Chapter 7

Defensive and Liberal Nationalisms: The Kurdish Question and Modernization/Democratization

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Introduction

Since the foundation of modern Turkey, the “Kurdish question” or Kürt Sorunu has been and continues to be the most politically challenging and violent problem facing Turkish modernization. In accordance with the arguments in this essay, it can be formulated as the question of how to include ethnic Kurds in this project of modernization as Kurds—with their distinct identity and, of course, voluntarily—without undermining the project’s major goals and its sustainability. This question can be subdivided into one historical and one current component. The historical component regards the periods of authoritarian nation-state formation in the 1920s and 1930s, and the periods of multiparty democracy from the 1950s onwards. To what extent, and how, could Turkish modernization have included Kurds during these periods in ways that were more democratic and respectful of Kurdish identity and culture? Answering this question is crucial to understanding the roots of the Kurdish issue. The current component of the Kurdish question should also take into account present circumstances. Currently, Turkish modernization is going through a transition to liberal democracy, the consolidation of which is yet uncertain. This process is occurring in an environment of revived and remade Kurdish nationalism within Turkey as well as in its Middle Eastern neighbors and Europe. Thus, given the limitations and opportunities that these conditions generate, the Kurdish question can be more specifically defined. How can Kurds be included in this new stage of Turkish modernization by addressing Kurdish claims in ethnic-cultural, national, political, and socio-economic areas by using the means of liberal democracy, and without undermining social harmony and territorial integrity, i.e. the liberal-democratization process itself?

Formulating the Kurdish question this way has two consequences. First, for reasons that I explore in this essay, one must conclude that Turkish modernization has largely failed to adequately address the Kurdish question,
despite Turkish modernization’s many other achievements. This in turn appears to have weakened its ability to achieve many of its fundamental goals for Turkey such as full-fledged socio-economic development and equal membership of the ‘West.’ Second, one realizes that the Kurdish question is tightly connected to a Turkish question: how can Turks become more secure in their own identities and state, and thus embrace less diversity-phobic political values and more inclusive formulations of Turkishness? The average Turk’s perception of social-political diversity is still affected by the so-called ‘Sevres syndrome,’ which refers to the dominant ways in which Turks interpret how they lost their empire and came to the brink of colonization in early twentieth century. These interpretations attribute the Ottoman meltdown to the unbridled spiraling of hostile minority nationalisms that foreign powers fostered and liberal Ottoman-Turkish elites endorsed. But while most Turks thus harbor an instinctive skepticism towards Kurdish and any other minority movements, they also remain largely ignorant of who the Kurds are, and of their past and present grievances. The most salient references shaping their image of Kurds are likely to be the violent conflict with the separatist PKK and its byproducts in the form of urban poverty and crime. Thus, part of the Turkish question is how these perceptions can be replaced by more informed images of the Kurdish question. Although the focus of this essay is the Kurdish question, I hope that the discussion ahead will also elucidate the links with this Turkish question.

Seeking why the Kurdish question (and the associated Turkish question) has been such a great challenge to Turkish modernization, and making projections into the future, I aim to put forward and discuss in this essay three major sets of theses and arguments.

**Discursive-Cognitive Differentiation and the Specter of Radical Polarization**

Currently, the majority Turkish society—people with no Kurdish background, and Kurds who are assimilated into the mainstream society or well-integrated with it and view themselves as Turkish nationals as well as Kurdish—is experiencing a period of significant *ethnic differentiation* in a discursive and cognitive sense. The majority is increasingly becoming aware of Kurdish difference and perceiving social, political, and economic actors and events in terms of ethnicity. In the past, the majority society’s awareness and articulation of the Kurdish difference were suppressed by a mainstream discourse that subdued (or denied) the expression of the Kurdish category. In fact, until the early 1990s, the very term Kurd was taboo within the mainstream public-political discourse.

The drastic discursive changes that occurred during the 1990s are being reinforced and given new shape by current social and political developments. The political developments include the yet insufficiently implemented legal-political reforms since 2001 that significantly liberalized the expression of the Kurdish identity and political views; Turkey’s negotiations toward full membership in the EU, which began in October 2005 but whose culmination in full integration is yet uncertain; the war in Iraq and the uncertainties over this country’s integrity, and the rising expectations of Iraqi-Kurdish statehood; renewed Kurdish political activism in Turkey, which includes pro-PKK, other secular-nationalist, and Islamist
variants; and renewed violence between the PKK rebels and the security forces in the Turkish Southeast since 2004.5

The reflections of these developments in the majority society’s public-political discourse include renewed interest in the Kurdish question, and intellectual and literary works that reinterpret the history of Turkish nation-building and the historical and current meanings of the Turkish identity.6 The Kurdish identity category is increasingly employed by Kurdish as well as non-Kurdish actors in order to describe, classify, and explain events, actors, and social-political groups. For example, a meeting of intellectuals may increasingly be described as a meeting of ‘Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals,’ instead of just ‘intellectuals.’ It should be noted here that this current process of ethnic differentiation is mostly affecting the majority society. As members of an ethnic minority that conflicted with the state from the beginning, those Kurds who had a high level of ethnic consciousness, especially Kurdish nationalists, experienced ethnic differentiation much earlier.7 One reason for this is an important dissimilarity between Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms. Turkish nationalism was aimed at unifying politically and culturally a multiethnic population in a given territory. Not surprisingly, it tended to produce inclusive values that played down (and for reasons to be explained also suppressed) difference.

By contrast, from the beginning, Kurdish nationalism was based in ethnic particularism: it was aimed at politically unifying an ethnic-linguistic population based on its actual and imagined differences from neighboring groups.8 Accordingly, its values tended to highlight Kurdish (cultural, linguistic, historical) differences (e.g. from Turks, Arabs, or Persians). Thus, Kurdish cultural and political nationalists possessed a differentiated perception of Turkish society for a long time. The existence of this perception is easily revealed for example in their memoirs and biographies. For younger generations of Kurdish nationalists, it seems to have developed during the 1970s and gained serious momentum during the 1990s.9

The pessimistic and so far unlikely scenario is that the ongoing differentiation for the majority society and the existing differentiation for the minority evolve into radical polarization. For non-Kurdish members of the majority society, polarization would imply more and more exclusion of and opposition to Kurds. For Kurdish members of the majority society, it would mean either further assimilation into, or alienation from the majority.10 For Kurds with already differentiated self-perceptions, it would mean further politicization and differentiation from the majority society. Inevitably, this scenario would also produce further political violence and painful social-economic un-mixing of Turks and Kurds. A second and more likely scenario is that the Kurdish conflict continues as a protracted and violent conflict, but remains a regional (to Southeastern Turkey) conflict and creates limited social-political polarization on a national level. Even during the climax of violence between Kurdish separatists and the security forces in early 1990s, the state managed to prevent such polarization.

From the point of view of coexistence, peace and stability, the optimistic scenario is that the Kurdish difference is accommodated in a context of liberal democracy: protecting minorities’ abilities to promote their interests via the means of pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, and constitutional guarantees, while maintaining national, territorial and political
The Kurdish question and nationalism are unlikely to disappear under this scenario, as they would under the other two scenarios. However, this scenario has the potential to minimize violent ethno-political mobilization and conflict, and may be able to address the Kurdish question peacefully and to the satisfaction of most of the actors involved.

Ideas, Nationalism, and Turkish Modernization

Most of the current research gives the impression that the state policies toward Kurds were more or less predestined by the major ideational characteristics of Turkish nation- and state-building. In other words, the impression is given that these policies directly follow from the major goals of this project, which can be summarized as rapid, secular modernization and nation-building. However, it is misleading to suppose such a direct causal relationship between this project’s goals and means. Arguably, the same goals could have been pursued more successfully with different, more inclusive policies and less diversity-phobic institutions.

In order to examine the roots of the Kurdish question, current research has mostly focused on the ideational characteristics of Turkish modernization. These characteristics include its illiberal/authoritarian (i.e. oriented towards duties rather than rights), state-centric, diversity-phobic, assimilationist, and the interchangeably ethnic-exclusive and civic-inclusive (but ethnicity-blind) beliefs and values. This research helps a great deal in illuminating various aspects of the Kurdish question. Pending a more detailed discussion and review in the next section, however, it should be noted here that it leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, it understates the demographic-geographic factors, which will be discussed later, that help one to understand the Kurdish question in comparison to other ethnic questions in the world. Most importantly, however, it fails to distinguish between those ideas that were indispensable, shared ingredients of Turkish nationalists’ intellectual menu and those that should rather be explained as products of political rivalry and conflict. The tendency is to analyze Turkish nation- and state-building in terms of its dominant values alone, which became dominant as a result of these political dynamics. Thus, almost essentializing these dominant values, current research overlooks the less dominant values that partly affected state policies, the counterfactual paths that this project might have followed, and the future paths that it may take by building on hitherto less dominant values and ideas.

