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Şuhnaz Yılmaz

## IN PURSUIT OF ELUSIVE GLORY: ENVER PASHA'S ROLE IN THE PAN-ISLAMIC AND BASMACHI MOVEMENTS

Enver Pasha is one of the most controversial figures in Turkish history. This unknown graduate of the Imperial War College was only in his mid-twenties when he became the "hero of freedom" after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Thus started his rapid rise within the military ranks. His eventual transformation from a young and ambitious hero of freedom into a virtual autocrat as a member of the ruling triumvirate of the Committee of Union and Progress, also including Talat and Cemal, was completed in 1913. Leading the troops that recaptured Edirne during the Second Balkan War, Enver greatly increased his power and popularity, and within a year, he enhanced his prestige further, when he joined the royal family as the son-in-law of Sultan-Caliph Mehmed Reshad (r. 1909-18) by marrying the Ottoman princess Naciye Sultan. Enver became the Minister of War on the eve of the First World War and had a decisive influence in leading the Ottoman Empire into the war as an ally of Germany. Consequently, as one of the most important Ottoman political and military leaders, he played a key role in determining the fate of a truncated empire, which, in turn, shaped his own destiny.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, Enver was forced to give up his political and military position and to escape abroad. During his émigré years, he persistently tried to redeem himself. First, he attempted to collaborate with the Bolsheviks and tried to resume a leading role in the nationalist struggle in Anatolia. Failing to achieve this goal, he pursued his pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideals and joined the Basmachi movement in Central Asia. He died on the battlefield at the age of forty-one, attempting to lead a resistance movement of which he had limited control and even less understanding. This was the last battle of an Ottoman warrior fighting to restore the glory of an empire that no longer existed.

The last phase of Enver's life and activities (1918-1922), has been overshadowed by the "orthodox" Turkish historical interpretation of this period. The activities of the Unionist émigrés, and especially Enver, were often discredited as mere adventurism or were barely mentioned. Only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of Turkey's ties with the Turkic Republics of Central Asia, has Enver Pasha received more attention for the 'pan-Turkic' and 'pan-Islamic' ideas he promoted during the last years of his life.

This article presents a study of Enver Pasha's rather neglected activities during his émigré years, starting with his flight from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and

ending with his death fighting along the Basmachis against the Soviets in Central Asia in 1922. A comprehensive analysis and a reassessment of this period are critical for understanding (i) Enver's role in the initial stages of Turco-Soviet relations; and (ii) his motives for, and the ultimate impact of, his promotion of pan-Islamic ideas and his activities within the Basmachi resistance.

### *Activities Abroad: New Horizons in the East*

When it became clear that the Ottomans were defeated at the end of World War I, after the signing of the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918, Enver, Talat, Cemal and other leading Unionists left İstanbul on 2 November 1918 aboard a German vessel. In the meantime, in İstanbul court-martial proceedings had resulted in death sentences *in-absentia* for the fugitive Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) leaders. Upon the CUP leaders' flight from İstanbul, Talat Paşa concluded, "Our political life is over."<sup>1</sup> He insisted that they withdraw to a corner in Europe, keep a low profile and refrain from any active involvement in politics, but "if an opportunity arises it is natural that we will make use of it."<sup>2</sup>

Enver, however, had no intensions of leaving the political and the military arena. Considering the Ottoman defeat only as a temporary setback, in the last meeting of the CUP leaders before they left the Empire, Enver voiced his strong desire to fight "the second phase of the war." He optimistically emphasized that the Ottomans also won the Balkan War in its second phase.<sup>3</sup> Enver initially planned to go directly to the Caucasus, which would serve as the new base for his struggle. He stated, "We lost the war. In accordance with the Armistice, the British will be coming to İstanbul. Rather than seeing the British in İstanbul like this, I am determined to go to the Caucasus to serve Islam."<sup>4</sup>

Even before the First World War, during the September-October 1913 annual meeting of the CUP, forming close ties with Muslim and Turkic groups abroad was determined to be an official policy.<sup>5</sup> Several special agents were dispatched to Russia, Iran, India and Afghanistan to carry out propaganda and various activities, such as establishing secret branches of the CUP in the Caucasus and Turkestan.<sup>6</sup> With a substantial Turkic and Muslim population under Tsarist rule, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism became dominant themes in the Ottoman and German propaganda campaign against Russia during the war. Even Russian sources indicate that Turkish

<sup>1</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa*, vol.3 (İstanbul, 1970), p. 497.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Masayuki Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia 1919-1922*, (Tokio, 1991), p. 9. In this book, Yamauchi publishes numerous documents from the Turkish Historical Association Archives, which hereafter will be indicated as THAA.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Enver Pasha (in Crimea) to his uncle Kamil Bey dated Nov. 12, 1918 (THAA Klasör 2/ Fihrist 732) in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, p. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Jakob Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, (Bloomington, 1995), p. 49.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 50-52.



agents had actively criss-crossed Transcaucasia.<sup>7</sup> Before the Ottoman surrender in 1918, Enver Pasha had already established a military force in the Caucasus, under the command of his brother Nuri and uncle Halil Pasha.<sup>8</sup>

Illness and the failure of his attempt to reach the Caucasus in a small boat forced Enver to postpone his plans to resume the fighting.<sup>9</sup> Instead, news of the disbanding of the military unit in the Caucasus and the arrest of his relatives in command, led Enver to join the other fugitive CUP leaders in Germany.<sup>10</sup> During the winter of 1918-1919, Enver attempted to contact the British agents in Berlin for a settlement.<sup>11</sup> When he realized that these efforts were futile, he turned his attention once again to the East. His most important contact in this period was to visit the Bolshevik Comintern Secretary Karl Radek in prison to propose a Muslim-Soviet alliance against the British. Enver also played a role in the release of Radek by the Germans.<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime, Enver's persistent efforts to reach Russia were obstructed by a series of catastrophes. In one of his letters to Mustafa Kemal, Enver wrote, "With the realization that the aid for Anatolia would be provided only by the Russians, I agreed with the people here [meaning the CUP leaders in Germany] to leave for Russia accompanied by Baha Bey. However, during the course of one year, I was detained twice and spent five months in prison. I survived six plane crashes."<sup>13</sup> When Enver finally reached Moscow in early 1920, he established contacts with the Soviet foreign office and with Lenin. At the same time, he was in touch with the Turkish nationalist delegation, led by Bekir Sami, which was visiting Moscow.<sup>14</sup> In this period, Enver emerged as a significant intermediary in forming the initial ties between the nationalists in Anatolia and the Soviets in Moscow.

