle class cling onto their language, the working class assimilated into the dominant culture in the workplace and adopted German. "In the 1980s a scenario predicting the complete disappearance of the Croatian and Hungarian language groups in Burgenland in the twenty-first century would have been the most plausible one."[17] Yet Europe experienced an ethnic revival in the 1990s that prevented the extinction of these languages in eastern Austria. In Austria, the century-long pattern remains one of "inclusion through linguistic assimilation" reinforced by bottom-up discouragement of ethnolinguistic identifications by the minorities themselves.[18] This model is also representative of the assimilation process that has been taking place in Austria since Habsburg times, a process which brought the Slovenian-speaking population of Carinthia from 101,030 (30% of Carinthia) in 1890 to 42,095 (9% of Carinthia) in 1951, and, in the space of two decades, halved it further to 20,972 by 1971.[19] It is fitting here to remember the opening paragraph of Joseph Roth's literary masterpiece about Austro-Hungary:

> The Trottas were a young dynasty. Their progenitor had been knighted after the Battle of Solferino. He was a Slovene. Sipolje—the German name for his native village—became his title of nobility. Fate had elected him for a special deed. But he then made sure that later times lost all memory of him.[20]

Many Slovenes, Croats, Czechs, and Hungarians chose the familiar route of assimilation into Austrian society even in post-Habsburg times, which was made easier by a state policy that recognized only language groups, not objective and immutable ethnic groups.

A Preliminary Description of the Austrian Model

The Austrian experiences illustrate a transition from imperial, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional political community to a new community based on one language, which allows for the inclusion of ethnic minorities through linguistic assimilation. Common imperial history, territorial-regional identity, and Catholic religion are used in this model to connect Croats, Hungarians, Slovenes, and Czechs with the larger German-speaking Austrian society. International negotiations led to the official recognition of and linguistic-educational rights for Croats, Slovenes, and Hungarians, but not for Czechs or other minorities, which hints at the primacy of international factors in changing the Austrian regime of ethnicity. The Nazi period, which could be considered a domestic or an international factor depending on one's view of the

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Anschluss, introduced into this otherwise linguistic assimilationist model a particularly German emphasis on "objective ethnicity," which might be responsible for the jump in the numbers of Viennese Czechs and Carinthian Slovenes counted in the 1939 census (see Table 2). Another foreign influence appears with the Soviet occupation of eastern Austria and Yugoslav activity in Carinthia, both states founded as and supportive of ethno-federalism. Overall, Austria, like France, considered linguistic assimilation as a sufficient marker of membership in the nation, which allowed the state to elude considerations of the "objective" ethnic background of its citizens. This model has been interrupted and challenged by Nazi, Soviet, and Yugoslav intrusions, all of which share an emphasis on "objective" ethnicity. The German nationalist FPÖ, the reformed successor of the Nazi Party in Austria, continues, in muted fashion, the ethnic notion of citizenship. It is curious that the charismatic leader who carried this party to a stunning national victory in 2001 first rose to national prominence by wresting the governorship of Carinthia from the socialists who had held it for 40 years.[21]

Regime of Ethnicity in Germany

Today, the only four minorities that enjoy a constitutional recognition and special minority rights in Germany are the Danes and Frisians in Schleswig-Holstein, Sorbians in Brandenburg and Saxony, and Roma/Sinti regardless of where they live.[22] Danes and Frisians are estimated at 50,000 each, while Sorbians and Roma/Sinti are estimated at 60,000 and 70,000, respectively.[23] In the case of Frisians, this number represents only a fraction of their population in Germany, because it only considers the Frisians in Schleswig-Holstein as officially recognized "ethnic Frisians," while there are a further 350,000 Frisians living in West Frisia and Niedersachsen.[24]

Danish and Sorbian are languages of education in their respective territories, while German is the *Amtssprache* everywhere, including Schleswig-Holstein and the Sorbian autonomous enclave in Lusatia. While these are the four minorities covered by the minority legislation, the state collects copious information on the ethnic backgrounds of all residents of Germany. Until 1999, German citizenship was based on having a German bloodline, depriving everyone but ethnic Germans from citizenship.

According to the German Ministry of the Interior, there are 7.3 million "foreigners" living in Germany today, which corresponds to 8.9% of the German population. By 2003, one-third of these "foreigners" had been living in Germany for over 20 years.[25] Of these "foreigners" (i.e. ethnic minorities), the largest group today is by far the Turkish minority, numbering over 2 million people. Italians number almost 600,000, Greeks over 300,000, and Spanish and Portuguese over 100,000 (see Table 3). The ethnically based "German model" of citizenship has been studied comparatively as the exemplar of *jus sanguinis* (which is blood based), contrasted with Western countries that have territorially based citizenship laws such as France,

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TABLE 3 Official minorities and the most populous minorities in Germany (1997)

Name	Population	Territory	Language rights?	Official minority?
Danes	50,000	Schleswig-Holstein	Yes	Yes
Frisians	50,000	Schleswig-Holstein	Yes	Yes
Sorbs	60,000	Lusatia	Yes	Yes
Roma	100,000	None	Yes	Yes
Turks	2,014,311	None	No	No
Italians	586,089	None	No	No
Greeks	359,566	None	No	No
Spanish	132,283	None	No	No
Portuguese	125,131	None	No	No
Poles	276,753	None	No	No
Yugoslavs	662,691	None	No	No

Source: Compiled from Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, *Kleines Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland.*

Britain, the US, and Canada.[26] Here I will limit myself to a theoretically informed description of the origins and evolution of the German state's approach to ethnicity in its historical context.

