

Coercion and Mediation: Centralization and Sedentarization of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire

YONCA KÖKSAL

In the Western European model, the transformation from empires to nation-states resembles a shift from indirect to direct rule with the elimination and incorporation of local intermediaries through confrontation between well-defined and distinct spheres of state and local groups. This model considers the permanent use of indirect rule in non-Western states a failure and a challenge to state centralization. Contrary to this assumption, there are cases of indirect rule which are relatively successful in centralizing states. Centralization can proceed with mediation and incorporation of local actors, rearranging state policies according to responses of local groups, and thus, negotiating the boundary between the state and social forces.

The relationship between sedentarization of tribes and centralization is not much acknowledged in West European nation-state formation with the exception of colonial rule in which the main purpose is not necessarily to centralize or create nation states in colonies but rather to form an effective administration with less costly available means. Sedentarization is an important part of centralization and nation-state formation in non-Western cases. Expanding central control over vast nomadic groups is critical but can be too costly for state deployment of coercion. Using tribal leaders as agents of centralization can be an advantageous strategy. Sedentarization shows how top down state policies of coercion or bottom up strategies of mediation with local authorities can be combined in state centralization.¹

Known as the Tanzimat reforms, reorganization of provincial administration included the sedentarization of semi-nomadic tribes in various regions of the Ottoman Empire. In the province of Ankara, religiously and ethnically diverse tribes were sedentarized between 1839 and 1869. The cases in this article show that top down and bottom up state strategies can be employed together depending on the transformative process of state–social/tribal group interactions.² The earlier state-tribe interactions led to the recognition of the internal dynamics of tribes in reformulating centralization policies. The essay studies four tribes which varied in geographical concentration and hierarchical organization. Findings show that geographically bounded and hierarchical tribes were sedentarized by mediating with tribal authorities. In contrast, geographically scattered and non-hierarchical tribes confronted coercion, use of security forces and military troops.

Transformation to a nation-state necessitates privileging some groups while excluding others from the citizenship project. Excluded groups are more likely to

face coercion while mediation is usually applied to included groups. In most cases, inclusion is a result of religious or ethnic affinity with state rulers.³ However, the cases in this article display the pragmatic approach of Ottoman rulers in order to control population movement. The Yeniil and Afşar tribes were Alevi Turks. The Rışvans and part of the Cihanbeylis were Sunni Kurds. Yet, the religious and ethnic proximity to the Sunni Ottoman state did not matter in the use of coercion and mediation. What mattered in this early stage of centralization was the need to integrate all tribal groups to state rule. Thus, developing state strategies according to the internal dynamics of tribes overweighed ethnic and religious affinity. This practice is different from manipulation of ethnic and religious differences in the late Ottoman administration.⁴

Based on extensive archival research, the following pages explain how this interactive process between the Ottoman state and tribal groups worked to define uses of coercion and mediation. First, a theoretical model is introduced to explain state strategies in settling tribal groups. Next, different strategies that the Ottoman state employed to control semi-nomadic tribes since the fifteenth century are discussed in order to show what was novel about the Tanzimat settlement policies. Finally, the settlement of the four tribes in the region will be discussed, emphasizing tribal hierarchy and geographical concentration.

The intertwining of top down state projects and bottom up local responses is becoming a general concern of studies on state transformation. The literature generally treated the state as a conscious actor with well-formulated policies, that attempts to penetrate 'society,' a separate realm from the state. This approach acknowledges mutual empowerment of state and local groups, but defines 'state' and 'society' as two distinct entities in their own right. The assumption here is that state organization is powerful and cohesive enough to drive 'society' which is itself a problematic concept (non-differentiated cohesive whole including all social groups except the state).⁵

When this divide between the state and society is applied to state-tribe interactions, it posits a problematic boundary between tribes and the state.⁶ It has been argued that the relationship between states and tribes is a dichotomy in which tribes represented segmentary societies, decentralization and autonomy. Tribes are described as kinship groups of common descent which have segmentary and therefore egalitarian and decentralized structures.⁷ In contrast, states represented the source of governance and authority.⁸ This idealization of tribes (*aşiret* in Turkish) and states as two opposite and distinct entities is not applicable to the Middle East. In the Middle East, there is a continuous interaction between states and tribes: tribes and tribal confederacies created states, and states formed tribes.⁹ Among pastoral nomadic societies in the Middle East, tribal hierarchies in part developed through state-tribal interaction and not solely as a result of internal tribal dynamics.¹⁰ Tribal confederacies such as the Shahsevan¹¹ and Khamseh in Iran did not share a common descent. Rather, they were formed as political and cultural units as a result of their interactions with state authorities.¹²

A more relational perspective which rejects discrete, pre-given units such as individual and society as ultimate starting points of analysis¹³ is necessary to

problematize the boundary between state and tribal groups. The state-in-society perspective acknowledges the transformative aspects of state–social group interactions and recognizes the blurred and moving boundaries between the state and society. States are part of societies. States may help mould, but they are continually moulded by the society in which they are embedded. Societies affect transformations as much as or more than states affect societies, and they are never independent from social forces. Social forces, like states, are contingent on specific empirical conditions. Local groups do not have historically predesignated societal roles, but they come into being within the historical context.¹⁴

Here by historical context I mean path dependency. That is, previous interactions among the state and social actors set a future trajectory for both the state and social groups. The relations between states and other social forces may be mutually empowering. State and society relations are not a zero-sum game, but they can be beneficial for both sides. This type of analysis invites the specification of recurrent causal processes that govern intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale.¹⁵

When states and tribes coexisted over time, each can be defined in terms of its relations with the other.¹⁶ States played a very important role as an external stimulus leading to the rise of tribes and tribal confederacies, but the external stimulus of the state alone does not explain the rise of tribes. The state impact is contingent upon its interactions with tribal dynamics and the ecological setting in which these interactions take place.¹⁷ In this sense, the analytical distinction between internal and external factors is a dubious one, especially when there are no clear-cut boundaries between tribal and state loyalties.¹⁸ In fact, this article reverses the question. Instead of asking how states defined tribal structures, it focuses on how tribal structures and settings for state–tribe interactions influenced state policies of coercion and mediation.

The Tanzimat era is an example of state centralization, for which European nation-states were seen as a model. The reforms were undertaken to revitalize the empire through measures of domestic reorganization and legal codes. Reform from the top down was the characteristic of the Tanzimat period. The initiative came from the central government; it did not spring from the people. The government was the agency which had to hold the peoples of the empire together by evolving an administrative system with enough flexibility of local government under central control to be workable. Considered in the abstract, this system represented an intelligent attempt at combining centralization with decentralization, balancing officials appointed from Istanbul with representatives of the local population. In actuality, it failed to work smoothly.¹⁹ In settled communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim notables had an interest in preserving their power and opposing any fundamental reforms offered by state agents.²⁰ In semi-nomadic groups, tribal leaders mostly resisted attempts of taxation, military conscription and sedentarization. The state projects were modified based on local responses. The process of reform implementation was a negotiated outcome between the central state and local groups.

This modification of state policies was visible in sedentarization of the four tribes in the Ankara region. The state opted to use coercion to settle some tribes while choosing to mediate with chieftains of other tribes, all within the same region and

period. Tribal responses to state settlement strategies can reshape state policies. States employ coercion or mediation, depending on both internal tribal dynamics and needs of state control. Thus, strategies of expansion can be considered as a continuum. There are several factors affecting the use of coercion and mediation. These factors include geopolitical location, geographical boundedness, the internal organization of tribes, and trade between tribes and outside populations, all affecting state strategies of settlement.

Among the conditions which push states toward either mediation or coercion, geopolitical location plays an important role in defining state tribe relations. State policies for controlling tribes can differ more in frontiers than in core regions because frontier politics is defined by the relations with neighbouring states. Centralizing states may attempt to settle tribes in the frontier as a means of increasing their control against a weaker neighbouring state. In other cases, however, nomadic tribes create a natural barrier between neighbouring states. Attempts to expand state control by settling tribes can raise objections from the bordering state. Thus, tribes located in frontier areas may have more bargaining power since states do not directly intervene in tribal relations.