Representatives of the Ankara government initialed a friendship treaty with the Bolsheviks. The diplomatic bargaining for financial and military assistance, however, was deadlocked because of the Soviet insistence on the cession of the Van and Mush districts to Armenia.<sup>15</sup> At this point, Enver entered the diplomatic scene.

<sup>7</sup> Y. K. Sarkisyan, *Ekspansionistkaya politika Osmanskoy Impyerii v Zakavkaz'ya*, chap. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Halil Paşa, *Bitmeyen Savaş: Kütülmare Kahramanı Halil Paşa'nın Anıları*, M.T. Sorgun (İstanbul, 1972), pp. 247-248.

<sup>9</sup> Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Tanıdıklarım: Enver Paşa," *Yedigün*, no. 150 (March 1936), p. 32.

<sup>10</sup> Halil Paşa, *Bitmeyen Savaş*, pp. 267-277.

<sup>11</sup> Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, p. 13.

<sup>12</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık* (İstanbul, 1987), p. 217.

<sup>13</sup> Enver's letter from Moscow to Mustafa Kemal (Ankara), Undated (c.a.) May 21, (THAA Klasör 7, Mustafa Kemal Dosyası, Fihrist 5), in Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star*, p. 229; "Haksız ve Lüzumsuz bir Ta'riz," *Liva-el İslam*, September 1921, vol. 12, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Dan Rustow, "Enver Pasha," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 700.

<sup>15</sup> Turkish Parliamentary Library (T.B.M.M. Kütüphanesi), *Minutes of Meetings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, "Reports and Discussions on the Relations with the Russian Bolshevik Republic" I.84, C.3, 10.16.1920; I.85, C.1, 10. *Gizli Oturumlarında Sorunlar ve Görüşler* 17.1920. Also, see Mustafa Kemal, *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, 1920-

In the end, the Soviets gave up their demands and agreed to provide the Turkish mission with a substantial amount of weapons and ammunition.<sup>16</sup> Although the nature and scope of Enver's contribution to the negotiations are unclear, after this meeting he wrote a letter to Mustafa Kemal enthusiastically informing him about his meeting with Chicherin accompanying the representatives from Ankara boasting that the successful conclusion of negotiations was mostly due to his timely intervention.<sup>17</sup>

Mustafa Kemal, however, was quite skeptical about Enver's intentions while acting as an intermediary and trying to present himself as a representative of the Turkish nationalists. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal was concerned that an overemphasis on pan-Islam by Enver might alienate the anti-religious communists from the nationalist struggle in Anatolia. He wanted to emphasize, instead, the anti-British nature of the Turco-Soviet alliance and to present their aim as a struggle against British oppression, "which tries to lower all the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of the East to the level of farm animals."<sup>18</sup>

Far from concerned about Enver's pan-Islamic motives at this stage, the Soviets thought that his influence in the Islamic world could be manipulated in two major ways. First, Enver could assist in facilitating the unity and the support of the Muslim peoples of the former Russian Empire under Soviet rule, for this was the period of the Russian Civil War, when Soviet rule was under serious challenge in the Caucasus and, especially, in Central Asia. Second, Enver could instigate resistance against British imperialism in the Islamic world in general.<sup>19</sup> Hence, with the encouragement of the Soviets, Enver Pasha proclaimed the formation of a "Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies" (*İslam Cemiyetleri İttihadı*) which was intended to be a Muslim Revolutionary International. This party's Turkish affiliate, the "People's Councils Party" (*Halk Şuraları Fırkası*), was also founded.<sup>20</sup> As the Young Turk émigrés envisioned the division of labor among themselves in promoting anti-imperialist revolutionary movements in different parts of the Muslim world, Enver Pasha was to be in charge of Turkestan, Cemal Pasha of Afghanistan and India, and Halil Pasha of Iran.<sup>21</sup>

Enver participated in the communist-sponsored "Congress of the Peoples of the East" held in Baku September 1-9, 1920. Not part of the Kemalist Turkish delegation, Enver had a special status as representative of "the Union of the

1923 (Problems and Opinions in the Confidential Meetings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), ed. Raşit Metel (Ankara: 1990), pp. 141-155.

<sup>16</sup> The Soviets promised to deliver 15,000 Austrian rifles with 2,000 cartridges each, French guns for three batteries with 1,000 shells each and one million cartridges. Yamauchi, p. 120.

<sup>17</sup> Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat ve Terakki Erkanı* (İstanbul, 1967), p. 21.

<sup>18</sup> Letter from Mustafa Kemal to Enver dated 4 Oct. 1920, in Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları* (İstanbul, 1955), p. 56.

<sup>19</sup> Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Pasha as an Expatriate," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 35 (4), (October, 1999), p. 49.

<sup>20</sup> Dan Rustow, "Enver Pasha" *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 700.

<sup>21</sup> Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat ve Terakki Erkanı*, pp. 10-7.



Revolutionary Organizations of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia, and India," apparently in order to emphasize Enver's ties with the Muslim leaders of numerous local movements. Those ties, however, often had been limited to having conversations with them in Berlin. At the congress, Enver's speech juxtaposed communist terminology with Unionist ideas, often referring to the struggle against capitalism and imperialism, oppressed peoples, and national self-determination. He also attempted to justify the Ottoman entry into the First World War on the side of imperial Germany as choosing a lesser evil that, at least, accepted the Ottoman Empire's "right to survival." He claimed that he had always fought against imperialist powers and his only goal was to preserve the independence of his country.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, there was not much in the Unionist record that projected them as champions of either oppressed nations or the proletariat. Enver's enthusiasm for the Ottoman entry into the First World War as an ally of the Germans and his role in the decision for Armenian deportations and massacres aroused further suspicions regarding the sincerity of his claims. Yamauchi emphasizes that "At the Baku Congress, Enver was mistrusted by the majority of the communist deputies, especially those who were principally composed of non-Muslims, and they undoubtedly did not offer him a platform for further political ventures. It appears that the objects of his Bolshevik sponsors, Zinoviev and Radek were entirely defeated."<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the delegates from the Kokand and Gandje districts, who were not permitted to conclude their speeches, were spreading the news about the misdeeds of the Bolsheviks and the massacres of Muslims.<sup>24</sup>