Germany's Approach to Ethnicity since 1913

The German citizenship law of 1913 crystallized the unusually strict and consistent German definition of the citizenry as a community of descent.[27] "Before 1913 German citizenship law was internally inconsistent" because "it stood between two models—an older model of the citizenry as a territorial community, and a newer model of the citizenry as a community of descent, the former the product of the absolutist state, the latter of the emerging national state."[28] The attack on the old statist-imperial definition of citizenship "was led by the Pan-German League, which was devoted to the 'preservation of the German *Volkstum*.'"[29] The pre-1913 system revoked the citizenship of Germans who had lived outside Germany for more than 10 years, while allowing for the citizenship of ethnically non-German individuals such as the Poles who reside in Germany. The new law of 1913 would reverse both of these and strictly tie German citizenship to German ethnicity by allowing for *Auslandsdeutsche* (in Russia, in Romania, in the Baltics, etc.), some of whom had never been to Germany, to acquire German citizenship if they wished to, and by preventing non-German residents of Germany (mostly immigrant laborers from Poland and other Eastern European countries) from acquiring citizenship. This amendment to the citizenship law passed with almost unanimous support and, as the representative of the Danish minority attested at the time, the debates around it displayed an

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inexplicable hostility to the principle of *jus soli*.[30] The only opposition that it had to contend with was the state-national point of view:

> From a state-national point of view, it is the *strength* of attachment to the *Reich* that is decisive, hence conditional *jus soli* is acceptable, even if unconditional *jus soli* is not. From an ethnonational point of view, it is the *kind* of attachment that matters: *jus soli*, conditional as well as unconditional, is rejected because it grounds citizenship in territory rather than descent.[31]

In the German debates, the ethnic point of view triumphed without making any concessions to the statist and territorial notions of citizenship. A statist-minded politician such as Bismarck could assert that the Poles belong to "no other state and to no other people than the Prussian, to which I myself belong,"[32] but the likes of Prussian Bismarck were not powerful enough in Germany anymore.

At the end of World War I, Germany also made the transition from (Wilhelmine) Empire to (Weimar) Republic. Unlike Austria, which shrank more than 80% in its contiguous territory, Germany lost only parts of Poland/Eastern Prussia in the East, Alsace-Lorraine in the West, and the northern part of Schleswig-Holstein. The Schleswig-Holstein (S-H) region on the German–Danish border was subjected to a plebiscite. The plebiscite took place in two zones, corresponding to northern and central S-H, in 1920. In the north, 75% voted for joining Denmark while in central S-H 80% voted for remaining in Germany.[33] The northern part was more than three times larger than the central part. Furthermore, there were several pockets in the north, some of them territorially contiguous with central S-H that joined Germany, which also voted for remaining in Germany, while in central S-H there were no sub-regions that chose Denmark over Germany.[34] Following this demarcation, minority regimes were created for the Danes in Germany and the Germans in Denmark. As in Austria, in Germany, too, territorially based minority rights were granted as a consequence of international negotiations. Nonetheless, the German state had an ethnic understanding of its citizenry, as the ethnically based citizenship testifies.

The discourse of "objective ethnicity" emerged in German academia and exerted its influence on Austria, Russia/Soviet Union, and Turkey through the scholarly and political communities acquainted with German ideas. But the recognition of ethnic difference does not translate automatically into ethnically specific rights, affirmative action, and a celebration of multi-ethnic peoplehood; on the contrary, the state's recognition of ethnic difference often translated into exclusion and discrimination in this period, the best example of which is Nazi Germany. The door of assimilation was shut in favor of an acute awareness of ethnic differences, which later evolved into an outright campaign for the physical extermination (Jews, Gypsies) or forced enslavement (Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, other Slavs) of non-German ethnicities.

The question "What should Jews do to prove that they are loyal to the German state to be included as citizens?" was a topic of debate for so long that once Jews were

finally given full citizenship rights the prolonged discussions over this issue gave the German public the impression that Jews could never become "true" German citizens.[35] As Christoph Schulte writes in his introduction to *Deutschtum und Judentum*, "actually one cannot write anything more about Germanness and Jewishness. It is an impossible theme."[36] Therefore I cannot possibly do justice to this theme in the confines of this paper, but suffice it to say that the Jews suffered the most as first-hand victims of the acute ethnic-racial consciousness that developed in Germany and captured the state.

Danes, Frisians, Poles, and Sorbs established the "Association of Minorities" in Berlin in 1924.[37] Sorbian activist Jan Skala and leader of the Sorbian nationalist association "Domowina" Ernst Barth spearheaded a Sorbian ethno-cultural movement. As a Slavic minority, Sorbians suffered substantially under Nazi rule, and welcomed the Soviet occupation of East Germany. At the end of World War II, Sorbian leaders demanded that Lusatia be annexed to Czechoslovakia, which was seen as the neighboring Slavic big brother (Sorbian territory is contiguous with Czechoslovakia).[38] Though this seemed a genuine possibility in the beginning, the Soviet Union and the GDR decided only to give cultural and linguistic autonomy to the Sorbs. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the de-politicization of the Sorbian question and its reduction to a problem of educational and cultural demands.[39] Nonetheless, Sorbians are exceptional among the official minorities in Germany in having territorial autonomy. The creation of Sorbian autonomy highlights the decisive role that the conjuncture of foreign pressures (Soviet occupation) and domestic ethnic-cultural movements (Sorbian Domowina) has in the official construction of ethnic categories. Sorbian autonomy can be seen as a residue of Soviet-powered Leninist-Stalinist notions of national self-determination in Germany.