But different values, ideas and policies were known and put forward during the development of Turkish nation- and state-building. Diffusely stated ideas and values that could have led to the emergence of rudimentary forms of liberal-nationalist perspectives (henceforth LNP) later were suppressed by ideas and values that became dominant and will be called defensive-nationalist perspectives (henceforth DNP) throughout this essay. This outcome resulted from critical actor decisions, prioritization of some goals of modernization over the others, institutional choices, and events that led to the domination and marginalization of these alternative versions. Both of these perspectives will be defined and discussed in detail ahead.

However, the dominant ideational characteristics of Turkish modernization are essential to understand the past and the current of the Kurdish question in one important sense, that is, the significance of nationalism in this project. Turkish modernization can be understood as a
radical project of modernization/westernization that was aimed at modernizing both the private and public spheres of society in the image of advanced, western nation-states. In pursuit of this double transformation, Turkish nation- and state-building targeted more than merely the political institutions of the old regime. Within a short period of rapid and multifaceted transformation, they also opposed religion and traditional culture, the latter including Ottoman-cosmopolitan (palace and urban) and local (Anatolian-Muslim) culture. Inevitably, these clashes gave rise to major gaps in the ability of the state to regulate social and economic life, maintain social and political unity, and consolidate its own legitimacy during its formative years. Indeed, to resolve these problems in a context of rapid and multifaceted transformation, and of conflict with the old rules and sources of legitimacy must have been major challenges.

Turkish nationalism was the major ideological recipe that Turkish nation- and state-building put forward in response to these challenges. Thus, Turkish nationalism, its emphasis on cultural homogeneity, and national identity were supposed to fulfill key roles in this project. They were supposed to unify and homogenize a multiethnic, multi-confessional, and traditional society; provide legitimacy for the state and its modernizing project; and enable social and economic integration and development by standardizing language and other mediums of communication and cooperation. Accordingly, major attempts were made by the state to solidify Turkish nationalism as the main unifying ideology in society. Thus, nationalism has been and is a major component of Turkish mainstream political and social beliefs. All major Turkish political and social actors embrace the legitimacy and basic tenets of Turkish nationalism, except for the extremes on the left and religious-right, some liberals, and Kurdish nationalists. Finally, it is important to study Turkish nationalism in order to understand the Kurdish question because Kurdish nationalism partly developed as a response to it.

**Liberal-Nationalist Perspectives and the Kurdish Question**

Because of the importance of nationalism in Turkish modernization, and because strong Kurdish nationalist movements are already present in Turkey, its neighbors, and Europe, it is unlikely that the current process of political-economic and ideological transformation in Turkey will give rise to new political actors and ideologies that are devoid of nationalist values. Nor is it likely that such ideologies can develop politically feasible solutions enjoying wide constituencies. In fact, factors such as fears of globalization, disputes with the EU, and the Kurdish question have fed nationalist sentiments by drawing on which DNP have become more vocal. Theoretically, LNP can also emerge with more potential to offer solutions that are consistent with democratization.

In this sense, a major bottleneck toward the solution of the Kurdish question is the dormancy of LNP in the Turkish and Kurdish political and intellectual discourses. What I mean by liberal nationalism here and the theoretical and empirical compatibility of liberalism and nationalism will be discussed ahead. Suffice it to say that for the majority society, LNP would denote types of Turkish nationalism that posit a positive relationship between the recognition of ethnic-cultural diversity through minority rights (or affirmative policies) in a liberal-democratic system, and national (social,
For minority nationalisms, it would denote nationalisms that would be open to internal (cultural and ideological) diversity and multiple identities (such as simultaneous identification with Kurdish ethnicity and Turkish nationality) within the minority group, and promote self-governance through minority rights (or affirmative policies) in a liberal-democratic system.

Currently, there are three major groups of ideological perspectives and political projects that are vaguely but vocally articulated in response to the Kurdish question. The first are the Turkish DNP. The Turkish DNP evince skepticism of the political expressions of ethnic-cultural diversity, especially that of its Kurdish variety. These expressions are seen as inherently inimical to social and political unity and open to foreign manipulation. They reflect the dominant values and beliefs of Turkish nationalism and continue to shape the predominant political reflexes of the actors within the military, the state apparatus, and major political actors on the right and left. They have Kemalist, and Anatolian or Turkish Muslim-nationalist versions.

The second vocally articulated group of perspectives can be called the Kurdish DNP. According to these perspectives, it is historically evident that Turkish Kurds form a nation of their own and they are entitled to external self-determination, i.e. the right to secession, even though Kurds may choose to seek administrative autonomy within a Turkey that would be an EU member. Kurdish DNP tend to portray liberal Kurds who are integrated with the majority society’s political system and who may have multiple ethnic-national identities (say, Kurdish and Turkish or Iranian) more or less as traitors. These perspectives can have secessionist, pan-Kurdist, and autonomist versions. The Kurdish DNP have most clearly and militantly been articulated by the separatist PKK and by Turkish Kurds who live outside of Turkey. There is little social or political tolerance for these perspectives within the majority Turkish society.

A third group consists of liberal perspectives (henceforth LP). LP have become vocal in Turkey in line with Turkey’s integration with the world economy and the rise of the civil society’s autonomy from the state since the 1980s, and the acceleration of the integration with the EU since 1999. LP advocate Kurdish cultural and political rights within national unity and in a context of liberal democracy. On a discursive level, most LP evince strong skepticism of any nationalism. As will be discussed later, however, people who express LP often also harbor patriotic or moderate-nationalist values but would not express them as such. LP have center-right and social democratic versions that are inspired by western liberal thought, as well as Islamic versions inspired by the unifying role of Islam in Turkish society and the belief that ethnic-cultural expressions would not endanger national unity as long as Islam is allowed to play an enhanced role in society.

These three vocal perspectives fail to represent the interests and potential preferences of two groups in particular. First, the Kurdish DNP exclude the potential interests of what may be called a silent majority of Turkish Kurds, which comprises ethnic Kurds who are part of the majority society as defined above, and those Kurds who, although marginalized by Turkish modernization, may prefer to maintain plural identities and to remain part of the Turkish political system as long as their identity and cultural rights are recognized. In other words, they may want to adopt Kurdish LNP pursuing cultural rights in a context of liberal democracy.
Similarly, the Turkish DNP and LP fail to represent the interests and preferences of people who may be willing to embrace an alternative version of nationalism that upholds ethnic-cultural diversity and rights within a context of national unity and liberal democracy. In their stylized forms, purely liberal and nationalist perspectives are too opposed to each other to allow compromise; by comparison, LNP can help to bridge their differences.

Insofar as these observations are correct, LNP have the potential to contribute to the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question. Various values and ideas that could form the basis for such perspectives are separately present in Turkish political and intellectual discourses. However, they are not integrated and articulated as liberal-nationalism. Several necessary but insufficient factors would have to come together in order for this to happen. Intellectually, such perspectives would first have to be formulated, in particular by resolving the apparent incompatibilities between liberal and nationalist ideas. Socially and discursively, the emergence of LNP would require social debate in a series of areas, such as the desirability of ethnic-cultural rights in a democracy, the role that ethnic nationalism played in Turkish history, and the definitions and contents of Turkish and Kurdish identities. Such a debate is already occurring in Turkey, albeit with a less than desirable dialogue among major actors, as I try to demonstrate and argue in the fourth section.

Politically, after being formulated and socially debated, new perspectives would have to be embraced and translated into political projects by social and political actors. The potential social and political-economic constituencies of such projects, and the domestic and external contexts that would affect their chances of success, will be discussed in the conclusions section.

### Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question

On the surface, one can easily explain the dominant values and policies of Turkish nationalism. It is a state-building nationalism that was influenced by the French civic-republican model.\textsuperscript{19} It was aimed at building a nation from a multiethnic population within the remaining territory of an ex-empire that collapsed in the midst of competing ethno-nationalisms and imperialist interventions of rival great powers. Turkish nationalists were largely the late, revolutionary generation of Ottoman elites building on a grand state tradition that prioritized state survival over any other goal. Therefore, one may explain, Turkish nationalism developed diversity-phobic and authoritarian-assimilationist values suppressing the ethnic-linguistic differences in society. This explanation, however, leaves several questions unanswered.

The first one is the extent and nature of Turkish nation-building practices and values vis-à-vis Kurds. More than merely trying to assimilate Kurds on the basis of a common, Turkish vernacular, Turkish nation-building generated a mainstream public-political discourse that completely left out the Kurdish language and category. At times, great efforts were made to prove that “they were in reality of Turkish origin but had lost their Turkish identity due to foreign influence.”\textsuperscript{20} Particularly given the demographic structure of the population, however, these values and
practices do not seem to have been the only or the most effective means of assimilationist nation-building.

