An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Paşa as an Expatriate

ŞUHNAZ YILMAZ

There are few characters in Turkish history whose rise and fall have been as rapid and as dramatic as those of Enver Paşa. Starting out as an unknown graduate of the Imperial War College, he was only in his mid-twenties when he became the 'hero of freedom' after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Thus started his meteoric rise from the ranks of a lieutenant-colonel to a virtual dictator during the rule of the Triumvirate in 1913. Within a year, when he married an Ottoman princess, he also joined the royal family as the son-in-law of the Sultan. Rapidly achieving the power and titles he sought, Enver became the Minister of War as battle clouds were gathering over Europe. Hence, at the outset of the First World War, he emerged as one of the most important Ottoman political and military leaders who determined the fate of a crumbling empire, which in return shaped his own destiny.

The fall and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the War also meant the beginning of the end for Enver. He was forced not only to give up his political and military position, but also to leave the country. His expatriate years were marked by his persistent efforts to redeem himself, by attempting to resume a leading role first in the nationalist struggle in Anatolia and, failing to achieve that, in the Basmachi movement in Central Asia. In the end he died on the battlefield at the age of 41 trying to lead an indigenous movement of which he had rather limited control and insight. This was the last ring in the life-chain of an Ottoman warrior fighting to restore the glory of a diminishing Empire.

Enver Paşa has also been one of the most controversial figures in Turkish history. He was first glorified as the 'hero of freedom', but was then demonized for his deeds during the rule of the Triumvirate and was blamed as a key actor in dragging the Ottoman Empire into the First World War alongside the Central Powers. Moreover, the last phase of Enver’s life (1918–22), starting with his flight after the Mudros Armistice, has been eclipsed for a long time by the ‘orthodox’ Turkish historical interpretation of this period. The underlying reasons for this perspective could be found in the perceived threat of potential competition by the former Unionists for
political leadership in general, and the personal rivalry between Enver and Mustafa Kemal in particular. Thus, the activities of the Unionist émigrés and especially those of Enver have barely been mentioned and often discarded as mere 'adventurism'. Only recently, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of contacts with the Turkic Republics of Central Asia, Enver Paşa is receiving more attention because of the 'pan-Turkic' and 'pan-Islamic' ideas he promoted during the last years of his life.

This essay presents a study of Enver Paşa by evaluating his rapid rise and the period during which he was in power as one of the most influential figures who shaped the last decade of Ottoman history. However, the major emphasis of this work is on Enver's often neglected activities during his émigré years. The study of this later period, starting with Enver's expatriation in 1918 and ending with his death in Central Asia in 1922, is crucial for understanding Enver's important role in the initial stage of Turco-Soviet relations, his attempts to regain power in Anatolia, and the motives for and the results of his joining the Basmachi resistance.

Enver was born in Istanbul on 22 November 1881. His family was originally from Monastir and their ancestry can be traced back to the 'Gagavuz Turks'. The family moved back to Monastir when Enver was a boy in primary school. He completed his secondary schooling there, after which he headed once again to Istanbul in order to enter the Imperial War College (Mekteb-i Harbiye-i Şâhâne). In the military academy, he completed both the regular officers' training and the advanced general staff courses and he graduated second in his class on 5 December 1902.

As a young general staff captain, he was now ready to assume his first military post in the Third Army in Macedonia. He worked for three years in the military operations against Macedonian bands fighting against the Ottoman rule. These operations, which were simply called 'brigand chase' (eskiya takibi), entailed much more than following and fighting with random brigands, since these groups were actually well-organized and well-equipped Serbian, Macedo-Bulgarian, Greek and sometimes even Albanian nationalists who often received support from the small Balkan governments. At this post, Enver Paşa performed outstandingly, taking part in one successful chase after another. In the meantime, he was becoming increasingly aware of the existence and the strength of the nationalist movements in the Balkans, which he perceived to be more of a reaction to the despotic rule of Abdülhamid II and the corruption of the Ottoman state, rather than a manifestation of nationalism per se.

In September 1906 Enver was promoted to the rank of major in the Third Army headquarters in Monastir, where he would serve until his rebellious
flight to the Macedonian hills in 1908. The most significant impact of this period in Monastir was that Enver became acquainted with and joined the Committee of Progress and Union (CPU), the conspiratorial nucleus of the Young Turks, and helped to spread its activities with his strong organizational skills. The members of this secret organization were ready to defend the Empire. Before doing that, however, they demanded the restoration of parliament and the constitution of 1876 which would limit the absolute powers of the Sultan.

Rumours about the activities of the Committee of Progress and Union disturbed the Sultan greatly and an inspection committee was sent to inquire into the situation. As the Sultan’s agents assiduously worked in Macedonia, denunciations of the committee members and assassinations of the Sultan’s agents and officials working against the CPU took place. After the assassination attempt on Nazım Bey, Enver knew he would soon be under suspicion for being among the group of conspirators, so he refused to accept a reassignment to Istanbul. Instead, in June 1908, he escaped with a group of followers to the Macedonian hills, where he joined an adjunct-major, Ahmet Niyazi, and his men. This action, which served as the prelude to the Young Turk revolution of July 1908, was also in line with the CPU decision ‘to come out in the open in an effort at self-preservation’ in response to the constant threat of exposure by the Sultan’s agents. The initial attempts of Abdulhamit II to suppress the insurrection failed when Şemsi Paşa, who was in charge of government troops, was assassinated in Monastir on 7 July. There was strong public support for the CPU which demanded a constitutional government. In addition to this issue, one of the major tools used by CPU for instigating popular support was the appeal to nationalistic ideas. The rumours about a secret decision of the Russian Tsar and the British King to end Ottoman rule in Macedonia, and appeals to the Albanians by Firzovik to unite against an imminent Austrian attack to protect their religion and fatherland, proved quite successful in mobilizing the people. Finally, the Sultan yielded and restored the constitution that had been suspended in 1877. With the restoration of the constitution and parliament, brotherhood among all Ottomans, regardless of religion and race, was stressed, and the Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious leaders celebrated the declaration of the constitutional government together. Hence the Second Constitutional Period (which would last until 1918) began, and Enver was widely acclaimed as the ‘hero of liberty and revolution’.

This incident proved to be a turning point in Enver’s life, the first step on his rapid rise in less than a decade from his rank as major to the rank of Paşa and Minister of War, eventually leading the Ottoman Empire into the First World War. When Atatürk was asked when his birthday was, he responded that it was 19 May 1919, the day he reached Samsun and started
the Turkish War of Independence. If Enver had had a chance to choose a birthday for himself, it would probably have been 23 July 1908, the day when he became the ‘hero of freedom’ and claimed to have saved ‘the sick man’ of Europe.10

Owing to his significant role in the restoration of the constitution, Enver’s fame kept increasing: his pictures appeared everywhere, babies were named after him11 and even his moustache style known as ‘Enver bıyığı’ became very fashionable. People had very high hopes for the Young Turk victory and the era of impending change. However, the honeymoon with the Young Turks would not last long, for history would witness the emergence of the very ‘hero of freedom’ as a leading autocrat during the rule of the Triumvirate.

In 1909, Enver was sent as a military attaché to Berlin, where he established personal contacts with some German academics, journalists, high level government officials and even the Kaiser himself. This period was also significant in that it was during Enver’s posting in Berlin that the seeds of his lifelong admiration for German culture and military power took root.12 His adoration of things German is clearly reflected in a postcard which he sent to his sister Hasene Hanım from Germany: ‘Yesterday I watched the parade of one of the German army corps with 33,000 soldiers marching. It is so excellent that it makes one’s mouth water.’13

During April 1909, Enver made a brief return to Istanbul, in order to join the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) in the suppression of a conservative counter-revolution15 against the constitutional government. This incident consolidated the position of the CUP, dethroned Abdülhamit II, and brought about his replacement by his brother Mehmet V. Real power was concentrated in the hands of the CUP leaders with Enver being among them. It is also noteworthy that starting with the period after the revolution of 1908 and the suppression of the counter-revolution, Enver (together with Cemal Bey) would play an increasingly important role in army–Committee relations.15

The next place where Enver would greatly increase his fame and prestige was Tripoli of Barbary. In the autumn of 1911 Enver volunteered for service in the Libyan War against the Italians, where he successfully organized Arab tribes in resistance and fought with distinction. Consequently, he earned a double promotion to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel. The defence of Benghazi (Cyrenaica) enabled Enver greatly to utilize his organizational skills by forming effective defensive units from Arab tribes.16

A series of letters Enver wrote to the sister of Hans Humann, the German naval attaché in Istanbul, during his stay in Tripoli presents detailed
information about his life and activities in this area. The letters also reveal Enver’s complicated ideas and feelings towards Europe. On the one hand he felt disgusted with European tactics aimed at dismembering the Ottoman Empire, while on the other hand he appreciated and admired European culture. He wrote in one of his letters, ‘your civilization is a poison, but a poison that awakens people’. Just like the story of Goethe’s Faust that Enver was reading on his way to Benghazi, in which Doctor Faust bet against the devil, Enver perceived himself to be in a struggle against all the Great Powers. Enver’s remark in response to an article in a European newspaper is a good indicator of his approach to the issue and how he took all the developments so personally: ‘the Italians are furious with me’. As stressed by Haley, ‘In his mind, the entire conflict was between his own person and various scheming European nations, not between Italy and the Arab tribes, not even between the Ottoman state and the Europeans. He had been personally dispatched to right the situation.’