During his stay in Baku, Enver established contacts with various Muslim groups, most significantly with the Volga Tatars and Mir-Said Sultan Galiev. He seems to have been greatly influenced by the ideas of the "Muslim National Communists" Sultan Galiev, Ryskulov and Khodzhaev who propagated support for all revolutionary movements in the colonial world and for communism with a nationalistic and Islamic undertone.<sup>25</sup> Tatar leader Sultan Galiev actually built on Lenin's ideas in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, arguing that the class struggle was now taking place on an international scale and the Europeans were exploiting colonized nations in the most advanced and brutal form through imperialism. He claimed that this exploitation has also permeated the Muslim world, naturally bringing along with it seeds of national liberation movements and revolution. Sultan Galiev argued, "All Muslim colonized peoples are proletarian peoples and as almost all classes in Muslim societies have been oppressed by the colonialists, all classes have the right to be called 'proletarians'....Therefore its legitimate to say that the national liberation movement in Muslim countries has the

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Yamauchi, p. 33.

<sup>24</sup> On the Baku Congress and Enver's role in it, also see, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Pasha as an Expatriate," pp. 50-51.

<sup>25</sup> For further information on this issue, see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism* (New York, 1968), pp. 260-262.

character of a socialist revolution."<sup>26</sup> As a result of these interactions, Enver combined his pre-existing pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic inclinations with some communist ideas and terminology to produce the unique blend of communism, nationalism and Islam reflected in Enver's political program entitled *Mesai* [Labor].

By the end of the Baku Congress, however, the Soviets realized that it had failed to meet their expectations. Zinoviev even sent a telegram to Lenin expressing his disillusionment with the results. In fact, Enver's personal contacts with a number of Muslim delegates, especially with those from Turkestan, were making the Russians quite apprehensive. The general opinion in Baku was that "he was 'advised' by the Soviet authorities to return to Moscow at his earliest convenience."<sup>27</sup> Thus the Baku Congress, which was supposed to be the highest point of Enver's collaboration with the Bolsheviks, led both sides to a realization of their conflicting interests and diverging paths.

### *Attempts to regain control in Anatolia*

Enver returned to Europe from October 1920 to February 1921 in an attempt to inaugurate the Islamic Revolutionary Societies. During this period, he also established contacts with the Germans and the Italians for arms and ammunition sales to Moscow and tried to maintain an uneasy balance between acting as a loyal supporter of the Turkish nationalist cause and trying to persuade the Bolsheviks to provide support for a military expedition to Anatolia.<sup>28</sup> He strove to present himself as a better leftist alternative for the Soviets than the nationalist government of Ankara,<sup>29</sup> for Enver was very eager to regain his lost leadership position, which he believed that Mustafa Kemal had "usurped."<sup>30</sup> Enver had several meetings with the first ambassador of the Ankara government to Moscow, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, who tried to deter him from interfering in Anatolian affairs.<sup>31</sup> Bekir Sami Bey also tried to persuade Enver that he should fight for his fatherland and for Islam outside Anatolia in the East.<sup>32</sup> In response to these appeals, Enver wrote a long letter to Mustafa Kemal expressing his loyalty and his contentment to support the nationalist movement from abroad. However, when the Kemalists arrested Major Naim Cevad,

<sup>26</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, *The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 110-111.

<sup>27</sup> PRO FO 371/5178 (E 13412/345/44)

<sup>28</sup> Yamauchi, pp. 33-34.

<sup>29</sup> Eric Jan Zürcher, *Millî Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, (İstanbul, 1987), p. 227.

<sup>30</sup> For a detailed account of the conflict and competition between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal during this period, see Salahi Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 25 (4), (October 1989), pp. 506-515. For a psycho-biographical account of Enver's troubled relations with Mustafa Kemal, also see Norman Itzkowitz and Vamik Volkan, *The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography*, (Chicago, 1984), pp. 76, 82-83, 93, 105.

<sup>31</sup> Dan Rustow, "Enver Pasha" *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 700.

<sup>32</sup> Bekir Sami Bey (Moscow) to Enver Pasha (Berlin), Nov. 1920, (THAA Klasor 28/Fihrist 439), in Yamauchi, p. 125.



whom Enver had sent from Russia to Anatolia with large amounts of propaganda material for the People's Councils Party, it was revealed that Enver had no intention of abandoning his former plans.<sup>33</sup>

Enver's scheme of initiating a national guerrilla resistance based in Anatolia dates back to 1915 and was instigated by the fears of an Allied breakthrough at the Dardanelles.<sup>34</sup> The key actor for implementing these plans, both during and after the First World War, was the 'Special Organization' (*Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*) established by Enver in 1914. The Ottoman version of a military secret service, combining intelligence and propaganda activities with a guerrilla organization,<sup>35</sup> *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* initially propagated pan-Islamic themes and later increasingly pan-Turkic ones. Its activities were complemented by the formation, in 1918, of another organization, the Guard (*Karakol*), which sheltered former Unionists. *Karakol* significantly benefited from the resources and expertise of *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* and played an important role in the national resistance by smuggling men and materials to Anatolia and by establishing clandestine resistance cells. The nationalists also made extensive use of the secret depots of arms and ammunition established by *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*.<sup>36</sup> These organizations and a group of former Unionists in Anatolia were still supportive of Enver and maintained their contacts with him.

During the early stages of the nationalist struggle, particularly since Enver had set his eyes on regaining control in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal's position was not totally secure. There were reports that "Baku, the Unionist stronghold, at the center of the Oriental intrigue" was becoming "the rival of Angora."<sup>37</sup> The British even considered Enver and his followers to pose a more serious threat than the Kemalists. According to them, there were "two parties in Anatolia, not only one. The weaker is that of Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists... They have failed and their adherents are going over to the other far more dangerous party, that of Enver, Talat and the C.U.P.— Jew-German-Bolshevik combination."<sup>38</sup> Enver, eagerly striving to capture the leadership of the nationalist movement, had been gaining strength.

In this period, when the ultimate victor of the leadership battle in Anatolia was still unclear, the Soviets provided support for both sides. On the one hand, the nationalist delegations were visiting Moscow,<sup>39</sup> and Mustafa Kemal was

<sup>33</sup> Dan Rustow, "Enver Pasha" *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 700.

<sup>34</sup> Eric Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor* (Leiden, 1984), p. 169. At that time, even leaving Ankara and establishing a base in Konya or Eskisehir was under consideration.