Second, such an explanation ignores the diversity within Turkish nationalism and assumes that there was elite consensus on the goals as well as the means of nation-building. This does not seem to have been the case. Even though there might have been tacit or explicit agreement on the goals of nation-building, there appears to have been significant disagreement on the means. Third, one may argue that this explanation is not an explanation at all because it does not show how the outcome would have been different under different conditions and sequences of historical events. The real challenge is to build an analytic narrative that can relate to events "that did not occur and the motivation for not behaving in a particular way," which can link "what we observe with what we do not observe." Such an analytic narrative should also help one to explain the differences between Turkish nation-building and others, say, Iranian nation-building.

In order to contribute to the development of such an explanation, the goal in the rest of this section is to discuss the following theses. The demographic-structural features of the Kurdish question make it unlikely that DNP could ever successfully achieve the goals of Turkish nation-building. Under different sequences of political developments, the initial ideational diversity of Turkish nationalism could indirectly have led to the development of proto-LNP vis-à-vis Kurds, which might have been more successful in achieving nation-building. However, such an outcome might also have affected other aspects of Turkish modernization such as its radical secularism (or laicism). To some extent, the choice appears to have been between a path leading to a less diversity-phobic but also more conservative-Islamic society and a path leading to a more radically transformed and secularized society.

Demography, Geography, and the Kurdish Question
There are major historically given demographic and geographical conditions that make the Kurdish question more intractable than other cases of identity based politics. First, like the Alevis but unlike the other minority groups in Turkey, people with full or partial Kurdish background constitute a large portion of the population, twelve to twenty percent according to different estimates. Second, unlike other cases in Turkey, ethnic Kurds constitute significant majorities in a sizeable portion of the country, the Southeast. However, the remaining third or more of Turkish Kurds are spread throughout the country and mixed socially and economically with the rest of the population. This makes political-territorial separation difficult and prone to violence, and distinguishes the case of Turkish Kurds from cases such as the Quebecois in Canada and the Czechs and the Slovaks before their separation.

Third, Kurds are an indigenous group of Anatolia, unlike most other Muslim minorities in Turkey who migrated to Anatolia during the last two centuries. Most of the latter escaped persecution in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and were eager to assimilate. At the beginning of Turkish nation-building, the idea of a Kurdish nation and a Kurdish nationalist movement were already present, even though Kurdish masses were mostly oblivious to it and this idea was mainly held by a small group of urban-cosmopolitan elites. At the same time, there was no precedence of a Kurdish statehood
that the Kurdish elites could build on. Kurdish elites were torn between their competing potential roles and statuses as Ottoman state elites and Kurdish and Turkish nation-building elites.23

Fourth, the Kurdish population is predominantly rural, young, and poverty- and unemployment-stricken, especially in the Southeast, which facilitates the emergence of violent identity-based movements.24 However, one should stress that the reasons for the Kurdish question cannot be reduced to socioeconomic grievances: Turkey has other regions comparable to the Southeast in poverty but these have not produced such movements because they lack the other factors that produce the Kurdish question.

Fifth, Turkish Kurds have large and politically mobilized cultural relatives in three neighboring countries, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which makes the Kurdish issue a trans-state and trans-national issue. Initially, what is now Northern Iraq, where Iraqi Kurds are concentrated, was within the sought-after borders (Milli Misak) of Turkish nationalist movement. As a result of a critical agreement in 1926 between Britain, Turkey, and Iraq, the League of Nations included this region (the former Mosul province of the Ottoman Empire) within the British-mandated Iraq. As a result, a considerable portion of the Ottoman Kurds, who had lived under the same polity for centuries and who had originally been part of the Turkish state- and nation-building, remained outside modern Turkey’s borders, and control. This raised the specter of pan-Kurdish nationalism and secessionism in the future and reinforced the state’s wariness of Kurdish nationalism. Indeed, the later development of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism significantly affected the development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey.

Finally, one may argue that ethnic-nationalist questions are very difficult to resolve anywhere in the world. From the Irish and the Welsh in Britain to the Basques and the Catalans in Spain to the Tamils in Sri Lanka, these questions have proven to be long-lasting and violent. However, there are major differences in the degree to which different states have been able to manage these questions and to minimize human suffering and injustice. Thus, political institutions and ideologies play major roles in shaping the course in which identity-based political conflicts evolve.

In a nutshell, these conditions produce several insights. First, they explain why it was unlikely that DNP could ever have resolved the Kurdish question successfully, either through the complete assimilation of Kurds or by preventing Kurdish nationalism from producing a major anti-systemic movement.25 Second, the presence of a rival Kurdish nationalism at the beginning of nation-building may be part of the explanation why DNP came to dominate Turkish nationalism.

**Ideational Factors and the Kurdish Question**

What were the major ideational features of Turkish nation-building, and to what extent do they explain the practice? Can Turkish nation-building now, and in the future, support different values and policies? One way to approach these questions is by focusing on the dominant values of Turkish nation-building (mainly by inferring them from the state laws, discourse, and practices) and trying to explain how they qualitatively fit together. One problem with such an approach is the inherent assumption that the state’s dominant texts and practices properly represent the dominant values of Turkish nationalism. More importantly, however, such an approach
inherently seeks consistency both among the different values of nation-building, and between its values, goals, and means. In other words, it seeks to examine Turkish nationalism as a more or less monolithic set of consistent beliefs.

An alternative thesis that can be put forward is that Turkish nation-building produced an incoherent synthesis of different values and means of achieving the nationalist goals. Arriving at this thesis requires one to combine the ideational factors with structural conditions, political developments, and critical actor decisions in the form of an analytic narrative. On one hand, these latter factors led to the domination of Turkish nation-building by DNP and to the concealment of the ideational diversity that initially existed within this project. On the other hand, these factors led to an incomplete compromise (as opposed to a more or less complete domination or synthesis) between the different initial perspectives regarding the means of nation-building. This incompleteness explains the oscillations and inconsistencies among the values, and between the values and the practices. In other words, these inconsistencies and oscillations are an inherent outcome of Turkish nation-building.

Ideologies, especially broad and vague ideologies such as a particular group’s nationalism, are rarely homogeneous and coherent. They are not created by single ‘authors.’ They are not subject to critical scrutiny as for example academic writings are. They are created incrementally by numerous intellectual and political figures and emerge from social and political conflicts and compromises among numerous political actors and social groups.

Turkish nationalism might particularly have been permeated by such internal incoherence common to all mass ideologies. This is because modern Turkish nationalism emerged in a context of remarkable political and military turmoil, and, as argued, in a political context that undermined the state elites’ ability to seek popular participation and legitimacy. This context did not allow for conciliation among opposing views and social groups and between state elites and society, and for the emergence of a consensus. 26 The “oscillations” between the ethnic and civic definitions of Turkish national identity are but one example of this incomplete compromise between various state elites and the masses on one hand, and between DNP and LNP on the other.27

The growing body of historical research on Turkish nation-building suggests that during its initial, formative period (c.a. 1919-1925), there was ideational convergence among the nationalist elites on some goals but not on others, and there was considerable disagreement on how to achieve the agreed ends.28 In other words, while some of Turkish nationalism’s ideational characteristics and goals were relatively solid during the formative period, there was more ambiguity and flexibility regarding others.29

The first solid goal was that of one nation-state. Atatürk and other nationalists made great and successful efforts to enlist the support of the majority of Kurds for the nationalist struggle. While doing so, they acknowledged the identity of the Kurdish “component” (ansur) of the nationalist struggle and the legitimacy of the Kurdish ethnic-cultural (kavmi ve içtimai) rights.30 There is also some evidence that the institution of some sort of local autonomy within Turkey was foreseen for Kurds and other
Muslim minority groups. However, there is no evidence that the idea of a bi-national or multinational state was ever considered. The records of the long debates in the first Parliament (1920-23), which convened during the nationalist war of independence, show that the term ‘nation,’ in the sense of the actual or ideal body of people that the Parliament represented, was always used in the singular form. Kurds were talked about as a society or a ‘component’ of the ‘nation.’ This period should be considered to be a period of identity-formation when a new nationalist ideal and conception of ‘us’ as a ‘sovereign nation’ was emerging with shifting categorizations and no agreed upon name. Terms such as “Turks,” “Turks and Kurds,” “Muslims or the Muslim majority,” “nation of Ottoman Muslims,” or “people or state of Turkey” were being used interchangeably to denote more or less the same group. Within this conception of one nation, Kurdish differences and rights were recognized and freely talked about.

Second, there is no question that the nationalists were skeptical of cultural-linguistic diversity because of its potential to produce minority nationalisms. From France to Eastern Europe to Iran, it was the rule rather than the exception then that nation-building involved majority nationalisms’ pursuing homogeneity at the expense of minority cultures. The nationalists had their personal experiences regarding diversity during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire when they associated themselves with the center and with the task of preventing the breakdown. In their view, the reason Ottoman elite attempts to rescue the state by offering representation for the various ethnic and religious elements of the Empire in a context of constitutional monarchy failed was because too much tolerance was granted to rival micro nationalisms that were supported by foreign powers. Many of them grew up or had descendants in the Balkans and other former Ottoman territories where ethnically Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims became the ‘unwanted other’ of independence-seeking (non-Muslim) nationalists who saw them as the representatives and allies of the center.