As Enver’s frustration with the lack of supplies and money grew worse, so did his expression of disgust at the European powers, especially at the Italians and the British. After a while, he stopped reading European newspapers and built himself a ‘palace’, which S. Aydemir nicely describes as ‘an oriental general’s tent’ having neither windows nor door because of the lack of glass and wood. Adapting very well to his role as the ruler, Enver went as far as to print paper money bearing the signature of the ‘New Saviour of Tripoli of Barbary, Enver Bey’. The new currency sold so well that Enver wondered whether the Ottomans had ever got a better rate.

Enver’s aspirations, however, could not be confined to ruling a distant land of the Ottoman Empire. He sought the grandeur of a world leader. He had great admiration for Napoleon Bonaparte whose portrait would eventually decorate his office by the Bosphorus. Kemal Bey had compared Enver to Napoleon after Enver’s first public speech in 1908. ‘Unfortunately for the Ottoman army, Enver took the comparison to heart and was never able to be saved from its effects.’ Thus, when the developments in the Balkans and the outbreak of the First Balkan War shifted the attention of the Ottoman Empire from distant North Africa to this much closer threat, Enver left Benghazi to be once again at the centre of attention and to fulfil his aims for greater power.

Enver criticized severely the government’s passive policies throughout the Balkan Wars. He was especially against the plans to cede Edirne (a former capital of the Ottoman Empire which had strategic importance as well as symbolic significance for the general public), as part of the peace settlement. He condemned the influential senior bureaucrats in the
ENVER PAŞA AS AN EXPATRIATE

government for ‘signing the will of the fatherland with their shaking hands’. He was also very frustrated with the conservative and defeatist attitude of the senior commanders in the army.

On 23 January 1913, shortly after his return to Istanbul Enver led an attack by a small group of Unionist officers on the Sublime Porte. The Grand Vizier was forced to retire at gunpoint and the Minister of War was killed. The stated aim of this coup d'état, known as the ‘Sublime Porte Incident’, was an energetic resumption of the Balkan War and a halt to the loss of territory. However, the complete loss of Macedonia, most of Thrace and even Edirne would indicate how far the leaders were from achieving their aims.

The coup resulted in the establishment of a Union and Progress Party cabinet with Mahmud Şevket Paşa as the Grand Vizier. After the assassination of Mahmud Şevket on 11 June 1913, the triumvirate formed by Enver, Talat and Cemal Paşas started ruling the country. Thus, the transformation from the constitutional monarchy of 1908 to the rule of a military and partisan CUP triumvirate which would last until 1918 was completed.

Given the fact that Enver played a major role in the restoration of the constitution and the parliament in 1908 and was glorified as the ‘hero of freedom’, such a transformation might seem surprising. However, Hanioğlu points out that ‘Except for its value as a “modern” symbol and a mechanism for preventing Great Powers’ intervention, “parliament” as well as “representative” government meant little to the Young Turks ... Their stalwart adherence to Le Bon’s theories shaped their attitude toward parliament as an institution.’ Such an approach was shared by Enver Paşa and a number of influential junior officers of his generation. Thus, although this group emerged with the claims of establishing a parliamentary system as their primary goal, the underlying motives of their action seem to be determined more by a desire to limit the absolute powers of the Sultan while promoting Turkish nationalism and a more active and militaristic approach in response to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

In line with this more active and militaristic policy, during the Second Balkan War Enver led the troops which recaptured Edirne and thus greatly enhanced his power and prestige. Aware of his popularity and clearly revealing his excessive self-confidence, he wrote, 'I am as happy as a child, not because the entire Islamic world admires me, but because I am pleased with myself. I was the only person who could enter Edirne in a single night.' In the ensuing two years, Enver promoted himself again and again, resulting in his meteoric rise from the rank of a lieutenant-general to the rank of deputy commander-in-chief and the Minister of War. He further accelerated his rise in 1914 when he married an Ottoman princess, Naciye
Sultan, and became a member of the royal family and the son-in-law of the caliph. Thus, at the outset of the First World War, Enver emerged as one of the most important political and military leaders who would determine the fate of the Empire.

One of the major determinants of the outlook of the CUP in international affairs, especially after the severe Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War, was the effort to deal with the trauma of rapid and continual territorial disintegration. The commonly agreed-upon panacea was to seek a powerful European ally, though there were different shades of opinion within the CUP about who this ally should be. The perception was that any one of the European Great Powers could prevent further encroachments on the Ottoman territories by Russian attacks, as well as by powers of lesser strength which were seen as especially dangerous, such as Italy and Greece. Consequently, different members of the CUP made desperate attempts to approach all the Great Powers of Europe and even Russia in search of an ally.

In the meantime, war was brewing in Europe. When the efforts of Cemal Paşa in Paris and Talât Paşa in Bucharest, and the appeals to Britain, proved fruitless in securing an alliance for the Ottomans, Enver approached the German ambassador, Freiherr Hans von Wangenheim, for a secret alliance. The negotiations, which resulted in a defensive alliance against Russia on 2 August 1914, were conducted mainly by Enver Paşa himself, who informed only a few of the other CUP members about them. During the first days of August, in fact, many of the cabinet ministers were still totally unaware that a secret alliance had been made with Germany. Moreover, even those involved in the negotiations with Germany, except for Enver, seemed to be having second thoughts about the suitability of rapid intervention.

Enver Paşa was strongly in favour of Ottoman participation in the Great War and worked assiduously to accomplish it. He was greatly inspired by German military success against the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg and anticipated joining the camp of the victors as soon as possible. He thought that otherwise the Germans would win the war without Ottoman help and it would be too late to get a share of the pie. His policies, initially shaped by the fear of Russian expansionism, were gradually being replaced by the expectations of Ottoman victory which would put an end to the territorial disintegration and the long existing Russian threat.

In the events leading to the Ottoman entry into the First World War Enver emerged as a very important actor. Especially in the extremely crucial period during which the two German cruisers, *Goeben* and *Breslau*, fleeing from the Royal Navy were permitted to enter into the Straits through a fictitious purchase by the Ottomans and ended up bombarding Russian
ports. During this period marking the end of Ottoman neutrality, he played a key role in shaping the developments through his mostly secret contacts with the Germans.33 Hence he led the Ottoman Empire to fight its last great war with dreams of glory, resulting, however, in the death of the ‘sick man’ of Europe on the battlefield.

During the course of the First World War, with the aim of encircling and destroying the Russian forces by a surprise offensive, Enver took personal command of the Third Army on the Russian Front during December 1914. He thought such a victory would greatly increase his power and fame, while opening the way for more conquests in the east. Liman von Sanders wrote in his memoirs, ‘Before Enver left for the Caucasus while he was explaining me his plans, at the end of our discussion he told me about his magnificent, but rather strange ideas. After the Caucasus, he was intending to go on to (the conquest of) India and Afghanistan.’34 The offensive was also encouraged by the Germans who did not share Enver’s overwhelming optimism, but nevertheless wanted to divert the attention of the Russians from the Polish front as soon as possible.

The military campaign in the Sari Kamış region turned out to be a disaster, because Enver failed to take the terrain and the weather conditions into consideration. Far from fulfilling the initial plan of encirclement of the Russian forces, most of the Third Army was destroyed through cold and hunger even before reaching the battlefield. Out of 90,000 soldiers, the estimated casualties were around 80,000.35 After this incident, Enver returned to Istanbul and tried unsuccessfully to cover up the extent of the disaster. Armenians served as a convenient scapegoat for this purpose. In response to the ensuing Russian offensive in spring, the efforts of Enver and other the CUP leaders to undermine the Armenian support for the Russians by deporting them out of the war zone to Syria also proved to be disastrous. The deportations were marked by cold, illness and massacres, and most of the Armenian population of this region perished.36

Although there were some important military successes in the following years, notably the victory in Gallipoli owing to the brilliant skills of Mustafa Kemal as a military tactician and the advances in the Caucasus front after the collapse of the Russian Empire, by the autumn of 1918 the military situation became untenable. On 14 October 1918, the Grand Vizier Talat Paşa resigned with his Unionist cabinet in order to facilitate the armistice negotiations. Immediately after the signing of the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918, in response to their constantly deteriorating situation, on 2 November, Enver, Talat, Cemal and other leading Unionists left Istanbul aboard a German submarine, going to Odessa from where they went to Berlin. In the meantime, in Istanbul the court-martial proceedings resulted in death sentences in absentia for the fugitive CUP leaders including Enver.
When the CUP leaders left Istanbul, reflecting on their future Talat Paşa concluded, 'Our political life is over'.7 The flight of the triumvirs, however, by no means meant an end to their political activities. Enver's intentions, in particular, were far removed from the idea of withdrawing to a quiet corner leaving the political and the military arena. He viewed the situation only as a temporary setback: a tactical retreat to resume fighting after gathering some strength.