While Sorbian autonomy became the "showcase" of national self-determination in the GDR, Angolan, Cuban, Chinese, Greek, Hungarian, Korean, Polish, Vietnamese, and Mozambican "foreigners" who came to the GDR as part of the socialist friendship and solidarity programs were lacking not only citizenship but also the most basic human rights.[40] Sexual regulations surrounding these non-Germans were reminiscent of the Nazi emphasis on racial purity. Mozambicans and Vietnamese were both segregated from the German population so as to prevent any sexual encounters. Should a Vietnamese woman get pregnant, the socialist state offered cost-free abortion as the solution. If the mother refused to abort her child, she was immediately deported back to Vietnam.[41]

In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), minority rights and legislation were put in place to secure the educational and cultural rights of the Danes after World War II. The Danes and the Frisians organized around the South Schleswig Voters Association (SSW), sending between one and three members to the *Landtag* (regional parliament) of S-H, while being represented by more than 160 members in municipal councils throughout South Schleswig.[42] The days of violent conflict over S-H ended with the externally imposed peace of the postwar settlement. "Nowadays only a few extremists

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in Denmark and Germany seriously advocate border revisions" and "the minorities have actually become a kind of exotic group, remains from a past which are only interesting in the context of the present ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe."[43] Yet the "Euroregion debate" of 1997 inflamed nationalist emotions, since "those in favor of the Euroregion (uniting Danish and German parts of Schleswig in EU projects) . . . were accused of giving up Danish independence . . . The mayor of the 'amt' Sonderjylland even received a—in a Danish context totally unfamiliar—death threat . . ."[44] This example shows that even the most peaceful "showcase" of multi-ethnic life in Germany is not devoid of conflict.

While the Danes and Frisians served as the showcase of ethnic toleration, the largest minority in Germany, the Turks, have been deprived of German citizenship for three generations, since the beginning of their recruitment in 1961. While the Turkish population was approaching 2 million, there were only 8,000 (8,166 to be exact) German citizens of Turkish descent in 1986, as a result of the 1913 law on citizenship.[45] In stark contrast, over a million *Volksdeutsche* from Kazakhstan and Russia, who had been away from Germany for centuries, immigrated to Germany and acquired citizenship in the 1990s. What the contrasting legal status of Kazakh "Germans" and Turkish "guest workers" illustrates is that the ethnic exclusionist structure of the German state has not changed much since 1913, despite the catastrophe of World War II. The Allied occupation put an end to the Holocaust, but the German state continued to have an acute ethnic consciousness in choosing who to include and exclude from the political community. Direct foreign intervention and occupation put in place protection for Jews and Roma as genocide survivors, and Danes, Frisians, and Sorbians as showcases of protected minorities, but did not alter the basic structure of the regime of ethnicity. As human rights activists decried in 1993, "Germany, a representative democracy, cannot afford to leave outside of its political societal contract [i.e. citizenship] hundreds of thousands of people who were born, or otherwise lived for a long time, within its borders. The Turkish-German minority is unwilling to accept this any further . . ."[46] Chancellor Kohl's offer in the early 1980s to pay DM10,500 (approximately US$5,000) to every Turk who permanently leaves Germany and signs a document promising not to return, exposed the stunningly ethnic understanding of German citizenship.[47]

After 86 years, the citizenship law as amended in 1999 to allow for the citizenship of children born to foreign parents stipulated that at least one of the parents had to have been a legal resident of Germany for at least eight years.[48] The amended version of the law is still much less liberal than its French and American counterparts, and yet it was hailed, justifiably, as a revolutionary breakthrough. It is also an interesting development in that legislation relating to minority and foreigners' rights was passed without a decisive foreign intervention. This is a domestically induced change in the regime of ethnicity.

Why did the German citizenship law change when it did in 1999? Several hypotheses can be offered. First, the famous Süssmuth report argued that

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"Germany is in actuality a country of immigration," and, given the demographic trends (the German population is expected to decline from 82 to 60 million by 2050), immigrants are an indispensable part of a functioning German economy.[49] Süssmuth suggested that "in the social consciousness, it will henceforth become increasingly self-evident that citizenship is not inextricably bound up with ethnic heritage."[50] The linking of citizenship reform to the survival of a competitive German economy appealed to a technocratic vision of socio-economic engineering for the future. The appearance of popular German politicians of Turkish heritage, and the overwhelmingly leftist sympathies of the few Turks who are eligible to vote, might have induced the Social Democrat–Green coalition to expand citizenship so as to acquire Turkish votes for their parties in a political landscape where elections are increasingly decided by a few thousand votes. A third plausible explanation could be the impact of an intellectual sea change among German leftists in favor of multiculturalism. Some intellectuals were already conceiving of Germany as a multicultural "many peoples' republic" by the end of the Cold War.[51] All three explanations are plausible and it is not possible to adjudicate between them without a more intensive focus on the statements of political leaders, bureaucrats, and other people who have been instrumental in this change, including sources ranging from the stenographic records of parliamentary hearings to editorials in the major newspapers.

Regime of Ethnicity in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation since 1917

The Russian Empire before the Bolshevik Revolution was a "service state" like the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Prussian states, where the strength of attachment and service to the state entitled one to membership in the political community. For a long period of time the language of the nobility had been French; important official positions were staffed by Germans, including Empress Catherine the Great and the famous finance minister Sergei Witte; and the Romanov dynasty was related by blood to British royalty. Italian architects, Dutch painters, Cossack military units, Christened Tatar nobles, and many other ethnic groups gave the appearance of a Tower of Babel to the tsarist empire. It was not ethnic heritage but service and loyalty to the state that determined inclusion. Orthodoxy was a prerequisite for high office, much like Islam and Catholicism were in the Ottoman and Habsburg realms, respectively.[52]

Following the Bolshevik Revolution, minority nationalisms sprung onto the political scene, setting up national republics in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. It is possible to speak of a politicized ethnic consciousness among the above-mentioned minorities, which preceded and influenced Soviet nationalities policy. However, the construction and codification of hundreds of ethnic groups by the Soviet state cannot be attributed to bottom-up pressures

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from society. Though some ethnic identities were politicized, an overwhelming proportion of Soviet nationalities policy retained a "scientific detachment" from people's self-identification and the identity categories that were most salient socially.