As a result, there is no evidence that the nationalists ever considered adopting a liberal attitude toward diversity in the sense of protecting diversity and dealing with minority nationalisms by using persuasion rather than coercion. Even a major critic of the regime vis-à-vis its policies (or rather its alleged lack of policies) toward the Kurds, General Kazım Karabekir, was by no means a liberal in this sense. When faced with a choice between taltif (persuasion by paying tribute) and tehdit (use of threats and force) vis-à-vis Kurdish nationalism, he argued, one should always choose the latter.

Third, Kemalists were wary of Kurdish nationalism and separatism, although it is not clear how important this was in their minds until the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion. Some argue that the rebellion took them largely by surprise and left them in a state of existential shock, while others argue that they were well aware of the intentions and activities of the Azadi movement that was involved in the rebellion, at least after 1924. But it is clear that there was suspicion and disdain toward Kurdish nationalism, which had organized itself in terms of mostly urban based autonomist and secessionist organizations. The Sevres Treaty, which the Ottoman State signed after the end of the First World War but the nationalist movement voided the implementation of which, had stipulated Kurdish autonomy (and potential independence) in Eastern Turkey, along with an Armenian state.
Nevertheless, during the nationalist war, Turkish nationalists were able to enlist the support of the majority of Kurds on the basis of values such as common homeland and history and Muslim brotherhood. They were also able to suppress Kurdish and other uprisings against the nationalist movement.36

As a result, the Kurdish issue appears to have been overshadowed by other concerns, most importantly the consolidation of the nationalist regime, and, after the foundation of the republic in 1923, eradicating the public role of Islam. Concerns with Kurdish nationalist mobilization were discussed, especially in relation to the possibility that the establishment of a Kurdish government in British controlled Northern Iraq (then the Mosul region) could induce separatism among Turkish Kurds.37 However, the Kurdish language and culture were considered too backward and fragmented to be worthy of nationhood, and Kurds were viewed as being a backward portion of the population too divided by tribal divisions to achieve successful nationalist mobilization.38 Finally, the discourse of Turkish nationalists suggests their expectation that the union of Turks and Kurds would prevail based on common religion, “blood,” and ideals.39

Even with these solid features of Turkish nation-building given, some of the political and intellectual elite differences during this period could indirectly have led to the employment of more liberal policies toward diversity and Kurds. The opponents in that period differed from the hardliners who were defending DNP with respect to the state-society relationship that they envisioned and the level of respect and toleration they had for religion and tradition as instruments of nation-building. Karabekir, for example, thought that the Caliphate, a major symbol of Ottoman tradition drawing Turks and Kurds together as Muslims, had been abolished prematurely; he also urged the government to gain the sympathy of Kurdish peasants by nurturing direct and congenial relations with them, bypassing their oppressive and untrustworthy landlords and religious leaders.40 Implementing the first suggestion could have helped to avoid or to postpone the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion, which had mixed religious and Kurdish goals. But it would also have had implications for the degree to which the regime could have been able to pursue ‘fast-track’ secularism. Implementing the second suggestion would have made it necessary to adopt more lenient policies toward the use of Kurdish in order for state officials to be able to communicate effectively with the Kurdish masses.

The ideological differences during the first Grand National Assembly (1920-1923) are revealing. Even though the opponents in this period, called “the second group,” were more conservative (i.e. pro-religion and pro-Ottoman tradition) ideologically, they did not necessarily oppose the modernist-nationalist goals of the first group.41 Rather, they were opposing the first group’s revolutionary means of overhauling Ottoman institutions and of transforming society via top-down and fast-track decrees by bureaucratic-elites. Instead, the second group was defending a more moderate, gradualist, and voluntary transformation in which the representatives of society would participate through parliamentary debate and legislation. The indirect results of this alternative approach would have been more liberal-nationalist policies and institutions vis-à-vis diversity. It is hard to conceive, for example, that a process involving the voluntary participation of representatives from Kurdish areas would have approved
nation-building practices that denied the existence of the Kurdish category. At a minimum, it would have sanctioned a more liberal approach, for example by allowing the use of Kurdish in local economic transactions and cultural institutions.

Theoretically, more moderate methods than the state actually employed could have produced better results. For example, in the long run it would have been more effective for the state to win over moderate Kurdish elites by recognizing and respecting their ethnic-cultural identity. The memoirs of Turkish Kurd intellectuals contain numerous examples of how the children and grandchildren of brutally punished or exiled Kurdish nationalists often became even more obstinate nationalists a few decades later. Similarly, using Kurdish-speaking teachers and teaching materials in Kurdish would probably have been a more effective way of teaching Turkish to women and children whose mother tongues was Kurdish, than to deny them such opportunities. Thus, arguably, some of the actual practices of Turkish nationalism and nation-building can be argued to have contradicted the very goals of these ideologies themselves.

The political developments following the Sheikh Said rebellion led to the weakening and purging of actors who could have promoted these more moderate methods vis-à-vis Kurds, along with less radical methods vis-à-vis the state control of religion. With Mustafa Kemal’s backing, the “liberal” Okyar government, which was unwilling to use draconian methods to suppress the insurgency, was replaced by the İnönü government, which dealt with the insurgents by using military force and summary courts. The events that followed also led to the shutting down of the newly established opposition party representing the second group in the national assembly. The Sheikh Said rebellion was followed by a series of other rebellions until the 1940s. These rebellions and their political ramifications led to the militarization of the Kurdish question and generated a political discourse that was centered on the denial of Kurdish ethnicity. They also played a major role in enabling the ruling hardliners to prevent the emergence of any real opposition from emerging, because opponents could easily be blamed for inciting Kurdish nationalism.

More research on the historical record is needed to build a complete analytic narrative. Critical factors and turning points leading to the dominant status of DNP within Turkish nationalism seem to include the abolition of the Caliphate; the priority of secular reforms over the Kurdish question and the fact that actors who favored more liberal approaches toward Kurds also favored less radical reforms in the area of secularism and more public-political role for religion; the League of Nation’s inclusion of Northern Iraq in the British-mandated Iraq rather than in Turkey; and the political and psychological consequences of the early Kurdish rebellions. The last factor suggests that the Kurdish question might have shaped Turkish nationalism as much as it was shaped by Turkish nationalism and modernization.

One should emphasize however, that the outcome was different than it would have been had there been no diversity within Turkish nationalism. Although the ideas and values underlying LNP were marginalized, one cannot expect them to have disappeared altogether. It is noteworthy that the Turkish political system displayed significant flexibility in allowing limited Kurdish political representation. Kurdish actors were widely represented within mainstream political parties, especially after the transition to
multiparty democracy, although they were mostly products of patronage politics and acted as local, not ethnic, deputies. Although the Turkish mainstream public-political discourse almost completely suppressed the Kurdish category, it was also largely devoid of any negative connotations vis-à-vis Kurds. Kurds who were not suspected of Kurdish nationalism and who did not accentuate their ethnicity were able to participate in socio-economic and political life with little discrimination. Many Kurds experienced significant socio-economic upward mobility benefiting from these features of Turkish nation-building. As one author put it during the 1990s, the Kurds in Turkey were both insiders and outsiders. They knew the rules of the game, as played out in their country, and the country in which the Kurds moved was Turkey, not Kurdistan.43

As a result, one cannot talk about a common experience that applied to all Turkish Kurds. Those Kurds who joined, or were suspected of having joined Kurdish rebellions, and many of their descendants, faced such treatment in the hands of the state that they developed a hardened sense of Kurdish difference and a highly skeptical image of Turks and the Turkish state. Other Kurds voluntarily associated with Turkish nationalism as an ideology of liberation and modernization. Others reluctantly assimilated into the mainstream Turkish society, to differing degrees for different individuals, in response to the state’s assimilatory policies. Yet other Kurds developed their sense of ethnic difference as a result of their geographical, educational and economic mobility during the industrialization, urbanization, and politicization of Turkish society from the 1960s on. Finally, many more Kurds experienced ethnic differentiation as a result of the oppressive practices and human rights abuses of the 1980-1983 military rule, and the environment of physical and socio-economic insecurity created by the PKK insurgency and the state’s counterinsurgency during the 1990s.

The Possibility and Desirability of LNP

For the purposes of this essay, nationalism can be defined as an ideology fostering common identities and standards of cooperation (including a common vernacular and political discourse) within a people that the ideology conceptualizes as sovereign (i.e. bearing the right to self-government), culturally differentiable, territorially defined, and a major source of political loyalty and collective solidarity.44 Liberalism can be defined as an ideology or school of thought that seeks to maximize individual and societal well-being and liberty (or autonomy) through universally applicable rights, entitlements, and the rule of law.