In the last meeting of the CUP members before their departure, Enver clearly revealed his determination to fight what he perceived as 'the second phase of the war'. He optimistically reminded his colleagues, 'Don't forget, in the past we won the Balkan War in its second phase.'38 Enver initially intended to leave directly for the Caucasus, which was to be his new base to lead an anti-Entente struggle. He wrote, 'The last developments are evident. We lost the war. In accordance with the Armistice, the British will be coming to Istanbul. Rather than seeing the British in Istanbul like this, I am determined to go to the Caucasus to serve Islam.'39 It was not coincidental that Enver Paşa specifically wanted to start the struggle from the Caucasus. Before the surrender in 1918 he had already assembled a considerable military force there, which he had placed under the control of his brother Nuri and uncle Halil Paşa.40

Owing to an illness and the failure to reach the Caucasus in a taka (small sailing boat) which was wrecked off the shore in a storm, he had to postpone his plans. Moreover, upon the news that the military unit in the Caucasus had been disbanded and his relatives in command arrested,41 he decided to join the other CUP leaders in Europe. He thus set off for Germany.

During the winter of 1918–19, which Enver spent in Berlin, he tried to contact the British agents there for a settlement.42 When he realized that nothing would come of these contacts, he turned his attention once again to the East. His most important activity during this period was to visit the Bolshevik Comintern Secretary Karl Radek in prison and to propose to him a Muslim-Soviet alliance against the British. In the meantime, his numerous efforts to reach Russia were marked by a series of catastrophes. Enver later wrote to Mustafa Kemal, 'With the realization that the aid for Anatolia would be provided only by the Russians, I agreed with the people here [meaning the CUP leaders in Germany] to leave for Russia accompanied by Baha Bey. However, during the course of one year, I was detained twice and spent five months in prison. I survived six plane crashes.'43

Enver Paşa finally arrived in Moscow in early 1920. He was politically very active during his stay in the Bolshevik capital. He established contacts with the Soviet Foreign Office and with Lenin. At the same time, he was in touch with the Turkish Nationalist delegation visiting Moscow, which was headed by Bekir Sami.44 During this period, Enver emerges as an important
ENVER PAŞA AS AN EXPATRIATE

intermediary in establishing the initial contacts among the nationalists in Anatolia and the Soviets.

Although the Ankara government’s plenipotentiaries initialled a friendship treaty with the Soviets, the diplomatic bargaining for financial and military aid was deadlocked owing to Soviet demands for the cession of Van and Mush districts to Armenia.43 Taking advantage of these developments, Enver got involved in the diplomatic parley. According to the final decision reached during the negotiations, the Soviets agreed to provide the Turkish mission with a substantial amount of weapons and ammunition.44 The extent of Enver’s contribution during the negotiations is unknown. However, after this meeting Enver flattered himself that the successful conclusion of the negotiations was due mostly to his timely intervention. Enver had also written to Mustafa Kemal enthusiastically informing him about his meeting with Chicherin accompanying the plenipotentiaries from Ankara, and his participation to the preliminary meetings among the Turkish diplomats.45 Mustafa Kemal’s response to this letter was not matched with a similar degree of enthusiasm with respect to Enver’s activities. He was rather sceptical about Enver’s intentions of acting as an intermediary and trying to present himself as a genuine representative of Turkey. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal feared that overemphasis on pan-Islamism by Enver might alienate the Bolsheviks against the nationalist struggle in Anatolia. His conviction was that the anti-British aspect of the Turco-Soviet alliance should be emphasized. Thus he wrote to Enver Paşa that in order not to arouse Soviet suspicion and apprehensions, it was necessary to present their aims and activities as a struggle for independence and maintenance of survival against British oppression, ‘which tries to lower all the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of the East to the level of farm animals’.46 He stressed once again that Enver should refrain from over-emphasizing pan-Islamism.47

The Soviets, however, rather than being apprehensive of Enver’s pan-Islamic intentions, thought that his prestige in the Islamic world could be manipulated in two ways: (i) to provide the unity and the support of the Islamic domains under Soviet rule in particular;48 (ii) and to provoke resistance against the British yoke in the Islamic world in general.49 Thus, with the encouragement of the Soviet authorities, Enver proclaimed the formation of a ‘Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies’ (İslam Cemiyetleri İttifakı) which was intended to be a Muslim Revolutionary international. In addition to this party, its Turkish affiliate ‘People’s Council’s Party’ (Halk Şurası Fırkası) was also established.50 The Young Turk émigrés even envisaged a division of labour among themselves in promoting anti-imperialist revolutionary movements in different areas of the Muslim world: Enver Paşa was to be in charge of Turkestan, Kemal Paşa...
of Afghanistan and India, and Halil Paşa of Iran.53

Between 1 and 9 September 1920, Enver attended the Soviet-sponsored 'Congress of the Peoples of the East' in Baku. His participation was separate from the Kemalist Turkish delegation. He had the status of a special guest with the title of the representative of 'the Union of the Revolutionary Organizations of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia, and India'. Apparently, this title was created to depict Enver's ties with various Muslim leaders of the local movements, which actually did not go much beyond having conversations with them in Berlin. Enver Paşa's speech during the Baku Congress was a juxtaposition of Bolshevik terminology with Unionist ideas, emphasizing their common anti-Imperialist and anti-British struggle. In his speech, Enver made extensive use of Bolshevik jargon, frequently using expressions such as 'oppressed peoples', 'national self-determination', and 'struggle against capitalism and imperialism'.54 He also tried to justify the Ottoman entry into the First World War on the side of imperial Germany, arguing that when compared with the British and the Russian Empires, Germany was a lesser evil which at least accepted the Ottoman Empire's 'right to survival'. He claimed that he had always fought against imperialists and never pursued a goal other than preserving his state's independence.55

It was rather difficult, however, for the other members of the Conference to accept these arguments at face value. Moreover, there were not many incidents in the Unionist record which revealed them as the champions of oppressed nations or the proletariat.56 Enver's important role in the Ottoman entry into the First World War on the side of the Germans and in the decision for the Armenian deportations and massacres aroused further suspicions as to the sincerity of his remarks. Yamauchi points out that 'At the Baku Congress, Enver was mistrusted by the majority of the communist deputies, especially those who were principally composed of non-Muslims, and they undoubtedly did not offer him a platform for further political ventures. It appears that the objects of his Bolshevik sponsors, Zinoviev and Radek, were entirely defeated.'57

A great degree of confusion and chaos dominated the Congress. As a British agent reported:58

The majority of the 1,500 delegates who arrived in Baku for the Congress, ...[were] illiterate and the wildest confusion characterised the proceedings. Not the faintest notice was taken of most of the numerous speeches made, the delegates being far more interested in each others' swords and revolvers. There was a constant coming and going throughout the sessions, and the proceedings were always interrupted for the 'Namaz' or prayers.
Moreover, the delegates from the Gandje and Kokand districts (although not allowed to complete their speeches) were spreading information about the misdeeds of Bolsheviks and the massacres of Muslims.

During his stay in Baku, Enver established contacts with various Muslim groups, most significantly with the Volga Tatars and Sultangaliev. The ideas of ‘Muslim National Communists’, as represented by Sultangaliev, Ryskulov and Khodzhaev (who propagated support for all revolutionary movements in the colonial world and communism with a nationalistic and Islamic undertone)\(^9\) seem to have had a significant impact on Enver Paşa. Enver’s already existing inclination for pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas would strengthen, and combined with the impact of communist ideology would evolve into his unique blend of communism, nationalism and Islam (as reflected in the political programme he prepared entitled *Mesa* [Labour]).