In vast empires, transferring military forces to distant frontier areas is very costly. States may tend to grant tribes autonomy in mountainous and inaccessible frontier areas. Less intervention may encourage indirect rule and negotiations with tribal chiefs. In contrast, in accessible core regions it is easier for states to intervene directly and use coercion when there is no external military threat.²¹

Geographical boundedness is the second factor that affects state use of coercion and mediation. It refers to the geographical concentration of tribes, that is, whether they live in a well-defined compact region with stable migration routes. Geographical boundedness emerges as a result of political or ecological adaptation. Ecological factors, such as agricultural fertility and accessibility to pastures, can lead to geographical concentration. For example, the Qashqai confederacy in Iran had isolated and inaccessible pastures with long migration routes. Qashqai pastoralism depended, for ecological reasons, on the seasonal movement of herds between widely separated pastures; nomadism was not a political adaptation in the Qashqai case.²² In other cases such as the Bakhtiari of Iran, an antagonistic state could be a factor in inducing tribes to adopt pastoral nomadism as a means of escaping state authority.²³

Geographically concentrated populations tend to settle permanently when they find an opportunity to transfer their mobile capital (i.e., animals and animal products) to immobile capital (i.e., land purchase). Fredrik Barth argues that settlement can be a means of reinvesting wealth. Rich members of a tribe, especially lineage leaders, attempt to diversify their wealth by purchasing shops or productive agricultural land.²⁴ When geographical concentration combined with political initiatives, settlement can be a more likely option. For example, the Greek Sarakatsans were a geographically concentrated tribe with well-defined seasonal migration in the Zagos region. When the Greek state granted the rights of village citizenship to Sarakatsans in 1938, Sarakatsans displayed greater conformity with village habits at least in their more outward and material aspects. Citizenship rights encouraged their sedentarization.²⁵

The internal organization of tribes, or hierarchy, is the third factor which influences the use of coercion and mediation. The necessary condition for

hierarchical organization is the existence of a tribal chief who can coordinate tribal units and place semi-nomadic groups in contact with the state. Non-hierarchical tribes do not have a tribal chief who can coordinate activity with smaller sub-units. Furthermore, hierarchy is measured along a continuum. It decreases as the ability of a chief to administer tribal sub-units weakens. Hierarchical organization increases when administrative duties are diffused to section chiefs and local headmen who can communicate with the tribal chief in even smaller units. The existence of section chiefs and local headmen creates a regular channel of communication and the devolution of authority down the tribal hierarchy.

Geographically scattered tribes tend to have a non-hierarchical organization: They live in small units in which coordination of activity by central authorities is difficult. The state has to impose a chief in order to maintain communications with the tribe. The attempts to impose a chief tend to fail in geographically scattered groups since the tribal chief would have difficulty supervising small groups that are spread over a large area. When attempts to create a tribal chief fail, the next option for the state is usually to intervene with military force. Geographically concentrated tribes, however, have more households attached to each other in the same unit, and the region in which they migrate is relatively small. The greater density of population and limited mobility makes it easier for a chief to control tribal members. This structure presents the state with the opportunity to negotiate with the tribal chief and impose less coercive solutions.

Another factor that influences state-tribe relations is the density of trade between tribes and settled populations. Proximity to trade routes, urban centres and natural resources presents more opportunities for sedentarization. Tribes located close to important trade routes would have more contact with settled populations and central authorities. Proximity to natural resources such as mines and oil can encourage sedentarization since labouring in mines and trade increase the number and importance of contacts with sedentary authorities and, thus, the potential external sources of authority. Trade may encourage tribes to adopt a centralized chieftainship in order to better regulate lucrative trade. In Iran, Bakhtiari, Qashqai and Khamseh chiefs gained power from their ability to control the increasingly important trade crossing their lands in the nineteenth century. Later these chiefs acquired further influence from their relations with the British.²⁶ The Khamseh confederacy, for example, was created to foment conflict in the area, and it was used by British and local mercantile interests against the Qashqai confederacy.²⁷

We can analyse the settlement of four Ottoman tribes (the Yeniil, Cihanbeyli, Afşar and Rışvan) with reference to the above factors and especially geographical boundedness and tribal hierarchy. All four tribes lived in the province of Ankara and engaged in similar trade and economic activities. Their livestock was mainly sheep and goats, and they made their living by trading animal products with local residents. Thus, geopolitical location and trade, two factors that influence state settlement strategy, are constant. This allows us to concentrate on the effects of geographical boundedness and tribal hierarchy on the state strategies of tribal settlement.

Although all four tribes were semi-nomadic, their geographical boundedness and tribal hierarchy varied. The Yeniil tribe was geographically the most bounded tribe. Documents describe the Yeniil tribe as a quasi-settled tribe that migrated seasonally

between pastures and included among its members merchants and artisans in the province of Ankara.²⁸ During the Tanzimat, the Yeniil tribe was successfully settled around the towns of Tokad and Kangırı with the minimum use of coercion. The Cihanbeyli tribe was less concentrated than the Yeniil tribe, but relatively bounded compared to the Afşar and Rışvan tribes. The Cihanbeylis migrated seasonally, but their route of migration was limited to the districts of Sivas, Ankara and the province of Konya. By the end of the Tanzimat era, many members of the Cihanbeyli tribe were settled in the towns of Esbikeşan and Koçgiri. The Afşars were scattered across a wide area, which ranged from the province of Ankara to the provinces of Adana and Maraş.²⁹ The state attempted to settle them in the districts of Bozok and Kayseri in the province of Ankara at the beginning of the Tanzimat, but they deserted their settlement and escaped to Mount Kozan. The Rışvan tribe was scattered across a larger area in the neighbouring provinces of Adana, Maraş and Diyarbakir. The mediated attempts to settle the Afşars and Rışvans failed until their forced settlement on Mount Kozan in 1865.

The Ottoman state's attempt to impose hierarchy led to different outcomes in these tribes. The Rışvans had no tribal chief before the Tanzimat. They lived in scattered units and rebelled against any kind of tribal authority. The state's attempts to impose a chief in the Rışvan tribe failed during the Tanzimat. Tribal notables and section headmen, who had limited control over scattered units, continued to provide a weak coordination link with the imperial centre. Likewise, the Afşar tribe had no tribal chief before the Tanzimat. Efforts to implement a tribal chief in the Afşar tribe produced partial success. A tribal chief was installed, but appointed chiefs faced severe rivalry from tribe members during the Tanzimat.

At the beginning of the Tanzimat, the Cihanbeyli tribe had a strong chief who controlled all tribe sections. The state successfully furthered hierarchy and distributed administrative duties to section chiefs and local headmen during the Tanzimat. This reduced the absolute control of the Cihanbeyli chief and balanced his power with other tribal authorities. The Yeniil tribe likewise had a well-organized hierarchical structure even before the Tanzimat. Administrative power was distributed in descending authority from the governor to section chiefs and to local headmen in smaller units. This structure stayed the same throughout the Tanzimat and facilitated the settlement of the Yeniil.

The following section describes state policies for controlling tribes. It demonstrates how these policies were received by the tribes in the province of Ankara. Then, it analyzes how state-tribe interactions in earlier centuries presented an opportunity for the state to experiment with the effectiveness of its strategies and to revise its settlement policies for the four tribes during the Tanzimat.

Existing studies on tribal groups define the following strategies (or a combination of these) that the Ottoman state employed in order to control its large tribal population before the Tanzimat: 1) transforming or destroying existing structures of tribes through exile and military force; 2) drawing a perimeter around tribes, extracting tribute across the perimeter but intervening little inside it; 3) integrating selected leaders and their followers into the system of rule, backing these indirect rulers with force or other resources when necessary; and 4) integrating and assimilating tribes

into administrative structures by incentives such as trade subsidies and land allocation. The first strategy is coercive while the remaining three focus on mediation, including limited use of coercion.

Before the Tanzimat, there were short-term temporary state policies of settlement. The state deployed the above strategies temporarily to pacify tribes in situations when tribes disturbed sedentary groups, when it was necessary to populate newly conquered land, or when tribes did not pay their taxes. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire conquered new lands in the Balkans and Anatolia. The new territorial acquisitions required the importation of settlers to work and produce revenue for the state treasury in the long run. The constant flow of tribes from the East provided an important settlement resource. The Ottoman state encouraged the movement of semi-nomadic groups to new territories and attempted to 'enliven' (*şenlendirmek*) land through the settlement of both sedentary and semi-nomadic groups. Settlement was implemented in three ways: endowments (*vakıf*), creation of residential units around watchtowers, and forced exile (*sürgün*).³⁰

The creation of endowments and residence units represented incentive-based strategies for integrating tribes into administrative structures. The formation of religious endowments promoted the settlement of religious men (dervishes) in frontier regions. Dervishes brought their followers to new settlements. New settlers were granted tax exemptions for short durations. Semi-nomadic groups were also settled around watchtowers, which protected roads and protected food supplies and animals for traders and military personnel. Tribes did not resist this incorporation into the security network of the empire since they received tax exemptions in return for their services.