The Soviet socialist state promoted ethnic particularism and fixed objective ethnic identities to individuals through their internal passports, autonomous ethnic territories, ethnically based affirmative action and other policies of *korenizatsiia* (nativization) in the ethnic republics.[53] The formulation of this policy was intimately related to the production of ethnographic knowledge in the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the ideas that the Soviet "scientists" held about ethnicity:

> [T]he production of knowledge cannot be easily disentangled from the exercise of power in the Soviet Union—or in any other modern state. To be sure, the party-state was the locus of political power. But the party-state did not have a monopoly on knowledge; on the contrary, it depended to a significant degree on the information about the population that experts and local elites provided. By compiling critical ethnographic knowledge that shaped how the regime saw its lands and peoples, and by helping the regime generate official categories and lists, these experts and local elites participated in the formation of the Soviet Union.[54]

Ethnographers came up with a list of 191 *narodnosti* (peoples) for the 1926 census, corresponding to what are now known as ethnic groups.[55] The act of conducting the census itself was an assertion of power, since the census takers were instructed not to accept any inappropriate answers, such as "Muslim," and to ask further questions in order to ascribe an ethnic identity to each citizen.[56] "Experts on Central Asia insisted that religion and clan were the key components of local identity in their region of focus, while experts on Siberia maintained that tribal identities remained most significant in their region."[57] Despite such objections, the alliance of ethnographers and Soviet authorities managed to categorize Soviet citizenry into almost 200 ethnic groups. As a political consequence of such "scientific classification," Stalin divided Muslim Central Asia into five ethnic republics, and the Muslims in the Volga basin were split primarily between Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, although elite and mass-level identifications indicate that a larger Muslim (reformed or traditional) and/or Turkic linguistic identity could better reflect people's primary political identity.[58]

Lenin's commitment to compensating the non-Russian groups that had been victimized by tsarist imperialism played an important role in the making of the USSR through the *korenizatsiia* principle, which is perhaps the first example of "affirmative action."[59] Quotas for native cadres in the ethnic republics created a tremendous incentive for ethnic identification in pursuit of upward social mobility. While social mobility as such was encouraged, it was strictly bounded by territory. Internal passports and the *propiska* system froze ethnic populations to specific territories, amounting to a "second serfdom." This prevented Moscow, Leningrad, and other major traditionally Russian cities from developing into genuinely multicultural,

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multi-ethnic urban centers like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Minorities were promoted within their autonomies but not at the all-Union level. Until the last years of Gorbachev, not a single member of the Politburo hailed from the traditionally Muslim ethnic groups, which constituted 17% of the Soviet population by 1989 (see Table 4). Ethnic categories purportedly created for the purposes of affirmative action provided structures for systematic discrimination, not to mention societal fragmentation.

The most atrocious turn in Soviet nationalities policy occurred in the late 1930s, concurrent with the ideological offensive of Nazi Germany. Ethnic groups with "external homelands," such as the Germans, Poles, Bulgarians, and Koreans, were deported from territories in the Western borderlands to Central Asia and other remote locations.[60] Internal passports that indicated every citizen's ethnic background enabled the systematic application of this policy at lightening speed. During World War II, a list of "Punished Peoples" who were alleged to have collaborated with the Germans, including most notably the Chechens, Crimean Tatars,[61] and Meshketian Turks, were exiled to Central Asia and Siberia, up to half of their population perishing during the week's long train journey in deliberately overloaded cars. Thanks to an exhaustive system of ethnic categorization in the census, internal passports, and

TABLE 4 Population of the main nationalities in the Soviet Union (in thousands)

	1959	1979	1989
Russians	114,114	137,397	145,072
Ukrainians	37,253	42,347	44,136
Bielorussians	7,913	9,436	10,030
Uzbeks	6,015	12,456	16,686
Tatars	4,968	6,317	
Kazakhs	3,622	6,556	8,138
Azerbaijanis	2,940	5,477	6,791
Armenians	2,787	4,151	4,627
Georgians	2,692	3,571	3,983
Lithuanians	2,326	2,851	3,068
Moldavians	2,214	2,968	3,355
Chuvashes	1,470	1,751	
Latvians	1,400	1,439	1,459
Tadzhiks	1,397	2,898	4,217
Mordvins	1,285	1,192	
Turkmens	1,002	2,028	2,718
Estonians	989	1,020	1,027
Bashkirs	989	1,371	
Kirgiz	969	1,906	
Germans		1,936	
Jews		1,811	

Source: Hosking, *The First Socialist State*, 524.

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local and central authorities, it was possible to deport all citizens of Chechen descent in one day, including those fighting the Nazis on the front. The Soviet experience is truly amazing in illuminating the devious potential of ethnic categories administered by the state. After the ethnic cleansing of "Enemy Nations" and "Punished Peoples," a third and final chapter in the familiar saga of ethnic targeting took place with the "anti-cosmopolitanism campaign" of 1953, through which high-ranking Jews were purged.[62]

Surprisingly enough, throughout Khrushchev's "thaw," Brezhnev's "stagnation," and Gorbachev's "glasnost," the Soviet regime of ethnicity persisted in the form that it was constructed by Stalin. The territorial dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 showed striking continuity with the Soviet past both in preserving the internal borders that Stalin had drawn in the 1920s and also in utilizing the Soviet discourse of national sovereignty.[63] In the five Central Asian states and some regional autonomies within Russia (such as Tatarstan), even the communist-era party bosses remained in power as the new national(ist) leaders.