By the end of the Baku Congress, the Russians had to admit their failure in terms of meeting the Bolshevik interests, and Zinoviev even sent a telegram to this effect to Lenin. Moreover, Enver’s personal meetings with numerous Muslim delegates, especially with those from Turkestan, were making the Russians quite anxious. ‘The general opinion in Baku’ was that ‘he was “advised” by the Soviet authorities to return to Moscow at his earliest convenience’.\(^{10}\) Thus, the Baku Congress, which was symbolically the highest point of Enver’s collaboration with the Bolsheviks, in terms of its results was more functional in bringing about a realization of conflicting interests on both sides, rather than enhancing their co-operation.

Enver spent the period between October 1920 and February 1921 in Europe in order to promote the inauguration of the Islamic Revolutionary Societies. In the meantime he established contacts with the Germans and the Italians for arms and ammunition sales to the Soviets. During this period, he was trying to preserve an uneasy balance. On the one hand, he was acting as a loyal supporter of the Turkish Nationalist cause. On the other hand, he was trying to persuade the Bolsheviks to provide military support for an expedition in Anatolia.\(^{11}\) He intended to present himself as a better and more reliable leftist alternative for the Soviets than the Nationalist government of Ankara.

Enver was very eager to retrieve his lost position, which Mustafa Kemal had ‘usurped’. Thus, his *rapprochement* with the Bolsheviks was marked by hopes of utilizing Soviet financial and military aid for the rehabilitation of his political power and of regaining control over the national resistance movement in Anatolia.

Enver had several conversations with Ali Fuat Cebesoy (the newly appointed ambassador of the Ankara government) and even with Chicherin,
and both of them tried to prevent him from interfering in the Anatolian movement. Bekir Sami Bey tried to persuade Enver Paşa that he should struggle for his fatherland and for Islam outside Anatolia in the east. In response to these appeals, Enver sent a lengthy letter to Mustafa Kemal assuring him of his loyalty and his contentment in supporting the nationalist movement from abroad. However, when Major Naim Cevad, whom Enver had sent from Russia to Anatolia, was arrested by the Kemalists with large quantities of propaganda material for the Peoples' Councils Party, it became clear that Enver had no intention of abandoning his former plans.

Enver’s plans of initiating a national guerrilla resistance based in Anatolia dated from as far back as 1915, and was instigated by the fears of an Allied breakthrough at the Dardanelles. The most important actor at the institutional level that was responsible for the implementation of such plans both during and after the First World War was the ‘Special Organization’ (Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa), which has been created by Enver in 1914. Teşkilât-ı Mahsusas was the Ottoman version of a military secret service, combining an intelligence and propaganda service with a guerrilla organization. It is noteworthy that prominent members of the inner circle of the CUP, such as Dr Bahattin Şakir and Mithat Şükrü also formed the political core of this organization. Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa propagated pan-Islamic themes, and later on increasingly pan-Turkic ones.

In 1918, the activities of Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa were supplemented by the formation of another organization, namely the Guard (Karakol). The Guard, which sheltered former Unionists, benefited greatly from the resources and expertise of Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa. It played a crucial role for the national resistance movement by smuggling men and materials to Anatolia and establishing clandestine resistance networks. In addition to this, in the provincial centres of Thrace and Anatolia, the local branches of the CUP instigated the national agitation. In their struggle, the national activists made extensive use of the secret depots of arms and ammunition, which had been established by Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa.

Enver tried very hard to maintain his contacts with these organizations and a group of former Unionists in Anatolia, who were supportive of him. At the initial stages of the nationalist struggle, Mustafa Kemal’s position seemed far from being secure, especially since Enver was very willing to be in charge of Anatolian developments once again. There were reports that ‘Baku, the Unionist stronghold, at the center of the Oriental intrigue’ was becoming ‘the rival of Angora’. The US High Commissioner in Constantinople was stating that Enver, who was cast out of Turkey, was regaining his prestige and influence. The British at this point even considered Enver and his followers to pose a more serious threat than the Kemalists. According to them, there were ‘...two parties in Anatolia, not
ENVER PAŞA AS AN EXPATRIATE

only one. The weaker is that of Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists... They have failed and their adherents are going over to the other far more dangerous party, that of Enver, Talât and the CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik combination.\textsuperscript{76} About one third of the Nationalist Assembly of Ankara was inclined towards or supportive of Enver.\textsuperscript{77} Even if Enver might not have been as powerful as the British sources indicate, it is certain that he was making intense efforts to capture the Nationalist movement and was steadily gaining strength.

At this period, when it was still unclear who would eventually capture the leadership of the Nationalists, the Bolsheviks maintained their contacts with and provided support for both sides. On the one hand, Nationalist delegations were visiting Moscow\textsuperscript{73} and Mustafa Kemal was corresponding with the Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin.\textsuperscript{79} On the other hand, the Soviets were said to be ‘finding the money for the Unionist campaign’.\textsuperscript{74} Mustafa Kemal was seriously disturbed by the challenge presented by Enver to his authority at home and abroad. To prevent Enver’s return, the Turkish Grand National Assembly issued a decree on 12 March 1921 to the effect that Enver and Halil Paşa were prohibited from returning to Anatolia ‘since this would be detrimental to the internal politics and external relations’ of the Ankara government.\textsuperscript{75} Enver, however, had no intention of giving up.

The peak of Enver’s efforts and expectations to regain control in Anatolia occurred at a time when the Greek offensive towards Ankara was in full progress. Nationalists were withdrawing and were even considering temporarily moving the Turkish Grand National Assembly to another city further away from the war zone.\textsuperscript{6} Enver’s letter written on 16 July 1921 to Mustafa Kemal is very significant in indicating his intentions. He wrote: 77

\textit{If you consider us [the Unionists] as a rival, you are making a big mistake....We are not after any titles or positions. As far as I am concerned, I will follow my ideals. That is to incite the Muslims to struggle against the European beasts which trample upon Islam.... By the news which you have been sending through my friends I understand that you do not want us to return.... For the time being since we are being helpful to our motherland in Moscow, we are not coming back.... However, when we start to feel that... our staying abroad becomes useless and even dangerous for Turkey... and the Islamic world, we will return to Anatolia.}

On 30 July 1921, Enver went to Batumi, where he met with other Unionists and started waiting for an opportunity to enter Anatolia. It is noteworthy that the Congress of the People’s Councils Party meeting, held in Batumi on 5 September 1921, revived and used the name ‘Union and
Progress Party’ and demanded the Ankara government to abandon its hostility towards the émigré Unionists. In this period, Enver not only had support among the émigré Unionists, but was also closely linked with a number of influential people within the resistance movement in Anatolia, thus posing a serious challenge for Mustafa Kemal. Rustow points out that ‘The Trabzon Defense of Rights Society was openly supporting Enver, and in the Ankara Assembly a group of about forty ex-Unionists are said to have been working secretly to replace Kemal with Enver’. However, Mustafa Kemal’s decisive victory at the Sakarya battle (2–13 September) consolidated his political position and authority, while sweeping away the expectations of Enver and his supporters.

When the Bolsheviks shifted their support from Enver Paşa to Mustafa Kemal in the aftermath of the Sakarya battle, Enver had to abandon his Anatolian plans, marking a final break in his flirtation with Moscow. Moreover, he was increasingly becoming aware of the discouraging prospects of his hybrid ideology in striving to promote a version of Bolshevism compatible with Islam. Developments in Russian Turkestan had been signalling the incompatibility of Bolshevism and Islam for a while now.

While the Baku Congress was in progress, on 2 September 1920 the Red Army stormed Bukhara City and proclaimed a People’s Soviet Republic. The new reformist government of Young Bukharans which replaced the Emir in collaboration with the Soviets was soon to be disillusioned. It assumed that Bukhara would be at least semi-independent. However, the increasing Russian overlordship, the pressure from the Red Army and the removal of the State treasury were indicating otherwise. In the meantime, the fugitive Emir of Bukhara, Alim Khan, was still trying to hold out in eastern Bukhara with the support of a sporadic Muslim resistance movement composed of ‘Basmachi’ bands.

When the Soviet government sent Enver Paşa to Central Asia in the early days of November 1921, it had a number of motives. First of all, Enver, an unwanted ally to the Nationalist leaders of Anatolia, would be prevented from intermingling in the Anatolian affairs where he was no longer needed. Instead, the Soviets were planning to exploit his popularity among the Muslims in an effort to curtail the support for the Basmachis. Moreover, Enver could be useful in counteracting a possible bid by the Afghans (with British support) to interfere in the Central Asian affairs under the banner of Islam and pan-Islamic ideas. The unfolding events would soon indicate, however, that Enver had quite different motives of his own.