Forced exile (*sürgün*) represented the coercive aspect of state policies. In both settled and nomadic groups, the Ottoman centre required migration to newly conquered land. The exile of rebellious tribes and convicts was a common strategy for eliminating local unrest and populating new land in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Exile was usually accomplished through coercion, although some incentives such as tax exemptions were provided once the groups moved to their new settlements. Forced exile also continued in later centuries as a means of providing state control long after the conquest of new land had ended.

In the late seventeenth century, with war defeats, fiscal crises and continuous unrest in Anatolia, forced exile became a commonly used state strategy. The conquest of new land was no longer possible, and tribal settlements had to be oriented internally.³¹ Furthermore, fiscal crisis and local unrest weakened central control over tribes. Some tribes became bandits and robbers and refused to pay their taxes. The general policy for preventing unrest involved sending tribes to exile in distant provinces. This was a temporary solution in which the state aimed at preventing tribes from returning to the regions in which they had caused unrest.³²

In addition to forced exile and the direct use of coercion, some mediation was employed in that time period. In frontier regions where relations with bordering states were important, the state drew a perimeter around some tribes and extracted tribute from them without intervening inside that perimeter. This was achieved through negotiating with selected tribal leaders. These leaders were incorporated into the administration by granting them favors and backing them with military force or other resources when necessary. State protection thus led to the emergence of some

leaders as rulers of their tribes. The Ottoman state did not intervene much in the internal relations of tribes as long as tribal leaders were able to extract revenues for the state. For example, along the Persian border Kurdish emirates ruled semi-autonomously in Kurdistan. They were autonomous in administering their tribes but depended on the Ottoman state in foreign relations. Emirs were required to pay a fixed amount of revenue to the Ottoman treasury each year until the early nineteenth century.³³

Some combinations of these policies were applied to the Yeniil, Afşar, Cihanbeyli and Rişvan tribes. While it is possible that all four tribes were present in the region in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, no detailed information exists on the subject. The earliest document on one of these tribes was cited in Ahmet Refik's classification of archival documents on tribes. It refers to a conflict in 1565 between the Danişmendli tribe and the Afşars in Maraş, a district near the province of Ankara. Another document written in 1577 mentions the unrest caused by the Cihanbeyli tribe in the districts of Ankara and Aksaray.³⁴ We also know that the Afşar tribe was among the Shia Turcomans³⁵ who migrated to Persia after increasing Sunni Ottoman control in Central Anatolia, and they contributed to the rise of the Safavid Empire under Nadir Shah's leadership.³⁶

As early as the sixteenth century, the Yeniil tribe was declared a separate administrative unit (*müstakil kaza*). This was an example of the strategy of drawing a perimeter around tribes: Appointed governors – usually among tribe notables – ruled the Yeniil tribe, and a separate judge (*qadi*) was responsible for administering justice within the tribe. The tribe governor and the judge were not subjected to local state agents. Rather, they directly communicated with the governor of the province (*vali*), the highest state official in the region. Thus, separate district status provided autonomy for tribes in their internal affairs, but tribes remained dependent on the provincial governor in external affairs.³⁷

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all four tribes were considered rebellious, and the Ottoman state had to devise ways to control them. As a result of disturbances, all four tribes were expelled to Rakka in Syria in 1691. Since the Ottoman state did not provide any incentives or planning for the settlement of tribes in Rakka, the state probably did not intend to sedentarize them. Rather, the exile was a temporary solution to prevent further unrest. Rakka was a popular destination for exile. Arab tribes resided in Rakka, and the Ottoman state intended to pit the Arab tribes against the Kurdish and Turkish tribes: This would prevent unrest in Anatolia, and Syrian land would become more obedient to the state as Arab, Kurdish and Turkish tribes consumed their energies battling one another.³⁸

This exile policy was a failure for the Ottoman state. The land in Rakka was infertile, there were few water sources, and the pressure of the Arab tribes was unbearable. All four tribes deserted Rakka and returned to their original winter and summer pastures almost immediately. Several times the Ottoman centre unsuccessfully attempted to send them back to Rakka using armed forces. At the end of the eighteenth century, all four tribes were reportedly back in their original summer and winter pastures.³⁹

The unsuccessful attempts to settle the four tribes in earlier centuries forced the Ottoman state to review its policy of exile. Consequently, during the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state adopted a new strategy of controlling tribes by sedentarizing them in

their pastures instead of expelling them to distant provinces. Even when tribes had to be removed from their pastures, the state attempted to at least limit their movement within the proximate district.

In the eighteenth century, the Yeniil tribe lived in the southern parts of the districts of Sivas and Niğde.⁴⁰ The Cihanbeyli tribe was reported to reside mainly in the provinces of Diyarbakir and Musul and in the district of Mardin. The Cihanbeylis were reported as having a hundred thousand tents in 1766. They frequently deserted their settlements and caused unrest in Ankara and the neighboring provinces. The Afşar tribe was reported to live in a large area stretching from Kayseri in the north to Adana in the south and Maraş in the east. In 1766 the Rışvans were reported as having 12,000 tents in the region. They resided in the district of Sivas during the summer and migrated to Aleppo in the winter.⁴¹

In the early nineteenth century, there are occasional references to the tribes in the memoirs of European travellers. British travelers, William Ainsworth and William Hamilton, report their encounters with Turcoman and Kurdish tribes although they rarely report the names of tribes during their travel in Central Anatolia.⁴² Hamilton makes interesting observations about the inhabitants of the region. He divides them into four categories: the common Turkish peasant, the Turcoman (*Türkmen*), the Euruque (*Yörüük*), and the Kurd. The Turkish peasants dwelled in villages and were agricultural laborers. Although many of them retired to the mountains during the summer, they lived in houses, not in tents. The Turcomans had a pastoralist life. They lived in stationary villages during the winter and always lived in tents during the summer, but seldom cultivated ground or raised corn. They lived mainly on the produce of their flocks and herds. They were governed by their own chiefs. The Euruques had no villages and were truly nomadic. They lived in tents and on the produce of flocks and herds, but generally in wooded and mountainous districts. The Kurds, who spoke a different language than the rest, had their own chiefs and led a thoroughly independent life. Similar to Euruques, they had no villages and cultivated no land, but bred horses and kept large flocks. The Kurds were geographically scattered, moving into different districts according to the season. They were not numerous in Asia Minor, and lived around the district of Haimaneh (near Ankara) and the south of Mount Argaeus.⁴³

The Ottoman state intervened in this geography and attempted to sedentarize pastoral nomadic tribes in the region during the Tanzimat. Compared to earlier settlements, the difference the Tanzimat made in controlling these four tribes can be summarized as the following. First, there was a mass scale attempt to sedentarize tribes in the province of Ankara. This was a general policy in the Tanzimat era; The Ottoman state attempted to sedentarize many tribes in various regions of the empire. Regardless of whether they were a source of disruption or not, tribes in several areas, including Bosnia, Kurdistan, Syria and Transjordan were forced or encouraged to settle permanently in their respective regions.⁴⁴

Second, the Tanzimat pattern of sedentarization by abandoning movement and pastoral nomadism was altogether different from the earlier practices of settlement, which did not radically alter semi-nomadism since most tribal members kept their pastures and their migratory routes. Settlement practices in earlier centuries aimed to pacify and control the four tribes without directly intervening in their internal administration. During the Tanzimat, settlement policies eliminated the migration

routes and attempted to register the property and population of the four tribes for taxation purposes. Sedentarization prevented herding and animal husbandry when migration to pastures was eliminated. Therefore, the Ottoman state had to adopt some flexible practices, such as allowing some tribe members, especially the more obedient and less troublesome ones, to use pastures closer to their new settlements from time to time. These flexibilities, however, also caused some problems when tribes insisted on taking their animals to distant and fruitful pastures.⁴⁵

Third, sedentarization of the four tribes resembled the broader state policy of the Tanzimat. An important idea behind the Tanzimat reforms was to create a central state administration under which all subjects would be treated equally.⁴⁶ The ruling elite had both practical and ideological reasons for adopting this policy. They thought that equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims would provide territorial integrity and prevent separatist movements, especially in the Balkans. A direct relationship between rulers and subjects would also provide efficient taxation and rational administration. Their model was the nation-states in Europe, where centralization of administration eliminated local intermediaries and formed direct relations between states and citizens. The premises of the Reform edict (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun* of 1839) display the concerns of the Ottoman state for combining its needs for revenue and control with the idea of Ottoman citizenship. The premises included equal taxation, equal military conscription and guarantees for life, honor and property of all subjects.