<sup>35</sup> For additional information, see Ergun Hıçyılmaz, *Belgelerle Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* (İstanbul, 1979); Philip Hendrich Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa" (PhD diss. Princeton University, 1963).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>37</sup> *Political Report on the Caucasus*, Constantinople, 7 Sept. 1920, (confidential) PRO FO 371/5178 (E 14638/345/44).

<sup>38</sup> S.I.S., 2 Sept. 1920, no. CX/ 676/V, PRO FO 371/5178 (E 11702/345/44).

<sup>39</sup> Turkish Parliamentary Library (T.B.M.M. Kütüphanesi), *Minutes of Meetings of Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 'Reports and Discussions on the Relations with the Russian Bolshevik Republic' I.84, C.3, 10.16.1920.



corresponding with the Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, the Soviets were said to be financing the Unionist campaign.<sup>41</sup> Because Mustafa Kemal was seriously concerned with the challenge posed by Enver, the Turkish Grand National Assembly issued a decree on 12 March 1921 prohibiting Enver and Halil Pashas from returning to Anatolia "since this would be detrimental to the internal politics and external relations" of the Ankara government.<sup>42</sup> On 16 July 1921, Enver wrote to Mustafa Kemal, "By the news, which you have been sending through my friends, I understand that you do not want us to return.... For the time being since we are being helpful to our motherland in Moscow, we are not coming back.... However, when we start to feel that... our staying abroad becomes useless and even dangerous for Turkey...and the Islamic world, we will return to Anatolia."<sup>43</sup>

Enver's efforts and expectations to regain control in Anatolia reached their peak while the Greek offensive toward Ankara was in full progress. The nationalists had been withdrawing and were even considering temporarily moving the Turkish Grand National Assembly to another city further away from the war zone.<sup>44</sup> Just two weeks after writing to Mustafa Kemal, on 30 July 1921, Enver arrived at Batumi, where he met with a number of other Unionists and started waiting for an opportunity to return to Anatolia. It is noteworthy that the Congress of the People's Councils Party, meeting in Batumi on 5 September 1921, revived the name "Union and Progress Party" and demanded the Ankara government abandon its hostility towards the émigré Unionists. According to Aydemir, Enver Pasha had even requested his uniform, sword, and decorations from İstanbul in preparation for his Anatolian expedition.<sup>45</sup>

In this period, Enver maintained his support among the émigré Unionists and was also closely linked with a number of influential figures in Anatolia, posing a serious challenge for Mustafa Kemal. As Rustow states, "The Trabzon Defense of Rights Society was openly supporting Enver, and in the Ankara Assembly a group of about forty ex-Unionists are said to have been working secretly to replace Kemal with Enver."<sup>46</sup> Mustafa Kemal's decisive victory at the Sakarya battle of 2-13 September, however, consolidated his position, marking the end of the Anatolian dreams of Enver and his supporters.

<sup>40</sup> Robeck to Curzon, 12 June 1920, no. 695, PRO FO 371/ 5178 (E 6346/345/44): see also attached the article "Tchicherine et Mustapha Kemal Pasha" in *La Cause Commune*, the Russian weekly newspaper published in Paris, sent by the British Embassy in Paris.

<sup>41</sup> S.I.S., 2 Sept. 1920, no. CX/ 676/V, PRO FO 371/5178 (E 11702/345/44).

<sup>42</sup> Turkish Republican Archives, Decree of the Parliament concerning Enver and Halil Pasha, 3.12.1921, no. 731/ 385.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 46-47; A. F. Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, p. 231.

<sup>44</sup> K. Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)* (Ankara, 1991), p. 46.

<sup>45</sup> Aydemir, vol.III, p. 586.

<sup>46</sup> Dan Rustow, "Enver Pasha," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 700.

*Enver's Last Battle in Central Asia*

In the wake of the battle of Sakarya, the Soviets shifted their support from Enver Pasha to Mustafa Kemal, and Enver had to give up his plans to regain power in Anatolia. This development was a final blow to his collaboration with the Bolsheviks as events in Russian Turkestan had already started to indicate Soviet designs for control over Central Asia and forced Enver to realize the gloomy prospects of his hybrid ideology of Bolshevism compatible with Islam.

While the Baku Congress was still in progress, the new reformist government of the Young Bukharans (*Yash Bukharalilar*) overthrew the Bukharan Emir Alim Khan with the help of the Red Army, which stormed Bukhara City.<sup>47</sup> The Young Bukharans, constituted the political branch of the Reformist movement *Jadidism* in Turkestan. The Jadid movement had begun with a strong focus on education and targeted the improvement of the traditional schools and madrasahs, but it assumed a political character in response to the oppressive policies of the Emir, who was perceived as a puppet of Tsarist Russia and its representatives in Bukhara. First the 1916 uprising in Turkestan and then the 1917 October Revolution inspired the Young Bukharans to plan the overthrow of the Emir.<sup>48</sup> Lacking any substantial military power, however, they had to seek the assistance of the Soviet Commissariat in Tashkent and the Red Army.

Following the deposition of the Emirate in Bukhara, Mirza Rahim Khan became the head of the interim government; Fayzullah Khoja served as the president of the ministerial council; and Osman Khoja became the minister of finance on 29 August 1920. The Young Bukharans who had replaced the Emir in collaboration with the Bolsheviks proclaimed a People's Soviet Republic on 2 September 1920.<sup>49</sup> Osman Khoja served as the first and last president of the ephemeral Bukharan Republic between 1921 and 1922.<sup>50</sup>

Although the Young Bukharans anticipated that Bukhara would be at least semi-independent, they were soon to be greatly disillusioned. The pressure from the Red Army, the removal of the state treasury, and the constantly increasing Russian control were clear signs reflecting the genuine Soviet intentions. In the meantime, the fugitive Emir was still struggling to hold out in Eastern Bukhara with the support

<sup>47</sup> Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 244-246.

<sup>48</sup> For an Uzbek historian's detailed study of this period based on archival documents, see Hamid Ziyaev, *Turkistanda Rossiya Tajavuzi va Hukmranliga Qarshi Kurash* (Tashkent, 1998), pp. 400-430.

<sup>49</sup> *Istoria grazhdanskoy voyny u Uzbekistane*, vol.2 (Tashkent, 1970), p. 152.