Yeltsin and Putin were paradoxically more successful in using their executive powers than their purportedly more powerful Soviet successors in implementing two changes related to the nationalities policy. In 1997 Yeltsin abolished the ethnicity category in internal passports, despite protests from the ethnic republics.[64] In an indirect challenge to Soviet ethno-federalism, Putin first created supergovernors to oversee the workings of ethnic and non-ethnic provinces alike, and later announced his plan to replace the election from below of regional governors with direct appointment from Moscow, which would deprive ethnic republics of their theoretical right (since in practice elections in Russia are not free and fair) to elect their own governors.

Remarkable also is the fact that the first major revisions to the Soviet/Russian regime of ethnicity since the 1920s also occurred through executive fiat. As in the original foundation, in the 1997 revision, too, there was a strong scholarly "social scientific" proponent of the revision in the person of Valeri Tishkov, the director of the Institute of Ethnology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, who also served as the Minister of Nationalities in post-communist Russia.[65] There was also pressure from the EU, which denounced the inscription of individual ethnic background in passports as an infringement of privacy, while still supporting the collection of data on ethnic background at the aggregate level.[66] The change after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the demographic balance of the newly found Russian Federation might have also encouraged the political leadership to seek assimilation of the non-Russian ethnic groups by dismantling ethno-federalism. Since so much hinges on the intentions of Yeltsin and his close associates, a definitive answer to the question of the driving forces behind the change in Russian internal passports cannot be given.

Regardless of the change in the internal passports, the major components of the Soviet era ethnic regime are still intact in Russia today. The Russian regime of ethnicity can be described as "institutionalized multi-nationalism" based on an objective, ascriptive understanding of ethnicity. This is an institutional and discursive structure

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that hinders assimilation and facilitates the preservation of ethnic differences as hereditary categories. It harbors historically validated threats to the well-being of entire ethnic categories and obstructs the upward social mobility of individuals from minority ethnic backgrounds.

Regime of Ethnicity in Turkey since 1923

The Ottoman Empire was a dynastic state with a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional population, and a bureaucratic incorporation and rewards system based on service to the state. Islamic faith was a prerequisite for some of the highest offices, but non-Muslims could be found even in the Cabinet and other key official positions, thus making the Ottoman system more genuinely multi-confessional than even the Habsburg and tsarist systems. The Muslim blob that constituted the "sovereign nation [*millet-i hakime*]" included many traditionally Muslim ethnic groups such as the Abkhaz, Albanians, Arabs, Azeris, Bosnians, Circassians, Chechens, Dagestanis, Kurds, Laz, Macedonians, Tatars, and Turkmen, as well as Muslim Bulgarians, Georgians, Greeks, Hungarians, Jews, Poles, Roma, Serbs, and Ukrainians, among others.[67]

The post-Ottoman Republic of Turkey was internationally recognized in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which established the minority regime in Turkey.[68] Turkey refused to attribute minority status on the basis of ethnicity, language, and Islamic sectarian divisions because these would officially codify minorities among Muslims.[69] Following a very narrow definition of minorities, Turkey accepted to codify only non-Muslims as minorities with corresponding rights, including schools where instruction in minority languages would be available. Even though a strictly legal reading of Article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty, which concerns minority rights and the rights of all Turkish citizens, could be interpreted to allow for the use of minority languages in trade and in the media, Turkey only accepted minority rights for non-Muslims, and this reading became the norm in domestic and international forums.[70] In actual practice, Turkey did not even recognize all non-Muslim groups as minorities. Only Armenians, Greeks, and Jews are officially recognized as minorities.[71] Assyrians, Chaldeans, Nestorians, and Yezidis are not considered minorities even though they are not Muslim.[72]

Turkey and Greece agreed to exchange the Christians in Turkey (except in Istanbul) and the Muslims in Greece (except in Western Thrace), which tremendously homogenized both countries, creating 98% Christian and Muslim majorities in Greece and Turkey, respectively. Population exchange took place on a religious basis, hence resulting in the transfer of Karamanli Christians, who are ethno-linguistically Turkish, to Greece, and the transfer of Muslims, who are ethno-linguistically Greek, to Turkey. The codification of Armenians, Greeks, and Jews as the official minorities had important implications, since these groups had been demographically miniscule then, and are even more so today. They constituted 2% of the population

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TABLE 5 Muslim population and official minorities in Turkey, 1927–2003

Census year	Islam	Greek-Orthodox	Armenian-Gregorian	Jewish
1927	13,269,6006	109,905	77,433	81,672
1945	18,497,801	103,839	60,260	76,965
1955	22,804,048	86,665	60,071	45,995
1965	31,129,854	73,725	69,526	38,267
2005 (estimate)	70,000,000	6,000	60,000	20,000

Source: Compiled from Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*.

in 1927 and declined relatively and absolutely to 0.1% of the population by the 1990s (see Table 5). Counterfactually, by ethnicity and language, Abkhaz, Albanians, Arabs, Bosnians, Circassians, Laz, Kurds, Pomaks, Tatars, and many other Muslim groups could become minorities (see Table 6). By sectarian division, the Shiite Alevis could become minorities.