The sedentarization of the four tribes in the province of Ankara would satisfy the needs for both taxation and conscription. It was also a measure of central control, an important element of the Ottoman nation-state. Sedentarization would eliminate indirect rule and increase the presence of the state at the local level. One interesting anecdote shows that the premise of the Gülhane Edict, the guarantees for life, honour and property, was applied in tribal settlements: As the Rışvan tribe lived in scattered small groups, before the Tanzimat it was customary to kidnap headmen and tribal leaders. The state would bring the captives to Istanbul, negotiate with tribal leaders, and threaten tribal units with the arrest of more leaders. The captive leaders in turn signed documents promising that the tribe would return to the designated settlement areas. Archival documents note that eventually the Tanzimat administration had to abolish this practice as a result of legal changes guaranteeing life and liberty. In 1846 the state decreed that holding Rışvan notables captive was against Tanzimat regulations of guarantees for life, honor and property.⁴⁷

Finally, the Ottoman state blended old and new administrative policies to settle the tribes in the province of Ankara. The state combined its prior experience with tribes and new strategies for sedentarization. The oldest strategy, negotiation with tribal authorities, continued, and there was increasing emphasis on mediation during the Tanzimat. Thus, the Ottoman state continued actively to pursue the imposition of tribal chiefs to mediate relations with the state. Tanzimat reforms attempted to curtail the power of tribal chiefs while at the same time using them for sedentarization. The Ottoman centre recognized the importance of communicating with all levels of tribal structure and thus tried to reinforce a hierarchical organization that, from top to bottom, included tribal chiefs, section headmen, and local headmen. The direct communication of the state with leaders in small units would keep the power of tribal chiefs in check.

During the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state adopted new control techniques and strengthened old ones. The Ottoman state reinforced the earlier strategy of providing incentives to enhance tribal settlements. Tax exemptions continued to be an effective incentive, as in previous centuries. During the Tanzimat, the four tribes were encouraged by more constructive measures, such as the construction of houses and small donations of animal and land. New strategies such as the regular census of tribes were attempted as a result of the increasing need of the state to gain regular information about tribes.⁴⁸ In addition to these strategies, the issuing of travel permits, an old technique to control the movement of people and goods, was reinforced to limit the movement of tribal groups.

The section below discusses the varying outcomes of settlement policies in the Yeniil, Cihanbeyli, Aşar and Rışvan tribes in detail. As few studies have been conducted on the tribes of the Ankara region, Ottoman archival documents were used to ascertain the hierarchical organization and geographical boundedness of the tribes.⁴⁹ These documents include state documents (petitions between the centre and local state officials) and petitions of local people to the state, including both tribe members and local inhabitants. In the absence of written culture among the tribes, state documents provide a very detailed source of information about state-tribe relations. For increased reliability of state documents, documents from 1839 until 1869 and data from several catalogues were examined.⁵⁰

The settlement of the Yeniil tribe proves that a geographically concentrated tribe with a hierarchical organization can be settled permanently with a minimum use of coercion (that is, with only limited surveillance). The Ottoman state recognized the existing hierarchical structure in the Yeniil tribe and manipulated it as a means of furthering the tribe's settlement during the Tanzimat period.

The Yeniil tribe was formed as a confederation of several Turkic tribes and tribal sections and was officially recognized as the Yeniil tribe in the sixteenth century.⁵¹ At the time of the formation of the confederacy, there were several tribal and section chiefs who exercised authority over different tribal groups. This confederacy was recognized as a separate administrative unit in the seventeenth century, and the Ottoman state appointed a tribal governor among tribal and section chiefs. The governor gradually established his authority over section and local headmen. At the turn of the nineteenth century, all tribes and tribal sections under the Yeniil administration were loyal to the tribal governor, but they were also able to balance his power by exerting collective influence over decision making processes. Furthermore, section and local headmen would contact the Ottoman centre directly when they had any complaints regarding the administration.

In 1840, immediately after the declaration of the Tanzimat, the state granted the Yeniil tribe separate administrative status (*müstakil muhassılık*), and placed additional tribe sections under the administration of the Yeniil. In this system, a tribal chief was appointed with the title of director (*müdür*). However, he was subordinate to the state appointed governor (*kaymakam* or *muhassıl*). The governors were usually appointed among the notables of the towns and cities in which the Yeniils resided. The first governor (*muhassıl*) of the Yeniil was the old *voynoda*, the governor responsible for tax collection from the tribe before the Tanzimat. Thus,

the same person stayed in office with only a change in title and a minor addition of administrative duties.⁵²

Separate administration provided some initial benefits for both the state and the tribal governor. Because tribal governors were not subordinated to the local administrators of nearby towns and districts, conflict between provincial officials and tribes was kept at minimum. Tribal governors enjoyed this privileged status of unchecked power while the Ottoman state was able to keep a close eye on the tribe by controlling the appointment of the governor.

In the period of separate administration, the Ottoman centre achieved sedentarization through mediation and rarely used policing activity. A state decree dated 1851 describes this mediation process in the Haremeyn and Pehlivanlı tribes, which were administratively part of the Yeniil unit. In this decree, the state ordered the governor of Ankara to select some members of the tribe who could 'understand the words of the centre' (*sözanlarlar*). This was a reference to tribe members with which it would be easy to negotiate in every locality. These people would act as sureties for each other under the supervision of local headmen (*muhtar*) and negotiate the settlement process. In the event that tribe members deserted the settlement, the headmen would be responsible for catching the deserters. Also, when unlawful activities took place in the settlement, the headmen were to inform the local councils. The state also appointed with salary some local council members from neighboring towns to supervise the settlement process. The settlement was accompanied with incentives and subsidies. Tribal members familiar with agriculture would be given small plots of land, and they would immediately begin cultivation. Others could work as shepherds or camel herders. If the land in a village was not sufficient for tribal settlement, tribe members would be made sharecroppers (*ortakçıs*).⁵³

In 1857 the Yeniil separate administrative unit was abolished. The Yeniil tribe and sections under its jurisdiction were incorporated into the regular administration. Although separate administration had furthered tribal settlement, it did not prove to be a stable solution as a result of tribal responses to state policies. First, tribes and tribal sections that had recently been placed under Yeniil administration with the Tanzimat reforms were not willing to give up their autonomy and taxation privileges to the Yeniil governor.

Tribes and tribal sections demanded separation from the Yeniil administration and frequently complained about the governor to the state because of unfair tax collection and corruption. The imperial centre usually approved their demands, in return asking the tribes to settle permanently. An example of such a conflict appears in a document dated 1847. Members of the Boynuboğanlı tribe complained to the state that the Yeniil governor (*kaymakam*), Hacı Ali Ağa had demanded extra taxes from the tribe. The Boynuboğanlıs were unwilling to pay and demanded that the state separate them from the Yeniil administration. In return, they agreed to settle down permanently in the district of Bilecik. The Ottoman state accepted their settlement offer and dismissed the governor of the Yeniil.⁵⁴

The second and possibly more important reason for the abolition of the separate administration was the unchecked power of the tribal governors. Tribal governors were subordinate only to the governor of the province. Thus in the absence of closer scrutiny of local district officials, when the governor allied with tribal notables and section headmen, he was able to rule unimpeded.

Some Yeniil governors abused their unchecked power and collected illegal taxes. In 1857 the governor of the Yeniil allied with a local notable from Kangırı, Hacı Seyyid. A petition signed by Yeniil members complained that the governor relieved some males from military service in exchange for bribes. He and Hacı Seyyid also made a habit of collecting extra taxes and selling young tribal women to outsiders. In one instance, some members of the tribe reported that the governor forced the tribe to send camels away from mines to port cities where he could earn more money in transportation. Tribe members argued that to end the unimpeded and corrupt rule of the governor, the separate administrative unit had to be abolished. The state accepted their demand, abolished the separate administration, and placed the Yeniil tribal units under the administration of the towns in which some of its members already resided.⁵⁵ In return, the centre demanded that the tribe make timely tax payments and continue sending their camels to the lead mines. Both the Yeniil tribe and the state benefited from the deal. The Ottoman state was able to secure permanent settlement and the transportation of lead while tribe members benefited from the discharge of the despotic governor.

After the abolition of the separate administration, a specific commission was established to guide the incorporation of the Yeniil tribe into the regular administration. Provincial council members in Ankara were appointed to this commission. The headmen (*muhtar*) and notables of the tribe were to be brought before the commission in Ankara in order to negotiate the amount of unpaid taxes. Starting in 1859, the taxes of the tribe were calculated together with the taxes of the villages and towns in which the tribe members resided. If any tribe members caused disturbances, a specific commission made up of members of the provincial council, local notables and tribe headmen was to adjudicate.⁵⁶

By the 1860's the settlement of the Yeniil was complete. They were incorporated into villages and towns in the Tokad region. There is no doubt that the existence of a hierarchical organization at the beginning of the Tanzimat helped to further the sedentarization of the Yeniil without resort to military force. However, the settlement of other tribes was not nearly as peaceful.