<sup>50</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu, "Osman Khoja (Kocaoğlu) Between Reform Movements and Revolutions," in *Reform Movements and Revolutions in Turkistan: 1900-1924, Studies in Honour of Osman Khoja*, ed. Timur Kocaoğlu (Haarlem, 2001), pp. 31-48. This revealing study sheds light on a critical period eclipsed by Soviet historiography regarding the Reformist Movement (Jadidism) in Turkestan and the activities of one of the leading members of its political branch the Young Bukharans, namely, Osman Khodja. After Osman Khoja came to Turkey, he has adopted the last name Kocaoğlu.



of a sporadic Muslim resistance movement, the *Basmachi*.<sup>51</sup> When Alim Khan's situation became totally untenable in Turkestan, he fled to Afghanistan in February 1921 and continued to support the Basmachi movement across the border. These disunited partisan bands contested Soviet rule over Turkestan in a period during the Russian Civil War following the October Revolution, when this region was cut off from European Russia by White armies. The partisans often came from different social classes and frequently fought under different leaders for different goals. What united the traditionalist and reformist Muslims, however, was their belief that Bolshevik policies posed a grave threat to Islam and their independence. Hence, eventually even a major part of the Young Bukharans, including Osman Khoja, would become active supporters of the Basmachi resistance against Soviet domination in 1922.

When the Soviets sent Enver Pasha to Central Asia in November 1921, they had three main motives. First, Enver, an unwanted company by the Turkish nationalist leaders, would be prevented from intervening in Anatolian affairs. Second, the Soviets were planning to exploit his popularity among the Muslims in an effort to curtail the support for the Basmachi. Finally, Enver could be useful in counter-acting a possible attempt by the Afghans (with British support) to interfere in Central Asian affairs under the banner of Islam and pan-Islamic ideas. The unfolding events would soon indicate, however, that Enver had rather different motives of his own, which took their final shape during his visit to Bukhara.<sup>52</sup>

Enver's goal was to lead a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic battle in Turkestan. He dreamed that a successful struggle in Turkestan would form the base for an international pan-Turkic state with a pan-Islamic undertone. Although he had received some news about the developments in this region through the Muslim delegates he met during the Baku Congress, he had very scarce knowledge about Central Asian realities. In his memoirs, the prominent Bashkir leader Zeki Velidi Togan states that during their secret meetings in Bukhara, he realized that Enver was "an idealist out of touch with real life and incidents. He has not read any of the European or Russian publications concerning the geography or statistics of Turkestan. Without any doubt he decided on what he was going to do in Turkestan

<sup>51</sup> In Richard Pipes, *Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism (1917-1923)* (Cambridge, 1954), p. 178, there is a discussion on the obscure origins of the word *Basmachi*. Pipes states that Zeki Velidi Togan traces the word from 'basmak' meaning "to press" and *basmachi* being "the oppressed." According to Hosking, the term *basmachi* (brigands) was fastened on the various guerrilla groups by their opponents, while they referred to themselves as "freemen." Geoffrey Hosking, *The First Socialist Society*, p. 113. For a comprehensive account of the awakening of national consciousness among the various Turkic Peoples of Russia and different resistance movements, see Nadir Devlet, *Rusya Türkleri'nin Milli Mücadele Tarihi (1905-1917)*, (Ankara, 1985).

<sup>52</sup> Timur Kocaoğlu, "Osman Khoja (Kocaoğlu) Between Reform Movements and Revolutions," in *Reform Movements and Revolutions in Turkistan: 1900-1924*, p. 40.



during his stay in Bukhara."<sup>53</sup> The distorted information, most of which Enver received from Hacı Sami, sounded very tantalizing. Hacı Sami claimed, "In 1916, as a simple and unassuming Turk I raised all of Kirgizistan against the Russians. Given your [Enver Pasha's] great fame and popularity nothing can stand in our way in Turkestan."<sup>54</sup>

In addition to his pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideals, there were significant (and frequently overlooked) practical considerations shaping Enver's decision to abandon his communist allies. Ever since it had become evident that Enver could no longer play an important role in Anatolia, his relations with the Soviets had grown more ambivalent. There was also an increasing degree of mutual distrust. Enver was very alarmed when the Bolsheviks did not allow Cemal Pasha to visit Bukhara upon his return from Afghanistan to meet him. When he asked the Russian Consul Jurinev about the date of Cemal's return to Afghanistan, Jurinev replied, "The return of Cemal Pasha to these areas? Forget about it. We are also well aware of the kinds of activities you are engaged in here."<sup>55</sup> Togan argues that Enver perceived this bold remark as an outright threat and was considering that the Russians would eventually kill both Cemal Pasha and himself.<sup>56</sup>

Togan warned Enver numerous times during their secret meetings, about the problems associated with his decision to join the Basmachis, cautioning against any overt collaboration with them and the traditionally minded ex-Emir. Togan also opposed the idea of a direct military confrontation with the Bolsheviks and advised Enver to assist the movement from Afghanistan.<sup>57</sup> In this period, Enver briefly considered returning to Berlin via Moscow to rejoin his beloved wife Naciye Sultan,<sup>58</sup> but even his love for her and the birth of their youngest son were not enough to make him leave the battlefields. In the end, Enver's Central Asian dreams and idealistic motives prevailed. Only twenty-three days after his arrival in Bukhara, Enver used the pretext of going on a "hunting expedition" to defect to the Basmachis.

After Enver's defection, there was a radical change in how the Soviets depicted him. They blamed their unloyal partner as "an adventurer, to whom Turkey and afterwards Bukhara were indebted for some of the most tragic and bloody pages of their history."<sup>59</sup> The Soviets claimed, "That adventurer, not staying idle for a

<sup>53</sup> Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar: Türkistan ve Diğer Müslüman Dostu Türkleri'nin Milli Varlık ve Kültür Mücadeleleri* (İstanbul, 1969), p. 392. Zeki Velidi Togan was a well-known and highly respected figure in Turanian circles and played a leading role in the Bashkirian struggle for independence.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 390. These claims of Hacı Sami were of course greatly exaggerated.

<sup>55</sup> Aydemir, vol. 3, p. 633.

<sup>56</sup> Togan, *Hatıralar*, p. 391.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 387-389.

<sup>58</sup> Arı Inan, ed., *Enver Paşa'nın Özel Mektupları*, (Ankara, 1997). This book is a collection of the private letters of Enver Pasha written to his wife Naciye Sultan and Halil Pasha. The frequent letters of Enver Pasha (written almost on a daily basis) to Naciye Sultan usually have a very romantic and emotional tone.