In their stylized forms, liberalism and nationalism are incompatible ideologies. Liberalism cherishes individual freedoms and autonomy, while nationalism treasures sacrifice for the group. Liberalism is focused on the positive-sum opportunities for international and transnational cooperation, while nationalism is focused on international competition caused by zero-sum conflicts of national interest. Liberalism highlights the liberating, developmental potentials of markets and other self-regulating social orders, while nationalism looks to nation-states for the same potential. Liberalism emphasizes the future, and the possibility and desirability of social and political progress via the voluntary actions of individuals. Nationalism
emphasizes the past, and the importance of historically created social-cultural differences and loyalties that only change slowly.

In their practical forms, however, nationalism and liberalism often complement each other. Liberal cooperation requires that people focus on their common rather than opposing interests. In practice, this means that they have sufficiently in common so that competition among them does not translate into zero-sum conflicts that end up breaking up all cooperation. Nationalism helps this by fostering a common identity, culture, and standards of cooperation within nations. The successful operation of the liberal state (for example welfare state practices) require a shared notion of justice (for example Rawls’ scheme of redistribution towards worst-off members of society) among a people “whose members acknowledge ties of solidarity”. National identities that nurture such sentiments of solidarity thus help liberal states to operate more efficiently. Furthermore, many people would argue that markets and nation-states complement each other because markets need nation-states’ crucial help in order to build and maintain the formal and informal institutions—from the judiciary to schools to welfare state practices moderating the distributional conflicts that can undermine the market system—that are crucial for their survival and equitable functioning. Like any other institutions, the creation and maintenance of these political and economic institutions need people who are willing to contribute to their creation and are willing to make a long-term commitment to their maintenance. Nationalism helps this by fostering a sense of responsibility and commitment to one’s national institutions.

Finally, liberalism needs protections against arbitrary and oppressive states, and nationalism provides an ideology as to why states need people’s approval for government, by defining nations as the bearers of sovereignty. Without liberalism, nationalism tends to produce authoritarian nation-states disrespectful of individual freedoms and autonomy. Without nationalism, liberalism tends to produce free markets coupled with benign yet weak states and political systems; these states may have little capacity to nurture a sense of popular sovereignty and to address social and political conflicts domestically, and to foster peace and cooperation internationally.

Thus, many liberals are also ‘moderate’ nationalists in the sense that, first, while analyzing the world they take the existence of national social and political institutions and identities for granted. Second, they have national identities and loyalties themselves in the sense that they are not entirely neutral toward the well-being and interests of different nations. What would liberalism devoid of any nationalism look like in order to be ethically and philosophically consistent? Liberals would have to equally value the well-being of their own national group and that of others, and would have to be equally committed to contributing to both. Similarly, they would have to value the territorial unity of their own country no more than they value that of others. In the face of these requirements, most individual and voluntary contributions to social and cultural public goods in developing and developed nations cannot be categorized as purely liberal contributions. Many philanthropists contribute to humanitarian causes in their own countries more than in countries that need it more on the basis of objective criteria, say Darfur where millions face displacement or death. Professionals who have globally mobile skills prefer to work in their own countries often because of a sense of responsibility toward contributing to the common
good in their homelands. Although these people may be seen to harbor nationalist values of some sort, many of them may also denounce the excesses that nationalist ideologies tend to promote, from notions of racial and cultural superiority to the brutal subjugation of minorities, because of their respect for human rights and freedoms. Thus, they often hold simultaneously liberal and nationalist values. In fact, because nationalism is a limited ideology with few claims regarding questions such as democracy and economic policy, people who harbor nationalist values have to rely on ideologies such as liberalism or social democracy in order to determine their beliefs on these questions.

Nevertheless, it may be impossible to define a coherent notion of liberal nationalism in a political-theoretical and philosophical sense. Notions of liberal nationalism seem too easily to justify those who argue that some nations’ nationalisms, especially those of Anglo-American nations which are most associated with liberalism, are more benign than—and thus superior to—other nations’ nationalisms. History is replete with liberals who undertook, or agreed to, the brutal subjugation of other people in the name of liberalism or civic nationalism. Thus, it is very hard for students of politics, especially normative political theorists who by nature of their discipline seek coherence within normative theories, to imagine liberalism and nationalism together. So many stylized principles of liberalism and nationalism contradict each other that liberal-nationalism seems an oxymoron. Accordingly, attempts to conceptualize versions of nationalism that are more compatible with liberalism and democracy, such as civic nationalism as opposed to ethnic nationalism, have been criticized for creating a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

If internal consistency were a prerequisite for actual actors to hold an ideology, however, few ideologies would pass the test. In practical life, people compartmentalize their lives and adhere to different ideologies in different domains. Thus, for positive theorists as well as political behavioralists, the apparent contradictions between liberalism and nationalism are less important. Furthermore, along with the ascendancy of identity politics since the 1980s and the challenges this posed to liberalism, a significant body of liberal theorists has developed liberal notions of nationalism. They have argued that liberalism can and ought to embrace some forms of nationalism in order to be able to fulfill its own ideals.

Liberal-nationalist theorists differ from their libertarian, civic-republican, and communitarian counterparts in the following important ways that are crucial for this essay. Libertarians oppose all types of nationalism as inherently exclusive and undemocratic. They also downplay the importance that national identities, and a national political-discursive space where people from different backgrounds share views and inform each other, may have for political systems. By contrast, liberal nationalists maintain that a common, national vernacular and identity, and a political discursive space shared by all ethnic-cultural groups in society, are essential for the survival and proper functioning of liberal democratic institutions.

Civic and republican nationalists surmise that liberal institutions can promote equality among individuals of different ethnic-cultural backgrounds by creating ethnicity-blind institutions that treat everybody the same regardless of their differences. Thus, they oppose minority group rights. Liberal nationalists maintain that ethnicity-blind institutions unfairly favor
the culture-language and identity of the majority in society and tilt the balance of opportunities in the majority’s favor. They maintain that people can legitimately value the maintenance of a minority culture-language that may be essential to their ability to make meaningful individual choices. Thus, they assert that the liberal goal of equality may require the institution of minority rights or entitlements.

Finally, liberal nationalists differ from communitarians by highlighting that individuals should have choice in determining their group belongings. Communitarians view group identities as given at birth and value groups’ ability to restrict the choices of their individual members for the survival of the group identity and culture. By contrast, liberal nationalists uphold individual members’ ability to “exit,” i.e., disavow their identity or distribute their loyalties among different groups by cultivating multiple and conglomerate identities, as essential to individual freedoms and autonomy.

Liberal nationalism also differs from conservative versions of nationalism in many ways, most importantly for our purposes with respect to its definition of national identities. Conservative nationalists tend to tie national identities with religion, tradition, and traditional sources of power. Liberal nationalists argue that the contents of these identities can change (e.g. to reflect a more pluralistic society) through inclusive processes of deliberation.

The forces of globalization increase the importance of liberal notions of nationalism in two senses, especially for developing nations. First, it is rarely realized that a major effect of globalization on developing countries is that the human and financial resources in these countries become internationally mobile. The primary beneficiaries are people, mostly elites, whose skills and resources are internationally mobile. As Miller argues, these elites can nurture cosmopolitan identities picking from a global “supermarket of identities and cultures.” However, what then happens to those “who for one reason or another are less well equipped to take advantage of the opportunities of the giant supermarket? Who has the responsibility to provide for them?” i.e. if sentiments of national solidarity are absent on the part of the elite. Developing countries are especially vulnerable to the flight of local human and financial capital that is much needed for national development. Liberal nationalism is an ideology that justifies the voluntary employment of these resources for national developmental needs without necessarily undermining the global economic order. Second, globalization tends to weaken nation-states from above and below. While strengthening supranational as well as transnational institutions and identities (especially but not exclusively for people with internationally mobile skills and opportunities), it may promote micro nationalisms among minorities. Liberal nationalism offers a way to minimize the conflict-prone and disintegrating impact of micro nationalisms by accommodating them via minority rights, short of the right to secession.

In light of the above discussion, we can now offer more refined definitions of DNP and LNP in the Turkish context. For the majority society, both of these perspectives can be described as nationalist in the sense of their shared sensitivity to the maintenance of a cross-ethnic national identity and common political culture, and to the perceived interests and unity of the Turkish nation-state. However, they differ as to how these can and ought to be pursued.
homogeneity (and to a lesser extent, religious homogeneity in a cultural, identity-related sense) is the insurance for state survival and for social cohesion and political-territorial unity. In addition to the peculiar historical context in which it emerged, DNP acquired its diversity-phobic values from an uneasy combination of two ideologies, civic nationalism promoting ethnicity-blind institutions and ethnic nationalism favoring Turkish ethnicity and culture.