The case of the Cihanbeyli settlement indicates that coercion becomes a more likely option for the state as tribal hierarchy and geographical boundedness decrease. It also displays the active efforts of the Ottoman state to impose local and section headmen as a means to enhance tribal hierarchy.

Compared to the Yeniil, the Cihanbeyli tribe was less hierarchical and geographically more scattered. Archival documents indicate 600 Cihanbeyli households in the district of Sivas.⁵⁷ In his monograph on the Kurdish tribes of the Ottoman Empire in 1908, Mark Sykes reports that the Koçgiri⁵⁸ tribe consisted of 10,000 families in the little known district north of the Sivas–Zara road. He also described the Janbekli (Cihanbeyli) tribe of 5,000 families near Ankara. He noted that the tribe was expelled from east of Urfa by Sultan Selim. The tribe was probably the remnants of the Rakka exile.⁵⁹ Although the Cihanbeyli tribe was geographically scattered and mobile, it had developed a semi-hierarchical organization by the beginning of the Tanzimat period. The chief of the tribe (*mir*) held enormous power. In contrast to the powerful section and local headmen of the Yeniil tribe, section and

local headmen were relatively weak in the Cihanbeyli tribe, and the Cihanbeyli chief had control of the tribal structure.

The most influential chief of the Cihanbeyli tribe was Alişan Bey. He ruled the tribe for ten years (1842–1852), and was an indispensable part of the Tanzimat administration. In the period of the Cihanbeyli separate administration, Alişan Bey ruled alongside the governor (*kaymakam*) of the tribe. In contrast to the Yeniil, where the governor had control over tribal and section chiefs, the appointed Cihanbeyli governor depended on Alişan Bey's support, as he was an outsider and had little knowledge about tribal relations. Alişan Bey was never appointed as a governor of the tribe but his official title of *mir* (chieftain) demonstrates the state's acknowledgement of his power. He was willing to cooperate with the state since this provided him with benefits such as tax collection and an entourage of state troops. The geographically scattered nature of the Cihanbeylis and the resulting absence of strong local and section headmen made Alişan the key broker between the centre and the tribe. Ultimately, the state gave Alişan Bey a pay raise and a medal for his success in the settlement of the Cihanbeylis.⁶⁰

The following anecdotes regarding Alişan Bey clarify the multi-layered role of the tribal chief as a state official with administrative, security and financial duties. In 1848 the provincial council of Sivas sent a petition to the state demanding the use of military force against the Cihanbeylis, who had not been obeying the government since the decree of the Tanzimat.⁶¹ Fearing military intervention, Alişan Bey organized a petition drive and secured the signatures of tribe notables, and section and local headmen. In this petition Alişan Bey and the other signatories guaranteed that the tribe would not cause damage to local residents. The imperial centre accepted Alişan Bey's offer and decided against sending military troops to the area.⁶² In this example, Alişan Bey acted as an administrator and compelled tribe members to obey state rule.

Alişan was also responsible for policing members of the tribe: In 1845 two bandits from the Yozganlı tribe – a subunit of the Cihanbeyli – were arrested after they stole the money and goods of a trader called Malkoc Hacı Musa of Tiflis. They were immediately thrown into prison by the local governor, but Alişan Bey assured the authorities that they would return the goods and money to the trader if released. However, the bandits fled after their release, and Alişan was brought to Ankara and placed under state surveillance. Since he had acted as guarantor, officials asked him to catch the bandits. He was released from prison under the condition of returning the bandits, and he was given enough money to gather men and guns to pursue the bandits.⁶³

Another example displays Alişan Bey's financial duties. In 1847 the Cihanbeyli tribe was in great debt to a Russian trader, David Savalan.⁶⁴ Savalan went to the Sublime Porte and demanded immediate payment. The debt was probably related to animal trade since the Cihanbeylis were famous for sheep breeding. The Ottoman centre decided to collect the debt from the Cihanbeylis in the form of wool. However, the Cihanbeylis were either unable or unwilling to pay the debt, and they stole the sheep of local residents to use as payment. The state responded by ordering butchers to give up any sheep procured from the Cihanbeyli tribe.⁶⁵ Alişan Bey was made responsible for the debt, and he signed a document stating that he would arrange timely payments. However, he was unable to assure full repayment.⁶⁶

The debt conflict between the tribe and the Russian merchant gained such proportions so as to threaten the meat supply of Istanbul. Most of the sheep that

maintained the capital city's meat supply came from tribes in the Ankara region. Since this meat was given to David Savalan – on account of Russia's political influence – a shortage of meat affected Istanbul. A state order demanded that butchers from the Balkan lands send more meat to Istanbul to prevent the shortage.⁶⁷ After this incident, Alişan guaranteed debt payment, but once again he was unable to assure full payment.

Alişan Bey was dismissed from office two years after this incident, his inability to make timely payments to the state contributing to his dismissal. More importantly, his power over the tribe units had gradually decreased as the Ottoman state attempted to further hierarchy by imposing local and section headmen. The headmen of smaller tribes and tribe sections under the Cihanbeyli administration were not willing to share their administrative duties and economic benefits with Alişan Bey. This is exemplified in Abdurrahman Bey's 1844 petition as the head of the Mirveys tribe, one of the Cihanbeyli subunits (*boy*) in the region. In his complaint, Abdurrahman Bey accused Alişan Bey of intervening in the Mirveys tax collection and administrative matters. He warned the centre that if the chieftainship in the Cihanbeyli tribe was not abolished, the settlement of the tribe would be unsuccessful.

Rüstem Paşa, chief inspector of reforms in Anatolia, revealed the Ottoman state's strategy of diffusing control to smaller unit headmen in his reply to this petition. His report shows the active engagement of the Ottoman state in order to change the tribal structure and to curtail the power of the tribal chief by diffusing authority to the leaders of smaller tribal units. He argued that it was too early to dismiss the chieftainship. Rüstem Paşa had probably noted the key brokerage role played by Alişan Bey in the tribe, and he offered to keep the position intact while appointing headmen (*muhtars*) to every section. His model involved diffusing authority within the tribe by singling out certain leaders as headmen and gradually disabling the tribal chief.⁶⁸ The Ottoman centre implemented Rüstem Paşa's plan, appointing headmen to their localities and dismissing Alişan Bey later. Salahaddin Ağa, a local notable in Ankara,⁶⁹ was later appointed as the chief of the Cihanbeyli tribe. Alişan Bey's acceptance of dismissal from the chieftainship was maintained by granting him a state post. In a document dated 1852, Alişan was reported as the local governor of the town of Kırşehir, not far from his tribal lands.⁷⁰ Securing the governorship of an important city was a highly prestigious and economically beneficial position for Alişan Bey, and thus, he managed to save his political fortunes.

The dismissal of Alişan Bey was an important step towards the sedentarization of the Cihanbeylis. Rüstem Paşa's plan seemed to work well. In 1860, the separate administrative unit of the Cihanbeyli was abolished, and the tribal units were incorporated into the towns and villages in which they resided.⁷¹ Some sections of the tribe were settled in villages in the Esbikeşan town in Konya, but the majority were settled in the district of Koçgiri in Sivas.⁷² Coercion was occasionally used in the Cihanbeyli settlement, especially when tribe members were involved in banditry. Even in these cases, the tribal chief had some control over policing activity.

In contrast to the minimum use of coercion in the settlement of the Yeniil and Cihanbeyli tribes, the settlement of the segments of the Afşar tribe living in the province of Ankara required frequent military intervention. In 1865 the Ottoman

state sent large troops to Mount Kozan and forced the Afşars and other tribes in the region to settle permanently. This forced settlement was called *Fırka-yı Islahiye* (reform expedition).⁷³ The Afşar settlement demonstrates that the absence of tribal hierarchy in a geographically scattered tribe can lead to state use of coercion. Coercion increasingly became the sole option for the Ottoman state as its attempts to impose a tribal chief on the Afşars failed.

The Afşars lived in a large area ranging from Ankara, to Adana and Maraş. Documents report one to two thousand Afşar households in the district of Bozok in Ankara. The Afşar tribe never received separate administrative status since there was no chieftain to pledge responsibility to the governor. The imperial centre appointed chieftains to the tribe, but they were unable to control administration in the early Tanzimat. In 1846 the Afşar units in the Bozok region rebelled and killed Osman Paşa who was appointed to collect unpaid taxes from the Afşars by the governor of Maraş.⁷⁴ After the death of Osman Paşa, the state appointed a member of the Afşar tribe, Çerkez Bey, as the tribal chief in 1849.⁷⁵ Çerkez Bey ruled the tribe for ten years until his death in 1859.⁷⁶ However, his rule did not resemble Alişan Bey's rule of the Cihanbeyli tribe. While Alişan Bey was able to control and administer his tribe in a centralized fashion, Çerkez Bey's rule relied on alliances with other tribal leaders and prominent local families. Thus, he was successful insofar as he managed to rule for a long time without being executed.