Enver had the intention of leading a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic battle in Turkestan, about the realities of which he had very scarce knowledge. He
had received some news about the developments in Central Asia through the Muslim delegates he met during the Baku Congress. Moreover, the distorted information, most of which he obtained through Haci Sami, seemed quite promising. Haci Sami claimed, ‘In 1916, as a simple and unassuming Turk I raised all of Kirgizistan against the Russians. Given your [Enver Paşa’s] great fame and popularity nothing can stand in our way in Turkestan.’ In addition to the idealistic motives, there were also important (and frequently overlooked) practical considerations shaping Enver’s decision to leave his communist allies. Ever since it became clear that Enver would not have a significant role in Anatolia, his relations with the Russians were becoming more and more ambiguous. There was also an increasing degree of distrust on both sides. Enver was very disturbed when the Bolsheviks did not permit Cemal Paşa to stop in Bukhara on his way from Afghanistan to meet him. The response he got upon asking the Russian Consul Jurinev about the time of Cemal’s return to Afghanistan was even more alarming for Enver. Jurinev said, ‘The return of Cemal Paşa to these areas? Forget about it. We are also well aware of the kinds of activities you are engaged in here.’ In his memoirs, Zeki Velidi Togan reports that Enver perceived this remark as an outright threat and was thinking that the Russians would eventually kill both Cemal Paşa and himself.

When Enver revealed his intentions to join the Basmachis to Togan in their secret meetings in Bukhara, Togan warned him a number of times about the problems associated with his decision. He argued against any overt collaboration with the traditionally-minded ex-Emir and the Basmachis and a direct military confrontation against the Bolsheviks. Togan recommended Enver to support the movement from Afghanistan and he even started to make some arrangements towards this end upon Enver’s request. In this period, Enver also briefly considered returning to Berlin via Moscow to rejoin his wife Naciye Sultan, whom he appeared to love passionately. In the end, however, Enver’s idealistic motives and Central Asian dreams weighed more heavily.

Twenty-three days after his arrival in Bukhara, Enver used the pretext of going on a ‘hunting expedition’ to get out of the city in order to defect to the Basmachis. He sent news to the ex-Emir in Afghanistan that he was willing to fight on his side; and set out to meet with İbrahim Bey, a loyal supporter of the ex-Emir and one of the major leaders of the Basmachi movement in his absence.

After Enver’s changing sides, there was also a radical change in how the Soviets depicted him. They accused their disloyal partner Enver as ‘an adventurist, to whom Turkey and afterwards Bukhara were indebted for some of the most tragic and bloody pages of their history.’ According to the Soviet accounts, ‘That adventurist, not staying idle for a moment, while
the better sons of Turkey were fighting for the freedom of their motherland, arrived in Bukhara as a visitor and decided to take advantage of the difficult situation and laid his blood-stained hands on the Bukharan Revolution.\textsuperscript{89}

How much Enver would have been willing to fight along, actually to lead ‘those better sons of Turkey’, if he were once again admitted in that exclusive club! However, not surprisingly, yet very astonishingly and frustratingly for him, its doors had been slammed shut in his face. The unwanted guest was now seeking a new home with which he could identify and dreamed to make it the base of his future glory. Hence, deprived of his Anatolian plans, Enver once again started to promote pan-Islamic ideas and pan-Turkism and joined the Basmachi movement in Central Asia against the Russians.

The initial response of the Basmachis to Enver Paşa was very far from a cordial embrace. When Enver and his companions entered the Lokay tribal territory, which was controlled by İbrahim Bey, they were distrusted as previous Bolsheviks and were disarmed. In the following three months, as revealed by numerous letters addressed to his wife scribbled in microscopic letters on tiny pieces of paper, Enver would be a virtual prisoner in the hands of İbrahim.\textsuperscript{90} During this period, he would have better insight into the movement into which he had rushed with very little knowledge about its nature. First of all, he became aware of the bigotry of many of the Basmachi bands, who perceived the Jadidist Young Bukharans, rather that the Russians, as their biggest enemy. Not to be a target, Enver even had to burn his family photographs. He wrote in despair to his wife: ‘After the morning prayer in Göktaş, I cried while burning the photographs of you and our children. The people of this area are extremely conservative. There is constant propaganda against me. In order to destroy everything that would cause a reaction from these bigots, I also had to burn the books that I had with me...’\textsuperscript{91} Humiliated and frequently robbed (not only of his belongings but also of his ideals and dreams), even Enver himself at one point admits that it was a big illusion for a foreigner like him to think that he could accomplish something with the people of this area.\textsuperscript{92} İbrahim Bey released Enver only after receiving a letter from the ex-Emir conferring on him the title of ‘ghazi’ and ordering that he should be allowed to fight for the cause of Islam as the son-in-law of the former Sultan-Caliph.\textsuperscript{93} Hence, finally freed from detention, Enver set off to fight.

Just as the paths of Enver and the Soviets were diverging, relations between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks were becoming even more cordial. There were ‘several signs of a détente between the Angora government and Moscow...’ and little was now heard of open Bolshevik support to Enver Paşa and his party.\textsuperscript{94} In September 1921, Mustafa Kemal ordered the delivery of 40 per cent of the produce in the Black Sea region
to the famine-struck Soviet Union as an indication of Turkey’s goodwill and friendship. Soon after the Turkish victory at Sakarya, the Soviets resumed supplying the Turks with financial aid and some arms and ammunition. On 19 December 1921 General Frunze, the Commander of the Ukrainian Red Army and a member of the executive committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine, came to Ankara to sign a Treaty of Friendship between the Turkish Nationalists and his government. It is ironic that this was the very same General Frunze who headed the Red Army in Turkestan and overthrew the Emir of Bukhara in collaboration with the Young Bukharans. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal gave a speech to welcome the Soviet Bukhara Commission visiting Ankara and spoke pointedly ‘of the statesmen of revolutionary Russia as men who had recognized, not merely in theory but in fact, the right of peoples to dispose of their own destinies’.

While Enver was trying to gather some military strength to fight against the Bolsheviks in eastern Bukhara during the early days of March 1922, Comrade Aralov, the new Russian Ambassador in Anatolia, was raising his glass to the strong bond of friendship between Ankara and Moscow. Aralov expressed his wish that this friendship would be as pure as the water in his glass. To which Mustafa Kemal replied, ‘I desire that we shall be bound as tightly together as the hydrogen and oxygen of which that water is composed’.

Relations between the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks were not always as cordial as this sounds and there was a considerable degree of suspicion and mistrust in how they perceived each other. Nevertheless, in their international isolation and respective solitary struggles, the bonds between the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks were getting stronger. As for the ties of Enver with Moscow, by this time they were completely broken. Enver now had the extremely difficult mission of uniting various groups of Basmachi, who fought under different leaders for different aims, to fight against the Red Army.

Achieving this goal was certainly not an easy task. The Basmachis were very far from being a monolithic unit and having a unity of purpose. As reflected by British intelligence reports:

It is necessary to distinguish between two classes of Basmachis in Ferghana. The genuine political Basmachis, the original Soviet rebels against Soviet rule, are represented by Sher Mohammed and his following of 5,000–6,000 men.... He is at present practically powerless, owing to lack of ammunition, but he and his men do little looting and are in fact popular among the inhabitants, who feed them and otherwise keep them supplied. On the other hand, there are the purely bandit Basmachis, under such leaders as Ahmad Pahlawan (circ. 2,000 men), who terrorise the countryside. These men originally
went out, like others, from hatred of the Bolsheviks, but shortage of food and other necessities was too much for them and the patriot became merged in the brigand.... The latter Basmachis are hated by the people of the towns and by the militia.

The Basmachis, nevertheless, often enjoyed the support of the local people oppressed by the Red Army and had 'almost as many spies out as their enemies'. For instance, at Kokand on 21 June some 20 youths of the town sang a song in the bazaar abusing the Basmachis. Next morning everyone of those 20 men was found with his throat cut, and his body hanging from a hook in one or other of the butcher's shops in the town.100 There were many similar incidents indicating the support of the people for the Basmachi movement.

Enver Paşa strove, without great success, to unite all the rebel leaders under his command. Despite the factionalism of the Basmachi and difficulties confronting him, he had considerable military achievements by the middle of spring of 1922, when his forces controlled the whole of the eastern part of Bukhara. The Soviets were quite worried and perceived this situation to be more complicated than some military victories won by Enver:101

What will be the outcome of this enterprise? From a military point of view, there can be only one opinion, that the large Soviet Federation which knew how to contain the English and the French attack when fighting Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel, is strong enough to destroy the enterprise of Enver Paşa.... It is not the military aspect of this affair which makes us worry, it is more the political aspect... In effect, the past glory of Enver as man of the Muslim state, can still attract crowds of ignorant dehgans in some remote regions today.

Soviet authorities, who at this point seemed to be more concerned with Enver's prestige in the Muslim world than with his military capabilities, tried to negotiate with their 'former Comrade' in April 1922. Enver's response was, however, much more ambitious than they could imagine and would be willing to take.