By contrast, the majority’s LNP would acknowledge that ethnic-cultural peculiarities may be legitimate objects of loyalty in a context of national unity. The state’s allowing, or even institutionalizing, more freedom of expression for these particularities may be a better way to serve national interests and to strengthen national unity. This is because it would induce voluntary participation especially by people who had been marginalized or alienated by state- and nation-building. First, these people would have less reason to seek secession when their special cultural-linguistic needs are accommodated. Second, they would be encouraged to voluntarily associate themselves with the national polity and/or identity when their autonomy to make such choices is recognized and respected. Thus, LNP may be better insurance for state survival. During the last decades, LNP have also been influenced by liberal-nationalist ideas that posit that individual autonomy and life choices can be enriched by promoting diversity.

In a nutshell, the majority’s DNP are diversity-phobic and have an uneasy relationship with pluralistic democracy, while the LNP tend to be more tolerant and supportive of diversity and more compatible with pluralistic democracy.

The minorities’ DNP and LNP are also nationalist perspectives as defined above. A common claim in the writings of Kurdish nationalists is that Turkish Kurds constitute a sovereign nation of their own; however, different actors seem to have different ideas as to the nature of this sovereignty and differ on how Kurds should exercise it.54 A major distinction is between actors favoring violent and nonviolent means. However, even ‘moderate’ actors argue that violence is legitimately used against the state under certain conditions.55 The minority’s DNP are based in a communitarian and often essentialist conception of nationhood. They imply suspicion toward diversity and multiple identities within the minority group and disdain group members who choose to associate themselves with the majority identity. In addition, they imply distrust in the majority political system and disbelief that the minority’s cultural and other interests can be served by working within that system. In the view of DNP, minority political actors who cooperate with the majority political actors are traitors who undermine the group cause. In return, the minority’s LNP imply that minority interests can be served by cooperating with majority political actors who are willing to accommodate the minority’s demands in a context of liberal democracy. It also implies recognition of diversity within the minority group and acceptance toward group members who choose to associate themselves with the majority identity.

Note that I use the term liberal in reference to attitudes toward ethnic-cultural diversity and freedom of expression, that is, the extent to which one recognizes and welcomes diversity (rather than seeks homogeneity) and other individuals’ autonomy in choosing and expressing their group identities. Liberal-nationalist views in the sense used here (and, for that
matter, defensive-nationalist views) are found among center-right as well as social-democratic actors. Also note that the distinction between defensive- and liberal-nationalist perspectives is one between sets of beliefs and values, not necessarily one between actors. Distinctions between liberal-nationalist and defensive-nationalist actors can be misleading because they may overlook the potential diversity of beliefs and values within each of these actors. Thus, they may overlook the ideological sources of change within each actor. For example, it is possible that individuals are aware of one perspective and feel some affinity for it, although their political preferences and behavior are predominantly shaped by another perspective. Actors’ behaviors may also be context-dependent: for example, in a political context, a person’s behavior may reflect a defensive-nationalist perspective, while the same person’s behavior may seem to reflect a liberal-nationalist perspective in a social context. This context-dependence may explain the seemingly paradoxical observation that although Turkish politics has been predominantly shaped by authoritarian attitudes toward difference, social life in an everyday sense has continued to reflect many attitudes that are relatively flexible and tolerant, if not liberal, towards diversity. Finally, it is possible for people to sympathize with the liberal-nationalist perspective without expressing it in public-political settings.56

Important policy implications follow from distinguishing between different types of nationalisms, and from recognizing the possibility of actors who embrace the Turkish national identity and the basic premises of Turkish nationalism but who also embrace ethnic-cultural diversity and liberal democracy. For example, the assumption that Turkish nationalism per se is a direct cause of the Kurdish question leads many analysts to propose policies that follow this causal analysis. One such proposal is for state institutions to adopt a new and ethnicity-neutral identity, such as Türkiyellilik (meaning from Turkey), through changes in the constitution. 57 Insofar as the assumption that Turkish nationalism is a direct cause of the Kurdish question is incorrect, however, this proposal may either be unnecessary or fail to produce the desired results.58

Discussions of liberal nationalism can also complement citizenship-based reform projects by highlighting the role that national identities play in liberal democracies. 59 Reforms emphasizing citizenship-based strategies can help to resolve the Kurdish question without embarking on new forms of identity construction. They can do so by developing rights and practices that people from different backgrounds would experience as citizens, which would address their common as well as different socioeconomic and expressive needs. They can also have positive spillover effects on national identity, because common experiences of citizenship would also strengthen people’s sense of belonging to the same group. However, would such spillover effects suffice to sustain a sufficiently strong national identity and shared political-discursive space? Some identity-based challenges challenging the Turkish democracy, such as Kurdish DNP, are not merely demanding to change the rules of the Turkish polity. They are also challenging its very existence. A purely citizenship-based strategy which underestimates the importance of unifying values and national identities for the functioning of liberal democracies, which liberal nationalism emphasizes, may fail to meet these centrifugal challenges.
Current Mainstream-Discursive Dynamics

The potential emergence of LNP requires among other conditions intellectual debates that would resolve the apparent contradictions between liberal-democratic policies and national integrity and interest. Social-intellectual debates on human and minority rights, national interest, democracy, and the Kurdish issue have accelerated since the 1990s, but especially after 1999 when the PKK leader Öcalan was sentenced to jail for life and the EU declared Turkey a candidate for full membership. These debates are necessary for liberal-democratic change, although they cannot by themselves bring about ideological shifts.

As argued, the three vocal sides of these debates have been the Turkish DNP, which has often been called a new wave of nationalism and which has adopted an EU-skeptical tone, the LP, and the Kurdish DNP, leaving out potential LNP. The Kurdish DNP largely evolve in separation from the Turkish mainstream social-political discourse and requires separate treatment. Thus, my following discussion will focus on Turkish DNP and LP, as reflected by the Turkish mainstream discourse.60

A detailed content analysis of the mainstream-nationalist Turkish daily Hürriyet supports the thesis that since 1999 the mainstream discourse has been undergoing a transformation that prepares a basis for LNP. The analysis covers all issues of Hürriyet from 1984 through 2003. All articles that were fully or partially related to the Kurdish question were identified and their contents were analyzed with respect to their subject matter and the terms and group categories they used to describe people, places and events. The data on 1984-1998 come from another article by the author.61 Table 1 and Figure 1 compare the period of 2000-2004 to the period of 1984-1998. Pending the results of content analyses covering more media sources, these results, although they come from an unlikely case of a nationalist newspaper, suggest a considerable shift within the mainstream discourse. Non-security (social and identity- and human rights-related) aspects of the Kurdish issue have become considerably more visible.

This data merely suggests, of course, that issues of minority and human rights are being reported on and discussed. It does not show in which ways they are discussed, in a qualitative sense. Examining some of the books contributing to the debates reveals, however, that they address a number of important questions regarding the causal connections between diversity and national unity.62 In particular, these contributions reveal attempts to reevaluate Turkey’s history of state- and nation-building with a view to identify, and problematize, the political and ideological roots of its diversity-phobic values. Most of these contributions are also intended to appeal to a large societal audience beyond narrow academic and intellectual circles. The debates take place between two increasingly vocal and organized sides: those who reinterpret the history of nation-building in ways that criticize the dominant (DNP) narratives and those who seek new ways of justifying the dominant narratives. These debates are more than battles between competing records of historical evidence. They represent efforts to reinterpret history in a way that can justify the formation of less (or more) diversity-phobic nationalist values: they prepare the intellectual background for potential political and ideological shifts in the future.
Many of these contributions reflect an implicit Turkish LNP vis-à-vis the Kurdish question, although they would not necessarily be labeled as such by their authors and readers. Thus, these attempts do not yet amount to the formulation of LNP, and would benefit from more broad-based participation by, and appeal to, the public.

**Political-Economic Prospects and Policy Implications**

If DNP monopolize the political articulation of the current ethnic differentiation that the Turkish society is going through, radical polarization can result whereby people begin to see each other not only as different but as threatening. LNP can play a role in averting this outcome, if current social and intellectual debates can produce less diversity-phobic mainstream beliefs. However, a number of internal and external political-economic processes will determine whether or not such perspectives can emerge and be translated into viable social and political projects.

Turkish and Kurdish DNP reinforce each other. Similarly, Turkish and Kurdish LNP would reinforce each other. Moreover, majority LNP would not be sustainable, in the sense of drawing critical popular support, unless they are supported by minority LNP, and vice versa. This is because the credibility of LNP is inevitably undermined if either the majority or minority political-discursive space is dominated by DNP. Minority LNP promise that the primary interests of the minority can successfully be pursued by abandoning claims to external sovereignty, working within the majority political system, and allowing internal diversity. This promise cannot be credible in the eyes of the minority members if the majority political-discursive space is dominated by DNP, which oppose these demands.

For the majority society, LNP maintain that diversity and its political expressions by the minorities are not inimical to social and political integrity. This premise cannot be credible in the eyes of the majority members if the main minority is dominated by DNP, which reject the legitimacy of the majority political system. Thus, any political efforts to generate alternatives from LNP require simultaneous collaboration on the part of the majority and minority societies. This condition of simultaneity is a major challenge for the emergence of LNP, and is summarized by Figure 2.