<sup>59</sup> Soloveichik, "Revoliutsionnaia Bukhara" *Novyi Vostok*, no. 22, (1922), p. 281.

moment, while the better sons of Turkey were fighting for the freedom of their motherland, arrived in Bukhara as a visitor and decided to take advantage of the difficult situation and laid his blood-stained hands on the Bukharan Revolution."<sup>60</sup> In fact, this Ottoman warrior, unwanted in Anatolia, was seeking a new home that could form the base for his future glory.

The initial response of the Basmachis to Enver Pasha was far from cordial. Enver sent word to the fugitive Emir in Afghanistan that he was willing to fight on his side and set out to meet with İbrahim Laqay, a loyal supporter of Alim Khan and one of the major leaders of the Basmachi movement in Turkestan in the ex-Emir's absence. When Enver and his companions entered Laqay tribal territory under İbrahim's control, they were immediately disarmed, for they were distrusted as previous Bolsheviks. In the following three months, Enver reported that he was a virtual prisoner in the hands of İbrahim in numerous letters scribbled on tiny pieces of paper that Enver sent to his wife.<sup>61</sup> Gaining a better understanding of the movement into which he had rushed with very little knowledge, Enver became aware of the bigotry of many of the Basmachi bands. He wrote in despair to his wife: "After the morning prayer in Göktaş, I cried while burning the photographs of you and our children. The people of this area are extremely conservative. There is constant propaganda against me. In order to destroy everything that would get a reaction from these bigots, I also had to burn the books that I had with me...."<sup>62</sup> Humiliated and robbed not only of his belongings but also of his dreams, Enver acknowledged that it was a big illusion for a foreigner like him to think that he could accomplish something with these people.<sup>63</sup> İbrahim Bey released Enver after receiving a letter from Alim Khan granting Enver the title of "ghazi" and ordering that Enver should be allowed to fight for the cause of Islam as the son-in-law of the former Sultan-Caliph.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the intervention of Osman Khoja was another important factor expediting Enver's release.<sup>65</sup> Now Enver was ready to fight.

As the paths of Enver and the Soviets were diverging, relations between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks were rapidly improving.<sup>66</sup> In September 1921, Mustafa Kemal ordered the allocation of forty percent of the production in the Black Sea region for the famine-struck Soviet Union as a gesture of Turkish support and goodwill.<sup>67</sup> Following the Turkish victory at Sakarya, the Soviets resumed providing

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 283.

<sup>61</sup> Aydemir, vol. 3, p. 641-658.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 652.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 658.

<sup>64</sup> Said Alim Khan, *La Voix de la Boukharie Opprimée*, (Paris, 1929), pp. 36-37.

<sup>65</sup> "Bukhara'nın İlk ve Son Cumhurbaşkanı Osman Hoca Anlatıyor: Enver Paşa'yı Nasıl Kurtardım," *Yakın Tarihimiz*, vol. 1, pp. 403-405.

<sup>66</sup> Rumbold to Curzon, January 24, 1922, no.95, Foreign Office Confidential Print (E 1107/27/44), vol.3, p. 36.

<sup>67</sup> Mustafa Kemal to Turkish Embassy in Moscow (letter to be presented to Chicherin), 3 Sept. 1921, no. 2705, in Turkish Ministry of Culture (ed.), *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası: Milli Mücadele Dönemine Ait 100 Belge (1919-1923)*, vol.1, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), p. 353.



the Turks with financial aid, some arms, and ammunition. Although the Soviets never acknowledged it, Osman Khoja has argued that the funds for this Soviet assistance had actually been provided through financial support from the Young Bukharan government in Turkestan, which, in turn, was very supportive of the nationalist struggle in Anatolia.<sup>68</sup> On 19 December 1921, General Frunze, the Commander of the Ukrainian Red Army and a member of the executive committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine, visited Ankara to sign a treaty of friendship between the Turkish nationalists and his government.<sup>69</sup> This was the same General Frunze who had led the Red Army into Turkestan and overthrown the Emir of Bukhara in collaboration with the Young Bukharans. On another occasion, while Enver was fighting against the Bolsheviks in Eastern Bukhara during the early days of March 1922, Comrade Aralov, the new Russian Ambassador in Anatolia, was praising the strong bond of friendship between Ankara and Moscow.<sup>70</sup> Despite a certain degree of suspicion and mistrust, through their international isolation and respective struggles the bonds between the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks grew stronger. In contrast, by this time Enver's ties with Moscow were completely severed.

The day after his release, Enver addressed a declaration, to the fighters of Bukhara and Turkestan, asking the separate Basmachi bands to unite against Moscow under his command.<sup>71</sup> But the Basmachi often fought under different leaders for different aims. As revealed by British intelligence reports,

It is necessary to distinguish between two classes of Basmachis in Ferghana. The genuine political Basmachis, the original Soviet rebels against Soviet rule, are represented by Sher Mohammed and his following of 5,000-6,000 men.... On the other hand, there are the purely bandit Basmachis, under such leaders as Ahmad Pahlawan (circ. 2,000 men), who terrorize the countryside. These men originally went out, like others, from hatred of the Bolsheviks, but shortage of food and other necessities was too much for them and the patriot became merged in the brigand.<sup>72</sup>

Although Enver Pasha struggled, without much success, to unite all the rebel leaders under his command, he had considerable military achievements. In this period, the Young Bukharans' leader Osman Khoja started to become wary of the oppressive Soviet policies and not only established close contacts with Enver Pasha but even employed Turkish officers who had escaped from the Russian prisoner of

<sup>68</sup> Osman Kocaoğlu, "Rus Yardımının İç Yüzü," *Yakın Tarihimiz*, vol.1, pp. 292-293; Mehmet Saray, *Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası*, (İstanbul, 1990), pp. 76-78.

<sup>69</sup> Kamuran Gürün, p.76. The Treaty of Friendship was signed on 2 Jan. 1922.

<sup>70</sup> Rumbold to Curzon, Constantinople, March 7, 1922, no. 229 (confidential), Foreign Office Confidential Print (E 2755/5/44), vol. 3, p.47.

<sup>71</sup> Mehmet Saray, "Bukhara Cumhuriyeti'nin Türkiye'ye Yardımı," in *Reform Movements and Revolutions in Turkistan: 1900-1924*, p. 345.