During Çerkez Bey's rule, different sections of the Afşars rebelled, robbed and killed local residents. In one such incident dating from 1858, the merchants and shopkeepers of the town of Kozan sent a petition with 365 signatures to Istanbul. They complained about the settlement deserters who escaped to Mount Kozan, invaded the town, and damaged property. They wanted the state to send military troops to eliminate Afşar bandits from the region.⁷⁷ The state assigned Çerkez Bey to this duty and sent additional gendarme forces for reinforcement. Çerkez Bey was successful and was given a medal for catching the deserters. His success was assisted by his kinship ties and allies on Mount Kozan. Çerkez Bey was the son-in-law of Çadırcı Mehmed Ağa, who was the governor of the district of Kozan and a member of the prominent Kozanoğlu family.⁷⁸

His military successes and close alliances with the region's most prominent family helped Çerkez Bey to establish limited control over the Afşar tribe. He became a valued ally of the Ottoman state, and the state favored him in disputes with other state officials. An example of the favorable treatment of Çerkez Bey was reported in 1858. The Ottoman state forced the resettlement of the Afşar tribe in the districts of Bozok and Kayseri and incorporated their tax registers into the town of Bozok.⁷⁹ Çerkez Bey, his clerk (*kethüda*) and his son, Hacı Bey, who at the time was the governor of the town of Hamasi, were assigned to manage the settlement. They resettled some Afşar subunits in the area with the help of military forces. A member of the district council of Kayseri, Hacı Mehmed Ağa, was appointed as comptroller and charged with paying Çerkez Bey and his men's salary. Hacı Mehmed failed to make timely payments and squandered the money. As a result, Çerkez Bey, with his son and his men, invaded the mansion of the governor of Kayseri. They argued with the governor and Hacı Mehmed, and Çerkez Bey's son pointed a gun at the governor. However, they were arrested before they did any harm.

Çerkez Bey escaped from prison and came to Istanbul in the hope that the Sultan would grant him an audience. He explained to the court in Istanbul that Hacı Mehmed had not paid the salaries due them and that the governor of Kayseri and certain members of the Afşar tribe had conspired to lead the people to rebellion. The court decided not to punish him and his men in order to prevent further conflict among the Afşars. The state declared Hacı Mehmed guilty for not paying the money he had promised and he was dismissed from the council. In addition, an investigation of the situation was ordered.⁸⁰ This case indicates that despite disputes between the provincial administration and the tribal chief, the state viewed Çerkez Bey as a valuable broker between the centre and the tribe.

However, backing for Çerkez Bey's rule was not enough to complete the Afşar settlement and so the Ottoman centre tried to encourage settlement through incentives. For example, Afşar and Rışvan members who agreed to settle in the district of Ankara would be rewarded with an exemption from grain taxes for two years.⁸¹ The state also planned to build a mine town around the Akdağ mine which was located on Mount Kozan and to provide work to local Afşars in exchange for settlement. Some funds were reserved for construction of the town although there is no evidence that these plans were realized.⁸²

None of these incentives helped further the settlement of the Afşar tribe. Çerkez Bey and subsequent tribal chiefs were unable to stop banditry and unrest. In 1864 the Ottoman state began to show a willingness for a large-scale military intervention. It ordered the notables of the Afşar tribe (20–30 people) into exile in the Balkans. In this document, it was mentioned that if the exile did not further the settlement, a large-scale military intervention would be likely.⁸³ In 1865 an Ottoman expedition entered Mount Kozan with 9,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery. Its objectives were to capture the lords, settle tribes, and establish a regular bureaucratic administration.⁸⁴ The result was costly and caused the deaths and exile of many tribal notables.

The *Fırka-yı Islahiye* expedition was the first of its kind in Anatolia. Although its success was based on the cooperation of the ruling Kozanoğlu family, the scale of the expedition and the immediate success in settling tribes differed from earlier settlement policies. Instead of using occasional military force as a response to unrest, the state intervened directly in the region. After the administrative incorporation of Mount Kozan, the scattered Afşar subunits were incorporated into the towns and districts in which they were forced to settle. Given the enduring absence of tribal hierarchy and the geographical boundedness of the Afşar tribe, the Ottoman state found little choice but to coerce settlement.

In contrast to the Afşar tribe, where a tribal chieftain was partially imposed, attempts to impose a tribal chief on the Rışvan tribe failed because of its geographically scattered nature. The case of the Rışvan settlement displays the frequent use of military troops and policing activity. The Rışvan tribe was also affected by the *Fırka-yı Islahiye* expedition, and some of the Rışvan units were settled during this military intervention.

The Rışvan tribe was geographically the most scattered tribe among the four tribes. Archive documents note one thousand Rışvan households in the neighboring

province of Konya in 1849.⁸⁵ Mark Sykes does not report any Rıŝvan tribe in the province of Ankara in 1908, but he reports 70 families of the nomadic Rıŝvan tribe around Erzurum, a city quite distant from the province of Ankara. This probably shows the extent of the geographically scattered character of the tribe.⁸⁶ The Rıŝvans were highly mobile, and they deserted their settlements easily. Some deserters of the Rıŝvan settlement in Konya went as far as Diyarbakir and Syria.⁸⁷ During the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state tried to settle the Rıŝvans in several areas in and around the province of Ankara: Yozgad, Kırŝehir (close to Mount Çiçek and Mount Ilgar) and Esbikeŝan (in the province of Konya).⁸⁸ These attempts required the use of military force since there was no tribal chief with which the centre could negotiate.

The Rıŝvan tribe lacked hierarchical structure. They circulated in small units across a wide region. Their high mobility made it impossible for a chief to impose control. The leaders of tribal subunits had only limited control, and none emerged powerful enough to control all sections of the tribe. In the early Tanzimat period, the state granted the Rıŝvan tribe separate administrative status and appointed a governor and a chief to the tribe. There were constant conflicts between the governor and the chief. In 1845 the governor, Mustafa Ağa, and the tribal chief, Ali Bey, complained about each other to the centre alleging the abuse of power. Both were dismissed and sent to Konya for trial.⁸⁹

Overall, neither the appointed governor nor the chief had much power, and the imposition of a tribal chief failed during the Tanzimat. The governor did not have any administrative control since he did not have connections to scattered tribal units. The tribal chief did not have much power, either. He had to rely on the leaders of scattered small units to administer the tribe. The tribal chief usually allied with tribe notables and did not obey state orders. The centre thus had to rely on these tribal leaders in the absence of a clearly defined tribal chief. For example, in 1847 when Rıŝvans residing in the province of Trabzon failed to pay their annual taxes, the local headmen and elders of the tribe – not the tribal chief – signed a petition that made them sureties for the tax payment.⁹⁰

In 1842 the state attempted to settle the Rıŝvans in the province of Konya. In less than a year, they escaped from the settlement and began to rob local residents.⁹¹ The state avoided the use of large-scale military force at first, given the heavy winter season. The Ottoman centre reordered the settlement of the Rıŝvans in the district of Esbikeŝan in Konya region in 1850.⁹² The new settlement strategy took advantage of the scattered nature of the tribe. Scattered tribal groups were settled in various villages, preventing the small Rıŝvan units from gathering enough manpower to resist soldiers and the gendarmes. However, contrary to expectations, most settlers promptly deserted the settlement, and they became a threat to local populations when they were involved in robbery and banditry.

The Ottoman state did not give up its attempts to settle the Rıŝvan tribe after this failure. In 1864 the separate administration of the Rıŝvan tribe was abolished, and tribal groups were incorporated into the administrative units in which they resided. Tribal notables strongly objected. They allied with the appointed tribal chief and sent a petition to the state demanding the reversal of the decision. Their demand was rejected, and the Rıŝvan tribe was forced to settle in the Konya region once again.⁹³

Ironically, the success of the RıŖvan settlement was based on their scattered nature and the use of coercion. Since the RıŖvans lived in small, highly mobile units, they could not resist military troops. They faced the choice of settlement or military reprisal. The *Fırka-yı Islahiye* expedition of 1865 also furthered the settlement of the most rebellious RıŖvan sections on Mount Kozan. Ultimately the RıŖvan tribe was not settled in the Konya region. Rather, it was settled sparsely across a wide area in the provinces of Ankara and Konya.⁹⁴

The sedentarization of tribes, an important measure of centralization, was accomplished by interacting with tribal groups in the province of Ankara. Top down imposition of settlement by centrally promoted plans necessitated use of coercion which was costly for the Ottoman state. The state strategy was to further tribal hierarchy and to negotiate with tribal leaders. Coercion was employed only when mediation failed. State centralization was a process in which both state and local actors positioned themselves according to perceived responses. The use of indirect rule in state centralization in the context of state-tribe relations is the contribution of non-Western cases to the study of state transformations since state-tribe relations is not part of the analysis of Western cases.