One object of cooperation among moderate actors may be to reduce or to lift the national electoral threshold, which requires a party to win a minimum of ten percent of national votes in order to enter Parliament. This threshold has prevented explicitly Kurdish parties from entering Parliament, building strong ties with their constituency independently from the PKK support, and fully embracing legal politics. In return, Kurdish parties should make a commitment to non-violence and the other principles of liberal democracy, and develop Kurdish LNP. A related challenge is the ability of liberal-nationalist actors (both Turkish and Kurdish) to differentiate themselves from other actors (in the case of Kurds, especially from the PKK but also from any pan-Kurdish nationalist actors), and to create trust among themselves.

Knowing the condition of simultaneity, defensive nationalists have an incentive to undermine the emergence of LNP among Kurds and within the
majority society. In this respect, their incentives conflict with that of the Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurds need Turkey’s support in order to be able to maintain and extend their current autonomy. They thus have an incentive not to pursue pan-Kurdish nationalism. Nevertheless, it is possible that Iraqi Kurdish politics will become more pan-Kurdist and anti-Turkish in the future. In this case, the credibility and sustainability of LNP would be undermined in Turkey. Similarly, DNP in Turkey undermine the possibility of cooperation between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds because, from the point of view of DNP, the more Turkey recognizes Iraqi Kurds the more it would encourage separatist Turkish Kurds. Finally, the prospects for cooperation between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds critically depend on the US support and political skills to mediate the two sides’ fundamental interests and concerns. The US’ inability to take decisive action against pan-Kurdism in general, and the PKK presence in Iraq in particular, is likely to strengthen DNP in Turkey, while undermining cooperation between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds and stability in the region. This relationship between the Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish relations and the dominant nationalist perspectives in Turkey is illustrated in Figure 3.

In general, the emergence of LNP Turkey’s EU-integration should also be seen as mutually reinforcing processes. EU membership does not eliminate nationalism in member or candidate countries; in fact, it reinforces nationalism by raising concerns about losing sovereignty to a supranational entity and by creating incentives to mobilize in order to promote national interests within the EU institutions. However, EU integration should modify nationalism. Although there is no single set of agreed upon standards on minority rights within the EU, it is clear that minority issues are expected to be resolved by using the means of liberal democracy. Thus, mainstream Turkish political actors as well as Kurdish political actors who want to maintain Turkey’s EU integration will have to develop LNP toward the Kurdish question and other minority issues.

EU actors who are in favor of Turkey’s membership and who are interested in the stability of the Union’s southeastern flank have much to gain from supporting the emergence of Turkish and Kurdish LNP. However, the EU’s ability to do so will depend on the EU’s own stability, the continuation of its political will to incorporate Turkey, and the EU elites’ ability to explain to the European public why Turkey’s membership would benefit them. It will also depend on the EU’s ability to differentiate between actors promoting LNP and DNP in Turkey. The EU’s support of Kurdish political actors who fail to denounce DNP and to separate themselves from the PKK is likely to reinforce the Turkish DNP and to induce further political polarization. Finally, it should be stressed that Turkey has to complete its democratic consolidation vis-à-vis the Kurdish question for the sake of its own development and unity, even if it does not become a member of the EU.

Those segments of Turkish society who favor political and economic integration with the world, especially with advanced western democracies, constitute the major potential political constituency for LNP. The continuing weakness of Kurdish political-economic actors who fall into this category, along with the weakness of Kurdish civil society organizations, is a factor weakening the prospects for LNP.65 Turkish Kurds who are well-integrated with the majority society but who seek respect for their ethnic background,
and Kurds who are socially and politically marginalized but who believe that their political and economic interests are better served by being part of a politically and economically developed Turkey, form parts of the potential constituencies of all LNP in Turkey.

Notes

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2. This question can be extended into the 19th century Ottoman-Turkish modernization.

3. I use the term “Turkish” in the sense of a national identity (and citizenship) which can have different meanings for different people, and which can be embraced by people with different ethnic backgrounds. “Turkish” in this sense includes people with single as well as plural ethnic-national identities, such as people who consider themselves primarily ethnic or cultural Turks, people who consider themselves primarily Turkish nationals or citizens, Turkish Muslims, or Alevi Turks while maintaining non-Turkish ethnic identities, and people who view themselves as Türkiyeli, which means “from Turkey.” In the Turkish language, the term Türk has multiple meanings, depending on the context in which it is used. It can denote an ethnic identity as in someone who descends from a Turkic ethnic group, a territorial-national identity as in a native or inhabitant of Turkey, a linguistic-cultural identity as in a Muslim whose mother tongue is Turkish, or just citizenship. Historically, it was used by insiders and outsiders to denote an ethnic-linguistic category, as well as to denote a religious and political-territorial category to cover all Ottoman Muslims. During Turkish nation-building the meaning of the term was reinvented and expanded to denote a nation, nationality and citizenship, without losing its usage as an ethnic-linguistic category. Although confusing, such multiple perceptions are a common trait of ethnic-national categories from Iran to France to Spain. They reflect the diverse and overlapping layers of identities in these large and heterogeneous societies, especially those which were epicenters of empires before experiencing territorial contraction.


6. Murat Somer, “Defensive vs. Liberal-Nationalist Perspectives on Diversity and the Kurdish Conflict: Europeanization, the Internal Debate, and Türkiyelilik,” New Perspectives on Turkey 32, (2005): 73-91, see 30. While popular books such as Hasan Cemal, Kürtler (The Kurds), (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), and Mustafa Akyol, Kürt Sorunu Yeniden Đışânmek (To Rethink the Kurdish Question), (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006) reflect elaborate attempts to reevaluate the Kurdish conflict from new perspectives that are sensitive to Kurdish concerns, many others take on an increasingly skeptical and often vulgar perspective.

7. Throughout this essay, I use the term minority in a purely numerical-demographic sense, not necessarily as a legal or political status and category. Note that Turkish individuals can simultaneously be part of the majority (via self-identifying as Turkish nationals and via socioeconomic integration with the majority society) and the minority (via their ethnic-linguistic self-perception).


9. Among others, Rafet Balli, Kürt Dosyası (Kurdish File), (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1991); Mustafa Remzi Bucak, Bir Kürt Aydınadan Ismet İnönü‘ye Mektup (Letter from a Kurdish Intellectual to İsmet İnönü), (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1991); Ali M. Birand, Apo ve PKK (Öcalan and the PKK), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1992); Oral Çalışlar, Öcalan ve Burkay’la Kürt Sorunu (The Kurdish Problem with Öcalan and Burkay), (İstanbul: Pencere Yayınları, 1993); Musa Anter, Hatalarım 1-2 (My Memoirs 1-2), (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 1999); Kemal Burkay, Anlar, Belgeler (Memories, Documents), (İstanbul: Deng Yayınları, 2002 2nd ed); Ferzende Kaya, Mesopotamia Sürgünü: Abdüllümelik Firat’ın Yaşamöyküsü (The Mesopotamia Exile: Abdüllümelik Firat’s Biography), (İstanbul: Alfa, 2005).

10. For an elaboration, see Somer, “Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict,” 23-50.

11. While liberal democracy is the norm within the EU which Turkey is seeking to join, there is no single criteria or set of practices as to how liberal democracies ought to protect minority interests, within the EU and in general.


13. Note that both DNP and LNP are defined as plural: neither forms a monolithic set and neither was expressed as the ideology of a particular group. The choice of the term “defensive” nationalism as opposed to “offensive” nationalism is not intended to convey any normative judgment or justification.

14. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, (New York: Routledge, 1993); Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4 [Turkish Modernization, Essays 4], (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayını, 1991); Mustafa Remzi Bucak, Kürt Sorunu Yeniden Đışänmek (To Rethink the Kurdish Question), (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006).

15. Insofar as ethnic differentiation and polarization have occurred, these (Turkish and Kurdish) spaces can be seen to be separate. Currently, one can only talk about a partial separation, because the majority of Kurds also participates in the Turkish discourse.

16. The desirability of the institution of cultural rights is problematic within liberalism because the absolutist discourse of rights tends to create zero-sum rivalries among different rights and between the holders of different rights. Hence, the recognition of diversity may be achieved through other means, such as temporary entitlements or affirmative policies. For a review, see Ronald Beiner, Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, (Vancouver: The UCB Press, 2003), 150-151.

17. Zühtü Arslan, “Türkiye’de Liberal Düşünçenin Önündeki Engeller,” (The Obstacles before the Liberal Thought in Turkey), in Liberalizm (Liberalism), ed., Murat Yılmaz. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003); Mustafa Ergőn, “Liberalizm ve Türkiye’deki Serüveni,” (Liberalism and Its Adventure in Turkey), in Liberalizm (Liberalism), ed., Murat Yılmaz, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005); Yılmaz, ed., Liberalizm (Liberalism), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005).