Turkey's refusal to recognize minorities among Muslims represents a continuation of the Ottoman *millet* system, which assigned collective rights on the basis of religion. While many other aspects of the Ottoman legacy were repudiated in the Republican period, this aspect was tacitly preserved. One can also argue that more than the *millet* system, it was the particular configuration of friends and enemies in the War of Liberation that accounts for the exclusion of Christians and the inclusion of Muslims regardless of ethnicity. Most Greeks actively supported the Greek invasion of Anatolia, or revolted separately to set up a Greek state in the Black Sea region, and some Armenians joined forces with the French to set up an Armenian state in

TABLE 6 Minority languages of Muslim ethnic groups in Turkey

Language	1927 (total 13,762,074)	1960 (total 27,754,820)
Turkish	11,777,810	25,172,535
Albanian	21,774	12,025
Arabic	134,273	347,690
Bosnian	–	14,570
Bulgarian	20,554	–
Circasssian	95,901	63,137
Georgian	–	32,944
Kurdish	1,184,446	1,847,674
Laz	–	21,703
Pomak	–	24,098
Persian	1,687	1,090
Tatar	11,465	–

Source: Compiled from Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, 157, 207.

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Eastern Anatolia. Christians were associated with active collaboration with foreign invaders, and as being the grounds on which foreign powers meddled in the domestic affairs of Turkey. The friend–enemy dissociation between Muslims and Christians, reinforced during the War of Liberation, may account for the exclusion of Christians and the willingness to codify them as minorities after 1923. There were a few ethnic organizations among Muslims, most notably among the Kurds and Circassians, which also sided with the invading foreign armies, but these represent the minority of the minorities. The War of Liberation was conceived as a war undertaken by the Muslims of Anatolia against non-Muslim European invaders and their local Christian collaborators. This inclusion/exclusion paradigm, once established and codified into law, persisted from 1923 to 2003.

After 1923, an effort at nation building was ushered in in Turkey, which conceived a "common language" to be the basis of the new nation. This effort had a militant secular dimension, whereby the Ottoman-Islamic "past" was repudiated. The Republic sought to turn "Muslims into (secular) Turks" through linguistic assimilation and secular education. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Balkans, from Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia kept pouring into Anatolia and were welcomed by the new state as they increased the population density of Turkey (a major concern after the decimation of Turks/Muslims in a decade-long (1912–1922) series of wars).[73]

Linguistic assimilation coupled with a secularization campaign was the model that Turkey borrowed from France.[74] In the 1920s and early 1930s, apart from Muslim ethnic groups, Jews were also part of Turkey's secular, linguistic melting pot. For example, Moiz Kohen (Moshe Cohen) took the ur-Turkic name Tekin Alp and became a major proponent of Kemalist nationalism, leading the campaign to learn and teach Turkish among the Jews, and writing books and articles about Kemalism.[75]

The Greeks in particular, but also Armenians and other (unrecognized) Christian groups, were excluded from the new Turkish nation from the beginning. Despite their demographic insignificance, the state perceived them as a liability. Their linguistic and religious organizations were prevented from expanding, the religious higher education of Christians was hindered, and they were tacitly excluded from employment in the state bureaucracy, which induced them to leave Turkey.

Starting in the 1930s, Jews were also stigmatized. The late 1930s and early 1940s, in particular, signaled increased interaction between Turkey and Nazi Germany. There was a remarkable increase in anti-Semitism[76] and race-based theories of Turkishness in the public sphere, which the government never officially supported but also did not suppress until the mid-1940s. One can notice a chronological parallel between the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe and in Turkey. In 1934, disturbances in Thrace forced the Jews who lived scattered there to migrate to Istanbul, while the publication of Franz Werfel's *Forty Days in Musa Dag* in German, by opening the debate over Armenian deportations, occasioned renewed public hostility against the Armenians *and* against the Jews, since Werfel was Jewish.[77] The crowning of the anti-minority policies

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during the One Party regime (1923–1950) occurred when the government instituted a "Wealth Tax" in 1942, which was aimed at eradicating minority wealth in Istanbul (since commerce and business was still run by Christians and Jews there). Though it was passed as a law applicable to all, the Wealth Tax was applied disproportionately to non-Muslims, to whom 87% of the tax was assigned.[78] Defenders of the Wealth Tax claim that the peasants and other population segments paid much more in the same period as a result of to war-induced taxation, and that the non-Muslim overrepresentation in the Wealth Tax is due to their overrepresentation among the Turkish bourgeoisie.[79] The rise of the Cyprus issue in the 1950s put the lives of Greeks in Turkey in jeopardy, during the infamous 6–7 September (1955) events in which mobs destroyed Greek stores in Beyoglu, Istanbul. In 1964 the government deported a large number of the remaining Greeks at a time of heightened tensions over Cyprus.[80] The minority regime, which only covers the Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, persisted in Turkey without any modifications from 1923 to 2003. There were officially no minorities other than these three, and hence all Muslim ethno-linguistic groups were considered candidates for long-term assimilation and conversion into Turks. Since the state does not recognize or codify ethnic background, we do not have any reliable numbers on the ethnic minorities among the Muslim majority in Turkey. However, the population censuses from 1927 until 1965 included a question about languages spoken other than Turkish.[81] This question also reveals the "linguistic" orientation of the Turkish model, which aims at inclusion through linguistic assimilation, as in the French and, to a certain extent, Austrian models. Also as a result of assimilation, language can serve only as a very approximate measure of ethnic background. For example, in the 1960 census, the languages (among Muslims) listed in Table 6 were counted.

Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity is the most salient, especially in Southeastern Anatolia, and it is perhaps the only politicized ethnic identity in Turkey. However, Kurds are not the only ethnic group with an ethno-linguistic and territorial consciousness. Laz, for example, identify half a dozen towns along the Black Sea coast in the provinces of Rize and Artvin as their homeland, Ardesen and Hopa being the two most prominent.[82]

How and why, despite such a multi-ethnic make-up, did the official policy of not recognizing ethnicity as a political category or ethnically based demands as legitimate demands persist for eight decades? One could argue that the military-bureaucratic praetorian guard of Kemalism did not permit such change in the regime of ethnicity, which was seen as a fundamental tenet of Kemalism. This is not a satisfactory explanation because so many other fundamental tenets of Kemalism were eroded, challenged, and changed over the same period of time. Consider the militant secular attitude in the 1940s, and the socialistic-authoritarian control and ownership of the state in the economy. Both militant secularism and excessive state intrusion in the economy relaxed significantly with the transition to multiparty democracy in the 1950s. By the early 1980s, the Turkish state offered mandatory religion courses in

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Islam from fourth grade through high school, while export-oriented growth and privatization were official state policies. Therefore, once these radical changes in the economic, cultural, educational, and foreign policy of the state are taken into account, it is hard to speak of an overall persistence of Kernalist policies in most issue areas in Turkey. However, the ethnic taboo had not been broken in the more than five-decade (1950–2003) revision of the Kemalist state.