Enver not only refused to negotiate a truce with the Soviet Government, but also sent them an 'ultimatum' (dated 19 May 1922) through his friend Nariman Narimanov, the chairman of the government of Soviet Azerbaijan. He demanded an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops ('generously' allowing them 14 days for carrying it out) from Turkestan, which he described as being 'under the heels of a regime of brute force dragged in from abroad by demagogues and anarchists'.102 In his ultimatum, Enver did not fail to mention that if the Soviets refused to comply with his demands,
his wrath would be upon them. He threatened, 'In the event of Soviet Russia finding it unnecessary to respect the wishes of the Muslim peoples, who are under the oppressive yoke of dishonest Commissars, and who have sprung to arms to free their territory from the alien power of Moscow, I must warn you Mr. Commissar, that two weeks after the handing over of the present memorandum from the Supreme Council, I shall act according to my own judgement.' The response of the Russians was to declare Enver an agent of the British and to send Red Army reinforcements to the region.

Enver's position began to deteriorate rapidly after this point. He was not only fighting against the Russians, but also struggling with numerous other problems. A major source of weakness for the Basmachi movement was the rivalry among individual chieftains and tribal feuds. In addition to this, 'Basmachi units of different ethnic origin were at times as busy warring with each other as they were fighting with the Communists'. There were bitter hostilities especially between the Turkmens and Uzbeks and Kirghiz and Uzbeks. Moreover Enver, with his pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideas and a history of collaboration with the Soviet authorities, was still considered to be an 'outsider' by many of the Basmachi leaders. They viewed him with suspicion and were hostile towards him. Ibrahim Bey, who was a significant source of trouble for Enver from the beginning, was not only uncooperative, but was also becoming aggressive. Enver actually had to rend some of his forces against him in July 1922; the limited scope of Enver's power and the untenable nature of his position were indicated by the fact that of the 16,000 rebels active in Eastern Bukhara at most 3,000 owed him allegiance.

Enver's problems were not limited to the factionalism of the Basmachis. When he assigned himself as 'Commander in Chief of all Islamic troops, son-in-law of the Caliph and the Representative of the Prophet' and started issuing decrees concerning civil life in Bukhara, he was already stepping on the toes of the ex-Emir. Uneasy and suspicious about the activities of Enver, the ex-Emir began to withhold his support. Enver, who had high hopes of obtaining substantial military aid via Afghanistan, was to be disappointed. Consequently, he lacked the arms and especially the ammunition which he desperately needed to fight against the Russians. He even tried to produce his own ammunition at Baysun; however, the results were not encouraging. The high lead content in the cartridge cases made them useless when rifles became heated. Enver placed himself in an even more difficult situation by frequently engaging in open battles against the Russians, as opposed to guerrilla warfare in which the Basmachis were more experienced and in a relatively advantageous position.

In this period, during which facts merged with rumours, it becomes very difficult to trace Enver. As a bewildered British agent reported, 'Regarding
Bukhara and the career of Enver, I have been able to obtain very little trustworthy information. Feeling runs high in Ferghana between pro- and anti-Bolsheviks, and each side spreads “the news” it would like to be true. Then he gave an example that one of his informants heard in the middle of June at Uzgend that Enver had conquered Katta Kurgan and Bukhara. Upon the agent’s arrival to Samarkand to verify this information, however, he was told that Enver had fled to Mezar-i Şerif without fighting at all.

The truth was that Enver’s already weak forces were rapidly melting away. Brief successes were increasingly followed by defeats and heavy losses. Enver, nevertheless, kept on fighting until he was killed on 4 August 1922, by machine-gun fire while leading a cavalry counter-charge against a superior Russian force.

Just like his life and previous activities among the Basmachis, Enver’s death was also surrounded by a cloud of intentional and unintended pieces of misinformation, rumours and an odd combination of myth and reality. For one thing, according to many accounts he lived much longer than he actually did. There was a deliberate effort on the side of the Turkestan Committee to keep Enver’s death a secret. Qadir gives an account of how Hacı Sami sent a special messenger to Togan informing him of Enver’s death and warning him about the necessity of suppressing the truth: ‘Sami Bey suspected treachery. He said that the Committee must give out that Enver was not dead; simply that he had disappeared. This was necessary in order to keep the movement going; if it were known that Enver were dead it would collapse altogether.’ This effort to hush up the news, combined with the vivid imagination of the people, seems to have been quite successful in keeping Enver alive well after his death.

The Red Army troops did not realize that they killed Enver during this battle. The announcement of his death was made as late as 11 October in Pravda and many papers in Turkestan continued to report on the activities of Enver. Even the Russians realized that they could benefit from keeping Enver alive and using his name for propaganda purposes. The communist journal Siren, published on 29 October in Turkestan, claimed that finally peace had been established between Enver Paşa and Moscow. According to this article, Enver was to command the Muslim troops, who would help Mustafa Kemal in the occupation of the neutral zone of Chanak.

Liman von Sanders wrote about the activities of Enver Paşa in Turkestan referring to an article published in Le Temps on 5 August 1922 (the day after Enver Paşa’s death): “The “Temps” for the 5th August publishes an interesting telegram from Constantinople, according to which an agreement has been reached between the governments of Moscow and Angora and that of Enver Paşa, whereby Enver is to be nominated general representative of..."
Russian and national Turkish interests in Bukhara. If this news is true, it constitutes another failure of the British anti-Turkish oriental policy in the Near East. If in September, already a month after he died, it was strongly believed in Ferghana that Enver was hiding somewhere in Bukhara and would be able 'if only further assistance is given him, to raise all Turkestan against the Bolsheviks'. As late as November 1922, the British Foreign Office received Meshed Intelligence reports 'full of news of renewed rebellions under Enver’s direction'. Though there was also a newly emerging doubt about the trustworthiness of these reports.

Towards the end of October, Afghan papers were, however, already publishing alleged eyewitness accounts of Enver Paşa’s end. According to the Ittihad-i Islam of Mezar-i Sharif:

Enver had allowed his forces to disperse to their homes for the ‘Id-ul-Zuha. On August third, the eve of the ‘Id, he told his officers and followers that he had dreamt that he would die a martyr’s death. Next day, after the ‘Id prayers, the few remaining troops went off to join the general feasting and a party of Russians surrounded the camp at Baljiwan and rushed it. Enver is said to have put up a gallant resistance and routed one party of Russians with the few followers who hurriedly came to his assistance, but was then hit three times and fell. His body was recovered and buried with all honour.

There were also dramatic details added of the devotion and death of his companion-in-arms Davlet, who immediately rushed to his aid. In the Afghan and Basmachi versions of Enver’s last battle and death, the martyrdom aspect was strongly emphasized. If Enver was killed, it had to have been a martyr’s death!

After Enver’s death the Basmachi resistance did not survive very long either. In this period, the Soviet tactic of combining repression with a degree of appeasement (especially in religious matters) proved to be very effective. They restored waqf land to mosques, reopened Sharia courts and Koranic schools. At least temporarily they seemed to compromise with Islamic values and institutions in its traditional forms and to withdraw their support from Islamic reformists. Consequently, the popular support for the resistance movement declined sharply starting with the second half of 1922. Deprived of their popular base, the Basmachis were confined to dispersed bands in mountainous areas. The resistance movement would emerge once again during the Stalin era as a reaction to the compulsory collectivization of agriculture, which entailed a direct assault on the traditional way of life in Turkestan.

Enver’s venture to Central Asia exhibited a number of problems from the beginning. First of all, Enver had very little knowledge about the
His idealistic motives and apprehensions about his uneasy relations with the Russians, combined with the boldness of his entire career, gave way to his hasty involvement in an indigenous movement with very little insight and planning. This lack of information and understanding was clearly revealed when Enver tried to juxtapose his pan-Islamic and Turanian ideals to a resistance movement which had nothing to do with them. Even though religion played a very important role for the Basmachis, they were merely fighting against the oppressive policies of the Russians and had neither the power nor the intention of uniting the Islamic world. As for pan-Turkic ideals, "The people knew little, and cared less, about Osmanli dreams of Central Asian hegemony, if such exist; certainly Pan-Turanism did not figure on the Basmachi programme, whether inspired by Enver or not." Moreover, Enver was once again unable to assess his capabilities and limits realistically. His ultimatum to the Russians, unwise handling of the ex-Emir, and engagement in open warfare rather than partisan resistance were just some of the indicators of this deficiency. Even Enver, however, was aware that his situation was not as promising as Haci Sami made it sound. Muhittin Bey, one of his aides-de-camp, recalls that while Enver Pasha was leaving Bukhara he said, "It is necessary to struggle for Turkestan. If you are afraid of the death that you deserve, you are doomed to live like a dog. You would be cursed by past and future generations. However, if we are ready to die for independence, we can provide those who are following us with free and happy lives." He had hopes for success. If he could not be victorious, however, he wished to die on the battlefield just like the Ottoman Empire. Although he was unable to realize his Central Asian dreams, he managed to achieve his last wish.