18. For two examples, see Taha Parla, “İrkçılıktan Mahalleciğe, Mahalleciğten Milliyetciliğe” (From Racism to Parochialism, from Parochialism to Nationalism), Radikal 2, May 22, 2005 and Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Milliyetçiğin Ýyisi Var mı?” (Is There Any Good Nationalism?), Radikal 2, June 30, 2005.


23. The path of joining Turkish nationalist elites was open to Kurdish elites adopting Turkish nationalism and language. Some prominent Turkish nationalists such as Ziya Gökalp and Abdullah Cevdet were of Kurdish background, and many Kurdish members of the first Parliament also harbored strong Turkish and Ottoman identities. Among others, see TBMM, TBMM Gizli Celse Kayıtları 1920-1934, Cilt 1-4, (Turkish Grand National Assembly Classified Records, 1920-1934, Vols. 1-4 (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayıncılık, 1985 [1920-1934]), see Vol. 4: 162-163.

24. The land ownership structure in the Southeast is considerably less equal than in the rest of Turkey. This should not be seen as a necessary condition
explaining the economic underdevelopment or ethnonationalist mobilization in the region. See Servet Mutlu, Doğu Sorunun Kökenleri: Ekonomik Açdan [The Roots of Eastern Question: From An Economic Perspective], (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2002), for a detailed discussion. However, the landless increase the numbers of the young and disgruntled population, which adds to the potential ground for ethnonationalist mobilization.

25. For a related commentary, see Mesut Yeğen, “Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler,” (The Republic and Kurds), Radikal, December 5, 2004.


28. 1920 is the year nationalists assembled the Great National Assembly (BMM); 1925 is the year Sheikh Said rebellion took place, which hardliner nationalists used to pacify the “liberal wing.” See Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 58-59).

29. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey; Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi; Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis te Muhalefet: İkinci Grup (The Opposition in the First Assembly: the Second Group), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994) and Ahmet Demirel, “Millî Mücadele Döneminde Birinci Meclis’teki Liberal Fikirler ve Tartışmalar,” (Liberal Ideas and Discussions in the First Assembly during the Period of National Struggle), in Liberalizm (Liberalism), ed., Murat Yılmaz, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005); Erik Jan Zürcher, Savaş, Devrim ve Ulaşallaşma [War, Revolution and Nation-Building], (İstanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005) and Zürcher, ed. Türkiye’de Etnik Çatışma [Ethnic Conflict in Turkey], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005).

30. Among others, Kıriçi and Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey; Doğu Perinçek, Kurtuluş Savaşında Kürt Politikası (The Policy on Kurds during the War of Independence), (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999); Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk’ten Sıçrade Vatandaşı.


32. TBMM, TBMM Gizli Celse Kayıtları 1985 [1920-1934]. For apparent exceptions outside the Parliament, for example the term “kardeş milletler” (sister nations) see, Atatürk 1945 [1919-1938]: 28.

33. The main ‘rival other,’ which was excluded from this emerging conception of ‘us’ was the non-Muslim minorities, mainly the Greeks and the Armenians, who were seen as allies of the occupying powers. See Ayhan Aktar (2000) for an elaboration.

34. Karabekir, Kürt Meselesi.

35. Uğur Mumcu (1994); Mutlu, Doğu Sorunun Kökenleri.; Bruinessen, Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet. There is also scholarly disagreement on how much the new government’s plans prior to 1925 foresaw emphasizing the Turkish language, culture and ethnicity and suppressing the Kurdish language, culture and ethnicity.


38. Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Süyleminde Kürt Sorunu [The Kurdish Problem in the State Discourse], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999). Also see BMM Gizli Celse Kayıtları 1920-1934, Vol. 11: 93.

39. For example, TBMM, TBMM Gizli Celse Kayıtları 1920-1934, Vol. 12: 73, 86, 94-95, 1153; İğdemir, 1975: 65. It is not clear what the speakers meant by
'blood' in these statements, because Kurds were also recognized as an ethnic-cultural group distinct from Turks. It may be a reference to common nationhood (e.g., the term race was often used then to denote nation), the cultural proximity or mixing between Turks and Kurds, or to their historical coexistence.

40. Kazım Karabekir, Kürt Meselesi [The Kurdish Problem], (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2004).

41. Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet, and Demirel, “Milli Mücadele Döneminde.”

42. Bucak, Bir Kürt Aydınandan; Cemal, Kürtler; Kaya, Mesopotamia Sürgünü.


44. Note that while defining nationalism as an ideology as opposed to a sentiment or collective action, I do not define it as a strictly political ideology that claims that the borders of the nation must be coterminous with the state. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), and Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), for alternative definitions. The broader definition here allows for nationalism to continue as an ideology of patriotism, i.e. political loyalty and collective solidarity, even after the group achieves its goal of making the borders of the nation coterminous with that of the state by founding a nation-state. This definition also allows for nationalist ideologies which, while retaining the claim to the right of self-government, do not seek a separate nation state M. Keating, “Stateless Nation-building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System,” Nations and Nationalism 3, no. 4 (1997): 689-717. Also note that unlike other definitions, the definition here does not imply that nationalism requires one nation to be the supreme source of loyalty, as opposed to, say, one’s family, religion, ideologies such as socialism, and other national loyalties for people with multiple loyalties. In some contexts, however, nationalism may require people to choose between two national loyalties. For related and alternative definitions, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).  


46. See, among others, Greenfeld, Nationalism, for the relation between the emergence of nationalism and democratic regimes.

47. Note that such ethical dilemmas cannot be resolved by appealing to purely rational and universalist ethical principles. For example, one may find rational reasons as to why we should focus on giving charity to one national group rather than to all nations, but it is much harder to justify rationally why we choose a particular national group. Which nation we focus on is often determined by national sentiments and senses of belonging. See Miller, On Nationality, Ch. 3 for an extended discussion of this point.

48. See Beiner, Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, for a review.


50. This applies both to people who are born into that cultural group and value the security of belonging to that group, and those who are not born into a minority group but who believe that diversity in their environment enables them to become aware of different possibilities and choices in life.

51. There are important reasons not to conceptualize these as rights. See footnote 11.

52. Miller, On Nationality, 178.
53. Somer, “Defensive vs. Liberal-Nationalist Perspectives on Diversity and the Kurdish Conflict.”
55. E.g. the views of Kemal Burkay. Çalışlar, *Öcalan ve Burkay*, 113-115, 119-120. The major actor favoring violent means has been the PKK.
56. See Somer, “Resurgence and Remaking of Identity”, for an elaboration.
57. Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar* [Minorities in Turkey], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004).
58. This is not to say that the strengthening of a common Türkiye identity cannot be beneficial for social-political peace and harmony in itself.
60. The term mainstream is intended to mean here the “generally acceptable social-political discourse, denoting the way people openly write and talk when they cannot control their audience, i.e., in the presence of people they do not necessarily know and trust.” As such, the mainstream discourse covers the discourse used by the mainstream media, politicians, state actors, and any other actors whenever these actors know that they are unable control who will be in their audience and thus feel compelled to be socially and politically correct. See Somer, “Resurgence and Remaking of Identity” and Somer, “Defensive vs. Liberal-Nationalist Perspectives on Diversity and the Kurdish Conflict,” for a more detailed discussion and for how the mainstream discourse is partially separate from the state discourse. Sometimes, the state discourse may overlap with the mainstream discourse, but it is maintained that the two are different and are affected by partially separate dynamics.
61. Somer, “Resurgence and Remaking of Identity”.
62. Somer, “Defensive vs. Liberal-Nationalist Perspectives on Diversity and the Kurdish Conflict.”
63. For example, Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler*.
64. For a recent commentary, see E. Fuat Keyman, “AK Parti’nin Kürt Sorununun Keşifte Danışma” [The Kurdish Problem and Democratization], *Radikal* 2, August 7, 2005.
65. For the need to strengthen civil society organizations among Kurds, see Keyman, 2005.

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Zürcher, Erik Jan. *Savaş, Devrim ve Ulusallama* [War, Revolution and Nation-Building]. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005.
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<th>Period</th>
<th>Monthly Average of Articles</th>
<th>Share of All Articles Using the Word Kurd</th>
<th>Share of Non-Security Articles within All Articles</th>
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Figure Error! Main Document Only. Interest in the non-Security Aspects of the Kurdish Question and the Daily Hürriyet, 1984-2003.
Table showing the interaction between DNP and LNP in the minority political space dominated by DNP and LNP. The table indicates the dominance and control over both aspects in different scenarios.

**Figure 2.** LNP as Focal Points and the Necessity of Simultaneity.
Turkey-Iraqi Kurdish Relations

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<th>Perspective</th>
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<th>Cooperative</th>
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<td>DNP dominant in Turkey</td>
<td>Cooperation with Iraqis unsustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>LNP in Turkey unsustainable</td>
<td>LNP in Turkey sustainable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.** Turkey – Iraqi Kurdish relations and the Dominant Perspective in Turkey