In 2003, Turkey allowed broadcasting and teaching in minority languages, and the state's own television company, TRT, took the lead by broadcasting weekly programs in Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, and Zaza. The EU has been pressuring Turkey in this direction since Turkey's first application to the EU in 1987, but the change came only in 2003, and, even then, with bureaucratic obstruction and foot dragging.[83]

If the change was due to EU pressures, why did it happen in 2003 and not in the 1980s or 1990s? If the change was due to the rise of ethnically assertive Kurds and other minorities, why did it take more than 50 years after the first multiparty elections? Since the Democrat Party (DP) government (1950–1960), anti-Kemalist right-wing parties have been sweeping the polls and ruling Turkey with few interruptions. The Turkish left also incorporated many ethnic Kurds among its ranks. Why did the regime of ethnicity not change in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, or in the 1980s and 1990s? This is not a question that can be answered within the confines of this paper, but the conjuncture of foreign intervention and favorable domestic coalitions could explain this change. As in Austria, Germany, and Russia, the regime of ethnicity in Turkey still demonstrates considerable continuity with the pattern of the last eight decades.

NOTES

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1. Such similarities motivated the volume edited by Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire*.
2. For a map of the Habsburg regions in 1890, see Gullberg, *State, Territory and Identity*, 9.
3. For the idea of a "Carinthian Republic," see Valentin, *Die Idee einer "Karntner Republik" in den Jahren 1918/19*. For the strong autonomist tendencies and regional identities of Salzburg and Tyrol, see Barth-Scalmani et al. "National Identity or Regional Identity: Austria versus Tyrol/Salzburg," 32–63.
4. "The population of South Tyrol as of 1951 included 216,400 German-speaking inhabitants and Ladins. The latter are a very small (estimated between 10–20,000) group of mountain people who speak a dialect derived from Latin. There were about 117,500 Italians, *and it is important in terms of the controversy to note that all but 7,000 came to the area after 1910*" (emphasis mine). Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe*, 57.
5. Eisenstadt was designated as the new regional capital of (Austrian) Burgenland.

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6. Holzer and Münz, "Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Austria," 698. "The Nazi policy against Jews and Gypsies met with little opposition from the German-speaking majority and from the two other minorities not directly affected... Only a few of the Jewish residents returned to Burgenland after 1945. And only a small number of the 7,000 Gypsies survived the 'Gypsy camps' of Lackenbach and Salzburg-Maxglan, the ghetto of Lodz and Auschwitz."
7. Plebiscites were part of the popular, democratic nationalist *Zeitgeist* of the interwar era. Turkey advocated plebiscites in Western Thrace (Greece), Batumi (Georgia), Musul (British Iraq), and Hatay (French Syria). Among these, a plebiscite was held only in Hatay in 1938, which resulted in a vote for independence from French Syria, and a (re-) union with Turkey a year later. Plebiscites in Burgenland and Carinthia decided the current borders of Austria, while plebiscites in Schleswig-Holstein determined the Danish–German border. Hitler resorted to plebiscites in Saarland and in Austria, both of which resulted in union with Germany, though the conditions under which they were held are dubious.
8. Gullberg, *State, Territory and Identity*, 120.
9. Ibid., 130.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 132. Since the knowledge of the Slovene language is an imprecise measure that by definition underestimates the ethnic Slovene presence in the region (some ethnic Slovenes may be German speakers only), the defeat of the ethnic definition of national belonging in the plebiscite is even more resounding than a look at the linguistic demography and plebiscite results reveals.
12. Moser, "Sprachliche und soziale Identitat der Slowenen in Karnten," 27–28.
13. Ibid., 29.
14. Putz, "Die Karntner Slowenen und die Kirche," 45. Translations from other languages into English in this paper are mine.
15. Elste, *Karntens braune Elite*.
16. Barker, *The Slovenes of Carinthia*.
17. Holzer and Münz, "Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Austria," 721.
18. "Since the inter-war period, the elected local representatives (the so-called Conference of Mayors of Croat and bilingual communities) on the Social Democratic side have tended to favor assimilation rather than ethnic self-assertion. On the whole they have also encouraged the ethnic minorities not to exercise the rights established for them in the 1955 State Treaty, and to renounce their mother tongue in favor of German." Ibid., 700.
19. The first two numbers are from Filla et al., *Am Rande Österreichs*, 37.
20. Roth, *The Radetzky March*, 1.
21. For the political controversies surrounding FPÖ leader Jörg Haider's accession to the governorship of Carinthia, see Sully, *A Contemporary History of Austria*, 148–52.
22. The First Report submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany under Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities discusses the legal framework of these four groups' minority status, available from the Ministry of the Interior: http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/1999/First_Report_submitted_by_the_Federal_Id_23214_en,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/First_Report_submitted_by_the_Federal_Id_23214_en.pdf; INTERNET (accessed 5 February 2007).
23. Ibid., 5–11.
24. Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, *Kleines Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland*, 58.