<sup>72</sup> PRO FO 371/ 8075 (N 10281/6/97).



war camp in Krasnoyarsk in forming the Bukharan militia that would constitute the core of the future army of the republic.<sup>73</sup> By mid-spring 1922 at the peak of their power, Enver's forces controlled all of the Eastern part of Bukhara. Growing anxious, the Soviets acknowledged,

From a military point of view, there can be only one opinion, that the large Soviet Federation ... is strong enough to destroy the enterprise of Enver Pasha.... It is not the military aspect of this affair, which makes us worry, it is more the political aspect... In effect, the past glory of Enver as man of the Muslim state can still attract crowds of ignorant *dehgans* in some remote regions today.<sup>74</sup>

The Soviet authorities consequently attempted to negotiate with their "unloyal Comrade" in April 1922, but considered Enver's response too demanding.

Enver not only refused to negotiate a truce with Moscow, but on 19 May 1922 also sent an "ultimatum" through his friend Nariman Narimanov, the chairman of the government of Soviet Azerbaijan, giving the Soviets two weeks to withdraw their troops from Turkestan.<sup>75</sup> Instead, the Soviets declared Enver an agent of the British and dispatched Red Army reinforcements to this area. Meanwhile, Enver had to struggle with a variety of additional problems, besides fighting the Russians. Basmachi bands of different ethnic origins were at times busier fighting each other than the Soviets.<sup>76</sup> There were especially deep animosities between Turkmens and Uzbeks and between Kirghiz and Uzbeks. In addition, Enver was still an "outsider" for many of the Basmachi leaders because of his pan-Islamic and Turanian ideas and history of collaboration with the Soviets. İbrahim Bey, in particular, was a constant source of trouble for Enver from the outset, and Enver had to dispatch some of his forces to fight against him in July 1922.<sup>77</sup> Of some 16,000 rebels operating in Eastern Bukhara, at most 3,000 were loyal to Enver.<sup>78</sup>

When Enver, the self-styled "Commander in Chief of all Islamic troops, son-in-law of the Caliph and the Representative of the Prophet," began issuing decrees

<sup>73</sup> Raci Çakıröz and Timur Kocaoglu, "Türkistan'da Türk Subayları (1914-1923)," *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi*, no.1-11, 1987, p. 40.

<sup>74</sup> I. Sol'ts, "Anglo-Envreskaia avantiura i osvobozhdenie narodov vostoka" (The British-Enver Venture and the Liberation of the Peoples of the East), *Kommunist* (Apr.-May 1922), p.8 quoted in De Lageard, Helene Aymen. "The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals (1920-1922)" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No.3 (1987), p. 8. De Lageard presents a comprehensive study of three journals published by the Red Army in Tashkent for the period 1920-1922, which corresponds to the arrival of *Turkommissiia* in Turkestan and the most effective period of the Basmachi resistance.

<sup>75</sup> Joseph Castagn, *Les Basmachis*, (Paris, 1925), pp. 49-50; Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi-II" *Central Asian Survey*, vol.6, no.2 (1987), pp. 37-38.

<sup>76</sup> Richard Pipes, p. 257.

<sup>77</sup> Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi-I" *Central Asian Survey*, vol.6, no.1 (1987), p. 61.

<sup>78</sup> K. Vasilevskii, "Fazy Basmacheskovo dvizheniia v Srednei Azii" *Novyi Vostok*, no.29 (1930), p. 134.

on civil life in Bukhara, the ex-Emir became uneasy and started to withhold his support. Hoping to receive significant military assistance via Afghanistan, Enver was to be deeply disappointed. Enver desperately attempted to produce his own ammunition at Baysun, but the results were discouraging.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, Enver often engaged in open battles against the Soviets in the style of his days in the Ottoman army, as opposed to using guerrilla tactics in which the Basmachis were more experienced. Consequently, Enver's already weak forces rapidly started to diminish. Although brief successes were increasingly followed by defeats and heavy losses, Enver did not give up fighting until he was killed by machine-gun fire while leading a cavalry countercharge against a superior Russian force on 4 August 1922.<sup>80</sup>

The news regarding Enver's death combined myth and reality. According to many accounts, he lived much longer than he actually did. The Turkestan Committee deliberately tried to keep Enver's death a secret. Hacı Sami sent a secret messenger to Togan informing him of Enver's death and arguing that "the Committee must give out that Enver was not dead; simply that he had disappeared. This was necessary in order to keep the movement going; if it were known that Enver were dead it would collapse altogether."<sup>81</sup> Initially, the Red Army troops did not realize that they had killed Enver. His death was not announced until 11 October in *Pravda*, and many papers in Turkestan continued to report various deeds attributed to Enver.<sup>82</sup> Because even some Russians believed that they could gain by keeping Enver alive, on 29 October, the Communist journal *Siren*, published in Turkestan, claimed that peace finally had been established between Enver and the Russians.<sup>83</sup> In September, already a month after his death, many people in Ferghana still had believed that Enver would emerge from hiding somewhere in Bukhara "if only further assistance is given him, to raise all Turkestan against the Bolsheviks."<sup>84</sup> As late as November 1922, the Meshed Intelligence reports sent to the British Foreign Office were full of news regarding rebel activity under Enver's leadership. Yet there were also some signs of doubt concerning the reliability of this information.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Glenda Fraser, "Enver Pasha's Bid for Turkestan, 1920-1922," *Canadian Journal of History*, vol. 22 (1988), p. 207.

<sup>80</sup> For a detailed account of Enver's death, see S. Aydemir, vol. III, p. 683-686; and E. Kozlovskiy, *Krasnaya Armiya v Sredeney Azii*, (Tashkent, 1928), p. 37. In his book published by the Turkish Historical Association, Baymirza Hayit, however, gives the date of Enver's death as August 5, 2002. Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadeleleri Tarihi*, (Ankara, 1995), p. 283.

<sup>81</sup> India Office 1920/73, Statement by Qadir, autumn 1923, quoted in Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi-I" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.6, No.1 (1987), p. 61.

<sup>82</sup> *Pravda Turkestana* was one of the sources that reported Enver's death relatively early, on 15 Aug. 1922.

<sup>83</sup> India Office Library, IS Meshed, 20 Nov. 1922, quoted in Fraser, "Enver Pasha's Bid for Turkestan, 1920-1922," p. 211.

<sup>84</sup> PRO FO 371/ 8075 (N 10281/6/97).