The Ottoman state was quite successful in settling the tribes in the province of Ankara. The four factors described in this article and the early Tanzimat ideology of creating an Ottoman citizenship (which disregarded religious and ethnic differences) contributed to the successful sedentarization of the tribes in the province of Ankara. However, experience with other tribal settlements in different regions of the empire was different. Especially in the frontier areas of Kurdistan and Arab provinces, where tribal settlements started later, the settlement strategy was based on ethnic politics and produced more troublesome consequences especially during Abdulhamid II's reign. After the 1860's, ethnic conflicts in Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria were instances of less successful outcomes of the attempts at sedentarization and increasing state control.

In conclusion, the Ottoman state recognized that the most effective mechanism for expanding state control through mediation was a well-defined tribal chief. The state also recognized that the power of tribal chiefs should be balanced and so it devolved administrative functions to section and local headmen. The comparative cases in this article allow us to draw four important conclusions concerning state control and tribal settlement in the Ottoman context. First, even within the same geographical region the state combined direct and indirect rule (coercion and mediation) in various configurations in order to enhance its control of non-sedentary populations. Second, the state's decision to use coercion, mediation or a combination of both was a consequence of its adaptive interactions with tribes. Third, state settlement policies were primarily contingent upon the geographical boundedness and internal organization of non-sedentary groups and secondarily upon a tribe's geopolitical location and its role in regional trade. Finally, ethnic and religious differences between the tribes did not play an important role in the settlement policies. Regardless of their origins, all four tribes were incorporated to the expansion of state control.

Notes

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1. For a general discussion and critique of these approaches, see C. Tilly, 'Survey Article: Power – Top Down and Bottom Up', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol.7, No.3 (1999), pp.330–52.
2. This interactive perspective is best represented in J. Migdal, A. Kohli, and V. Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
3. A. Marx, *Faith in Nation*, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4. Especially for Abdulhamid II's reign, see E.L. Rogan, 'Aşiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II's School for Tribes (1892–1907)', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.28, No.1 (Feb.1996), pp.83–107, and S. Duguid, 'The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.9 (1973), pp.139–55.
5. T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer & T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back in*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp.3–37.
6. One recent example is Scott's analysis of villagization in Ethiopia. See J. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Themes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp.223–6.
7. See P. Crone, 'The Tribe and the State', in J. Hall (ed.), *States in History*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.48–77.
8. *Ibid*, pp.68–73.
9. See I. Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, F. Rosenthal (trans.), N.J. Dawood (ed.), Bolingen Series (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp.91–262 for a discussion of the cycles of the rise of states from tribal confederacies.
10. T.J. Barfield, 'Shadow Empires: Imperial State Formation along the Chinese Nomadic Frontier', in S.E. Alcock, K.D. Morrison, T.N. D'Altroy & C.M. Sinopoli (eds.), *Empires: Perspectives from Archeology and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.10–41; P. Khoury and J. Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), and R.P. Lindner, 'What was a Nomadic Tribe?', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.24, No.4 (1992), pp.689–711.
11. R. Tapper, 'Shahsevan in Safavid Persia', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol.37, No.2 (1974), pp.321–54.
12. R. Tapper, 'Introduction', in R. Tapper (ed.), *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp.1–82.
13. M. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.103, No.2 (1997), p.287.
14. J. Migdal, A. Kohli, and V. Shue, 'Introduction: Developing a state-in-society perspective', in J. Migdal, A. Kohli and V. Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.1–4.
15. Tilly, 'Survey Article: Power – Top Down and Bottom Up', pp.330–52.
16. Khoury and Kostiner, *Tribes and State Formation*, p.3.
17. L. Beck, 'Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy', in R. Tapper (ed.), *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p.284.
18. For example, in the Bakhtiari tribe of Iran tribal leaders became so embedded in state administration that they were alienated from their tribes. Thus, Bakhtiari chiefs became simultaneously part of the external stimulus of the state while they were by definition part of the internal tribal hierarchy. See, D. Brooks, 'The Enemy Within: Limitations on Leadership in the Bakhtiari', in R. Tapper (ed.), *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p.362.
19. R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.8–49; and Y. Köksal, 'Imperial Centre and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Edirne and Ankara', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol.27 (2002), pp.107–38.
20. A. Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', in A. Hourani, P.S. Khoury & M.C. Wilson (eds.) *The Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp.83–110.

21. For examples of frontier regions, see T.M. Barret, *At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the Northern Caucasus Frontier, 1700–1860* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Barfield, *Shadow Empires*; J.E. Woods, *The Aqqyunlus: Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999).
22. Beck, 'Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy', p.294. In fact, state pressure aimed to break this economic adaptation of the tribe by preventing the movement and therefore attacking the economic basis of Qashqais.
23. Brook, 'The Enemy Within: Limitations on Leadership in the Bakhtiari', p.350. Other examples were Yomut Turkmen of Iran and the Yoruk of Turkey. See D.G. Bates, *Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yoruk of Southeastern Turkey* (Ann Arbor: Anthropological Papers, University of Michigan, 1973), p.37 and W. Irons, *The Yomut Turkmen: A study of Social Organization Among a Central Asian Turkic-Speaking Population* (Ann Arbor: Anthropological Papers, University of Michigan, 1975), pp.72–5.
24. Families whose herd size brings diminishing returns for capital and risk involvement can consider other means of deploying capital in land or urban shops. See F. Barth, *Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp.101–11; Bates states that this model of settlement accounts for individual decisions for settlement, but does not describe the group settlement of whole communities. See D.G. Bates, *Nomads and Farmers*, p.196.
25. J.K. Campbell, *Honor, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in Greek Mountain Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp.14–15.
26. Tapper, 'Introduction', p.58.
27. Beck, 'Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy', p.303.
28. Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul (hereafter BOA), Ayniyat Defteri 445, p.61, 1276.S.28/26 Sept. 1859.
29. In 1846, they were reported to have one to two thousand households in the province of Ankara. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 402, pp.128–130, 1262. Za.8/28 Oct. 1846.
30. Ö.L. Barkan, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu olarak Sürgünler', *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, Vol.XI 1, No.4 (1950), pp.524–61, and Ö.L. Barkan, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Vakıflar ve Temlikler', *Vakıflar Dergisi* Vol.2 (1942), pp.279–365.
31. Reşat Kasaba notes that the Ottoman state aimed to create a more stable and sedentary empire at the end of the seventeenth century because of changing international conditions. See R. Kasaba, 'Do States Always Favor Stasis? The Changing Status of Tribes in the Ottoman Empire', in J. Migdal (ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging: States in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
32. C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiret İskanları* (Istanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1987), p.112 ; and Yusuf Hallaçoğlu, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), p.110–16.
33. M. Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State : The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1992), pp.151–85.
34. A. Refik, *Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri (966–1200)* (Istanbul: İstanbul Devlet Matbaası, 1930), pp.47–8.
35. The Afşars were Oghuz Turks. They belonged to the Bozok group, and descended from Afşar, the son of Yıldız Han who was the grandson of Oghuz Khan. See M. Işık, *Afşarlar: Tarihi, Yetiştirdiği Şahıslar, Folkloru* (Ankara: Kardeş Matbaası, 1963), p.2.
36. Tapper, 'Shahsevan in Safavid Persia,' p.338.
37. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiret İskanları*, p.20.
38. *Ibid.*, pp.57–65.
39. *Ibid.*, p.70.
40. Earlier documents in A. Refik's classification report that the Yeniil Turcomans lived around Arapkir, Canik, Divriği, Bozok, Çorum, Amasya and Sivas in summer. They migrated to Damascus in winter. See A. Refik, *Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri*, pp. 69–70.
41. Hallaçoğlu, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İskan Siyaseti*, p.112.
42. Ainsworth mentions Kara koyunlu (p.277), Jerid (p.284) and Sherakli (p.293) Turcoman tribes, and Akajuk Kurds by name. See W. Ainsworth, 'Journey from Angora by Kaisariyah, Malatiyah, and Gergen Kal'eh-si, to Bir or Birecik', *Journal of Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol.10 (1840), pp.275–310. Hamilton describes 'a place called by the Turks Afshars and by the Greeks Anabarza.