In order to have a better understanding of Enver’s goals and actions marking his rapid rise and fall, it is important to place him within the wider context of his society and time. This is crucial for a genuine understanding of the dynamics of the rendezvous of a man with his historical role, which requires him to be at the right place at the right time, as well as having the willingness and capability to be ‘that man’. In the case of Enver, the setting was the Ottoman Empire of the late nineteenth century. The Empire, whose glory had been fading away since the seventeenth century, was now considered the ‘sick man of Europe’. It suffered enormous financial losses and numerous territorial defeats on all fronts. The Ottomans were especially threatened in the Balkans, where the impact of the rise of various nationalism was strongly felt in this multi-national empire which was quite far from being a ‘melting pot’. The despotic rule of Abdülhamit II and the
ENVER PAŞA AS AN EXPATRIATE

extreme corruption at all levels of the state apparatus were making the situation even worse. Thus, by challenging this despotic and corrupt rule, Enver emerged as the ‘hero of freedom’. The dethronement of Abdülhamit II created an opportunity for Enver to attain more power and attention which he desperately sought and a vacuum of leadership which he did not hesitate to fill. Enver, however, would be transformed in a very short time from the ‘hero of freedom’ to a despotic ruler playing a major role in shaping the last decade of Ottoman history.

Enver’s prestige and public support were mostly based on his military successes and his demands for a more active rather than a merely responsive and incremental policy-making, while confronting the challenge of dismemberment. His successes, especially in Tripolitania and during the reconquest of Edirne in the Second Balkan War, stood out in a period marked by the despair of successive defeats; his military reputation endowed him with great power and authority, beyond the general strength of the CUP. Enver, along with Kemal Paşa, was a leading figure in the army-Committee relations. His position at the intersection of the political and military spheres enabled him to acquire and consolidate his power. Thus, at the outset of the First World War, Enver emerged not only as the leader of a group in the CUP, but also as a major decision-maker for the country.

‘War is the surest vehicle through which great historical figures accrue guilt or fame.’ In the case of Enver it was both. His rise was determined by military successes, and his fall would also be closely tied to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire fighting on the side of the Germans during the First World War. While Enver’s power was rapidly increasing while Minister of War, his dreams of greater glory clouded his ability for reality-testing at an even faster rate. Hence, the Sarıkamış campaign against the Russians, during which he failed to assess the capabilities of his army realistically, marked the beginning of the end for Enver. His defeat in a way echoed the fall of his great hero, Napoleon. When the Ottoman Empire lost the War, he had to leave not only his military and political position, but also his country.

There is a lot of insight that Enver’s expatriate years can provide. Although Enver was out of his country, during this quite neglected chapter of his life he was definitely not out of the political scene. His activities were influential at the initial stages of Turco-Russian relations and to a certain extent for Russian–German relations as well. Moreover, Enver presented a serious challenge to Mustafa Kemal as the leader of the nationalist struggle, which was mostly shaped around and built on Unionist organizations and initiatives. Enver’s close ties with the former Unionists both in Anatolia and abroad enhanced his position and determination to regain control of the nationalist struggle, an idea which he would only give up after Mustafa Kemal’s decisive victory against the Greeks at Sakarya.
The shift of Soviet support to the Kemalists marked the end of Enver’s honeymoon with the Bolsheviks. The collaboration between the Bolsheviks and a group of émigré Unionists led by Enver – two groups who shared only a common enemy, Western imperialism in general and Britain in particular – proved to be ephemeral. The disillusioned Enver then joined the anti-Soviet Basmachi resistance in Central Asia. At this stage, Enver’s pan-Islamic and especially pan-Turkic ideas gained ascendance. The last phase of Enver’s career among the Basmachis was marked by the incongruous dreams of Enver and his followers. Throughout his struggle in Central Asia, he was unable to arouse the support of the masses to his pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideals. Nevertheless, he tried to co-ordinate and lead an indigenous struggle against the Russians with very limited means and even less insight. This would be Enver’s last battle, concluded by his death on the battlefield.

In evaluating Enver’s activities, the final point which needs to be stressed is the necessity to revise official Turkish historiography, especially with respect to Enver’s activities during his émigré years. The trend has been to disregard them as insignificant and to view these actions as merely those of an adventurer. However, there are two important points which need to be re-evaluated:

(i) Enver’s (and former Unionists’) relations with the nationalist struggle in Anatolia;

(ii) his contacts with the Soviets and his role at the initial stage of Turco-Soviet relations.

As E.-J. Zürcher points out, ‘Turkish history and biography accentuate the antagonism between the Kemalists and Unionists (these two groups being regarded as two distinct entities), emphasizing the role of the former and belittling that of the latter. They present the Turkish nationalist movement as an original creation of Mustafa Kemal and disregard the existing continuity between the Young Turk and Turkish nationalist periods and the role played by the CUP in the national resistance movement.’

However, there was a significant continuity in terms of the cadres and institutions that formed the base of the nationalist movement, some factions of which shaped and assisted Enver’s ambitions to regain control in Anatolia.

In evaluating Enver’s relations with the Bolsheviks, it is necessary to place him once again within a historical context. The collapse of the Russian Empire created new dynamics in the region, opening up new horizons in the East. Not only Enver, but also a number of his contemporaries (for example, Kemal Paşa in Afghanistan), perceived the rising Bolshevik power and the predominating revolutionary atmosphere as an opportunity to respond and counterbalance the challenge of the West. Thus, their rapprochement with Bolshevism and their promotion of pan-
Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas should be evaluated by taking into consideration these drastic changes in the international scene.

Enver Paşa wrote in one of his letters, 'The other day I read a German book, and one sentence inspired me: “When we can’t realize our ideals, we can at least idealize our reality.”' Just like the sentence in the German book which inspired him, Enver Paşa during his military and political career constantly strove towards either realizing his ideals or, more often, idealizing reality. In many instances, however, engulfed by his ambitions, he was unable to draw realistic limits around his aspirations and this led to his downfall. He spent his entire life in a perpetual battle in both the political and the military fields in order to restore the long-lost glory of an Empire which no longer existed.

NOTES
1. Gagavuz Turks are a Turkish tribe of Christian faith which settled around the banks of the Danube river. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, in the first volume of his monographic work Makedonya’ dan Ortaasıya’ ya Enver Paşa, discusses the origins of the Gagavuz Turks and also presents a family tree of Enver Paşa for seven generations. For detailed information on Gagavuz Turks see: B. Lewis, C. Pellat and J. Schacht (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.2, No.38 (1965), pp.971–2.
4. The details of how he became a member are extensively covered in his memoirs. Enver Paşa, Enver Paşa’nın Anıları, pp.57–61.
5. Nazım Bey, the commander of the Salonica garrison, was well known for his activities against the CPU. It is also noteworthy that he was Enver’s brother-in-law and the assassination attempt took place in the house where Enver lived together with his family. Enver discusses this incident in detail in his memoirs: Enver Paşa, Enver Paşa’nın Anıları, pp.79–84.
7. The Committee of Progress and Union (CPU) was renamed as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.
10. Ibid.
11. Some of these babies who were to become important political leaders include Enver Hoca of Albania and Anwar Sadat of Egypt.
13. Ibid., p.210. The original form of the card in Turkish is ‘Dünyanın her tarafında 33,000 kişilik bir Aalm改变了市の既習を求める雷斯ミティルム。イスラム族の子孫は人種に関係なく同等に配分されるべきです’.
14. This incident is known as ‘The Event of 31 March’ (31 Mart Vakası) in Turkish history because of the difference in calendars.
15. Şükri Hanioglu, Kendi Mektuplarımnda Enver Paşa, p.11.
16. For a detailed account of Enver’s activities in Tripoli see: Friedrich Perzynski, Enver Paşa um Tripolis (Munich, 1918); Ernst Bennett, With the Turks in Tripoli (London, 1912).
17. These letters are published in ‘Section II: Letters about the Tripoli Resistance’ in Şükrü Hanoğlu, Kendi Mektublarında Enver Paşa, pp.73–211.
24. Ibid., p.9.
25. Edirne, the first significant Ottoman conquest in Europe (1361), was perceived to be one of the symbols of Ottoman military greatness.
27. Consequently, when Enver eventually became the Minister of War, replacing these senior commanders with enthusiastic and reform-minded junior officers formed the essence of his reforms in the army. Alfred Nossig, ‘Die Reform der türkischen Armee’, in Die neue Türkei und ihre Führer (Halle, 1916), pp.24–9.
31. For example, on 3 August 1914, Said Halim Pasha reported to Wangenheim that he was against any overt action until the mobilization had been completed and the willingness of Bulgarians to be on the side of the Central Powers had become clear.
32. For a more detailed account see: Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire (1914–18) (Princeton, 1968).
36. The number of deaths cited differ drastically between 500,000 and 1,500,000 and it is still a significant issue of controversy especially among Turkish and Armenian historians.
37. S. Aydemir, op. cit., Vol.III, p.497. During this discussion, Talat Pasha underlined that considering their present conditions and the current dynamics of world politics, they should withdraw to a corner in Europe keeping a low profile and should refrain from active involvement in politics. However, he also noted, ‘if an opportunity arises it is natural that we will make use of it’.
38. Masayuki Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia 1919–1922 (Tokyo, 1991), p.9. In this book, Yamauchi publishes numerous documents from the Turkish Historical Association Archives, which hereafter will be indicated as THAA.
39. Letter from Enver Paşa (in Crimea) to his uncle Kamil Bey dated 12 Nov. 1918 (THAA Klasör 2/Fihrist 732) in Yamauchi, The Green Crescent under the Red Star, p.79. It is interesting to note that in this letter Enver expresses his intention to serve Islam, instead of mentioning the fatherland or the Turks.
41. Ibid., pp.267–77.
45. Turkish Parliamentary Library (T.B.M.M. Kütüphanesi), Minutes of Meetings of Turkish Grand National Assembly, 'Reports and Discussions on the Relations with the Russian Bolshevik Republic', 1.84, C.3, 16 Oct.1920, 1.85, C.1, 10. "Gizli Oturumlarda Sorunlar ve Görürlər" 1920. Also see: Mustafa Kemal, "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1920-1923: Problems and Opinions in the Confidential Meetings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly", Râşid Metel (Ankara, 1990), pp.141–55. These parliamentary discussions are very significant in indicating how the nationalist Turks viewed their relations with the Bolsheviks.