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25. Available from http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/804.0.html; INTERNET (accessed 15 March 2006).
26. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*; Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*; Piper, *Racism, Nationalism and Citizenship*.
27. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 114.
28. Ibid., 115.
29. Ibid., 116.
30. Ibid., 122: "Not without reason did the representative of the Danish minority in North Schleswig complain to the Reichstag, 'I simply do not understand this exaggerated fear (*Angstlichkeit*) of *jus soli*.'"
31. Ibid., 124.
32. Ibid., 127.
33. Teebken and Christiansen, *Living Together*, 15–16, 98.
34. For a sub-regional breakdown of the vote in the plebiscite, refer to the map on page 38 of Lesiuk, *Danisch-deutsche Erfahrungen in der Lösung von ethnisch-nationalen Problemen im Grenzgebiet*.
35. Brenner, "No Place of Honor," 166–68.
36. Schulte, *Deutschtum und Judentum* 5. This is an edited volume that brings together the reflections of German Jews including Walther Rathenau, Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzwieg, and Martin Buber.
37. Steensen, "Frühe Beziehungen zwischen Sorben und Nordfriesen (I) Der Verband der nationalen Minderheiten in Deutschland und die Europaischen Nationalitatenkongresse," 3–11.
38. Kotsch, *Minderheitenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 47–57.
39. Ibid., 175–246.
40. "By 1989, 60,000 Vietnamese, 52,000 Poles, 15,000 Mozambicans, and 8,000 Cubans were among the 'socialist friends' living in the GDR. After the dissolution of the East German state, they would face deportation, the premature discontinuation of their residence permits, and a more openly sanctioned and violent xenophobic landscape. By 1989, there were between 90,000 to 100,000 non-Soviet contract workers living in the GDR—Angolans, Mozambicans, Cubans, Vietnamese, and Chinese." Göktürk et al., *Germany in Transit*, 40.
41. "Agreement on the Procedures Concerning Pregnancy among Vietnamese Women Laborers in the GDPR (1987)," in Gokturk et al., *Germany in Transit*, 56–57.
42. Teebken and Christiansen, *Living Together*, 12–13, 49–50.
43. Kühl, *The "Schleswig Experience"*, 59.
44. Ibid., 31.
45. Wernicke, "The Long Road to the German Passport," 116–18.
46. Leggewie and Şenocak, *Deutsche Türken*, inside front cover.
47. Ludat, "A Question of the Greater Fear," 23–27.
48. Ibid., "Law on the Reform of the Nationality Law (1999)," 126–27.
49. Ibid., Süssmuth, "Report of the Independent Commission on Immigration," 137–39. Rita Süssmuth was the President of the Bundestag from 1988 to 1998.
50. Ibid., 139.
51. Leggewie, *Multi Kulti*; Zank, *The German Melting-Pot*.
52. "Some native elites were more favored than others, notably the Slavic nobilities of the West, the Baltic Germans, and the Georgian *aznauroba* (nobility). But after the integration of the Tatar nobility into the Russian *dvorianstvo* (nobility) in the sixteenth century, only a few Muslim notables were able to retain their privileged status." Suny, *Revenge of the Past*, 25.

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53. Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," 414–52.
54. Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 11.
55. Ibid., 329–33 for the list, 101–41 for its implementation and modification after the census.
56. Ibid., 110 for the list of five questions.
57. Ibid., 111.
58. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*; Bennigsen, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union*; Allworth, *Central Asia*.
59. For an overview, see Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, 6–27; for the disagreement between Lenin and Stalin, see Suny, *The Soviet Experiment*, 140–44.
60. Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, Chapter 8, 311–43.
61. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*, 165–79.
62. Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, 312–13.
63. Walker, *Dissolution*.
64. Arel, "Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents."
65. For Tishkov's newspaper op-eds, see Arel, "Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents."
66. Arel, "Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents."
67. For the Balkan Muslims and their migrations in the Ottoman Empire, see McCarthy, "Muslims in Ottoman Europe"; for the Caucasian Muslims and their migrations to Anatolia, see Habiçoğlu, *Kafkasya'dan Anadolu'ya Göçler ve İskanları*.
68. Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar*.
69. Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*, 1044, "Aff-ı umumi ve ekaliyetler."
70. Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar*, 74–81.
71. Ibid.
72. For Assyrians in Turkey, see Bilge, *Geçmişten Günümüze Süryaniler*. Assyrian is sometimes/often used interchangeably to include Chaldean and Nestorian in the construction of an expansive, secular nationalist Assyrian identity. For a brief discussion of these differences, see Akturk, "Perspectives on Assyrian Nationalism," 134–55. For Yezidis in Turkey, see Özcan, *İstanbul'da, Diyarbakır'da Azalırken*, 254–58.
73. Çağaptay, "Race, Assimilation, and Kemalism," 86–101; Çağaptay, "Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey," 601–20; Poulton, "The Muslim Experience in the Balkan States, 1919–1991"; Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*.
74. Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar*. France also hoped for the linguistic assimilation of Basques, Bretons, Corsicans, and other non-French minorities into French society in this period. Even today the French model is based on linguistic assimilation.
75. Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*.
76. Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*.
77. Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*, 246–68.
78. Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*; Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*, 270–94.
79. Kafaoğlu, *Varlık Vergisi Gerçeği*.
80. Özcan, *İstanbul'da, Diyarbakır'da Azalırken*.
81. Compiled from Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*.
82. See Aksamaz, *Kafkasya'dan Karadeniz'e Lazların Tarihsel Yolculuğu*; see also Aksamaz, *Dil-Tarih-Kültür-Gelenekleriyle Lazlar*; Özgün, *Lazlar*. Strong political autonomist tendencies are seen in Koçiva, *Lazona*.
83. See Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar*, 120–23, for examples of bureaucratic obstruction in the practice of this law.

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