<sup>85</sup> Meshed Intelligence Diary, India Office, 25 Nov. 1922, no. P 4635 (confidential) FO 371/ 8080 (N 10497/173/97). Part of the reason that the information about Enver's death arrived at



By the end of October, Afghan papers were publishing alleged eyewitness accounts of Enver's death. *İttihad-ı İslam* of Mezar-ı Sharif reported that Enver had sent most of his forces to their homes for the religious celebration of 'Id-ul-Zuha. On 3 August, the eve of the 'Id, he told his followers that he had dreamt that he would die as a martyr. According to this account,

Next day, after the 'Id prayers, the few remaining troops went off to join the general feasting and a party of Russians surrounded the camp at Baljiwan and rushed it. Enver is said to have put up a gallant resistance and routed one party of Russians with the few followers who hurriedly came to his assistance, but was then hit three times and fell. His body was recovered and buried with all honour.<sup>86</sup>

In the Afghan, Basmachi, and Turkish depictions of Enver's last battle, his heroism and martyrdom have been at the forefront.<sup>87</sup>

After Enver's death the Basmachi resistance did not withstand the Soviet strategy of combining repression with a degree of appeasement (particularly on sensitive religious issues). The Soviets withdrew their support from the Islamic reformists, whose insistence on independence had made them quite a nuisance for the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the Soviets restored *waqf* land to mosques and reopened Koranic schools and Shari'a courts. Consequently, during the second half of 1922, popular support for the resistance movement sharply declined. Deprived of mass support, Basmachis were reduced to dispersed bands confined to mountainous areas. The resistance movement, however, would emerge once again during the Stalin era as a reaction to the compulsory collectivization of agriculture.<sup>88</sup>

While Enver was leaving Bukhara to join the Basmachi movement, he had said, "It is necessary to struggle for Turkestan. If you are afraid of the death that you deserve, you are doomed to live like a dog. You would be cursed by the past and future generations. However, if we are ready to die for independence, we can provide those who are following us with free and happy lives."<sup>89</sup> Although he failed to realize his dreams in Turkestan, Enver Pasha at least managed to achieve this last wish, to die on the battlefield just as had the Ottoman Empire.

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the Foreign Office so late was the long delay in the transmission of the copies of the Meshed Intelligence Diaries.

<sup>86</sup> North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary, India Office, 1 Dec. 1922, no. P 4716 (confidential) PRO FO 371/8080 (N 10675/173/97). This report transmits a copy of diary no. 40 for the week ending 19 Oct. 1922. But as it is revealed by the dates, the British Foreign Office received the news of Enver's death as late as December.

<sup>87</sup> "Enver Paşa'nın Şehadeti," *Tevhid-i Efkar*, 11 Teşrinisani, 1923, pp. 1-2.

<sup>88</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, *The First Socialist Society*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>89</sup> Muhittin Bey, *Vakit*, 11.25.1923, quoted in Togan, p. 395.

## Conclusion

There are few people in Turkish history whose rise and fall have been as influential and dramatic as those of Enver Pasha.<sup>90</sup> When the Ottoman Empire lost the First World War, he had to flee, giving up his position of military and political leadership. Although Enver left his country, he definitely did not leave the political scene. Consequently, Enver's émigré years provide significant insight into the formative stage of Turco-Soviet relations. Enver also presented a challenge to Mustafa Kemal's leadership of the nationalist struggle, which was mostly shaped around Unionist organizations and initiatives. Enver's close ties with the former Unionists in Anatolia and with the Bolsheviks abroad enhanced his determination to gain the leadership of the nationalist struggle. He would be forced to abandon this goal, however, after Mustafa Kemal's decisive victory against the Greeks in Sakarya.

The collaboration between the Bolsheviks and a group of émigré Unionists led by Enver did not last long. The shift of Soviet support to the Kemalists in Anatolia and Soviet designs for establishing control over Central Asia sealed the end of Enver's honeymoon with the Bolsheviks and inspired Enver to fight on the side of the anti-Soviet Basmachi resistance in Central Asia. During this last phase of Enver's life, his pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas gained ascendancy. Throughout his struggle in Central Asia, he strove to rally the support of the masses to his pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideals. He tried to achieve this goal by leading an indigenous struggle against Moscow with limited resources and even less insight.

Enver's quest in Central Asia was laden with a number of problems from the outset. First, Enver had very limited insight regarding the realities of Turkestan and the Basmachi movement. Second, Enver tried to impose his pan-Islamic and Turanian ideals on an indigenous movement, which wanted nothing to do with them. The Basmachis had neither the intention nor the power to serve as a springboard for the formation of a pan-Islamic empire. As for pan-Turkic ideals, "The people knew little, and cared less, about Osmanlı dreams of Central Asian hegemony, if such existed; certainly Pan-Turanism did not figure in the Basmachi programme, whether inspired by Enver or not."<sup>91</sup> They were merely fighting against the oppressive policies of the Russians. Finally, Enver could not evaluate his capabilities and limits realistically. His unwise handling of the ex-Emir, his ultimatum to Moscow, and his frequent engagement in open warfare rather than partisan resistance were just a few examples of this deficiency.

In assessing Enver's activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it is essential to situate him within a historical context. While Enver and his colleagues were

<sup>90</sup> For a firsthand account of the early years and rapid rise of Enver, see Enver Paşa, *Enver Paşa'nın Anıları (1881-1908)*, ed. Halil Erdoğan Cengiz (İstanbul, 1991); Şükrü Hanioglu, *Kendi Mektuplarında Enver Paşa* (İstanbul, 1989).

<sup>91</sup> *Extracts from Despatch no.101 of 14 Sept. 1922, from acting British Consul General, Kashgar, to Government of India.* (Communicated to Foreign Office, Nov. 16) India Office, 16 Nov. 1922, no. P 4536 (confidential), PRO FO 371/ 8075 (N 10281/6/97).



traumatized by the rapid disintegration and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian revolution created new opportunities and challenges for them in the East. Not only Enver, but also a number of his contemporaries, perceived the rising communist power and the prevailing revolutionary atmosphere as an invaluable opportunity to counterbalance the challenge of the West. An evaluation of their initial rapprochement with the Soviets and their subsequent promotion of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas should take these drastic changes in the international scene into account. Enver's émigré years were the final chapter of a life of perpetual battle in pursuit of elusive glory during a period of uncertainty and radical change.

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