46. The Soviets promised to provide 15,000 Austrian rifles with 2,000 cartridges each, French guns for three batteries with 1,000 shells each and one million cartridges. Yamauchi, op. cit., p.120.


49. Ibid.

50. It should not be forgotten that this was the period of Civil War and Soviet rule was being seriously challenged in the Caucasus and especially in Central Asia.

51. Especially in strategic places like India and Iran.

52. Dan Rustow, 'Enver Paşa', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, p.700.


55. Ibid.

56. Within this context, Enver tried to emphasize his contributions to the struggle in Tripoli.

57. Yamauchi, p.33.


60. PRO FO 371/5178 (E 13412/345/44).


63. Bekir Sami Bey (Moscow) to Enver Paşa (Berlin), Nov. 1920 (THAA Klasör 28/Fihrist 439), in Yamauchi, op. cit., p.125.

64. Dan Rustow, 'Enver Paşa', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, p.700.

65. Eric Zürcher, The Unionist Factor (Leiden, 1984), p.169. At that time, even abandoning Ankara and establishing a base in Konya or Eskişehir was under consideration.


67. Ibid., p.168.


69. Bristol to Secretary of State, Constantinople, 2 Jan. 1920, National Archives, Records of the Department of Navy, Record Group 45, Box. 831.

70. S.I.S., 2 Sept. 1920, No.CX/676/V, PRO FO 371/5178 (E 11702/345/44).

71. Ibid.

72. Turkish Parliamentary Library (T.B.M.M. Kütüphanesi), Minutes of Meetings of Turkish Grand National Assembly, 'Reports and Discussions on the Relations with the Russian Bolshevik Republic', 1.84, C.3, 16 Oct. 1920.

73. Robeck to Curzon, 12 June 1920, No.695, PRO FO 371/5178 (E 6346/345/44), see also attached the article "Tschicherine et Mustapha Kemal Paşa" in La Cause Commune, the Russian weekly newspaper published in Paris, sent by the British Embassy in Paris.

74. S.I.S., 2 Sept. 1920, No.CX/676/V, PRO FO 371/5178 (E 11702/345/44).

75. Turkish Republican Archives, Decree of the Parliament concerning Enver and Halil Paşa, 3 Dec. 1921, No.731/385.
77. Ibid., pp.46–7; A.F. Cebesoy, Moskova Hârraları, p.231.
80. When his situation became totally untenable, he took refuge in Afghanistan and continued
to support the Basmachi movement across the border.
81. In Richard Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism
(1917–1923) (Cambridge, 1954), p.178 there is a discussion on the origins of the word
Basmachi being obscure. Pipes states that Zeki Velidi Togan traces the word from ‘basmak’
terms ‘to press’ and Basmachi being ‘the oppressed’.
82. Zeki Velidi Togan, Hârralar: Türkistan ve Diğer Müslüman Doğu Türkleri’nin Millî Varlık
ve Kültür Mücadeleleri (Istanbul, 1969), p.390. These claims of Haci Sami were of course
grossly exaggerated.
84. Zeki Velidi Togan was a well-known and respected figure in Turanian circles and played a
key role in the Bashkirian struggle for independence.
85. Togan, Hârraları, p.391.
86. Ibid., pp.387–9.
of the private letters of Enver Paşa written to his wife Naciye Sultan and Halil Paşa.
Frequent letters of Enver Paşa (written almost every day) to his wife Naciye Sultan usually
have a very romantic and passionate tone. However, even his love for her and the birth of
his youngest son were not enough to make him quit the battlefields.
89. Ibid., p.283.
91. Ibid., p.652.
92. Ibid., p.658.
94. Rumbold to Curzon, 24 Jan. 1922, No.95, Foreign Office Confidential Print (E
1107/27/44), Vol.3, p.36.
95. Mustafa Kemal to Turkish Embassy in Moscow (letter to be presented to Chicherin), 3
Sept. 1921, No.2705, in Turkish Ministry of Culture (ed.), Atatürk’ün Millî Daş Politikası:
Millî Mücadele Dönemine Ait 100 Belge (1919–1923), Vol.I (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı,
96. Kamuran Gürün, p.76. The Treaty of Friendship was signed on 2 Jan. 1922.
97. Rumbold to Curzon, Constantinople, 24 Jan. 1922, no.95, Foreign Office Confidential
98. Rumbold to Curzon, Constantinople, 7 March 1922, No.229 (confidential), Foreign Office
Confidential Print (E 2755/5/44), Vol.3, p.47.
99. PRO FO 371/ 8075 (N 10281/6/97).
100. Ibid.
101. I. Sol’ts, ‘Anglo-Enverkaia avantura i osvobozhdenie narodov vostoka’ (The British-Enver
Venture and the Liberation of the Peoples of the East), Kommunist (Apr.–May 1922), p.8 quoted
in Helen Aymen De Lageard, ‘The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals
Lageard presents a comprehensive study of three journals published by the Red Army in
Tashkent for the period 1920–22, which corresponds with the arrival of Turkommissia in
Turkestan, as well as the most powerful moments of the revolt of the Basmachi.
103. Ibid.
ENVER PAŞA AS AN EXPATRIATE


108. PRO FO 371/8075 (N 10281/6/97).

109. Ibid.


112. *Pravda Turkestana* was one of the sources which reported Enver’s death relatively early, on 15 Aug. 1922.


115. PRO FO 371/8075 (N 10281/6/97).

116. Meshed Intelligence Diary, India Office, 25 Nov. 1922, No.P 4635 (confidential) FO 371/8080 (N 10497/173/97). Part of the reason that the news about Enver’s death arrived at the Foreign Office so late was the long delays in the transmission of the copies of the Meshed Intelligence Diaries. For example, the cited document transmits copies diaries for periods ending 25 Sept. and 2 Oct.

117. Ibid.

118. North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary, India Office, 1 Dec. 1922, No.P 4716 (confidential) PRO FO 371/8080 (N 10675/173/97). This report transmits a copy of diary No.40 for the week ending 19 Oct. 1922. But as can be seen from the dates the British Foreign Office received the news of the death of Enver as late as December. Copies were also sent to Director of Military Intelligence and Air Ministry.


120. In his memoirs Togan states that during their secret meetings in Bukhara he realized that Enver was ‘an idealist out of touch with real life and incidents. He has not read any of the European or Russian publications concerning the geography or statistics of Turkestan. Without any doubt he decided on what he was going to do in Turkestan during his stay in Bukhara’ (p.392)

121. *Extracts from Despatch no.101 of 14 Sept. 1922, from acting British Consul General, Kashgar, to Government of India (Communicated to Foreign Office, 16 Nov.)* India Office, 16 Nov. 1922, No.P 4536 (confidential), PRO FO 371/8075 (N 10281/6/97). A copy of this report was also sent to the Director of Military Intelligence.


124. Ibid.

125. Hailey, p.244.