- Close to Everek Kieui, a village in Develi district. . . . The country is difficult and dangerous to travel through, the inhabitants being all robbers, who are called by the Turks *Acufshari*, and by the Greeks *Isavri*.' See W.J. Hamilton, *Asia Minor, Pontus, and Armenia: Some Account of Their Antiquities and Geology*, Vol.2 (London: John Murray, Albemarle St., 1842), p.263.
43. Hamilton, *Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia*, pp.219–21.
 44. See A. Cevdet Pasha, *Maruzat*, 2nd Edn (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları,1980) for Bosnia, M. Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaik and State*, pp.133–202 for patterns of state–tribe interactions before and during the Tanzimat in Kurdistan, B. Schaebler, 'State(s) Power and the Druzes: Integration and the Struggle for Social control (1838–1949)', in T. Philipp and B. Schaebler (eds.), *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation* (Berlin: Franz Steiner, 1998), pp.331–65 for Syria, and Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire : Transjordan, 1850–1921* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) for Transjordan.
 45. It was reported that the desertion of settlements for pastures was an important problem, and this should be prevented by granting tax exemptions and encouraging agricultural production. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 422, pp.82–85, 1267.B.19/20 May 1851.
 46. For a detailed discussion of the reflection of the Tanzimat concepts in the legal sphere, see Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp.3–51 and pp.358–408, and Ilber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983), pp.51–178.
 47. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 405, pp.91–93, 1263.Ra.13/1 March 1847.
 48. Counting the population was noted as the most important issue in several documents. See BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 417, p.25, 1266.C.14/27April 1850.
 49. The only exception is A. Gould, 'Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.7 (1976), pp.485–506.
 50. Using state documents raises the issues of reliability and validity of the data source. Reliability refers to whether the documents give an accurate picture of events. The state documents may reflect the state's point of view, but locals may have had a different view on the issues reported. Ottoman archival documents provide a rare opportunity to check reliability since the archives include petitions of state officials, tribal leaders and village residents. I checked the reliability of the data by comparing the reports of officials, local people and tribal leaders whenever they are available in different registries. In most cases, data from different registries confirm and support each other.
The validity issue refers to whether the state documents are the right places to test theoretical propositions since I make claims about tribal hierarchy based on state documents. Since this article examines state policies of settlement, not the detailed study of the internal relations of tribes, the main focus is on defining the ways the state constructed tribal hierarchy and dealt with it. In this sense, state documents are valid and valuable sources for the study of settlement policies. I also support archival data with memoirs of European travelers and state officials, although most travelers had brief encounters with semi-nomadic tribes without providing detailed information.
 51. The Yeniil Turcomans were reported to belong to the endowment of the Valide Sultan in Istanbul in the 16th century. Therefore, they are also known as Uskudar Turcomans. See Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiret İskanları*, p.16.
 52. BOA, Cevdet Dahiliye, 2666, 1256.M.27/31 March 1840.
 53. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 422, pp.84–5, 1267.B.19/20 May 1851.
 54. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 405, pp.106–7, 1263.B.25/9 July 1847.
 55. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 441, pp.123–4, 1274.M.30/20 Sept. 1857.
 56. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 444, pp.98–9, 25.B.1275/28 Feb. 1859.
 57. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 399, p.81, 1262.Ca.28/24 May 1846.
 58. Archival documents occasionally use the Koçğiris and the Cihanbeylis interchangeably. This is probably because of the small number of the Cihanbeylis living closely with the Koçğiris. Sykes describes Koçğiri as 'a peculiar nation, or perhaps one might call them a separate nation' (p.479). See M. Sykes, 'The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol.38 (Jul.–Dec. 1908), pp.451–86. M. Baran mentions that the Koçğiri and the Cihanbeyli (Canbegan) tribes were two separate tribes in the district of Koçğiri. See Baran, *Koçğiri: Kuzey-Batı Dersim* (Istanbul: Tohum, 2002), pp.51–4.
 59. Sykes, 'The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire', p.472 and 481–82.
 60. Alişan Bey's title was recorded as *istabl-ı amire*, which was a title granted to successful state officials. BOA, *Ayniyat Defteri* 418, p.109, 1266.Za.1/8 Sept. 1850.

61. The exact Turkish wording of this claim is interesting: 'Tanzimattan beru hükümete aykırı davranan Cihanbeyli aşireti' (The Cihanbeyli tribe which reacted against the government since the Tanzimat).
62. BOA, Amedi Mektubi (hereafter A.MKT.), 39/85, 1264.R.3/9 March 1848.
63. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 402, pp.143–5, 1262.Za.21/10 Nov. 1846; Ayniyat Defteri 403, p.14, 1262.Za.25/14 Nov. 1846.
64. BOA, A. MKT. 72/56, 1263.R.4/22 March 1847 and BOA, A. MKT. 181/27, 1263.S.28/15 Feb. 1847.
65. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 407, pp.108–9, 1263.N.4/16 Aug. 1847.
66. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri, 411, p.40, 1264.Ş.10/12 July 1848.
67. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 411, pp.70–4, 1264.Ş.25/27 July 1848.
68. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 386, pp.8–9, 1260.Ra.9/29 March 1844.
69. Salahaddin Ağa was the old *ayan* (local notable who mediated relations between the centre and local residents before the Tanzimat) of the city of Ankara. The German traveler Mordtmann reports him as a very wealthy individual who was well respected by all religious and ethnic communities in the city of Ankara. See A.D. Mordtmann, *Anatolien-Skizzen und Reisebriefe aus Kleinasien* (1850–1859), F. Babinger (ed.), F. Sezgin (ed.) (Frankfurt: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1995).
70. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 428, p.90, 1269.Ra.4/16 Dec. 1852.
71. BOA, Cevdet Maliye 3026, 1276.C.17/11 Jan.1860.
72. For the Esbikeşan settlement, see BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 463, pp.156–57, 1279.Ca.7/31 Oct. 1862.
73. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, *Tezâkir*, Vol.3, Cavid Baysun (ed.) (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953–1967), pp.107–213.
74. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 402, pp.128–30, 1262.Za.8/28 Oct. 1846.
75. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 415, pp.6–7, 1265.L.7/26 Aug. 1849.
76. Muharrem Eren mentions Çerkez Beğ and İsmail Beğ as the leaders of the Afşars. See Muharrem Eren, *Koca Aşşar Köyü ve Tarihte Aşşarlar* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1992), p.251. The above archive document (BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 415, pp.6–7) mentions İsmail Ağa and Çerkez Bey among the leaders of the tribe.
77. BOA, Irade Meclis-i Vala 18396, 1275.S.13/22 Sept. 1858.
78. Muharrem Eren mentions the family origin of Çerkez Bey as descending from Arab Hasan who was the son of Kara Recep, the leader of Receblü Afşars division. See Eren, *Koca Aşşar Köyü*, p.254.
79. The first settlement attempt in these districts was in 1849.
80. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 442, pp.69–70, 1274.Ca.27/13 Jan. 1858.
81. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 422, pp.84–5, 1267.N.19/20 March 1851.
82. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 460, p.109, 1278.N.5/6 March 1862.
83. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 466, p.98, 1281.S.28/2 Aug. 1864.
84. Gould, 'Lords or Bandits', p.497.
85. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 413, p.119, 1265.Ca.4/28 March 1849.
86. Sykes, 'The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire', p.477.
87. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 391, pp.59–60, 1261.Ra.19/28 March 1845.
88. W-D. Hütteroth refers to this region as Espikeşan and provides number and names of towns settled by the tribes in the region using the 1870 Year Book of the Province of Konya: Turgut and Cihanbeyli towns (34 villages) and Espikeşan (37 villages). See W.D. Hütteroth, *Landliche Siedlungen im südlichen Interanatolien in den letzten vierhundert Jahren* (Göttingen: Geographischen Institutes der Universitaet Göttingen, 1968), pp.55–8.
89. BOA, A. MKT. 25/28, 1261.C.25/1 July 1845.
90. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 405, pp.91–3, 1263.R.13/31 March 1847.
91. BOA, A. MKT. 25/28, 1261.C.25/1 July 1845.
92. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 416, p.20, 1266.Ra.3/17 Jan. 1850.
93. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 465, p.153, 1280.Ş.16/26 Jan. 1864.
94. Some sections of the Rışvan tribe were settled on Mount Çiçek, in the district of Kırşehir. BOA, Ayniyat Defteri 805, No: 844, 1285.Ş.24/10 Dec. 1868.

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